


THE WHITE HOUSE PAPERS
VOLUME I



THE WHITE HOUSE PAPERS

of

Harry L. Hopkins

An intimate history by

ROBERT E. SHERWOOD

VOLUME I

SEPTEMBER 1939—JANUARY 1942

EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE
LONDON

First published 1948

Reprinted 1949

Reprinted 1950

*This book is produced in full conformity
with the Authorized Economy Standards
and is made and printed in Great Britain
for Eyre & Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd.,
15 Bedford Street, London, W.C.2, by The
Stanhope Press Ltd., Rochester*

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PREFACE

IMMEDIATELY after Franklin D. Roosevelt's death virtually everyone who was in any way associated with him received offers from editors and publishers to write memoirs—and it is by now a matter of record that most of these offers were accepted. I doubt that there have ever been so many books written so soon about the life and times of any one man.

I myself had no intention of adding to the burden on the library shelves. I had some wonderful ineradicable memories and an unorganised assortment of notes from the years 1940–1945, and I intended to put these down in more or less haphazard form to be contributed to the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and filed there for whatever use future biographers might be able to make of them, for I knew how much of our knowledge of Abraham Lincoln has depended on chance bits of recollection written down by comparatively unimportant contemporaries.

I knew that Harry Hopkins was planning to write a book—indeed, he had talked to me about it some months before Roosevelt's death and had begun at that time to make arrangements with publishers. When I saw him occasionally during the summer and fall of 1945 he talked as if he were making progress with the book, and I eagerly awaited its publication. I did not know at that time, but have learned subsequently, that he hoped to have the benefit of aid in the writing from his friend, Raymond Gram Swing. In November I saw Hopkins for the last time, and went to Hollywood to work for Samuel Goldwyn on a movie, 'The Best Years of Our Lives'. (This title referred hopefully to the future as opposed to the past.) I was there in the Goldwyn Studio when David Hopkins telephoned me the news of his father's death, and a week or so thereafter Louise Hopkins telephoned from New York to ask me if I would consider finishing the work on the book. I said I would do anything I could for Harry's memory, but I had no conception of what the task would involve. I knew that this book was to be limited to the war years—and that was the one period when I had close associations with Roosevelt and Hopkins—but I did not know what form the book was taking, nor how far Hopkins had got with it, nor how much of his writing was based on memory and how much on documentation. It was obvious that I could not attempt to perpetrate a fake by carrying on the book as though it had all been done by Hopkins; but it occurred to me that I might have to start off with the lame admission: 'At this point Hopkins died, so the rest of his story can be no more than a series of fragments.'

When I finished the Hollywood job and returned to New York some weeks later I discovered that Hopkins had not written so much as the words 'Chapter One', but that the documentation was enormous. There were some forty filing cabinets packed with papers in the Hopkins house, and a great many more in a warehouse, the latter being records of the New Deal years which I have never seen. Fortunately Hopkins had engaged an assistant, Sidney Hyman, who had been working for eight months putting the papers into order in folders marked 'Casablanca Conference', 'Aid for Russia—1943', etc., so that, in the months that it took me merely to read them I could proceed chronologically and begin to get a sense of narrative. I could also begin to see where the holes were in the record and what parts of it were obscure or confusing to me, and I decided that I must do some interviewing in an effort to gain fuller information and clarification. This led to a considerable amount of travelling and correspondence, and the work, which I at first estimated might take as much as a year to complete, has gone on for two and a half years with very little respite, morning, noon, or night.

The first reading of the papers was an exciting experience for me, and I must confess that this sense of excitement has continued through all the labour involved. For I found here so many answers to so many questions that had been piling up in my mind when I was near to high authority; I found solution of much that I had wondered about in my observation of the moods as well as the words and deeds of Roosevelt and Hopkins. I meant at first to try to write the book completely impersonally, but more and more I came to realise that I could not keep out of it my own recollections—those that I had intended to put down some day in haphazard form—and many more that were revived by the reading of these papers; and, of course, the recollections of others to whom I talked began to merge with my own.

It seemed that I should write the book as a biography of Hopkins in the war years, preceding it with a prefatory sketch of his career, including the New Deal, before he became directly involved in major world events. I could not write with any intimate personal knowledge of the years before 1940, but I went much more deeply into his career than I had intended mainly through my own curiosity to know how any man so obscure in origin and so untrained for great responsibility could have come to the extraordinary position that he held. One thing that impressed me deeply was the realization of the extent to which the New Deal conditioned Roosevelt and Hopkins and indeed the American people as a whole for the gigantic efforts demanded of them in global war. Spiritual preparedness for coping with powerful evil was required before it began to occur to people that some tanks and bombers and aircraft carriers might also be helpful. For Hopkins in particular the New Deal provided ideal training in combat conditions,

for his life then was a series of ferocious battles against widespread misery, natural disasters, local politicians, other Government agencies and the innumerable critics in the Congress and the Press who kept his free-spending programme constantly under fire. Fortunately for me, he kept voluminous scrap-books—or his various secretaries kept them for him—of Press clippings about himself, starting with the day of his first arrival in Washington. Those volumes certainly teem with vilification which was maintained steadily for twelve years, and some of it hit Hopkins much harder and hurt him much more than he cared to admit. But it can be said that he never lost his conviction that freedom to make such attacks on him or anyone else provides the red corpuscles which carry the oxygen through the very life blood of democracy; he indicated the depth of this conviction in words that he wrote (on the subject of future relations with Russia) near the end of his life.

Looking backward, as I have been compelled to do so constantly throughout this work, it seems to me that the hostility of so large a part of the Press to the Roosevelt Administration was essential to Roosevelt himself—as an inspiration even more than as a deterrent—and that he would not have been the President he was without it. He would never have thrived in an atmosphere of cloying unanimity.

Of all the attacks upon Hopkins the one that probably angered and amazed him most was the fantastic charge that, in the fall of 1943, he had plotted behind the scenes in the White House to have his friend General George C. Marshall removed from his position as Chief of Staff and 'kicked upstairs' to some sinecure command in Europe. I became very interested in this, for the Hopkins papers provided considerable evidences of the influences brought to bear on the President, but no indication as to why, at the second Cairo Conference, Roosevelt suddenly announced that Eisenhower instead of Marshall would be the Supreme Commander of OVERLORD (the major invasion of Europe—and no sinecure). I attempted to find out what was the determining factor in this tremendous decision. I went to Washington and talked to Admiral Ernest J. King. He gave me his recollection in very precise terms (he gave me a great deal more invaluable information and guidance in the preparation of this book). I talked to Laurence Steinhardt, John J. McCloy, and Lewis Douglas, all of whom had been present at Cairo, and to Averell Harriman and Charles E. Bohlen who had been at the immediately preceding Teheran Conference. I received General 'Hap' Arnold's version by letter. I went to London and saw Winston Churchill, who sent me fourteen typewritten pages of answers to a questionnaire I submitted to him, and whom I interviewed on three subsequent occasions. I talked to Churchill's Chief of Staff, General Sir Hastings Ismay (later Lord Ismay) and to Anthony Eden, Brendan Bracken, and many other associates of

Churchill's. I talked a great deal about this and many more subjects with John G. Winant. Later I asked Henry L. Stimson, Admiral Leahy and General Eisenhower for their versions of the background of the OVERLORD command decision, and I finally obtained General Marshall's after he returned from China early in 1947 to render further distinguished service to his country as Secretary of State.

The versions of this one story that I obtained all varied from each other, although they were by no means mutually exclusive, and I came out of this investigation as I came out of others with the knowledge that no one will ever know just what finally went on in Roosevelt's complex mind to determine his decision.

Shortly after I had started work on this book President Truman most kindly wrote me a letter expressing his satisfaction that 'the papers of that valiant servant of the public, the late Harry L. Hopkins' were to be prepared for publication. The President added, 'If I can be of assistance please do not hesitate to call upon me. I hope also you will receive the fullest co-operation of all whom you approach in the performance of this great trust.' Later I had a talk with the President about his own associations with Hopkins which had gone back to the very beginnings of the Relief Programme in 1933. Neither the President nor any other official of the United States Government ever told me either directly or indirectly what I should say or not say, nor made any requests or suggestions for the suppression or soft pedalling of any of the material included herein. I voluntarily submitted the complete manuscript to the Department of Defence in Washington for clearance solely on the ground of military security, and I must express my appreciation to Secretary James Forrestal and his Aide, Captain Robert W. Berry, U.S.N., for the co-operation I received. No requests for omissions were made, but I was asked to paraphrase a considerable number of the cables since publication of the literal text might compromise codes. I also sent the manuscript to the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I am most grateful to Captain T. B. Kittredge, U.S.N., and his associates for many helpful suggestions and corrections on points of fact and of interpretation. I have also had the benefit of great aid from Miss Grace Tully, Frank C. Walker, Samuel I. Rosenman, Aubrey Williams, and Commander C. R. Thompson in reading and checking the manuscript, or parts thereof, but this certainly does not involve any of them in responsibility for the whole. .

One afternoon and evening in Washington Leon Henderson was good enough to arrange a meeting for me at his house which lasted for some eight hours. Present were: Robert Kerr, who had been a very close friend of Hopkins since their days together at Grinnell College; Miss Jane Hoey and Mrs. Frances Kelley, who had been associated with Hopkins when he first went into social welfare work in New York City and continued with him

throughout the New Deal years; Aubrey Williams, Isador Lubin, Miss Ellen Woodward, Howard Hunter, Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur E. Goldschmidt and Henderson, all of whom were associated with the Relief Programme. Copious notes were taken at this meeting by Sidney Hyman and my secretary, Miss Grace Murphy, both of whom have worked with me steadily from the beginning to the end of this book. As a result of this session I was guided in the exploration of many channels of Hopkins' career of which I had previously known little or nothing. Later I had a long talk and correspondence with Hopkins' sister, Mrs. Adah Aime, and correspondence with his first wife, Mrs. Ethel Gross Hopkins, and their surviving sons David and Robert, also with Dr. Lewis Hopkins (Harry's brother), with Dr. John Nollen (formerly President of Grinnell College), and with Dr. Edward A. Steiner, one of the most distinguished of Grinnell professors. I had an extremely pleasant and enlightening session at lunch with Hopkins' stalwart opponent and comrade in arms, Harold L. Ickes.

The list is very large of those whom I have interviewed one or more times, or with whom I have corresponded. Some of the interviews were conducted by Hyman alone. I should give here a personal word of appreciation to everyone of those who has helped me—not, of course, because of any particular interest in my own work but because of a desire to have this story told as accurately and as fully as possible—but I must apologetically lump a large number of names together in alphabetical order:

Herbert Agar, Joseph Alsop, Paul Appleby, Frank Bane, Bernard M. Baruch, Lord Beaverbrook, Mrs. Anna Boettiger, Louis Brownlow, General J. H. Burns, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Lord Cherwell, Marquis Childs, Grenville Clark, Benjamin V. Cohen, Dr. James B. Conant, Captain Granville Conway, U.S.N., Oscar Cox, Wayne Coy, Dr. Samuel H. Cross, Joseph E. Davies, Chester Davis, Clarence Dykstra, Stephen Early, Morris Ernst, Dr. Herbert Evatt, Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, Herbert Feis, Judge Jerome Frank, Justice Felix Frankfurter, Dr. James R. Fulton, Richard V. Gilbert, Dr. Jacob Goldberg, Philip Graham, Lord Halifax, Robert Hannegan, William D. Hassett, Frances Head, General Sir Leslie Chasemore Hollis, Herschel Johnson, John Kingsbury, the late Fiorello La Guardia, Thomas W. Lamont, Dr. William Langer, Lord Layton, Lord Leathers, Walter Lippmann, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Oliver Lyttelton, Archibald MacLeish, General Robert McClure, Dr. Ross T. McIntire, Wing Commander D. C. McKinley, Admiral John McRea, John E. Masten, Charles E. Merriam, Dr. James Alexander Miller, Jean Monnet, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Edward R. Murrow, Robert Nathan, David K. Niles, Robert P. Patterson, Frederick Polangin, Quentin Reynolds, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Elmo Roper, Beardsley Ruml, Bishop Bernard Sheil, Admiral Forrest Sherman, Victor Sholis, Harold Smith, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Sir

William Stephenson, Robert Stevens, Edward Stettinius, Raymond Swing, Herbert Bayard Swope, Myron C. Taylor, Dorothy Thompson, Rexford Tugwell, Mrs. Edwin M. Watson, Sumner Welles, Mrs. Wendell Willkie, General Arthur Wilson, Ira Wolfert.

I also had a brief talk with Andrei Gromyko. When I told him that I had undertaken to write a book based on the papers of the late Harry Hopkins and that I should like to consult authorities of the Soviet Union in connection with it, he said that such a book might be helpful—and, again, it might not.

One name that is conspicuously absent from the list of those that I interviewed is that of Eleanor Roosevelt. I have seen her on a number of occasions while I have been working on this book, and I know that if I had asked her for help she would have given it with her own incomparable generosity, but I simply could not bring myself to put any questions to her, because her memories are her own, and I felt reluctant to intrude upon any part of them.

I have received aid and guidance from a great many others with whom I have talked casually, and from persons unknown to me who, having heard that this book was in process of preparation, have kindly written me about contacts that they had with Harry Hopkins. Of course I have attempted to read all of the books about the Roosevelt era and the Second World War, and this has not been the least part of the labour involved for it has seemed, at times, that the books were coming out at the rate of one a day. Unquestionably the best of these books, in my opinion—and pending the publication of Eisenhower's Memoirs and the completion of Churchill's—have been *The Roosevelt I Knew*, by Frances Perkins, and *On Active Service*, by Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy. There have been some other publications which, I hope, posterity will view with extreme suspicion.


I must express my appreciation to Miss Phyllis Moir and Mrs. Eva Marks, who worked for a time with Miss Murphy and Hyman and me in New York, and also to Alex. A. Whelan, who worked with me on the final stages of this book in England, and to Sam Simon and the admirable staff of the Hart Stenographic Bureau in New York. I also want to express my gratitude to Miss Lucy Mitchell, Victor Samrock, William Fields and others of the Playwrights' Company, who gave me great help and also a long leave of absence from my usual professional activities.

When I started writing this book I spent some time considering whether to use the proper courtesy titles in referring to living persons. But I felt it would be both cumbersome and absurd to write, for instance, 'Roosevelt then cabled to Mr. Churchill, etc.' Similarly, I have avoided to the greatest possible extent the complexities of changing military titles—for example, 'Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel, later Brigadier General, later Major General, later Lieutenant General, later General, later General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower.'

As to the problem of Footnotes—as an inveterate reader of history and biography I have long been plagued and angered and aged prematurely by contemplation of pages of type which were pock-marked with asterisks, daggers, and other nasty little symbols which pulled my eye down to small type at the bottom of the page and sometimes forced me to read on through the bottoms of subsequent pages before I could get back to the middle of the sentence from which I had been diverted and resume the narrative. Therefore, in this book, I have indulged myself in the luxury of no interruptions by footnotes, all of which will appear at the end of Volume II. I have, however, interrupted some of the documentary material with parenthetical notes, largely for explanatory purposes.

I determined when I started this work that I must attempt to immerse myself so completely in the period of which I was writing that I would not permit myself to be influenced by subsequent events; I felt that I must not let my judgment of something that I was considering in the Hopkins papers—concerning, for instance, the desperate need to get aid to Russia during the Battle of Stalingrad—be coloured in any way by what I had read in that morning's newspaper. This was a great deal easier than I had expected. It was a privilege to escape from the appalling and inexplicable present into the days when, as Herbert Agar has written, 'Good men dared to trust each other', when 'the good and the bad, the terror and the splendour were too big for most of us', when 'our spirits and our brains were splitting at the seams, which may be why so many are today denying that life was ever like that'. This book tells a part of the story of those days, and I can assure the reader that I have withheld no important part of the record as it was known to me or made available to me in the papers of my friend Harry Hopkins. I hope that all the rest of the record will now be made public, and the sooner the better, for there are lessons in it which the people of the world need most urgently to learn.

R. E. S.



INTRODUCTORY
BEFORE 1940—
THE EDUCATION OF
HARRY HOPKINS



THE FRIENDSHIP

DURING the years when Harry Hopkins lived as a guest in the White House he was generally regarded as a sinister figure, a backstairs intriguer, an Iowan combination of Machiavelli, Svengali and Rasputin. Hostility toward him was by no means limited to those who hated Franklin Delano Roosevelt. There were many of Roosevelt's most loyal friends and associates, in and out of the Cabinet, who disliked Hopkins intensely and resented the extraordinary position of influence and authority which he held. He was unquestionably a political liability to Roosevelt, a convenient target for all manner of attacks directed at the President himself, and many people wondered why Roosevelt kept him around.

But the Presidential *aide* who developed in the war years—and of whom General (later Secretary of State) George C. Marshall said: 'He rendered a service to his country which will never even vaguely be appreciated'—was in large measure Roosevelt's own creation. Roosevelt deliberately educated Hopkins in the arts and sciences of politics and of war, and then gave him immense powers of decision for no reason other than that he liked him, trusted him and needed him. A welfare worker from the Cornbelt, who tended to regard money (his own as well as other people's) as something to be spent as quickly as possible, a studiously unsuave and often intolerant and tactless reformer, Hopkins was widely different from Roosevelt in birth, breeding, and manners. But there were qualities in him, including some of the regrettable ones, which Roosevelt admired and enjoyed, perhaps partly because they were so different. One of the best statements of this relationship was written by the perceptive Raymond Clapper in 1938:

Many New Dealers have bored Roosevelt with their solemn earnestness. Hopkins never does. He knows instinctively when to ask, when to keep still, when to press, when to hold back, when to approach Roosevelt direct, when to go at him roundabout. . . . Quick, alert, shrewd, bold, and carrying it off with a bright Hell's bells air, Hopkins is in all respects the inevitable Roosevelt favourite.

Clapper wrote that description in the New Deal years when Hopkins had lofty political ambitions of his own. His position was drastically changed during the war years, when all personal ambition had been knocked out of him by near-fatal illness. Yet I heard from a distinguished European, who came into contact with both men for the first time in these years, a description of the relationship that almost exactly tallied with Clapper's; this observer said:

Hopkins has an almost 'feminine' sensitivity to Roosevelt's moods. He seems to know precisely when Roosevelt wants to consider affairs of State and when he wants to escape from the awful consciousness of the Presidency.

(While agreeing with that statement, I must add that I don't understand quite why this kind of sensitivity should be described as 'feminine'; I have heard of women who could bring up disagreeable subjects at inopportune moments just as well as any man.)

A revealing story of Roosevelt's regard for Hopkins was told by Wendell Willkie, who was not one of the more fervent admirers of either man. It will be remembered that, after his defeat at the polls in November, 1940, Willkie provided a fine example of good citizenship and good sportsmanship in accepting the verdict. Supporting Roosevelt's foreign policy, he felt it would be useful for him to visit Britain, which was then fighting alone against Hitler's seemingly all-conquering German war machine and was being bombed night after night with all the power and all the fury that the Nazi world-conquerors could project by air. Roosevelt readily agreed to Willkie's proposal, and invited him to come to the White House on January 19, 1941, the day before the first Third Term Inaugural in American history.

At that time Hopkins was in England, having gone there to explore the prodigious character of Winston Churchill and to report thereon to Roosevelt (which reports will be recorded in later chapters of this book), so Roosevelt suggested to Willkie that he must be sure to see Hopkins when he arrived in London. Willkie did not greet this suggestion with much enthusiasm. He probably had more cordial dislike and contempt for Hopkins than for anyone else in the Administration against which he had fought so recently and so bitterly. Indeed, he asked Roosevelt a pointed question: 'Why do you keep Hopkins so close to you? You surely must realize that people distrust him, and they resent his influence.' Willkie quoted Roosevelt as replying: 'I can understand that you wonder why I need that half-man around me.' (The 'half-man' was an allusion to Hopkins's extreme physical frailty.) 'But—some day you may well be sitting here where I am now as President of the United States. And when you are, you'll be looking at that door over there and knowing that practically everybody who walks through it wants something out of you. You'll learn what a lonely job this is, and you'll discover the need for somebody like Harry Hopkins, who asks for nothing except to serve you.'

Roosevelt did not talk much about the loneliness of high office. Indeed, in his letters he was for ever saying that he was having a 'grand', 'fine' or 'bully' time. But that loneliness was a reality. Roosevelt was naturally a gregarious

man, who preferred talking to reading or writing. Like anybody else, he wanted to get away from his job now and then, but people wouldn't let him do it. Even in a poker game, while the cards were being shuffled, some member of the Cabinet was apt to interject: 'By the way, Mr. President, the boys over at the Bureau of the Budget are taking what I consider a dangerously narrow-minded point of view toward our programme—and I'm sure if you study the details you'll agree that——' etc. Roosevelt became more and more suspicious of the people associated with him and kept more and more to himself. When he could choose his own company he preferred to be with old friends and relatives who had nothing to do with Government, and with whom he could talk about the old days in Hyde Park and about his innumerable, varied plans for his own future when he would retire to private life. It was characteristic of him that, when he went on his last journey to Warm Springs in a belated attempt to get some rest, his only companions apart from his personal staff were two gentle cousins of his own generation, Margaret Suckley and Laura Delano—and also his dog, Fala.

It is true that, in their final years, a special bond developed between Roosevelt and Hopkins, due to the fact that both men had fought with death at close range, both were living on borrowed time. But Hopkins achieved his favoured position long before he had his own first encounter with death—and long before he could be described as one who crossed the Presidential threshold wanting nothing. In the days when he was administrator of relief he was not reluctant to use his close friendship with the President for the advancement of his own interests and those of the agencies with which he was personally concerned.

I first met Hopkins on a week-end on Long Island early in September, 1938, under the hospitable roof of Herbert and Margaret Swope. At the time I was keeping a diary (I stopped doing so regularly in June, 1940, which is just when I should have started) and I noted at the time:

Long talk at breakfast with Harry Hopkins, the W.P.A. Administrator, a profoundly shrewd and faintly ominous man.

That was all I put down, but I remember that on that occasion Hopkins talked to me very agreeably, revealing a considerable knowledge of and enthusiasm for the theatre. He took obvious pride in the achievements of W.P.A. in the Federal Theatre and Arts Projects, and I believed he had every right to be proud. But I did not quite like him. He used such phrases as 'we've got to crack down on the bastards'. I could not disagree with his estimate of the targets in question, but I did not like the idea of cracking down. I had the characteristically American suspicion of anyone who appeared to be getting 'too big for his breeches'. A year or so later, when he was beaten down and chastened by terrible illness, I came to know him much

better and to form a friendship which must colour everything I write about him and for which no apologies are offered.

When, after Roosevelt's death, President Truman conferred the Distinguished Service Medal on Hopkins, the War Department citation spoke of the 'piercing understanding' which he had displayed in attacking the manifold problems of the war. That is a wonderful phrase for Hopkins—'piercing understanding'—indicating the penetrating sharpness of his mind and the relentless, tireless drive that was behind it. In the year before Pearl Harbour, and the years of war that followed, Hopkins made it his job, he made it his religion, to find out just what it was that Roosevelt really wanted and then to see to it that neither hell 'nor high water, nor even possible vacillations by Roosevelt himself, blocked its achievement. Hopkins never made the mistake of Colonel Edward M. House, which caused the fatal breach with Wilson, of assuming he knew the President's mind better than the President did. Roosevelt could send him on any mission, to the Pentagon Building or to Downing Street, with absolute confidence that Hopkins would not utter one decisive word based on guesswork as to his chief's policies or purposes. Hopkins ventured on no ground that Roosevelt had not charted. When Hopkins first journeyed to Moscow, in July, 1941, within a month after Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union, Roosevelt sent a message to Joseph Stalin: 'I ask you to treat him with the identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me.' At that time Roosevelt had never had any personal contact with Stalin, but Stalin took him at his word and talked to Hopkins with a degree of candour that he had displayed to no previous wartime emissary from the democratic world. What was remarkable about this first contact with Stalin—which will be recorded verbatim in a later chapter of this book—is that Hopkins carried with him no written instructions whatsoever from Roosevelt as to what he should say or do. The President could and did trust him fully.

Roosevelt used to say: 'Harry is the perfect ambassador for my purposes. He doesn't even know the meaning of the word "protocol"'. When he sees a piece of red tape he just pulls out those old garden shears of his and snips it. And when he's talking to some foreign dignitary he knows how to slump back in his chair and put his feet up on the conference table and say: "Oh, yeah?" It was this same ability to break all speed records in getting down to brass tacks that endeared Hopkins to the heart of Winston Churchill, who has said:

I have been present at several great conferences where twenty or more of the most important executive personages were gathered together. When the discussion flagged and all seemed baffled, it was on these occasions Harry Hopkins would rap out a deadly question: 'Surely, Mr.

President, here is the point we have got to settle. Are we going to face it or not?' Faced it always was, and being faced, was conquered.

One time Churchill, Roosevelt, and Hopkins were having lunch together upstairs in the Oval Study in the White House. They were thrashing out in advance major problems which were coming up for discussion at a full-dress conference to be held later that afternoon. As usual, both Roosevelt and Churchill were wandering far afield. (Churchill might have been refighthing the Battle of Blenheim and Roosevelt recalling the tactics employed by John Paul Jones when the *Bonhomme Richard* defeated the *Serapis*.) It was for Hopkins to bring these soaring imaginations down to earth, to contemplation of the topic immediately at hand.

When he did so, with his usual brusqueness, Churchill turned on him and said:

'Harry! When this war is over His Majesty's Government is going to reward you by conferring upon you a noble title.'

Hopkins remarked sourly that membership in the House of Lords was one reward that he did not covet. But Churchill went right ahead:

'We have already selected the title. You are to be named "Lord Root of the Matter".'

Hopkins had very little of Roosevelt's or Churchill's powers of vision and almost none of their historical sense. He looked to the immediate rather than the long-term result. He was an implementer rather than a planner. He was accustomed to divide people he knew into two groups, the 'talkers' and the 'doers', and he placed himself proudly in the second category. When Roosevelt contemplated a subject, his mind roamed all around it; he considered it in its relation to past, present, and future. Hopkins, contemplating the same subject, was interested only in thrusting straight through to its heart and then acting on it without further palaver. In that respect, Hopkins was remarkably useful to Roosevelt—but Roosevelt was essential to Hopkins.

Despite his furious devotion to duty, and despite his persistent ill health, Hopkins had a zest for living which caused him often to revert to the role of a Grinnell (Iowa) College freshman when turned loose in the Big Town. He loved the race tracks (\$2 window), the theatres and night clubs, he loved the society of the fashionable, the beautiful, the talented, the gay, and of such taverners as Sherman Billingsley, Jack and Charlie, and Toots Shor. He was pleased and rather proud whenever the hostile Press denounced him as a 'playboy'. That made him feel glamorous. The President's physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire, once said:

Our biggest job is to keep Harry from ever feeling completely well. When he thinks he's restored to health he goes out on the town—and from there to the Mayo Clinic.

Hopkins was not a hard drinker—he was physically incapable of being one—but almost any drink that he did take was more than was good for him.

Roosevelt regarded the mild frivolities of his wayward friend with amusement not unmingled with considerable concern. His attitude was that of an indulgent parent toward an errant son whose wild oats, while forgivable, must be strictly rationed.

Following is a handwritten letter, dated May 21, 1939, during one of the many periods when Hopkins was bedridden with wasting sickness:

Dear Harry,

Good Boy! Teacher says you have gained 2 pounds.

2 Lbs.=2\$.

Keep on gaining and put the reward into your little Savings Bank. But you must not gain more than 50 lbs. because Popper has not got more than 50\$.

As ever

F.D.R.

Clipped to that letter were two one-dollar bills. They are still clipped to it as this is written, eight years later. There was not a great deal more money left in the Hopkins estate.

Another letter, of May 18, 1944, when Hopkins was in the Ashford General Hospital:

Dear Harry,

It is grand to get the reports of how well you are getting on at White Sulphur Springs, and I have had a mighty nice letter from (Dr. Andrew B.) Rivers—couched mostly in medical terms—which, however, I have had translated!

The main things I get from it are two. First, that it is a good thing to connect up the plumbing and put your sewerage system into operating condition. The second is (and this comes from others in authority) that you have got to lead not the life of an invalid but the life of common or garden sense.

I, too, over one hundred years older than you are, have come to the same realization and I have cut my drinks down to one and a half cocktails per evening and nothing else—not one complementary highball or night cap. Also, I have cut my cigarettes down from twenty or thirty a day to five or six a day. Luckily they still taste rotten but it can be done.

The main gist of this is to plead with you to stay away until the middle of June at the earliest. I don't want you back until then. If you do come

back before then you will be extremely unpopular in Washington, with the exception of Cissy Patterson who wants to kill you off as soon as possible—just as she does me.

My plans—my medical laboratory work not being finished—are to be here about three days a week and to spend the other four days a week at Hyde Park, Shangri-la or on the Potomac. For later in the Summer I have various hens sitting but I don't know when they will hatch out.

I had a really grand time down at Bernie's (Baruch)—slept twelve hours out of the twenty-four, sat in the sun, never lost my temper, and decided to let the world go hang. The interesting thing is the world didn't hang.

I have a terrible pile in my basket but most of the stuff has answered itself anyway.

I am off to Hyde Park to stay until Tuesday or Wednesday next.

Lots of love to you both. Tell Louise to use the old-fashioned hatpin if you don't behave!

Affectionately,

F.D.R.

It is of incidental interest to note that the foregoing letter was written two weeks before the Allied Forces were due to land in Normandy, a time when Roosevelt was bearing a formidable weight of responsibility and anxiety. Roosevelt was all too well aware that the attempt at invasion of Hitler's 'Fortress of Europe' was incalculably hazardous and might fail; the English Channel might become, in the oft-reiterated words of Winston Churchill, a 'river of blood'. But Roosevelt simply could not be obsessed by fears and apprehensions. To say that he took the most terrible moments of the war with apparently insouciant lightness would seem to suggest that he was callous and heartless. He was neither of these things. He had a faculty—and it was always incomprehensible to me—for sloughing off care and worry, no matter how grave the emergency. That was most evident at the time of Pearl Harbour. It was this quality which enabled him to survive until victory was in sight.

Once when Hopkins, Samuel I. Rosenman, and I were working with him, Roosevelt dictated a paragraph for insertion in a speech. He said something to indicate that the current problems were giving him 'sleepless nights'. One of us protested: 'You may get away with that at the moment, Mr. President, but future historians are bound to find out that every night you go to sleep practically at the moment your head touches the pillow and you don't wake up until at least eight hours later.' Roosevelt laughed and eliminated the reference to sleepless nights.

Despite all the differences between their characters and experience, Roose-

velt and Hopkins were alike in one important way: they were thoroughly and gloriously unpompous. The predominant qualities in both were unconquerable confidence, courage, and good humour.

Frances Perkins has written of Roosevelt that he was 'the most complicated human being I ever knew'. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., has written: 'Roosevelt is an extraordinarily difficult person to describe . . . weary as well as buoyant, frivolous as well as grave, evasive as well as frank . . . a man of bewildering complexity of moods and motives.' Miss Perkins and Morgenthau were members of Roosevelt's Cabinet and knew him far longer and better than I did. But I saw enough of him, particularly in hours when he was off parade and relaxed, to be able to say 'Amen!' to their statements on his complexity. Being a writer by trade, I tried continually to study him, to try to look beyond his charming and amusing and warmly affectionate surface into his heavily forested interior. But I could never really understand what was going on in there. His character was not only multiplex; it was contradictory to a bewildering degree. He was hard and he was soft. At times he displayed a capacity for vindictiveness which could be described as petty, and at other times he demonstrated the Christian spirit of forgiveness and charity in its purest form. He could be a ruthless politician, but he was the champion of friends and associates who for him were political liabilities, conspicuously Harry Hopkins, and of causes which apparently competent advisers assured him would constitute political suicide. He could appear to be utterly cynical, worldly, illusionless, and yet his religious faith was the strongest and most mysterious force that was in him. Although he was progressive enough and liberal enough to be condemned as a 'traitor to his class' and 'that Red in the White House', he was in truth a profoundly old-fashioned person with an incurable nostalgia for the very 'horse-and-buggy era' on which he publicly heaped so much scorn. He loved peace and harmony in his surroundings and (like many others) greatly preferred to be agreed with, and yet most of his major appointments to the Cabinet and to the various New Deal and War Agencies were peculiarly violent, quarrelsome, recalcitrant men. He liked to fancy himself as a practical, down-to-earth, horse-sense realist—he often used to say 'Winston and Uncle Joe and I get along well together because we're all *realists*'—and yet his idealism was actually no less empyrean than Woodrow Wilson's. Probably the supreme contradiction in Roosevelt's character was the fact that, with all his complexity, he achieved a grand simplicity which will make him, I believe, much less of a mystery to biographers than Lincoln was and must for ever remain. Roosevelt wrote himself by word and deed in large plain letters which all can read and in terms which all can understand. Whatever the complexity of forces which impelled him, the end result was easily understandable to his countrymen and to the world at large. In his first Inaugural Address as

Governor of New York he spoke of the programme of social legislation which has been instituted by his predecessor, Alfred E. Smith, and said:

I object to having this spirit of personal civil responsibility to the State and to the individual which has placed New York in the lead as a progressive commonwealth described as 'humanitarian'. It is far more than that. It is the recognition that our civilization cannot endure unless we, as individuals, realize our personal responsibility to and dependence on the rest of the world. For it is literally true that the 'self-supporting' man or woman has become as extinct as the man of the stone age. Without the help of thousands of others, any one of us would die, naked and starved. Consider the bread upon our table, the clothes upon our backs, the luxuries that make life pleasant; how many men worked in sunlit fields, in dark mines, in the fierce heat of molten metal, and among the looms and wheels of countless factories, in order to create them for our use and enjoyment.

In reading those words it must be remembered that they were spoken in January, 1929, almost a year before the beginnings of economic collapse—four years before the rise of Hitler to power—more than ten years before the start of the Second World War—twelve years before Lend Lease. Yet those who heard them might have anticipated precisely the principles and policies of the man who was to be Governor for four years and President for twelve. Those words when spoken were extremely radical; it was considered downright Bolshevism to talk of interdependence in those days of the Coolidge boom, rugged individualism and 'every man for himself', when the American attitude toward the rest of the world was summed up in that magnificently unanswerable question: 'They hired the money, didn't they?'

When you consider the words of Roosevelt's first Albany Inaugural together with those of his first Washington Inaugural you wonder that anyone was ever surprised at what he did when he became President of the United States—which is hindsight prescience, to be sure, but so is all of history.

When Roosevelt took Hopkins into the White House to live on May 10, 1941, Hopkins was still nominally Secretary of Commerce, and such direction as he could give to the affairs of that Department was given largely by telephone. He was to all intents and purposes physically a finished man who might drag out his life for a few years of relative inactivity or who might collapse and die at any time. And it was not only the perilous state of his health that made him seem unlikely to be of any real use to the President in meeting the unprecedented demands of the Second World War: for Hopkins knew nothing about military matters. He had never fixed a bayonet in basic infantry drill; he had never answered General Quarters as an able seaman. In

the First World War he had been rejected by the Army and Navy on physical grounds and his war experience was limited to welfare work with the Red Cross in the deep South. Furthermore, his New Dealer pacifism inclined him emotionally toward a kind of isolationism. However, the fact is that by 1940 Roosevelt valued the peculiar kind of service rendered and the companionship provided by Hopkins to such an extent that he converted his friend to war purposes just as surely and as completely as, in the general upheaval of that same year, a Chicago industrialist named Albert J. Brown—ing converted his wallpaper factory into a plant for the production of incendiary bombs.

Hopkins was one of the many Americans who believed that National Defence meant just that. If an enemy fleet approached our shores, we would merely line up our own Navy (which was always 'second to none') like a football team defending its goal line in the days before the invention of the forward pass; any hostile ships that might break through the Navy would be handled by our coast defences. Hopkins did have a considerable conception of the importance of air power, but again it was on a purely defensive basis so far as the United States was concerned: we needed masses of fighting planes to keep invaders and marauders away from our own skies and bombers to sink enemy ships when they ventured within range. But Roosevelt educated him in the military facts of life, and so did General Marshall, for whom Hopkins had profound respect and whose appointment as Chief of Staff he had strongly recommended. It was consistent with Roosevelt's whole character that he should believe in attack as the best means of defence. That was evidenced by his championship of the airplane carrier as a weapon and his advocacy of all measures which permitted the fleet to operate far from home bases for ever-increasing periods of time. (Long before the end of the war our ships could remain in the remote Pacific indefinitely, being able to distil their own fresh water and to take on all necessary fuel, munitions, and supplies at sea, an improvement which was not popular with the crews.)

One evening—it was August 15, 1940, when the Battle of Britain was beginning—Roosevelt and Hopkins were talking in the Study at the White House, and Roosevelt, who was particularly interested in the possibilities of amphibious warfare, drew a map of the East Coast of the United States, locating the coastal defences and explaining that they actually could defend less than one and one-half per cent of our coastline. Roosevelt pointed out that an enemy could land an expeditionary force at any one of innumerable points on our shores, and therefore, if we were involved in war, it would be highly desirable for us to land on the enemy shores first—as, for instance, the north-west coast of Africa.

There were many military men, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower was

one of them, who came into contact with Hopkins for the first time in 1941, and all of these to whom I have talked have said substantially the same thing: knowing of him only as one of those New Deal 'visionaries' (i.e. crackpots), they had been rather dubious of his ability to understand purely military problems, but when they talked with him were amazed at his grasp of the essentials of grand strategy. That was the result of Roosevelt's teaching and of Hopkins's ready ability to learn. He needed plenty of that ability as the years went by and the problems multiplied in a war that touched every continent and every ocean and the skies above them and ended in the dread birth of the Atomic Age.

At the start of this first chapter I said that there were members of Roosevelt's Cabinet who resented the close relationship of Hopkins and the President. An exception was the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, a lifelong Republican who must have been vigorously opposed to the whole philosophy of W.P.A. and, as a stickler for form, must have been disturbed by the irregularity of Hopkins's extra-official position of authority. Yet in his diary Stimson wrote: 'The more I think of it, the more I think it is a Godsend that he (Hopkins) should be at the White House.'

The date of that entry was March 5, 1941, when the great Lend-Lease debate was coming to an end, when Hopkins was coming into a position in the world that no man had ever occupied before.

Other officers of the Government who did not consider Hopkins's presence in the White House a 'Godsend' credited him with the power to exert a baneful influence over Roosevelt, to compel Roosevelt to take actions which were against his better judgment and his own natural inclinations. This was the Svengali analogy, and it always amused Hopkins, for well did he know that whatever might be said for or against Roosevelt (and almost everything imaginable was said for and against him) no one could ever accuse him of being a sweetly submissive Trilby.

SIOUX CITY TO WASHINGTON

HOPKINS was born on August 17, 1890, in Sioux City, Iowa, a seemingly immeasurable distance from Hyde Park, New York. On his fifty-first birthday he returned to Washington with President Roosevelt after the Atlantic Conference, previous to which he had flown to Moscow via London. A friend asked him about his first encounter with Stalin, and he said: 'I couldn't believe it. There I was, walking up the staircase of the Kremlin, going to talk to the man who ruled 180 million people. And I kept asking myself—what are *you* doing here, Hopkins, you—the son of a harness-maker from Sioux City?' Whereupon the friend, who was a somewhat outspoken type, interrupted: 'Now, for God's sake, Harry—don't give me that old line again. You told me when you first set foot in the White House that there you were, the son of a harness-maker—and you said the same thing about your first visit to No. 10 Downing Street. Can't you ever stop boasting about your humble origin? It's the only sign of pretentiousness I've ever seen in you. And, anyway, there have probably been plenty of other harness-makers' sons in the Kremlin. When you go in there, or any place else—all you ought to think about is that you're the personal representative of the President and, by God, you have a *right* to be there!'

Hopkins was impressed by this point. In 1945, when he returned from his final trip to Moscow, which was also his last mission in the public service, he answered a congratulatory message by saying: 'It isn't so difficult to do a job like this reasonably well when you have the whole force of the United States Government behind you.'

He was the fourth of five children born to David Aldona and Anna Pickett Hopkins. His brothers were Lewis, John Emory, and Rome, and his sister Adah (who became Mrs. Frank Aime). An old friend of the family, Robert Kerr, has said: 'To anyone interested in genetics Harry presented a wonderful study as a combination of the characters of his father and mother.'

David Hopkins—known as 'Al' and 'Dad'—was evidently a charming, salty, easygoing, unconventional character who was always among the most popular citizens of any town where he happened to be living, but who did not stay for long in any one place. He was a smart man, but ill educated, having left school at the age of twelve to help support his mother. He had been, at various times, a newspaper-'carrier', prospector, harness-maker, travelling salesman, and storekeeper, but his main interest in life was bowling, at which he was expert, and from which he derived a good income in side bets. Harry told a story of his father's prowess on the bowling-alleys: 'One night Dad came home after a big match against someone who thought

himself a champion. Dad took me down to the cellar on some pretext, like fixing the furnace, then reached in his pocket and pulled out \$500 for me to look at. He had won it all that evening, but, of course, I wasn't supposed to tell my mother there was that amount of money in the house; she would have made Dad give it away to church missions.'

At the top of all of David A. Hopkins's letterheads in his various ventures were the words 'Business is Good', which suggested a quality of defiant optimism some part of which was imparted to his son Harry, who could slip now and then into scepticism, but who always returned to a state of passionate hopefulness.

Dad Hopkins was born in Bangor, Maine, but his family moved West after the Civil War. He was prospecting for gold in South Dakota when he met and married Anna Picket, a schoolteacher. She had been born in Hamilton, Ontario, and her family had moved from there to Vermillion, South Dakota, as homesteaders. She was strong in mind and body and in religious faith. As her husband found both diversion and the exercise of his greatest skill in the bowling-alleys, she found her supreme interest in the Methodist Church. She was active and dominant in church functions and achieved prominence as a devoted worker in the Methodist Missionary Society of Iowa. She was determined to bring up and educate her children strictly in the faith. There is no doubt that Harry inherited his missionary zeal, as he did his sharp features and penetrating eyes, from his mother; the sporting side of his nature was his father's contribution. Shortly after his birth the family moved from Sioux City to various new homes in Council Bluffs, Kearney, and Hastings in Nebraska, and then, for two years, Chicago—the location of the home being selected as close as possible to the centre of the area in which Dad was travelling at the time as salesman for a wholesale harness concern. A bad accident brought a happy change in the family fortunes and produced a period of stability: Dad was run down by a horse-drawn truck and suffered a broken leg. He sued the truck's owners, who settled, out of court, for \$10,000. Half of this prize went to Hopkins's lawyer, and with the remaining \$5,000 he bought a harness store of his own in Grinnell, Iowa. As the demand for harness declined he added newspapers, magazines, and candy to his stock and sold cigarettes under the counter. He was extremely popular with Grinnell College students and, it was said, knew more of them by their first names than did anyone else in town, including the College President. Grinnell was selected by Mrs. Hopkins as a good place in which to settle down, because of the exceptional educational opportunities that it provided for the children; it remained the family home for many years.

While his family lived in Chicago, Harry had a severe siege of typhoid which was the start of his long record of ill health. His nickname in school thereafter was, of course, 'Skinny'. Later, at college, he was addressed as 'Hi'.

While in High School in Grinnell he engaged in his first politicking, but it was then inspired more by a hell-raising impulse than by any lust for power. *Fortune Magazine* has recorded that 'he didn't like the way the teachers fixed the class elections in favour of the best students, so he organized a ballot stuffing for a boy named Sam O'Brien, who was none too academic. The teachers threw out the vote, but Harry kept on electioneering, and on the next supervised ballot O'Brien was elected just the same—by a bigger vote than he had got the first time.'

An ardent baseball player and fan, Hopkins used to crash the gate at the big games at Grinnell. He and his friend, Dwight Bradley, got into Ward Field as armour-bearers for the star catcher, B. M. Benson—one of the boys would carry his mask, the other his glove—but Hopkins himself was only a mediocre right fielder. Grinnell was a great town for basketball, and it was at this sport, both in school and college, that Harry excelled. He was on a team which had the distinction of winning the Missouri Valley Championship. His team-mates described his style of play as 'rough'; his opponents described it as 'dirty'.

He entered Grinnell College with the class of 1912. Spurred by his success as campaign manager for Sam O'Brien, he engaged in a great deal of electioneering (now usually for himself) and was a consistent vote-getter all through college, ending up his senior year with election as permanent President of the Class. (That was probably the last time in his life that he ever actually ran for electoral office; his subsequent ascents were all by appointment.) During one summer at college he worked in a nearby brickyard and during another on a farm, without, apparently, learning much about agriculture. He remained a persistent practical joker—a generally uninhibited extrovert with acute powers of calculation and a penchant for extra-curricular activities. As a senior at Grinnell he was approached by Sophomore leaders for advice on strategy and tactics in the annual Sophomore-Freshman Class battle. He gave it, freely. Then he was approached, quite independently, by Freshman leaders for advice. He gave that, freely, too—telling the Freshmen how to counter the 'possible' Sophomore strategy (which he had suggested). Neither side knew that Hopkins had master-minded both sides. The battle ended as Hopkins had planned it, with the Sophomores taking up defensive positions in a barn and the Freshmen dropping stink bombs through a hole in the roof. These tactics were regarded by the college authorities as unworthy of Grinnell's traditions of sportsmanship and fair play, and various culprits were punished; but Hopkins's guilt was never exposed. Also in his senior year he organized the Woodrow Wilson League in Grinnell and, learning that the Princeton President was to make a pre-Convention trip West, he wrote Wilson urging him to stop in Grinnell. Wilson did so for all of two minutes, appearing on the back platform of his



Roosevelt and Hopkins driving together, as America must often have seen them.



train. Hopkins had the college band out for the occasion at a cost to himself of \$1.50, which, I believe, he never paid.

Curiously mixed with this prankish tendency was a deeply Puritanical sense, the result of his elaborate religious training, and although he was outspoken on most subjects, he was secretive about his emotions. His sister, Adah Aime, has told me that in undergraduate days he had a girl, a Grinnell co-ed, with whom he 'went steady' for a long time. Suddenly he broke it off, which precipitated an embarrassing crisis in Grinnell social circles. According to Mrs. Aime, 'The girl was quite serious and later took up social work herself. But she did not practise religion in the same narrow way as Harry had been brought up to do, and he felt that was a bar to their happiness.' And that, presumably, was why he sanctimoniously ended the relationship. But he would not talk about it to his family. His good mother, distressed by this development, said: 'I can't ever make Harry out. He never tells me anything about what he's *really* thinking.' He remained secretive, but not always so priggishly censorious of lack of religious regularity in girls to whom he was attracted.

In the early years of the twentieth century Grinnell College had established a high reputation for scholarship, which Hopkins neither increased nor appreciably lowered. He appears to have been about average, or maybe a little below that, as a student. He certainly did not reveal much of the ability to learn with speed and accuracy which was to be his most remarkable attribute in later years. His favourite professor was Jesse Macy, who was, I believe, the originator of the first college course in political science in the United States. Macy, a Quaker farmer by birth, had been at Grinnell since before the Civil War, during which he served in Sherman's Army in the march from Atlanta to the sea. He was one of the first converts to the Darwinian theory, and believed it 'his duty to use every endeavour toward the attainment of a more righteous order in the State and in society, regardless of the prospects of success'. He expressed the belief that the democratic nations would 'learn to co-operate through a United States of the World'. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of this pioneer teacher upon an alert, receptive young student who had within him the makings of an aggressive New Dealer and internationalist. Macy was an exponent of the Socratic method, which Hopkins used with penetrating effect in later years. Furthermore, Macy could tell his pupil a great deal about the differences between the British and American constitutional systems, for he had spent considerable time in England and had formed a close friendship with James Bryce and the members of the London Economic Club and the Fabian Society at the time when the Sidney Webbs and Bernard Shaw were first forming what Beatrice Webb called 'this union of pity, hope, and faith'. Indeed, when Bryce was revising his classic work, *The American Com-*

monwealth, he went to spend several weeks of collaboration in Grinnell with Professor Macy. The great British Ambassador and scholar lived at the Macy house, which was a modest one, with no servants except for a part-time cook. On his first night Bryce put his shoes outside the door, in the traditional British country-house fashion. Professor Macy took the shoes to the kitchen and shined them himself—and this process was repeated through every night of Bryce's stay in Grinnell; indeed, this distinguished British statesman died without ever knowing that his collaborator and host in Grinnell, Iowa, had worked overtime every night to shine his shoes. But the scholarly associations established between Macy and Bryce were transmitted to Harry Hopkins, and were of vital importance at the time when Britain faced death at the hands of Hitlerism.

There was another great teacher at Grinnell, Dr. Edward A. Steiner, and from him Hopkins gained his first knowledge of the social sciences and of the strange, remote, gigantic mass that was Russia. Steiner, a Jew, had been born in Czechoslovakia and graduated from Heidelberg, then emigrated to the United States, where he became ordained as a Congregationalist minister. He went to Russia in 1903 and stayed with Tolstoy at Yasnaya Polyana, gathering material for his book on *Tolstoy, the Man* (he described the Countess Tolstoy as 'my reluctant hostess'). His course at Grinnell was called Applied Christianity and was, in fact, Sociology. Hopkins was permanently influenced by what he learned from Steiner on the Christian ethic and the teachings of Tolstoy. He had *War and Peace* in mind when, in July 1941, he flew over the vast Russian forests on the way to Moscow when it came the turn of the Soviet Union to face death at the hands of Nazi Germany.

In the Steiner course Hopkins had an 'A'. In Macy's courses he averaged 'B'. But in English composition he was usually a low 'D'—and once an 'E' (total failure)—which is no surprise to those who have read any of his writings. Strangely enough, when he talked his language was extraordinarily vivid and original and to the point. When he wrote for publication he was apt to become self-conscious, sententious, and awkward.

The influence of Grinnell—the college and the town itself—was always with Hopkins. He became something of an expatriate in the gaudy atmosphere of Jimmy Walker's New York, and then he became in effect a citizen of the world, but he never became urbane. All of the Hopkins family left Grinnell, scattering over the continent. Dad Hopkins spent his last years happily combining business with pleasure in Spokane, Washington, where he was proprietor of the bowling-alleys in the Davenport Hotel. The old man had an enduring grudge against Grinnell. There had been a drive for funds to build a hospital there and Dad Hopkins pledged a handsome contribution, but, when it came time to pay it, he was in one of his recurrent phases of

extreme financial embarrassment. This led him into a violent argument with the Hospital Board members, and there was even a threat of legal proceedings, which was averted when friends quietly chipped in enough money to meet the pledge. Dad Hopkins eventually paid this off, but he never forgot nor forgave the authorities. Years later he told Harry quite calmly that he was dying of cancer of the stomach, and then he exploded: 'And you can bury me any God-damned place except Grinnell!' When he did die, in 1930, Harry was notified by his brother Lewis that burial would be in the family plot at Grinnell. He did not obey his father and raise any protest, for he knew that his mother wanted the burial to be there, and she was the one who was living. This good woman died in 1932, just when her son Harry was on the threshold of fame and, in some quarters, notoriety.

In 1939, after his appointment as Secretary of Commerce, Harry Hopkins revisited his native State—a visit which, as will be seen, was charged with political implications—and he stopped at Grinnell to visit his old friends the Kerrs and to speak to the student body at the college. Most of this speech is given herewith because, being largely unprepared, it sounds like Hopkins when he talked without benefit of ghost writers:

When I hear people talking about what a college is for—its curriculum—I know the plural of that, too. I know that one of the best things in college is to have fun. You have plenty of time later in life to get banged around or to get solemn about it, but here you have great fun, and I think that is good, of and by itself. . . .

I was around this town for many years, and I found that this town had a government, had wards, and I learned that there were townships in the counties, and that there was a State Legislature. I did not know much about it. I heard they collected taxes. I used to hear rumours that the railroads owned the Legislature in the State of Iowa. I learned later it was true. I had the vaguest knowledge about government. The less government interfered with me around this town, the better I liked it. I didn't even like to have the college authorities interfere with me too much. . . .

Since then, and for the last twenty-seven or twenty-eight years, I have lived around various parts of the country, and, in more recent years of my life, have come in intimate contact with government. I have seen government wage wars; I have seen government baffled and unable to meet economic problems; I have seen and lived with a government which has struck out boldly attempting to meet our economic problems. I have lived to see the time when the Government of the United States worries about how much a farmer gets for his corn, wheat, or cotton. I have lived to see the time when a farmer gets a cheque signed by the Treasurer of the United States for doing something. I see old people getting pensions; see

unemployed people getting cheques from the United States Government; College students getting cheques signed by the United States Government.

I have seen people battling for control of the United States Government, and many years ago, when I first saw this struggle, I wondered why they made such an effort to control it, and I saw great and powerful interests spend a lot of money in an attempt to control government. I saw them do that, and you don't have to go very far away to see them still doing it. Make no mistake about it, there are many interests in this country who want to control government whether it be local, State, or Federal. I have no quarrel with that theory. I think it's perfectly proper for any group of people in a democracy to do anything they can to influence government. As long as the farmers out here talked it out by holding a lot of meetings and writing articles nobody paid any attention to them, but when they formed a political bloc and went to the State Legislature, the Congressmen, and the Senators, and said: 'Either you do what we want you to do or we won't send you back', Congressmen and everyone who ran for office in this great farm belt then began to make political speeches saying what they would do for the farmers. Each candidate wanted to do more than the other. I think that is good.

I don't think old people would get pensions if they didn't make a great political issue out of it. I remember ten years ago there were not more than ten votes in Congress for old-age pensions. Now no one in Congress would dare kick about old-age pensions, because it is a great political issue. The old people want pensions, and they are going to get them. In this last Congress, eighty-three Democratic Congressmen were pitched out and eighty-three Republican Congressmen went in because they promised bigger and better old-age pensions. I think, politically, they were very smart and intelligent. I don't see anything wrong about that. I do not see anything wrong in these pressure groups of one kind or another trying to influence government. They have simply taken a lesson out of the public utilities and railroads. They ran most of the State governments twenty-five and fifty years ago. You don't have to go back more than fifty years, and you will find that members of the State Legislature were on the payroll of the railroads. You don't have to go back very far, and you will find a great many of the lawyers were working for the utilities. I could make a speech about the lawyers, but I will just skip it.

I have seen this government at close range working with the American people, and I have seen them do these things, and I have a firm conviction they are going to keep on doing them. It does not make any difference what party is in power, the government is going to treat the people in

ways we have never dreamed of before, and therefore, government should be good.

With the world situation the way it is today, almost a madhouse, with hate and fear sweeping the world; with this nation almost the last stronghold of democracy; with the American people determined to maintain that democracy, the kind of government that we have is extremely important, and it is the one thing in America that is important.

This government is ours whether it be local, county, State, or Federal. It doesn't belong to anybody but the people of America. Don't treat it as an impersonal thing; don't treat it as something to sneer at; treat it as something that belongs to you. I don't care how much you criticize it, or to what party you belong—just remember that this government belongs to you, and needs you, and it is going to take brains and skill to run it in the future, because this country cannot continue to exist as a democracy with 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 people unemployed. It just can't be done. We have got to find a way of living in America in which every person in it shares in the national income, in such a way, that poverty in America is abolished. There is no reason why the people of America should dwell in poverty. A way must be found, and a way will be found.

And, finally, let me say this. Growing up in this town, moving to the East, and having been almost every place in this Union, I have grown to have a tremendous affection and love for this country—the fields—the land—and the people. Nothing must happen to it, and those of us who get a chance, and many of us will, because of the things this nation has done for us, should and will be motivated when the time comes to serve it well.

That Grinnell Speech, incidentally, contained one of the few public references that Hopkins ever made to the prospect or the actuality of another World War until 1941, when he himself was so heavily involved in it.

When Hopkins was about to graduate from Grinnell College he went round to see Dr. Steiner to say good-bye. He had not made up his mind as to his future career: he had talked of going into the newspaper business in Bozeman, Montana, in partnership with Chester Davis, who also was to serve with Franklin Roosevelt as War Food Administrator. But Hopkins avoided journalism by a narrow margin. Dr. Steiner showed Hopkins a telegram he had received from Christadora House, a charitable institution on Avenue 'B' in the New York slums. The telegram asked if Steiner could suggest a Grinnell student to act as counsellor that summer at the Christadora camp for poor children near Bound Brook, New Jersey, and Steiner asked Hopkins if he might be interested in this temporary job. Despite his mother's influence, Hopkins had never been much interested in missionary or social

work; he had been identified with the Y.M.C.A. in college, but this was merely a part of regular undergraduate activities. Nevertheless, he jumped at the opportunity offered through Dr. Steiner, not because he had any intention of making a career as a welfare worker, but because this was a chance to get to New York. The newspaper in Bozeman could wait until he had had a good look at the Big Town.

On the way East Hopkins stopped at Chicago for the Republican Convention, worming his way into it by posing as Elihu Root's 'secretary' (again he was carrying the catcher's mask). He heard Theodore Roosevelt shout that thieves were running the Republican party—that the renomination of William Howard Taft was 'naked theft'. That was the year T.R. bolted and formed the Bull Moose Party. Hopkins also attended the Democratic Convention in Baltimore and saw some of the battle of William Jennings Bryan to nominate Woodrow Wilson, but I do not know what guise he assumed to get into this one. The sight and sound of the political giants excited him, and for the next twenty years he nourished a secret desire to become a combatant in that blood-soaked arena.

On arrival at the Christadora Summer Camp at Bound Brook he confessed that he was bewildered by his first contacts with the products of the East Coast slums. He had certainly known poverty in his own family and friendly neighbourhood in the Middle West, but that kind of poverty involved the maintenance of a kind of dignity and self-respect and independence; it did not involve hunger, or squalor, or degradation. The poverty of the city slums was, to him, something alien, shocking, and enraging. At Bound Brook, he said later, he was brought sharply to the realization that 'I'd never seen a Jewish boy before in my life'. This was his real birth as a crusader for reform. The missionary impulse that he had inherited from his mother became the most powerful force within him. As with other changes in the circumstances of his life, he adjusted himself to his new environment with remarkable rapidity. After two months in the camp at Bound Brook he was the zealous champion of the underprivileged which he would always remain. He went to work for Christadora House, and began to learn the life as it was lived on the lower East Side of New York, which was as complete a sociological laboratory as one could find anywhere on earth. He worked for his board and lodging and, I believe, \$5 a month pocket-money. In 1912 New York was still the fabulous 'Bagdad on the Subway' of O. Henry, whose stories were just beginning to achieve posthumous success. It was still the city of Diamond Jim Brady and the Tenderloin and Millionaire's Row and the Five Points, where young Al Capone was learning his trade. And it was still the city of Tammany, which had enjoyed a half-century of corruption and 'free enterprise' on the loose under Boss Tweed, 'Honest John' Kelly, and Richard Croker. But the forces of reform were finding a glamor-

ous champion in John Purroy Mitchel, 'the Young Torquemada', and were mobilizing to drive the rascals out (temporarily). This cause was aided greatly by the results of an event which occurred in that summer of 1912: the murder of Herman Rosenthal, proprietor of one of the town's many gambling-houses. This appalling story, broken by another young Middle Westerner, Herbert Swope, helped to elect Mitchel Mayor, and Charles S. Whitman, who prosecuted the case, became Governor of the State.

The day after the execution of the 'Four Gunmen'—who bore the unforgettable names of Gyp the Blood, Dago Frank, Lefty Louie, and Whitey Lewis—Hopkins was attending a meeting of a boys' club in one of the East Side settlement houses where he was giving inspirational talks on civic betterment. He was horrified and profoundly puzzled when the boy who was leader of this group arose and said very seriously to the meeting: 'I move that the whole club stand up for two minutes in honour of the four gunmen who died today.' The motion was carried unanimously. Hopkins mentioned this discouraging incident in an article he wrote for the *Survey Graphic*, and asked, but did not attempt to answer, the question: 'What is responsible for the fact that thirty-five boys, all under sixteen, should wish to rise to their feet to pay homage to four men whose crimes their keen sense of right and wrong would naturally condemn under normal circumstances?'

Hopkins worked very hard then as always and had neither time nor money for exploration in the more enjoyable institutions of New York, but he did find a way to get into the Metropolitan Opera House free by enlisting in the organized clagues for such stars of the period as Enrico Caruso and Geraldine Farrar.

During his first winter in New York Hopkins went to see Dr. John A. Kingsbury, a scholarly, humane, and humorous man who was General Director of the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (A.I.C.P.), a powerful and well-supported charitable organization. Hopkins asked for a job that would pay slightly more than his present \$5 a month. Kingsbury took a liking to the gangling, open-faced Iowa youth, and, although he had no regular job to offer, put him on the payroll at \$40 a month on a 'training' basis, thus giving him a chance to learn something under expert guidance about social work and the conditions which made it necessary. Hopkins continued to live at Christadora House on Avenue 'B' and work there during the day, and at night he went out on assignments for A.I.C.P. in the tougher districts, particularly along the waterfront, where it was considered unsafe for the women workers to venture after dark. When Hopkins had been at this interesting occupation for a few months he went to Kingsbury and asked for a rise in pay. Kingsbury laughed and asked: 'On what possible grounds would I be justified in giving you a rise?' In great embarrassment Hopkins confessed that he had fallen in love with Miss

Ethel Gross, a co-worker at Christadora House, and they wanted to get married. Kingsbury was so impressed and amused by the sheer bravado of this that he agreed to increase Hopkins's allowance—it was not a wage or salary—to \$60 a month, and the wedding took place. This marriage, which ended in divorce seventeen years later, was productive of three sons, David (named after Dad Hopkins), Robert (named after Robert Kerr), and Stephen (named after a possible ancestor who had been a signer of the Declaration of Independence). In the Second World War these sons served in the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps, respectively. Stephen, the youngest, was killed in action when the Marines attacked Kwajalein Atoll in February, 1944.

In 1913-14, preceding the outbreak of the First World War, times were bad—they were always bad on the lower East Side, but now they were worse—and Kingsbury asked Hopkins to make a study of unemployment in the city. In those days if a man was out of work it was his own responsibility; it was probably his own fault and certainly his own tough luck. If he knew the right people, he could get some help at his local Tammany Club House. Or he could get food in a bread line and perhaps shelter in a flophouse, and he could seek relief for his family from one of the numerous private charitable organizations which overlapped each other and competed with each other, often with bitter jealousy, for prestige and funds. However, there were distinct signs of change in the old, anachronistic order, and the spokesmen of change were such as Kingsbury, the great Lillian Wald, Henry Bruere, and William H. Mathews. Hopkins's report on unemployment was one of the most searching that had ever been made, and showed remarkable understanding for one only twenty-three years old and fresh from the Cornbelt, where such conditions were unheard of. His period of apprenticeship ended and he was given a regular job with A.I.C.P.

He was put in charge of an emergency employment bureau which took care of—or, at least, did its best to care for—destitute transients in New York. There were many of these: some were hopeless derelicts who had drifted to the panhandler's paradise, but most were bewildered people who had come to the Big City full of hope and determination and the conviction that fabulous fortune awaited them expectantly around every corner (this was still the age of Horatio Alger). On rare occasions Hopkins was able to guide them to jobs. The vast majority, however, could only be directed to a Salvation Army soup kitchen or a mission where floor space was available for sleeping. Hopkins advised many of the younger ones to swallow their pride and write to their families for the price of a ticket back to the home town, and doubtless some of them resented these words of wisdom from one who was himself so freshly out of Iowa. If they had doubts about his right to advise them, he was developing more doubts of his own; he was beginning to wonder what kind of country this really was which vaunted its lofty

principles of freedom and equality and yet allowed such miserable conditions of injustice to persist.

When Mayor Mitchel took office in January, 1914, it seemed that the chance had come to do something about these conditions. The new Mayor appointed Kingsbury Commissioner of Public Charities. Within this Department was the Board of Child Welfare. On the recommendation of Kingsbury and Mathews, Chairman of this Board, Hopkins became its Executive Secretary at a salary of \$3,000 a year, which must have seemed a fortune. This was Hopkins's first job in public service and his last until 1931.

The outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914, caused worse unemployment conditions in New York, and the progressive minds of the Mitchel Reform Administration—a sort of intimation of the New Deal—began to experiment with new measures, among which were the first free employment agency and the institution of 'made' work by the City Government in connection with the municipal park system. Here, then, was the beginning of rehearsals for Hopkins in the spectacular role he was to play in support of Franklin D. Roosevelt twenty years later. He enjoyed this work greatly, and was beginning to raise a family and to establish a new identity for himself as an up-and-coming New Yorker; but there was no future for him in the city administration. Mitchel was a young man of considerable personal charm, courage, and talent, but he demonstrated a gift for antagonizing all kinds of people. Tammany Hall, of course, hated him, and so did William Randolph Hearst. His predilection for the companionship of High Society made him unpopular with the masses who charged there was 'too much Fifth Avenue, too little First Avenue'. The Republicans, High Society included, considered him too radical. To make the opposition virtually unanimous, he incurred the wrath of Catholic and Protestant Churches by investigations of gross mismanagement in State charities which had ecclesiastical patronage. He was defeated for re-election by the Hearst protégé, John F. ('Red Mike') Hylan, after which he entered the Army Air Corps and was killed in an accident while training.

In the city elections of 1917 Hopkins was disgusted with both the Democratic and Republican parties, the latter having also rejected Mitchel, and he supported Morris Hillquit, the Socialist candidate—a fact which returned to plague him in later years when he came up before the United States Senate for approval as Secretary of Commerce. After the entry of the United States into the First World War in 1917 Hopkins attempted to enlist in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, but was kept out by defective vision—a 'detached retina' in his left eye. He finally joined the Red Cross, and was sent to New Orleans to direct the Gulf Division. Later, he was promoted to direct all Red Cross activities in the South-Eastern States, with headquarters in Atlanta. In 1921 he returned to New York to look for a

job, and immediately got one through his old friend and benefactor, John Kingsbury, who had served with the Red Cross in France and then, after the war, had become Director of the Milbank Fund, and therefore a highly influential figure in the whole field of organized charities in New York. This fund had been established by Albert G. Milbank, Chairman of the Borden (Milk) Company, largely for the promotion of public health, and Kingsbury set up a new division within the structure of A.I.C.P. for the study of health conditions throughout New York and the formulation of a programme to meet them. Hopkins was offered and quickly accepted the post of Director of this division at a salary of \$8,000. He remained there for three years. There was a certain amount of friction between him and Bailey B. Burritt, Director of A.I.C.P., because the Health Division was separately financed by the Milbank Fund and Hopkins felt he should be independent of Burritt's authority. He was one who always chafed at ordinary, orderly administrative procedure, which is one of the reasons why he found himself so completely at home in the unconventional Roosevelt scheme of things. Much of his experience at this time gave him valuable preparation for problems which he was to encounter later in Washington, for there was a distinct resemblance between the point of view of the welfare worker and that of the voluntary Civil Servant. Both were commercially unselfish, animated by public spirit and reconciled to careers uncomplicated by the profit motive. It was therefore not unnatural that both should strive to be paid off in the currency of increased authority and opportunity to extend influence. This ambition led to competitive struggle which inevitably produced endless jurisdictional disputes—and the border warfare between one charity organization and another was much the same as between one Government agency and another.

Hopkins discovered that the study of health conditions in New York City presented many difficulties—indeed, that it was virtually impossible to do it thoroughly on a purely local basis. The shifting of population was too great. One could select any given section for a study of case histories in any given disease over a period of ten years, only to find that in this time most of the old cases had moved away to parts unknown and entirely new cases had moved in. This led Hopkins to think in larger and larger terms; he began to feel cramped by the city limits or even by the State lines. Moreover, he began now, under the influence of his wise friend, Kingsbury, to extend his intellectual explorations into the humanities in which he had previously taken little interest.

Both Kingsbury and his wife had a paternal feeling for Hopkins, and this continued through the years and through various drastic changes in Hopkins's professional and domestic life until Mrs. Kingsbury ventured the opinion to her husband: 'Maybe you'd have more influence with Harry if you stopped

treating him as your own boy.' But Kingsbury, even when he became Hopkins's assistant in W.P.A., could not detach the New Deal Administrator from the callow youth who had come into his office looking for a job. During the 1920's the Hopkins family lived first in Yonkers and then in Scarborough, because the Kingsburys lived there—and Kingsbury got them a cottage near his own summer place in Woodstock, N.Y. Kingsbury had a large library, from which Hopkins borrowed constantly, the while he attempted to build up a library of his own; on payday he would go out and spend a large part of his ready cash on books before starting to worry about the pressing needs of his growing family. He developed a passion for the life and works of John Keats, and would read Keats and Shelley and Amy Lowell on the commuter trains when all his neighbours were engrossed in the financial or sports pages. He also developed an improbable interest in fungi—this being a hobby of Kingsbury's—and the two men would spend hours on week-ends tramping through woods with their children in quest of specimens, Kingsbury explaining to Hopkins: 'this one is edible—but that one is deadly poison.' Hopkins also played some tennis and bridge, at both of which he was fairly good, and some golf, at which he was not. When he took friends or relatives to dinner in New York he generally went to some expensive speakeasy, and they were appalled at the insouciance with which he would pay a \$20 dinner bill and \$5 in tips as carelessly as if he could afford it.

In 1924 he moved from A.I.C.P. to the Executive Directorship of the New York Tuberculosis Association, with the agreement and endorsement of Burritt and Kingsbury. The President and moving spirit of the Association was Dr. James Alexander Miller, the distinguished specialist who had long been a national leader in the fight against tuberculosis. A careful, conservative man, Miller had managed to make the Association solvent and solid, with a surplus of some \$90,000. Hopkins managed to convert this surplus eventually into a deficit of some \$40,000, but at the end of his seven years with the Association, when he entered Government service, the Directors adopted a statement including the following expressions of appreciation:

During the period of his directorship the Association has grown enormously. Largely due to Mr. Hopkins's efforts, the New York Heart Committee was amalgamated with the Tuberculosis Association, and the name of the Association was changed from the New York Tuberculosis Association to the New York Tuberculosis and Health Association. . . .

The Board of Directors of the New York Tuberculosis and Health Association hereby records its deep appreciation of the services rendered by Mr. Hopkins and extends to him an expression of its most hearty gratitude for all that he has done for the development of the Association

and heartfelt good wishes for the successful use of the federal relief funds and of the great opportunities for leadership in public relief throughout the United States.

Hopkins had greatly increased the Association's income—principally through the stimulation of the sale of Christmas Seals—and he had also greatly increased its expenditures. Dr. Miller and his successor as President, Dr. Linsley R. Williams, were unable to devote much attention to the business affairs of the Association, and Hopkins was consequently pretty much on his own, which was what he liked to be. He had visions of an expanding empire—his intense ambition, be it said, being animated not by greed, but by incurable restlessness and discontentment. Tuberculosis would have seemed a big enough evil for any one organization to tackle, but Hopkins pushed the Association into new fields, until it had absorbed the New York Heart Association, the Children's Welfare Federation, the Associated Out-Patient Clinic and the Allied Dental Clinic. He wrote an article for the *Nation's Health* (January, 1927), indicating that he contemplated adding cancer control and mental hygiene to the already numerous activities. He wanted to drop the word tuberculosis from the Association name and have it the New York—and even ultimately the National—Health Association. One day early in 1928 Dr. Haven Emerson, former Health Commissioner of New York, told Hopkins of having watched men drilling in the rocks under 42nd Street, and said that it was outrageous that these men were being subjected to the dread occupational disease known as silicosis. Emerson felt that something should be done about it, so Hopkins immediately promised to do something. After Emerson had left him he went to Dr. Jacob A. Goldberg, Secretary of the Tuberculosis Association, and asked: 'Say, Jack—what is silicosis?' Hopkins thereupon organized and financed an exhaustive study of the subject under a committee which included Dr. Emerson, Goldberg and himself. The report of this committee, published in February, 1929, resulted in the development of an elaborate vacuum device to eliminate silica dust, and this was used successfully in the work on Rockefeller Centre and other excavations and tunnelling in New York City since then. That was typical of the way in which Hopkins worked: he was never deterred from attacking a problem by total ignorance of it, for he had an exceptional ability to cure his own ignorance and gain a 'piercing understanding'.

Dr. Goldberg has described Hopkins at this time: 'You could mark him down as an ulcerous type. He was intense, seeming to be in a perpetual nervous ferment—a chain smoker and black-coffee drinker. He was always careless in his appearance. Most of the time he would show up in the office looking as though he had spent the previous night sleeping in a hayloft. He would wear the same shirt three or four days at a time. He managed to shave

almost every day—usually at the office. While other executives that have run the Association would say, "We have this amount of money available—and this is how much we can spend", Hopkins, by contrast, used to say, "This is a good programme—it needs to be done—and we will do it." He never worried about the cost until later, when the Association had been committed to the programme and then he would scramble around to get the money.'

Dr. Miller has said: 'Harry never had the faintest conception of the value of money. But then, that is true of most social workers I have known. Although in no sense personally dishonest, they can become unscrupulous in the handling of funds. They can convince themselves that the worthy end justifies the means.'

When, after the 1929 crash, Herbert Hoover's 'chicken in every pot' was replaced by a discharge slip in every other pay-envelope, Hopkins's friend, William Mathews of the A.I.C.P., was struggling with the problem of workless, homeless men, and managed to obtain \$75,000 from the Harvey Gibson Emergency Committee of the American Red Cross. Mathews, who had been one of the pioneers in work relief back in 1914, conferred with Hopkins as to the best way of administering this fund. Together with Dr. Goldberg, they made an arrangement with the Park Commission whereby jobs for unemployed men would be provided on park projects, the cost of the labour to be defrayed from Mathews's fund. Hopkins and Dr. and Mrs. Goldberg went to A.I.C.P. every afternoon after their day's work at the Tuberculosis Association, and remained until late at night assigning jobs to applicants for work relief. There was no planning board for these assignments. No questions were asked—no investigations were conducted—there being no staff to conduct them. Any man who asked for a job was given one. 'Some of the men,' Goldberg has recalled, 'came in to us carrying violin-cases. We could see they were not fit for heavy work, so they were assigned to projects like sawing off dead limbs from trees, grading walks, leaf-raking, etc.' Leaf raking! That term appeared many more times in Hopkins's career.

Of course, the \$75,000 ran out quickly, but more funds were raised, and the volunteer employment bureau continued its hand-to-mouth operations until the Governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt, proclaimed unemployment relief to be a State responsibility. Hopkins was harshly criticized for these irregular activities by the established welfare agencies, which claimed it was 'unprofessional conduct' to hand out work tickets without thorough investigation into the background of each applicant, his own or his family's financial resources, and probably his religious affiliations. 'Harry told the agencies to go to hell,' said Goldberg.

Hopkins met Roosevelt for the first time during the campaign of 1928, when Alfred E. Smith was running for President and Roosevelt for Gover-

nor. Hopkins was impressed by this meeting, for he had been thrilled to hear the radio broadcast of Roosevelt's 'Happy Warrior' nominating speech for Smith, who was then Hopkins's idol, and for whom he campaigned ardently; but for Roosevelt the meeting with the sallow social worker was just another handshake. However, Hopkins was coming more and more to the attention of various of Roosevelt's friends, and of Mrs. Roosevelt, who was perpetually interested in welfare work.

To anyone with a mystical sense—and Hopkins, being his mother's son, had one which was strong, though well concealed—that election of 1928 eventually gave cause for wonderment. It could have been attributed to all manner of occult forces—to the hand of God or to the grim resolution of fate or to the inexorable turning of the tides of history—or merely to an inexplicable freak of luck. But there was something strange and tremendous in the fact that, although Al Smith was badly beaten throughout the nation and lost his own New York by over a hundred thousand votes, Roosevelt carried the State by the exceedingly narrow margin of twenty-five thousand. There were thus a relative handful of people in New York who failed to vote the straight Republican ticket, and thereby enabled Franklin Roosevelt to become a logical candidate for the Presidency in 1932 and to run again in 1936, 1940, and 1944, and to receive more than a hundred million votes from the American people in times of terrible crisis.

Roosevelt's narrow victory in 1928 was due partly to public recognition of his cheerful gallantry in fighting a fearful disease and partly to the fact that the people of New York approved of Al Smith's policies as Governor even though they did not wish to promote the author of them to the White House. There was no reason whatsoever to interpret the results as any indication that the formidable power of the Republican party was threatened. The Republicans had ruled the country for nearly seventy years, except for two interludes produced by schisms within their own ranks, and it seemed as Herbert Hoover assumed the Presidency that nothing less than economic calamity or another World War could upset the political balance of power within the foreseeable future. The American people could see not the slightest sign of either misfortune coming to pass, but less than a year had passed after Hoover's triumphant election before the boom burst, starting the creation of the enormous vacuum which was to be filled by the New Deal. On August 29, 1931, Governor Roosevelt made a speech to an extraordinary session of the State Legislature which sounded the very keynote of his social philosophy:

What is the State? It is the duly constituted representative of an organized society of human beings, created by them for their mutual protection and well-being. 'The State' or 'the Government' is but the

machinery through which such mutual aid and protection are achieved. The cave man fought for existence unaided or even opposed by his fellow man, but today the humblest citizen of our State stands protected by all the power and strength of his Government. Our Government is not the master but the creature of the people. The duty of the State toward the citizens is the duty of the servant to its master. The people have created it; the people, by common consent, permit its continual existence.

One of these duties of the State is that of caring for those of its citizens who find themselves the victims of such adverse circumstance as makes them unable to obtain even the necessities for mere existence without the aid of others. That responsibility is recognized by every civilized Nation. . . .

To these unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by Government, not as a matter of charity, but as a matter of social duty.

I do not know what was the immediate effect of these words on Hopkins. He may have been inclined to dismiss them as mere pious rhetoric from a politician. But, syllable for syllable, they were to form the directive which guided him throughout the next seven years of extraordinary adventure.

As a first means of implementing these words, Roosevelt set up the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration in New York State. The headline writers referred to this as T.E.R.A. and thereby designated the first of the many 'alphabetical agencies'. Furthermore, in forming this new agency Roosevelt was setting a precedent for himself which he was to follow again and again in the New Deal, and in the organization of the national effort to meet the demands of the Second World War: he was devising a new agency to meet a new problem rather than relying on the established department or bureau (in this case, the State Department of Public Welfare).


As Chairman of the T.E.R.A., Roosevelt named his old friend, Jesse Isador Straus, President of the great department store, R. H. Macy & Co., and a distinguished philanthropist. Straus did not want the job, but yielded to Roosevelt's incomparable blandishments; the Governor of New York was already a master in the art of giving a radical development a conservative mantle, not for the purpose of fooling the public, but rather to persuade himself that it was a perfectly reasonable and moderate evolution. Straus, being a good business man, wanted first to find a shrewd, competent executive to be his deputy. He sought the counsel of various leaders in welfare work, such as Henry Bruere, John Kingsbury, and Homer Folks. They all agreed that William Hodson, of the Russell Sage Foundation, was the best possible selection, and Straus offered him the job. Hodson consulted friends and colleagues and they advised him to refuse the invitation; many of them

believed that Roosevelt's radical experiment in forming this new agency was doomed to failure and that Hodson would inevitably take the blame for it. Hodson thereupon suggested Harry Hopkins for the job and telephoned him to ask if he would take it. Hopkins instantly replied: 'I would love it.' So he started to work on the largest and most daring programme for the relief of unemployment that had ever been undertaken by any State in the Union. After a year Straus resigned and recommended that his efficient and energetic deputy be appointed Chairman, to which the Governor readily agreed. During his two years' service with T.E.R.A. Hopkins did his work in the manner that Roosevelt liked best: imaginatively, speedily, and giving the least possible amount of trouble to Roosevelt himself. Of course, in the latter part of 1931 and in 1932 Roosevelt was looking beyond New York State, toward his own candidacy for the Democratic nomination, and he and his principal political advisers, Louis MacHenry Howe, James A. Farley, and Frank Walker, would have been concerned with Hopkins only if he had been a conspicuous failure and, therefore, an embarrassment.

In those uncertain days, when the return of prosperity was always 'just around the corner', it was difficult for anyone to accept the fact that the emergency would eventually be measured in terms of years rather than months, so when Hopkins undertook the T.E.R.A. he continued his position with the Tuberculosis and Health Association, but as he worked he became less sure that the new job was merely 'temporary'. On September 8, 1932, he wrote to his brother, Lewis:

For the past eight or ten months I have been trying to carry two jobs. The Governor asked me to be Chairman of the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration of New York State, which has already administered a fund of about \$30,000,000, and if a bond issue of another \$30,000,000 passes on election day, we will have that to administer, too. We have now taken care of about a million people in the State. The situation here is very bad, and in spite of the 'pollyannish' announcements that are coming out from Washington, and the rise in the stock market, there is a steady decline in employment and an increase in the number of those in need of relief.

I have no confidence whatever that the R.F.C. (the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, established by President Herbert Hoover) will help the situation much this winter, other than bolster up the railroads and the banks. I very naturally am earnestly hoping that Roosevelt will be elected. I think he would make a far better president than Hoover—chiefly because he is not afraid of a new idea, and furthermore, is not identified with big business after the fashion of 'the great engineer'. I am convinced that Roosevelt is not only fearless, but a very able executive.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From 21
39

Dear Harry -

Good Boy! Teacher says you
have gained 2 pounds.

2 lbs = 2 \$

Keep on gaining a pound The reward
into your little Savings Bank.

But you must not gain more
than 50 lbs, because Puffer
has not yet more than 50 \$

As ever

F.D.R.

This handwritten note from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry L. Hopkins, dated March 21, 1939, was written on one of the many occasions when Hopkins was seriously ill (see page 8).

All this business about his health is utter nonsense. I have seen a great deal of him within the past few months, and the amount of work that he can carry out is perfectly amazing. To be sure, I don't believe that the election of either of them is going to increase our respective salaries a bit.

That last statement proved to be a very good guess by Hopkins in so far as he himself was concerned. Although his man, Roosevelt, was elected, and Hopkins was thus catapulted into a position of world importance, he worked for the next twelve years at a salary lower than that of 1932, and he was broke when he died; but he was empowered to spend in those years of Government service nine billion dollars for the relief of others and to direct the expenditure of many billions more in Lend Lease. (The reference to Roosevelt's health in the above letter was a reflection of the 'whispering campaign' which suggested that he had been crippled not by infantile paralysis but by syphilis.)

A month after Roosevelt's election to the Presidency, and with repeal of prohibition apparently assured, Hopkins wrote again to his brother:

It seems to me that the principal idea of the public administrators for the past several years has been to protect big business and I have a great deal more confidence in the 'hoi polloi' that are going into office on the fourth of March than I ever had in Andy Mellon and his crowd of high-binders. For my part I would abolish the whole federal (prohibition) enforcement crowd as well as the local crowd, at once, and not spend another dime on enforcing a law that could not be enforced for ten times that amount of money. The 'noble experiment' is on the way out.

I agree with you entirely on the fact that we are not going to get nearly as much from taxes as some of the people think. For my part I do not believe in a high tax on liquor, especially on beer, and, as you indicate, if they try to tax it too much the bootleggers and those of us who have learned how to make home-made gin will keep right at it.

I look to see some pretty drastic changes made in Washington after the fourth of March. Certainly the unemployment situation is no better, and I can see no earthly reason for an upturn of business. It is going to be quite impossible, in my judgment, to get these ten or twelve million men back to work unless we have a universal five-day week, and I am not too sure about it even then. I have no sympathy with the 'share the work' movement that the big boys are advocating. Nor do I approve of the sales tax or other methods of taxation which have a horizontal base, because that means that the people pay the taxes who can least afford it. I would shove the income taxes, inheritance, gift taxes, etc., higher than they now are. Certainly that should be done before we begin to tax every working man for each pair of shoes that he buys.

When Hopkins wrote that, he was bursting with ambition to expand on a national scale. He could not bear to go back to the Tuberculosis and Health Association, where he had already achieved about as much advancement as he could hope for. His experience with T.E.R.A. in New York State had given him a taste of and for public life, and the service of millions of people and the expenditure of millions of dollars. I believe that when Jesse Straus was appointed Ambassador to France he asked Hopkins to go along with him as an *aide*, but Hopkins could not see himself in the role of a 'cookie pusher' (a term that both he and Roosevelt later loved to use to describe routine diplomats). Hopkins wanted to get into the Roosevelt Administration. Particularly in the weeks following the Inauguration, when the New Deal was bursting out in a series of bewildering pyrotechnical explosions, he felt that he must be part of this historic show. When he finally got the call, more than two months after Roosevelt took office, he answered it with alacrity and with no qualms.

When Hopkins went to Washington he had broken sharply with his previous life. He had been divorced by his first wife and had married again. He was at odds with his old friends, even John Kingsbury, and was virtually estranged from his sister, Adah Aime, to whom he had been particularly close in childhood and who was the only member of his family living in the East. There can be little doubt that Hopkins was ashamed of himself and therefore on the defensive, for the home that he broke up involved not only his wife, but their three small sons, with no means of support other than his own uncertain earnings. I have had no intention of going into the intricacies of Hopkins's private emotional life; for one thing, they appear far too complicated for me to cope with, and for another thing he had shaken them out of his system by the time he was called upon to take his place in the Second World War. But the developments of these final years before he entered public service cannot be glossed over without a word. As his old Professor, Dr. Edward A. Steiner, said in a letter to me, they were 'not to his credit'.

About 1927—I do not know the exact date—he fell in love with Barbara Duncan, an attractive, well-educated, well-bred girl who had come from her native Michigan to New York for training as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital. She developed tubercular symptoms and was given employment as a secretary at the Tuberculosis Association. Under the unhappy circumstances, it could hardly be called a glamorously romantic attachment which Hopkins had formed, and both he and Miss Duncan attempted to resist it. He went to a psychoanalyst, Dr. Frankwood E. Williams, and started to read voluminously in the works of Freud, Jung, and Adler. Both his sister, Mrs. Aime, and John Kingsbury have told me that, if he had been secretive about himself in his youth, he was the exact opposite now: he talked endlessly and boringly

to his close friends about his personal troubles, trying to rationalize his behaviour through exercises in self-psychoanalysis. In the summer of 1928, under the benevolent influence of Dr. Williams, Hopkins was firmly resolved that his home must not be destroyed, and he and Miss Duncan agreed that their romance must develop no further. Kingsbury was going to Europe with a group to study social conditions, and suggested that Hopkins go along as a member of the delegation, which was financed by the Milbank Fund. This seemed a good opportunity for Hopkins to get away from all domestic problems and pull himself together, and he accordingly went on his first trip to France and England. I am indebted to Mrs. Ethel Gross Hopkins for providing me with excerpts from letters that he wrote to her during that summer when he was struggling miserably to renew the bonds of their married life. He wrote from the Royal Palace Hotel in Kensington:

I have just had the most exalting experience. Having had a real English dinner with a delightful physician in his very English home, he took me for a tramp over Hampstead Heath—a great park on the outskirts of London. We were discussing the Mental Deficiency Act of England or some equally uplifting subject when we suddenly came on a lovely path upon which was a very impersonal sign which read 'Keats Walk'.

Upon inquiry it developed that here Keats walked with Fanny Brawne, and over this very Hampstead Heath—Keats had roamed for hours and it is just the same now as then. Imagine my feeling! The doctor, not knowing Keats, could not share my enthusiasm, but that didn't restrain mine, for at last I was in Keats's country, and every memory of the years I have known him (how long has it been—I think it dates from the time I was ill in New Hospital about eight years ago) swelled to my imagination and I saw his red head and proud step sauntering through the green. It was as though I could reach out and touch him—quite like a dream. But it was not—for not two blocks away was his home where he lived for three years and where the *Ode to the Nightingale* was written and other heavenly music. I saw his very house—and his garden that he sat in for hours on end. It is now State property, and, of course, was closed, but it is open during the day and I am going back soon. . . .

I know you will be glad to hear of this and are the only one that will fully understand what this incident is to me. That it was quite accidental made it all the more delightful. I fairly walk on air and wanted you to know. . . .

Following are more comments that he wrote at that time from London, which he was to visit again in the terror of the blitz:

Today I spent in the heart of London's East End—the poorest dock workers—miserable poverty—dirty rotten slums, but magnificent school health work under the direction of skilled and devoted doctors and nurses. It was thrilling. We are amateurs indeed! I am spending the week looking at the school work, the administration of which is complicated and extensive.

Next week the T.B. health service and then the district health service—it would take six months instead of weeks to do this adequately. I am being royally received and the whole works is open.

I had dinner with Harry Day last night at his very sporty club—a heavenly swim first. We sat on the veranda talking over a stein of beer and cigarettes and then for a long walk through Hyde Park where dozens of speakers harangued a friendly and intelligent crowd. . . .

I have had no time for sightseeing and am going to put that off until I learn the town better. . . .

London is big, old and stolid, and no stranger can ever get on the inside. . . .

I had an interesting day at East Stepney, a poverty borough of London. I saw the finest school work I ever hope to see—was entertained at lunch by the social workers of the neighborhood—visited some miserable tenements and arrived here thoroughly tired out. . . .

I finished the school work Friday and am beginning on the T.B. stuff tomorrow. Sightseeing is no fun alone, and apart from visiting all of Keats haunts I shall not do much. . . .

I am going to try to do some writing this summer and will let you know later how that works out. My job is altogether interesting and I am seeing and learning many things . . . I tramped all over London today. . . .

Hopkins at this time wrote fragments of poetry. Here is one:

See the snow—see it
Come on and see
White like my bed.
The snow is a white bed
Sleep in its coolness
Crawl under its clean covers and sleep.
Best sleep under the still white snow
Than go to sleep standing up.
See the snow—see it
Come on and see
White like my bed.

Here is another, an expression of his persistent love for his homeland and of his attitude toward the money-changers:

In long straight rows the corn's laid by in hot June days.
Almost tenderly Iowa's corn is nourished:
Its yellow mellowness is soft—its yellowness is precious.
Iowa tends its corn like a slick banker watches a ticker tape.
Too wet—too dry—early frost—late frost.
An Iowa farmer always looks in the dark.

The psychoanalytic experiment did not work. Hopkins never succeeded in reassembling the pieces of his shattered marriage. Two years later his wife divorced him and he and Barbara Duncan were married. One daughter, Diana, was born in 1932 of this marriage, which was a brief but very happy one. The second Mrs. Hopkins died of cancer in 1937.

THE RELIEF PROGRAMME

ADOLF Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933, and some Americans who had read *Mein Kampf* and had taken seriously its implications were frightened as they tried to peer into the heavily clouded future. It was not that there was any immediate prospect of war, for Germany still seemed to be prostrate militarily, and faith in the precautionary measures of the Treaty of Versailles still persisted. Far more immediate as a threat was the deeply disquieting suspicion that *it could happen here*. The dragon's teeth of Fascism and Communism were being sown throughout the world and in that winter of closing banks, of 'scrip' currency and interminable breadlines, it was all too possible to fear that these destructive seeds might take root in American soil. The people as a whole knew very little of the true character of the new man who was coming into the White House on March 4. What if he should prove to be another Man on Horseback? Under the existing circumstances, it might not have been difficult for him to seize dictatorial power.

The American people were literally starved for leadership. Herbert Hoover, who had appeared to possess exceptional qualifications for the Presidency, had failed lamentably under the stress of major emergency. Although he had been honoured as 'a Great Humanitarian', his performance as President of a depressed nation was that of one who was pathetically inept in the exercise of common, human understanding. He first coldly assured the people that the depression was an illusion which it was their patriotic duty to ignore; then, when economic collapse occurred in Europe, he angrily denounced the depression as something un-American from which we should isolate and insulate ourselves; and, finally, he truculently scolded the people for blaming the depression on his own Republican party which had taken full credit for the preceding boom. (As a noble Republican, Dwight Morrow, said at the time, 'Those who took credit for the rainfall should not complain when they are blamed for the drought.') The unfortunate fact was that Herbert Hoover was, in a word—and the word was applied by that sage Hoosier, George Ade—'clammy'. Under his hapless Administration the prestige of the Presidency had dropped to an alarmingly low level, and so had popular faith in our whole Constitutional system and particularly in what Hoover himself stoutly maintained to be 'the American way of life'. The temper of the people was fearful and bitterly resentful and ominous.

There is a persistent theory held by those who prate most steadily about 'the American way of life' that the average American is a rugged individualist to whom the whole conception of 'leadership' is something foreign

and distasteful—and this theory would certainly seem to be in accordance with our national tradition of lawlessness and disrespect for authority. But it is not entirely consistent with the facts. We Americans are inveterate hero-worshippers, to a far greater extent than are the British or the French. We like to personalize our loyalties, our causes. In our political or business or labour organizations we are comforted by the knowledge that at the top is a Big Boss whom we are free to revere or to hate and upon whom we can depend for quick decisions when the going gets tough. The same is true of our Boy Scout troops and our criminal gangs. It is most conspicuously true of our passion for competitive sport. We are trained from childhood to look to the coach for authority in emergencies. The master-minding coach who can send in substitutes with instructions whenever he feels like it—or even send in an entirely new team—is a purely American phenomenon. In British football the team must play through the game with the same eleven men with which it started and with no orders from the sidelines; if a man is injured and forced to leave the field, the team goes on playing with only ten men. Thus, in British sport, there can be no such thing as a Knute Rockne or a Connie Mack, whereas in American sport the master-mind is considered as an essential in the relentless pursuit of superiority.

In times of peace and prosperity, it is true, when the American people feel they are doing all right for themselves, they do not give much thought to the character of the man in the White House; they are satisfied to have a President who merely 'fits into the picture frame', as Warren G. Harding did, and who will eventually look sufficiently austere on the less frequently used postage stamps. But when adversity sets in and problems become too big for individual solution, then the average citizen becomes conscious of the old 'team spirit', and he starts looking anxiously toward the sidelines for instructions from the coach. That is when the President of the United States must step out of the picture frame and assert himself as a vital, human need. American faith in the recurrence of that miracle is unlimited. There is deep rooted in our consciousness the conviction that a great President will appear 'whenever we really need him', and in the years 1929-33 the question was being asked, constantly and apprehensively: "Where is he *now*?"

No cosmic dramatist could possibly devise a better entrance for a new President—or a new Dictator, or a new Messiah—than that accorded to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The eternally ironic fact is that the stage was so gloriously set for him not by his own friends and supporters, who were then relatively obscure people, but by those who were to become his bitterest enemies. Herbert Hoover was, in the parlance of vaudeville, 'a good act to follow'. Roosevelt rode in on a wheel chair instead of a white horse, but the roll of drums and the thunderclaps which attended him were positively Wagnerian as emotional stimuli and also as ugly warnings of what might

happen to American democracy if the new President should turn out to possess any of the qualities of a Hitler or even of a Huey Long. The people did not have to wait long for him to reveal himself, clearly and irrevocably. As the occasion of his entrance was tremendous, so was the manner of his rising to it. Harry Hopkins, who was to participate in the preparation of so many of the President's later speeches, wrote after Roosevelt's death: 'For myself I think his first inaugural address was the best speech he ever made.' It was certainly most thoroughly representative of the character of the man himself. In something under two thousand words he made it clear that there was going to be action on a wide variety of fronts—'and action now'. The most famous phrase, and deservedly so, was 'the only thing we have to fear is fear itself'—and one thinks of these words over and over again when considering Roosevelt's career and the wellsprings of his philosophy. But there were other memorable words which gained weight as they gained implementation:

The money-changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. . . .

There will be an end to speculation with other people's money. . . .

I favour as a practical policy the putting of first things first. . . .

Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. . . .

In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigour has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory. . . .

We do not distrust the future of essential democracy. The people of the United States have not failed. . . .

In the event that the national emergency is still critical . . . I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. . . .

In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour. . . .

Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. . . .

The last quotation in particular became recognized—and with acute pain in the more conservative and, later, isolationist circles—as expressive of the very core of Roosevelt's political doctrine. No President since Lincoln had tested the elasticity of the Constitution as he did—but I do not think that Roosevelt equalled Lincoln's record in circumventing the Constitution, nor

did he ever declare, as did William H. Seward: 'There is a higher law than the Constitution which regulates our authority.' Roosevelt never saw the need for a higher temporal law; he considered the Constitution broad enough to cover all foreseeable eventualities.

The records of Roosevelt's early career indicate an inclination toward Jeffersonian principles of democratic decentralization of power as opposed to the Hamiltonian concept of concentration of power in the Federal Government—and especially to John Jay's dictum: 'This country should be governed by the people who own it.' Roosevelt's experience in elective office had all been on the State level. As President he sometimes irritated his progressive advisers by his tendency to resolve every problem in terms of the exceptional circumstances of Hyde Park Township in the venerable Hudson River Valley, and yet he had been profoundly influenced by the belligerent progressivism of his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. While F.D.R. was serving his first term in the New York State Senate, in 1910, T.R. gave a speech at Osawatamie, Kansas—the battleground of John Brown. In the crowd that day were many Civil War veterans, and T.R. addressed himself primarily to them, emphasizing their struggle to establish human rights above property rights and to do so within the framework of a united nation. Because that Osawatamie Speech was of such great importance in shaping the structure of the New Deal, I venture to quote from it at some length:

I stand for the square deal. But when I say I am for the square deal, I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good service. . . .

The true conservative is the one who insists that property shall be the servant and not the master of the commonwealth; who insists that the creature of man's making shall be the servant and not the master of the man who made it. The citizens of the United States must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they have themselves called into being. . . .

The absence of effective State, and especially national, restraint upon unfair money-getting has tended to create a small class of enormously wealthy and economically powerful men whose chief object is to hold and increase their power. The prime need is to change the conditions which enable these men to accumulate power which it is not for the general welfare that they should hold or exercise. We grudge no man a fortune which represents his own power and sagacity when exercised with entire regard to the welfare of his fellows. . . . We grudge no man a fortune in civil life if it is honourably obtained and well used. It is not

enough that it should have been gained without doing damage to the country. We should permit it to be gained only so long as the gaining represents benefits to the community. This, I know, implies a policy of far more active Government interference with social and economic conditions in this country than we have yet had, but I think we have got to face the fact that such an increase in Governmental control is now necessary. . . .

The National Government belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole American people are interested, that interest can be guarded only by the National Government. The betterment which we seek must be accomplished, I believe, mainly through the National Government. The American people are right in demanding that New Nationalism without which we cannot cope with new problems. The New Nationalism puts national need before sectional or personal advantage. It is impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat national issues as local issues. It is still more impatient of the impotence which springs from overdivision of Governmental powers, the impotence which makes it possible for local selfishness or legal cunning, hired by wealthy special interest, to bring national activities to a deadlock. This New Nationalism regards the executive power as the steward of the public welfare. It demands of the judiciary that it shall be interested primarily in human welfare rather than in property, just as it demands that the representative body shall represent all the people rather than any one class or section of the people. I believe in shaping the ends of government to protect property as well as human welfare. Normally, and in the long run, the ends are the same; but whenever the alternative must be faced, I am for men and not for property, as you were in the Civil War.

Theodore Roosevelt died before his fifth cousin achieved any degree of prominence on the national scene, and during the years of the New Deal the 'Oyster Bay Roosevelts' were implacably opposed to the Hyde Park 'maverick'. However, the words of the great and gallant T.R. and the actions of F.D.R. were curiously in harmony with one another.

Eight days after the spectacular inauguration of the New Deal—eight days during which all the banks in the country had been closed—Franklin Roosevelt gave his first Fireside Chat. 'It has been wonderful to me to catch the note of confidence from all over the country. . . . Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan. . . . Together we cannot fail.' Here was the first real demonstration of Roosevelt's superb ability to use the first-person plural and bring the people right into the White House with him. The very fact of a 'chat' was in itself surprising and

immeasurably stimulating: traditionally, when a President spoke to the people, it was an 'address', which might be intended as an exhortation, or an elaborate apologia, or a stern lecture. But Roosevelt spoke simply, casually, as a friend or relative, who had figured out a way to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage, and those of us who heard that speech will never forget the surge of confidence that his buoyant spirit evoked. It was all the more thrilling after the hair-shirted carping and petulance that we had been hearing from Hoover. During the three days following this Fireside Chat 4,507 national banks and 567 State member banks reopened, and Roosevelt sent a Message to the Congress asking for modification of the Volstead Act to permit the manufacture and sale of beer, thus writing the beginning of the end of fourteen years of prohibition and attendant crime. This long-overdue reform was tossed in as a sort of bonus, and it was hailed joyfully by the people as proof that the new Administration was not only progressive and dynamic, but also essentially cheerful. Happy days were here again! More than eleven years later, when Roosevelt was running for President for the fourth time, he evoked roars of agreement from a crowd in Fenway Park in Boston when he said:

If there ever was a time in which the spiritual strength of our people was put to the test, that time was in the terrible depression of 1929 to 1933.

Then our people might have turned to alien ideologies—like communism or fascism.

But—our democratic faith was too sturdy. What the American people demanded in 1933 was not less democracy—but more democracy—and that is what they got.

The difference of opinion (to use the mildest of expressions) that existed between Roosevelt and his domestic foes was based on the definition of that word 'democracy'. Indeed, they came to hate the word so vehemently that they claimed it had never been applied to the American form of government until Woodrow Wilson dreamed it up. They said that the government, as conceived and established by the Founding Fathers, was a *republic*, not a *democracy*, but they were reluctant to explain just what was the difference; they didn't dare. (It might be noted in this connection that, in his first Message to Congress, more than two years before he spoke at Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln defined the United States as 'a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people'.) The political attacks on Roosevelt and the New Deal always resolved themselves into a plea: 'Let us get back to the Constitution', but Roosevelt successfully persuaded a majority of the people that what this really meant was: 'Let us get back to special privilege', or—'Let us get back into the temple from which That Man ejected us.'

In *The Roosevelt Revolution* the authoritative Ernest K. Lindley covered the first six months of the New Deal, and it is interesting to note that in this book he considered Hopkins as worth no more than a paragraph of mention as among those present in Washington. The conspicuous figures of that first year of the New Deal were Raymond Moley, Rexford G. Tugwell, and Adolf Berle, of the 'Brains Trust'; Louis MacHenry Howe, Roosevelt's close friend and most intimate adviser; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., another old friend who was at first Governor of the Farm Credit Administration; Lewis Douglas, Director of the Budget; Hugh S. Johnson, of N.R.A.; and, in the Cabinet, William H. Woodin, Harold L. Ickes, Frances Perkins, and Henry Wallace. However, well within Roosevelt's first term Hopkins came to be regarded as the Chief Apostle of the New Deal and the most cordially hated by its enemies. I think it may fairly be said that he earned this distinction. He was brought into the Government on May 22, when seventy-nine of Roosevelt's 'First Hundred Days' had already passed. He was made Federal Emergency Relief Administrator and it is my understanding that, as in the case of his Albany appointment two years previously, he was not the first choice for the job. Roosevelt later wrote of him:

The task he faced was stupendous. Little was known at Washington about the efficiency of the various State and local relief organizations throughout the country. There were no such organizations in some of the States and in many of the counties. There were no immediately available reliable statistics either about relief needs or relief expenditures.

Action had to be immediate. It was immediate. The day after he (Hopkins) took office he telegraphed his first communication to the Governors of the respective States; and before nightfall he had made grants of money to Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, and Texas.

From the very beginning two important points of policy were evident: (1) The operations of the programme, aside from certain basic standards and stipulations, were to be decentralized and local in character, and (2) work, rather than idleness on a dole, was preferred.

The original grant of money, in accordance with the statute, was on the basis of \$1.00 of Federal funds for every \$3.00 of local, State, and Federal funds spent during the preceding quarter year. The statute also provided that part of the fund could be used in States without such matching where the amount available by matching would be insufficient to meet the needs for relief in any State.

The day after Hopkins went to work for the Federal Government the *Washington Post* printed a somewhat mournful headline, 'Money Flies', and stated: 'The half-billion dollars for direct relief of States won't last a month

if Harry L. Hopkins, new relief administrator, maintains the pace he set yesterday in disbursing more than \$5,000,000 during his first two hours in office.'

Hopkins was off. He sat down at his desk and started flashing out telegrams even before the men had arrived to move the desk out of the hallway into his office. He said: 'I'm not going to last six months here, so I'll do as I please.' He had been told by Roosevelt that his job was to get relief to people who needed it and to have no truck with politicians. Of course, the relief programme offered more juicy plums in the way of political patronage than had ever before been known in peacetime. But at first, while Hopkins was still an amateur in Washington politics, he was scornful of these sordid considerations. In the early days of the New Deal he worked, as he was to work later in war, with regard for nothing but the interests of the American people and of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which to him meant one and the same thing. In appointing men and women to positions of authority he was concerned only with consideration of their competence and zeal; he did not give a damn whether they were Methodists, Baptists, Catholics or Jews—and he was specifically instructed by the President never to 'ask whether a person needing relief is a Republican, Democrat, Socialist or anything else'. Hopkins said: 'I don't like it when people finagle around the back door.' He thus soon found himself involved in controversy with James A. Farley and with various members of Congress and State Governors whose duty it was to look out for the interests of 'deserving Democrats'. Confident of Roosevelt's support, Hopkins continued for a long time on the principle that relief was entirely non-partisan. For that was a period of soaring altruism. In the first triumphant sweep of the New Deal, it was possible to afford the luxury of being non-political—but Hopkins learned better (or perhaps one should say 'worse') later on when the opposition began to recover its dissipated strength and elections became less easy to win.

There had been a pretence of a relief programme before F.E.R.A. Confronted with the obvious, overwhelming need for some kind of Federal Government aid for the idle and hungry victims of economic collapse, Hoover had found himself in one of the many impossible dilemmas that surrounded him: the 'dole' system was naturally repugnant to him, but the only logical alternative appeared to be a form of Government subsidy of public works projects which smacked of State Socialism. Since the dole was traditional, and had been since the institution of the 'Old Poor Law' in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Hoover favoured that, however much he hated it, simply because it *was* traditional. Thus, American citizens, who had so recently been given the assurance of two cars in every garage and a chicken in every pot, were now given basically the same kind of treatment that was accorded to paupers in sixteenth-century England. Hoover tried to

meet this problem, as he tried to meet so many others, by appointing commissions to 'study' it. (His principal committee was headed by Walter S. Gifford, of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.) But this was an emergency which demanded action first and study later. Finally, in the summer of 1932, with an election imminent, Hoover supported legislation which provided for loans, at 3 per cent interest, of \$200,000,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the various States for relief—the Federal Government to assume responsibility for the bookkeeping, but not for the actual application of these funds. This was known as the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, and it provided a nuclear regional organization which Hopkins took over when he started work; but it provided him with no funds, for the money had run out when he started to minister to the needs of some seventeen million people who were subsisting on the relief rolls. Under the new dispensation of F.E.R.A., the funds appropriated—\$500,000,000—were in the form of outright grants rather than loans to the States; but otherwise there was no essential departure from the principle of the dole. The main burden of cost and of administration was still on the local authorities to whom the needy must go, cap in hand, to accept charity. This is precisely where Hopkins came in and produced a profound change in the whole conception of Governmental responsibility and function.

Hopkins inherited from the previous relief organization several key men who were predominantly social workers, like himself, trained to think that local problems should be handled with funds locally raised and administered by local and, to the greatest possible extent, *private* charitable organizations. In other words, the fact of Federal Relief must be disguised in all possible ways. This was in deference to the creed that private enterprise must always provide the cure for any and every ill and that anyone who said that it might be unable to do so was, *ipso facto*, a declared enemy of the American way of life. But Roosevelt as Governor had proclaimed the principle of State responsibility to 'the humblest citizen', and Hopkins took those words literally. This was the great tenet of the New Deal, which became the number one item in Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights of eleven years later: the right to work.

One of the first men that Hopkins brought into F.E.R.A. to advise him was Frank Bane, whom he had met in the First World War when he was working for the Red Cross in the South. In 1931 Bane had organized the American Public Welfare Association and had consulted with Roosevelt and Hopkins on relief problems in New York State and with the Gifford Committee on the problems in the nation as a whole. The Gifford Committee was interested in developing the activities of private charitable agencies, whereas Bane insisted that all levels of government—Federal,

State, and community—should be directly and openly responsible for the administration of public relief. The Bane slogan was 'Public funds expended by public agencies', which did not find favour under the Hoover Administration, but was right in line with Hopkins's thinking.

Bane agreed to work for Hopkins without pay on a temporary basis. He named as his permanent successor another social worker, Aubrey Williams, of Alabama, whom Hopkins did not then know, but who was to become one of his ablest, most loyal and most smeared *aides* in the whole New Deal achievement. Williams had been a field representative of the American Public Welfare Association, of which Bane was Director. The long-scorned social workers were coming into their own as figures of national importance.

On June 17—three and a half weeks after he had entered Government service—Hopkins went to Detroit to speak at the National Conference of Social Work. Bane and Williams were already there when he arrived. They begged him to take a stand in favour of direct Federal relief—as opposed to relief administered through private agencies. He was in grave doubt as to the practicability of this; but it was the way his natural inclinations tended, and he followed his natural inclinations. He spoke out in favour of relief as an obligation of the Federal Government to the citizens—without any pretence of private agencies interposed—thereby putting into effect the Roosevelt doctrine that this relief was a sacred right rather than an act of charity, an obligation of Government to its citizens rather than a mere emergency alleviation of suffering in the form of alms. Hopkins's Detroit speech was given scant notice in the Press and such attention as it received overlooked utterly its main import. I do not know if Roosevelt himself or any of his then advisers knew at the time just what it was that Hopkins had said; but the principle had been stated, and it was followed religiously in the administration of F.E.R.A., and Roosevelt supported it and came to admire Hopkins and to give him more and more opportunities to exert his influence in the official family.

There were two other important principles that Hopkins advocated successfully in the beginnings of F.E.R.A. One was the payment of cash to those on relief rolls instead of grocery slips. The other, considered revolutionary and wildly impractical by the more conservative social workers, was the extension of relief to the provision not only of food, but of clothing, shelter, and medical care to the needy. These principles have continued and have affected the whole concept of social work, particularly in the field of public health.

It may be interposed at this point that I have often wondered about the accuracy of the famous statement, attributed to Thomas Corcoran, that 'we planned it that way'. Roosevelt had contemplated, in broad outline, the Tennessee Valley power project, the Agricultural Adjustment, Conservation and Public Works programmes, the Securities and Exchanges Control, and

something like the National Industrial Recovery Act, more than a year before he became President, and they were all quickly put into effect. But the vast relief programme, as Hopkins administered it, certainly did not work out according to any plan. It was a series of remarkable improvisations impelled by the character of the myriad problems that were discovered from day to day. By enforced research and a great deal of shrewd guesswork Hopkins found out what was really going on in the country as a whole and brought the facts home to Roosevelt. He personalized the problems for the President, and also most importantly for Mrs. Roosevelt, who made the concerns of helpless individuals her own. Any appraisal of the Roosevelt Administration must begin with the fact that the Government in Washington in the years following 1933 achieved an incomparable knowledge of the aspirations and the fears and the needs of the American people and that knowledge became of supreme importance when those same people had to be called upon for unprecedented efforts in the waging of the Second World War. The research which was needed to get the programme started was multiplied by the various extensive research projects carried out subsequently under the programme itself.

Although Hopkins will never be celebrated as a 'sound money' man or a champion of the sanctity of the taxpayer's dollar, he was exceptionally economy-minded in one respect: he liked to run his own organization on the smallest possible budget. Unlike most bureaucrats, he hated to have a lot of Civil Servants around. What he wanted and what he obtained was a small staff composed of people of such passionate zeal that they would work killing hours. At the end of the first year Hopkins's relief organization had handled on its rolls the vital problems of some seventeen million people and had spent a billion and a half dollars, but the organization itself consisted of only 121 people with a total payroll of only \$22,000 a month. To anyone in any way familiar with the normal workings of Government, the lowness of those figures is wellnigh incredible. But Hopkins managed to obtain people to whom a sixty-hour work-week would be a holiday. Hopkins's own salary was under \$8,000, as opposed to \$15,000 he had earned before entering the Government. He and his wife and baby lived for a considerable time on \$250 a month, the remainder of his salary going for the support of the three sons by his first marriage. He told a reporter: 'I'd like to be able to forget this \$500,000,000 business long enough to make some money for clothes and food. Mrs. Hopkins is yelling for a winter coat. I don't blame her.' Hopkins was by no means frugal in his personal tastes. He would like to have had a great deal of money, and if he had he would have spent it lavishly, but he never did have it to the end of his days. Now and then he would supplement his income by writing a magazine article and would feel very flush for a while. In 1944, in his last year in Government service, his

salary was raised to \$15,000, so he ended up just where he had been before he started.

In his perpetual haste, Hopkins was contemptuous of bureaucratic procedure. When inspectors from the Bureau of the Budget came around asking to see the 'organizational chart' they were told there wasn't any, as Hopkins would not permit one to be made. He said: 'I don't want anybody around here to waste any time drawing boxes. You'll always find that the person who drew the chart has his own name in the middle box.' He was also contemptuous of the formality—or 'dignity'—with which a high Government official feels it necessary to surround himself: the wainscoted office with thick carpets and two flags on standards behind the huge mahogany desk. Hopkins owned no morning-coat and striped trousers, but he rented this diplomatic uniform for the visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Washington in later years when he was a member of the Cabinet.

There was a kind of fanaticism in Hopkins's drive toward the objectives that he had to a large extent established for himself. This fanaticism was communicated to his co-workers, who felt that they were fighting a Holy War against want. But—lest this analogy be misinterpreted—it is necessary to add that no fighter in this war who served under Hopkins was compelled to wear the sackcloth uniform of asceticism. Despite the rigid Methodism of Hopkins's early training, many of his most important staff conferences during the New Deal years were held in automobiles *en route* to or returning from the Maryland race tracks around Washington. The organization which became W.P.A. was first outlined by Hopkins in a suite in the aristocratic Hotel St. Regis in New York. As Joseph E. Davies has said of Hopkins, 'He had the purity of St. Francis of Assisi combined with the sharp shrewdness of a race-track tout.'

Hopkins, in his first few months in office, sloughed off some of the tradition-bound social workers whom he had inherited from the previous half-hearted regime and brought in men and women who agreed with his own unrestricted conception of Governmental responsibilities. This did not mean that his staff was composed of yes-men and yes-women; they were, on the contrary, tireless and inveterate needlers, as he was, who would not hesitate to prod and goad anyone, including their own boss, who seemed at any instant to show signs of slacking on the job. Hopkins always thrived in an atmosphere of protest.

Years later, when I came to know Hopkins, I was given a demonstration of the exasperating way in which he applied the irritant method to those who worked with him. It was the summer of 1940 and I was engaged in frenzied work for the William Allen White Committee to promote aid to Britain. I encountered Hopkins on a Sunday on Long Island when he was staying at Mrs. Harvey Cushing's house, and he drew me aside to ask: 'What

are you warmongers up to now?' I assumed he was using that noun facetiously, and I told him that we were working on a campaign to transfer fifty American over-age destroyers to the British Navy.

Hopkins assumed a look of disgust. 'You mean you're going to come right out publicly and ask the President to give fifty of our fighting ships to a belligerent?'

I said that these destroyers were of no immediate use to us; they were lying idle and had been for years.

'But,' he asked, 'don't you realize that a public demand like that would be a big embarrassment to the President—especially now, with an election coming up?'

I said that some of us were working privately to get Wendell Willkie's agreement to the proposal which was in line with Roosevelt's whole policy.

Hopkins snapped at me: 'What do *you* know about the President's policy? Don't you know that this country is neutral?'

I was getting angrier by the minute and also depressed at the thought that this man, so close to Roosevelt, was revealing himself as a narrow-minded isolationist. I expressed this thought.

'The whole country's isolationist,' said Hopkins, 'except for a few pro-British fanatics like you. How do you imagine that the President could possibly justify himself with the people if he gave up fifty of our destroyers?'

I answered this with a tirade of much more vehemence and eloquence than I can usually summon. I said that the people were a lot less neutral than Hopkins seemed to think—that they hated Nazism—that if Roosevelt would speak to them with his own great courage and clarity they would support him, etc. etc. When I had concluded my impassioned oration Hopkins grinned and said: 'All right, then—why do you waste your breath shouting all this at *me*? Why don't you get out and say these things to the people?' He had just wanted to find out if I had any real arguments to support my emotional bias.

The direct result of this interview was that Hopkins brought me into the White House to work with Sam Rosenman and himself in helping President Roosevelt to prepare his next speech.

Hopkins pulled that same trick on a great many people to find out just how sound their arguments were and how sincere was their advocacy of them; but one could never be entirely sure if it were a trick, for sometimes this was his method of telling an overzealous proponent to pipe down.

In October, 1933, Hopkins knew that with winter coming on the unemployment problem was bound to become more desperate, and he believed that the only decent solution was a huge work programme. Aubrey Williams and other *aides* were urging him to propose such a programme to the President, but Hopkins felt sure that it would be turned down. He knew that

Roosevelt would be under fire on this not only from the conservatives: organized labour was strongly opposed to a programme of governmentally 'made' jobs. This was one of the times when Hopkins was impatient and irascible with those who were prodding him to do the very thing that he himself most wanted to do.

On Saturday, October 28, Hopkins arrived in Chicago to have lunch with Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, and to attend a football game. He was met at the station by Frank Bane and Louis Brownlow, Director of the Public Administration Clearing House, who had been talking to Williams about the work programme and who now joined in hammering at Hopkins to bring it to the President. Both men, experts in public administration, were able to give Hopkins an abundance of facts and figures and he was able to absorb them; but he still did not know how to sell the idea to Roosevelt, who was concerned about the attitude of organized labour. He went from Chicago to Kansas City to make a speech; among the people with whom he conferred on relief problems while there was the Federal Unemployment Director for Missouri, Judge Harry S. Truman. Williams reached Hopkins in Kansas City by telephone to announce that he had just seen Dr. John R. Commons in Madison, Wisconsin. Dr. Commons was one of the country's greatest authorities on all matters pertaining to labour, and when he heard what was on Williams's mind he dug into his voluminous files and came up with a clipping dating from 1898 of a statement by Samuel Gompers in which the father of American organized labour advocated precisely the form of work programme then suggested. Gompers called it 'The Day Labour Plan'. That was just what Hopkins had hoped for. It was his convenient conviction that a precedent can almost always be found for a new idea, however revolutionary it may seem, if you really search for it; the precedent for Lend Lease was found in an unimportant law passed by Congress in 1892, during the Benjamin Harrison Administration. Thus, when Hopkins learned what Gompers had said, he knew he had the persuasive argument that Roosevelt needed to overcome the labour leaders' objections to the work relief programme. He telephoned to the White House and was given an appointment for lunch on the day of his return to Washington.

During that lunch Roosevelt asked how many jobs would have to be provided and Hopkins said about four million.

'Let's see,' said Roosevelt. 'Four million people—that means roughly four hundred million dollars.' He thought this could be provided from the Public Works Fund, which was under the guardianship of Harold Ickes, who was neither then nor subsequently extravagant in his admiration for Harry Hopkins nor for his methods. When Hopkins left the White House after this lunch he 'fairly walked on air', as he had when he saw the house in which

Keats wrote 'Ode to a Nightingale'. He put through a telephone call to Williams, who was by then in New Orleans, making a speech for the Community Chest Fund, and insisted that Williams interrupt the speech and get to the telephone to hear the news that the Work Programme was going to start with \$400,000,000. Williams, Brownlow, and Bane were summoned immediately to Washington, where they assembled on Saturday night, one week after the football game in Chicago, together with Hopkins, Howard Hunter, Jacob Baker, Julius F. Stone, Clarence M. Bookman, Ellen Woodward, Robert S. McClure, Corrington Gill, Pierce Williams, and T. S. Edmonds. They worked most of Saturday night and Sunday in the Hotel Powhatan (later named the Roger Smith), and drew up the plans for the Civil Works Administration which put the four million people to work in the first thirty days of its existence and, in less than four months, inaugurated 180,000 work projects and spent over \$933,000,000. It was the parent of W.P.A. I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that its creation marked a turning-point in American history. It marked the real establishment of the principle of the right to work from which there could be no retreat.

Of the formation of C.W.A. Roosevelt wrote:

The Public Works Administration (P.W.A.) had not been able by that time to commence a very extensive programme of large public works because of the unavoidable time-consuming process of planning, designing and reviewing projects, clearing up legal matters, advertising for bids, and letting contracts.

This was Roosevelt's tactful means of explaining why he took nearly a billion dollars away from Ickes and entrusted the spending of it to Hopkins at that time (he eventually did the same with many times that sum). Ickes was a very careful, deliberate administrator, who took pains to examine personally every detail of every project and the disposition of every nickel that it cost, whether it be a village post office or a tri-borough bridge. This is hardly to his discredit, for it was the approach to each problem of a hard-headed business man as well as a conscientious public servant. Ickes was concerned about the return on the taxpayers' investment. Hopkins did not give a damn about the return; his approach was that of a social worker who was interested only in getting relief to the miserable and getting it there quickly. His ultimate argument was 'Hunger is not debatable'. Ickes thought primarily of the finished job—Hopkins of the numbers of unemployed who could be put on the job immediately. As an instance of Hopkins's impatience: someone came to him with an idea for a project which would take a lot of time to prepare in detail, but which, Hopkins was assured, 'will work out in the long run', and his exasperated comment on this was: 'People don't eat in the long run—they eat every day.'

To quote further from Roosevelt's review of C.W.A.:

Its organization and operation were essentially different from that of the F.E.R.A. (which was) mostly a State and local programme, loosely supervised and in part financed by the Federal Government, but actually administered and exercised locally. The C.W.A. was, however, completely operated and 90 per cent financed by the Federal Government.

It was, actually, one of the broadest programmes ever instituted by the United States Government. It sought to provide for individuals work as near as possible to their previous employment, and to pay the prevailing wage in each category and region with a minimum of thirty cents an hour. It abolished the 'Means Test' whereby a man who sought Government relief was denied it if a member of his family was already employed; Hopkins felt that the Means Test was an insult to the dignity of the individual, who, able and anxious to work, was forced into the status of an idle dependent. The organization of C.W.A. was a clean sweep for the Hopkins theories of work relief, and keen were the fears and violent the trembling of those who did not trust him, who suspected him of being an apostle of State Socialism rather than Jeffersonian Democracy. But Roosevelt had confidence in Hopkins's imagination and ingenuity, and both those qualities were required in abundance on this programme.

The charge has often been made that Roosevelt was 'so intoxicated with the pomp and privilege of power that he could not bear to delegate authority'. Much of that criticism came in later years, when the defence effort was mounting and Roosevelt for some eighteen months stubbornly refused to appoint one man to be head of the huge production programme; but when he did finally appoint Donald Nelson he delegated to him more authority than Nelson was able to handle. The record seems to prove that Roosevelt delegated authority with a lavish hand when he could find a man willing to take it—and he certainly found one in Hopkins. When he told Hopkins to invent jobs for four million men and women in thirty days he expected him to do it in his own way and without continually coming back to the White House for advice on details. The President also told Hopkins to talk the whole thing over with Harold Ickes and 'straighten it out' with him; but that proved a much more difficult task than the four million jobs.

Roosevelt was greatly comforted by the fact that he had his old friend Frank Walker on hand to keep an eye on Hopkins's activities. Walker, as President of the National Emergency Council, exercised a supervisory control over all the sudden New Deal agencies. Montana born, a graduate of Notre Dame, he was a quiet, gentle, trustworthy, unquenchably friendly man who was invaluable to Roosevelt through the years as spreader of oil

on troubled administrative waters. He later became chairman of the Democratic National Committee and Postmaster-General after Farley 'took a walk'. Roosevelt knew he could trust Walker to report if Hopkins were showing signs of going crazy and producing dangerous political repercussions throughout the country. Indeed, in the early days of C.W.A. such reports did come into the headquarters of the National Emergency Council from its State Directors. Some of them were almost hysterical with alarm at the intimations of wholesale waste and even corruption in the programme. Walker decided to take a trip through the country and see for himself. He returned to Washington with the assurance that C.W.A. was doing more than all the other New Deal measures to boost morale. He said that in his own home State of Montana, 'I saw old friends of mine—men I had been to school with—digging ditches and laying sewer pipe. They were wearing their regular business suits as they worked, because they couldn't afford overalls and rubber boots. If I ever thought, "There, but for the grace of God——" it was right then.' The sight of these old friends made him feel sick at heart, but when he talked to individuals he felt very differently, for they were happy to be working and proud of what they were doing. One of them pulled some silver coins out of his pocket and showed them to Walker. 'Do you know, Frank,' he said, 'this is the first money I've had in my pockets in a year and a half: Up to now I've had nothing but tickets that you exchange for groceries.' Another said: 'I hate to think what would have happened if this work hadn't come along. The last of my savings had run out. I'd sold or hocked everything I could. And my kids were hungry. I stood in front of the window of the bake-shop down the street and I wondered just how long it would be before I got desperate enough to pick up a rock and heave it through that window and grab some bread to take home.' It was not only hunger from which these men suffered; it was the deep sense of indignity and of grave injury to their national pride. The analogy used by President Roosevelt in his Inaugural Address was far from inappropriate: Americans felt as if, at a time when their country was being invaded and ravaged by alien enemies, their Government had failed to provide them with any weapons for defence. Now, armed with a shovel, or even a rake, they felt able to fight back. 'Leaf-raking' became the term of supreme opprobrium for the New Deal, but great numbers of people who did the raking preferred it to bread-lines or grocery tickets.

Walker said to Roosevelt: 'I'd pay little attention to those who criticize the creation of C.W.A. or its administration. Hopkins and his associates are doing their work well. They've done a magnificent job. It is amazing when you consider that within the short time since C.W.A. was established four million idle have been put to work. During Christmas week many of them were standing in a payroll line for the first time in eighteen months. You

have every reason to be proud of C.W.A. and its administration. It is my considered opinion that this has averted one of the most serious crises in our history. Revolution is an ugly word to use, but I think we were dangerously close at least to the threat of it.'

Walker was not always so cordial in his approval of Hopkins's administrative methods, but in his reports to the President throughout the New Deal years he was staunch in supporting Hopkins against the numerous and violent critics. A large part of Hopkins's original prestige with Roosevelt was undoubtedly attributable to Walker. The direct and unmistakable benefits to the jobless and their families were augmented by many evidences of business revival. Within the first weeks of C.W.A. shoe stores all over the country began to report that they were sold out and shoe factories began to reopen to meet the enormously increased demand.

C.W.A. came none too soon. That winter of 1933-4 was a terrible one. The temperature went to 56° below zero in parts of New England and to 6° below even in Washington, D.C., where the legislators could feel it. This was the first of a series of natural calamities—including droughts, floods, and hurricanes—which occurred during these years as if to test the Roosevelt Administration in its programme for national recovery. Hopkins had to increase his efforts to meet widespread suffering. By mid-January nearly twenty million people were dependent on Federal relief for the essentials of life, and the four hundred million dollars granted to C.W.A. was almost gone. Hopkins, with White House approval, went to the Congress for nine hundred and fifty millions more.

The Republican National Committee denounced him and C.W.A. for 'gross waste' and 'downright corruption', and one Democrat, Congressman George B. Terrell of Texas, arose to say: 'The Constitution is being violated here every day because there isn't a line in the Constitution that authorizes the expenditure of Federal money for other than Federal purposes. . . . I think (C.W.A.) is going to start civil war and revolution when we do stop it anyway. . . . The others (in Congress) can go through on these things like dumb driven cattle if they want to, but . . . I won't sacrifice my independence for any office I ever heard of.'

But Terrell's was a lone voice on Capitol Hill. The members of Congress were hearing from their constituencies the same kind of reports that Frank Walker had brought back to Washington, and there was an election coming up in 1934. So Hopkins got the money. One lamentably profane Senator was quoted by *Time* magazine as saying: 'If Roosevelt ever becomes Jesus Christ, he should have Harry Hopkins as his prophet.'

Time ran Hopkins's picture on its cover and, in a long article about him, paid tribute to him for having done 'a thoroughly professional job' as administrator. *Time* reported:

Of the \$950,000,000 given him by the new law, Mr. Hopkins said he intended to use \$450,000,000 to taper off C.W.A. gradually and \$500,000,000 for direct relief. Congress would like him to use more for C.W.A., but he came out strongly against it, declaring that C.W.A. was an emergency measure, should not be permanent, should be gradually demobilized.

Hopkins was not then speaking from the heart. He was, with utmost reluctance and deep disappointment, obeying orders. For, even while he was scoring triumphs on Capitol Hill, C.W.A. was being torpedoed at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and this was done not by Republican enemies of the New Deal, but by conservative elements within the Democratic party itself. The first crack in it came when Southern influence caused the abandonment of the thirty cents an hour wage minimum—causing wages in some parts of the South to drop to ten cents an hour or worse. Then Roosevelt was persuaded by Lewis Douglas and other economic advisers that there was something in what Terrell of Texas had said. They felt that there was serious potential danger in the work relief programme, their argument being that if you got large numbers of people settled in Government-made jobs, with guarantees of security that they would not readily obtain from private industry, *you might never be able to get them off the public payroll.* That argument carried weight with Roosevelt, and he told Hopkins that C.W.A. must be liquidated before spring and the former F.E.R.A. programme of direct relief resumed.

Although this was a bitter blow to Hopkins, it provided him with his first opportunity to demonstrate his utter loyalty to Roosevelt. He did not afflict the President with a threat to resign. He was harsh in compelling his shocked associates to take this setback without complaint and to get on with the job of relief. Roosevelt was keenly sensitive to this, and his personal fondness for as well as confidence in Hopkins increased more than ever at this time. The more he contemplated the C.W.A. record, the less he thought of the advice given him by Douglas, who soon came to the breaking-point with his Chief and left the Government. (He returned after Pearl Harbour and worked very closely and amicably with Hopkins during the war years.)

The ending of C.W.A. produced protests throughout the country which could not possibly be ignored. In one week upwards of 50,000 letters and 7,000 telegrams came into the White House. There were riots in various parts of the country. The people on the relief rolls made it violently clear that they agreed with Hopkins in his theory that direct relief had a demoralizing effect: they did not want tickets for baskets of groceries—they wanted *work*. In a review of the whole relief programme and problem, *Fortune* magazine made the following rather supercilious statement:

Direct relief is—purely and simply—the Dole. Almost as purely and simply, work relief is the Dole, too, except that it does provide a little more self-respect for its recipients: at least it creates for them the fiction that they are still useful citizens and that there is work for them to do.

Yet, in this same article, *Fortune* presented many illuminating instances of work relief which belied the cynical use of the word 'fiction'. For example, Hopkins took over 250,000 bales of surplus cotton from the A.A.A. for the dual purpose of supplying work relief for women who made the cotton into mattresses and then distributing the mattresses to people who could not otherwise afford them. (This evoked howls of protest from mattress manufacturers, but it was pointed out to them that they were not being subjected to unfair competition, since the purchasing power of the recipients of the work-relief mattresses was zero.)

For another example, as cited by *Fortune*:

In Bay City, Michigan, an underwear-manufacturing concern went bankrupt, and the closing of its plant threw some 250 workers on relief. Whereupon the State Relief Administration rented the plant, reopened it, and put the 250 workers back at their jobs on a subsistence level to make enough underwear to give every relief family in the State two sets for the winter.

The C.W.A. was unquestionably an expensive programme and could not have been continued for long on its original scale. But its achievement in three and a half months was a memorable one. It included:

40,000 schools built or improved.

12,000,000 feet of sewer pipe laid.

469 airports built: 529 more improved.

255,000 miles of road built or improved.

50,000 teachers employed to teach adults or to keep open rural schools which must otherwise have been closed.

3,700 playgrounds and athletic fields built or improved.

Among the 4,264,000 for whom work was found were 3,000 writers and artists, the inception of the Federal Arts Programme, to the numerous criticisms of which Hopkins replied: 'Hell! They've got to eat just like other people.'

In the generally thankless task of Government service—and in other fields of endeavour as well—a few words of encouragement from a respectable source can wipe out the effects of thousands of words of vituperation from the hostile Press or the Congress. Shortly after the start of C.W.A., Aubrey Williams received a letter from Gutzon Borglum, the American sculptor of

heroic mould. Williams turned this letter over to Hopkins, who treasured it all the rest of his life. Borglum wrote:

You have the only department that is free to help the creative impulses of the nation, all other aids take on the character of hard business. The Government continues the hard banker-broker business man we have become.

Mr. Hopkins—the C.W.A.—almost immediately shifted public aid from cold business to human helpfulness and that to usefulness, converting mass employment into an army of workers whose goal must be to better, to make more liveable our towns and cities, our schools more cheerful, our playgrounds and parks a pride and a delight. . . .

It is not a long step from this to one of organizing the latent talent whose belly has been longer empty and who carries a double hunger, unexpressed, creative longing, fitted and anxious to be a part in the great comeback.

Mr. Hopkins's department has opened the door, a crack, but opened to this great field of human interest and thought. The world of creative impulse, without which people perish. Frankly, a people have as much right to be saved as the trees, the birds, the whole animal kingdom, and no more, but their civilization must be saved.

I am not orthodox religiously, but all there is of God in creation is what man has in lonely martyrdom wrung from nowhere and everywhere, and it has been his consciousness of that that makes him master of the world, and not business or money, we must save that, civilization contains all that is precious in what we think we are. Will a basket of bread save that, a full belly and a dry back? Is there nothing about this fine young—still young, still virgin continent—that civilization needs, in which civilization can spread a greater wing? Have we in gold—the worship of Aaron's calf—made our final bow in the hall of world fame, to be remembered with Rome for our abuse of wealth?

We are the heirs, if not the children of Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Tom Payne, Pat Henry? Have we reached the lifeline's end of the little Republic they shaped for us, have we wholly forgotten that what we are is something quite outside business and our bellies, and that something in our minds and what there is in our hearts is of real importance? Mr. Hopkins, you and his *aides*, have it in your hands to give to young America a chance for heart and soul growth which she has never had. I don't mind telling you I hammered T.R. for years to throw some small part of our vast official power behind the civil life into the soul and heart of human endeavour. I awakened interest, Root was for it, but little happened. Taft laughed all such plans out of court, and Wilson, who

gave me a degree, said 'the creative impulse must submit to business competition' . . .

I knew Harding almost intimately, and he was a kind, fine soul, destroyed by his friends. He could see a 'welfare department', but the creative impulse does not want or need a welfare department! . . .

I answered a call to go to the West and carve Mount Rushmore. Coolidge had been somewhat won by the coin experience to big national impulse in art. He was interested; he knew as much about art as I do about the late Llama of Thibet; but he knew history; he knew the story of peoples; he knew the eternal fight civilization had to make to master its own physical mass. . . .

Hoover was indifferent and dead from the top down. His heart seemed to have ceased beating to the call of laughter, to music, the charm of letters, the colour and mystery of Innis and Millet—the power of Angelo or the burning words of Tom Payne. Everything seemed to die in his hands; I believe if a rose was put into his hand it would wilt.

What I really want to say is something about the programme for the artists about which you asked me. Frankly, I have ceased to believe; there was little else for one to do but one's own work, and let the world go its way. Your question, you see, reawakened a quarter of a century of dreams and effort, sacrifice and grief, in an effort to make our country—for, after all, this is our country—yours and mine and your children's, make it all we can, make life worth living here.

I want to suggest to you that you make your thought of aid to the creative ones among us greater, more effective in its scope, make it a feature, make your aid more than half of one per cent; make it at least five per cent; concentrate on the schools, the poor schools, the little schools, the public schools, put our educators to work; start with the children; make their classrooms, study-rooms and halls pleasant, with colour and design, fairy-tales and history, home life. You are not after masterpieces, and you should not be discouraged if you have many failures; the real success will be in the interest, the human interest, which you will awaken; and what that does to the nation's mind. There are twenty-odd million children that will be affected; some millions of teachers and mothers, and an occasional father! I wish you would think of this very studiously; I believe that's the door through which Hopkins, you and his *aides* can coax the soul of America back to interest in life.

Gutzon Borglum to the contrary notwithstanding, the Federal Arts Projects were subjected to more derision and more charges of 'un-American activities' than almost any other part of the huge Relief Programme. And they were the first to be lopped off by Congress when the revolt against the

programme set in. The word 'boondoggle' came into the language to describe the more fantastic projects dreamed up by Hopkins and other 'wild-eyed radicals' for the purpose of wasting the taxpayers' money. For years the anti-New Deal Press had a great deal of fun digging up new work-relief projects which sounded very comical, particularly those involving jobless white-collar workers who could not build bridges across San Francisco Bay or dams in the Columbia or Tennessee Valleys. One of these projects, discovered in New York City, involved the study of ancient safety-pins. This led to an exchange between Hopkins and reporters at a Press conference, the literal transcript of which provides an excellent example of his explosive method of speech:

QUESTION.—Are you contemplating any Federal investigation of any kind of the general situation in New York City?

ANSWER (Hopkins).—No. You mean apropos of this stuff in the paper a day or two ago?

Q.—Apropos of the project for safety-pins.

A.—Sure, I have something to say about that.

Q.—I asked first, have you contemplated making an investigation?

A.—Why should I? There is nothing the matter with that. They are damn good projects—excellent projects. That goes for all the projects up there. You know some people make fun of people who speak a foreign language, and dumb people criticize something they do not understand, and that is what is going on up there—God damn it! Here are a lot of people broke and we are putting them to work making researches of one kind or another, running big recreational projects where the whole material costs 3 per cent, and practically all the money goes for relief. As soon as you begin doing anything for white-collar people there is a certain group of people who begin to throw bricks. I have no apologies to make. As a matter of fact, we have not done enough. The plain fact of the matter is that there are people writing and talking about these things in New York who know nothing about research projects. They haven't taken the trouble to really look into it. I have a pile of letters from business men, if that is important, saying that these projects are damn good projects. These fellows can make fun and shoot at white-collar people if they want to. I notice somebody says facetiously, 'Repair all streets.' That is all they think about—money to repair streets. I think there are things in life besides that. We have projects up there to make Jewish dictionaries. There are rabbis who are broke and on the relief rolls. One hundred and fifty projects up there deal with pure science. What of it? I think those things are good in life. They are important in life. We are not backing down on any of those projects. They can make

fun of these white-collar and professional people if they want to. I am not going to do it. They can say, let them use a pick and shovel to repair streets, when the city ought to be doing that. I believe every one of these research projects are good projects. We don't need any apologies!

Q.—In that connection, I am not trying to argue with you.

A.—I am not really mad. . . .

Q.—About this white collar—there are 300 million for white-collar relief. Would it be your idea in administering 300 million, that you might just as well continue?

A.—The best of them will be continued, sure. Those are research projects they are jumping on.

Q.—As a matter of fact, don't you think there are a lot of research projects that would be more valuable to mankind in general than the classic example of ancient safety-pins?

A.—That is a matter of opinion. You may be interested in washing-machines—somebody else in safety-pins. Every one of those projects is worked out by technical people. In the field of medical science, we have doctors; in physical, we have physicists; in the social, social economists. Every one of those is under the direction of competent research people. You can make fun of anything; that is easy to do. A lot of people are opposed to the whole business. Let these white-collar professional fellows sit home and get a basket of groceries, that is what a lot of people want.

Q.—You say that people don't want to work?

A.—No, these fellows want to work, but there are a lot of people who don't believe in the work programme and want people to go back to direct relief. These people who want direct relief will always kick about these technical projects. Anything that from their point of view isn't utilitarian.

The reports of this conference quoted Hopkins as saying that 'people are too damned dumb', and this phrase was given plenty of circulation in the Press. Even ten years later, in the midst of war, Hopkins was assailed in scathing editorials as the man who believed that 'the American people are too damned dumb'. *The Washington Post* published a poem by a Virginia lady ending with the verse:

Though we still pay up our tax,
 Mr. Hopkins!
 We are sharpening the axe,
 Mr. Hopkins!
 Testing it with cautious thumb—
 And we're telling you, by gum,
 We are not quite too damned dumb,
 Mr. Hopkins!

Nevertheless, Hopkins generally got on very well with working newspaper-men (not including publishers). They appreciated the quickness and directness of his answers and the quotability of his cracks. A description of him at a Press conference was written by the immortal Ernie Pyle in *The Washington News*:

And you, Mr. Hopkins, I liked you because you look like common people. I don't mean any slur by that either, because they don't come any commoner than I am, but you sit there so easy swinging back and forth in your swivel chair, in your blue suit and blue shirt, and your neck is sort of skinny, like poor people's necks, and you act honest, too.

And you answer the reporters' questions as tho you were talking to them personally, instead of being a big official. It tickled me the way you would say, 'I can't answer that', in a tone that almost says out loud, 'Now you knew damn well when you asked me that I couldn't answer that.' . . .

And that old office of yours, Mr. Hopkins—good Lord, it's terrible. It's so little in the first place, and the walls are faded and water-pipes run up the walls and your desk doesn't even shine. But I guess you don't care. Maybe it wouldn't look right for you to have a nice office anyway, when you're dealing in misery all the time.

One nice thing about your office being so little, tho, the reporters all have to pack close up around your desk, and they can see and hear you well, and it's sort of like talking to you in your home, except there they'd be sitting down, I hope.

The reporters tell me, Mr. Hopkins, that you're about the fastest thinker of any of the big men who hold press conferences. Ickes is fast, too, and so is Farley, they say, but you always come back right now with something pretty good. And you've got a pleasant, clean-cut voice, too, and they say you never try to lie out of anything.

Hopkins's office, as described by Ernie Pyle, was in the Walker-Johnson Building, on New York Avenue, between the Corcoran Gallery and the Girl Scouts' Little House. It was a shabby old building, with a blind news-dealer by its front steps. When you went into it you were assailed by an odour of antiseptic which suggested the smell of a combination of hospital, locker-room, and stable. As *Fortune* described it: 'This, you might also say, is the very odour of Relief. It is at once prophylactic and unclean.' Hopkins's first office had been in the Federal Security Building, but he fought his way out of that and continued for five years to resist all attempts to move his headquarters into new Government buildings which were marbled and air-conditioned. In addition to his natural aversion to pomp and circumstance he had for a long time the feeling that he was only a temporary figure on the Washington scene. His position seemed insecure in

the extreme; he had arisen suddenly to this prominence and he might as suddenly be blown back into obscurity. Although he attempted to give the impression of being lighthearted and carefree, it was obvious to those closest to him that he was for ever fearful that the critics of the Relief Programme might one day achieve vindication—that someone would be proved guilty of graft for which Hopkins himself would inevitably assume responsibility, however spotless his personal record or that of his immediate staff. He knew all too well how powerful were the interests which were continually trying to detect and expose evidences of graft and corruption, and he knew also that it was humanly impossible to keep completely clean a programme that was administered to such a large extent by local politicians. It was understandable that the result of his constant worrying should be severe digestive disorders. Actually there were amazingly few instances of actual embezzlement of public funds, and in each of these the blame was very clearly fixed on local officials (some of them Republicans) and not on the Federal Government.

During his years in Washington, Hopkins wrote very few personal letters—and in those managed to tell very little of interest—but at the end of June 1934 he revealed something of his state of mind in a letter to his brother Lewis:

I am planning to sail for Europe on Wednesday the 4th unless something interferes at the last moment. This, of course, is always possible around here. I can scarcely realize that I have been with the Government now for a year. I had no intention of remaining longer than that, but I seem to be well on my way to stay through next winter anyway. I think you know, one of the great difficulties about this place is what to use for money. When I decided to come it looked fairly simple from that point of view because the Board of Directors of the N.Y.T.B. Association decided to give me a year's salary for my ten years' work there. The finances of the organization, however, went sour and the President died. Recently one of the Board told me that they are anxious to at least fill part of that agreement, and I have some substantial hope now that I can get enough money at least to keep me from getting head over heels in debt.

The other side of the picture is that this has been a fascinating experience. It is worth any amount of money to have a ringside seat at this show. I have learned enough about it to know that one should not bank too heavily on anything here for more than a few months at a time. While the work is fascinating and the President is a grand person to work for, I have no desire to stay here indefinitely.

Hopkins at this time was showing definite signs of physical strain and the European trip was taken largely at Roosevelt's urging. Indeed, it was more than urging—it was an order. Always a master at the art of relaxing himself,

Roosevelt could enforce relaxation on an overworked subordinate by sending him off on some comparatively meaningless mission, preferably one which involved a sea change. He wrote to Hopkins:

It is my desire that you make a trip abroad as soon as you can possibly get away and look over the housing and social-insurance schemes in England, Germany, Austria, and Italy, because I think you might pick up some ideas useful to us in developing our own American plan for security.

Incidentally, in view of the steady grind you have had, I think that the sea trip will do you a lot of good.

Hopkins told a friend that the President also asked him to have a look at the personnel in American Embassies and Legations and to report to him confidentially thereon. Roosevelt felt then that there were individuals in the Foreign Service who were not entirely sympathetic to the policies of his Administration and as the years went by and he received reports from Hopkins and many others who travelled abroad he became increasingly sure of it.

Hopkins and his wife sailed on the S.S. *Washington* on July 4, 1934, returning on August 23. During this summer there occurred the Nazi blood purge, followed by Hitler's statement to the quivering Reichstag: 'The Supreme Court of the German people during these twenty-four hours consisted of myself!' Which should have been enough to inform anyone of just what to expect from the Nazi regime. During that same summer the Nazis murdered Chancellor Dollfuss in Vienna, and Hindenburg died, thereby removing the last formal obstacle to Hitler's seizure of total power. However, I can find no record of the effect on Hopkins of these revealing events or of anything that he saw and heard in the police States. In his only published comments on his trip to Europe he expressed enthusiasm for the social security and public housing programmes in Britain, saying that even the Conservatives there were well ahead of the New Deal in social progress. The day of his return to Washington he lunched with the President, and then spent the week-end with him at Hyde Park, but he left no notes on these conversations. It is quite possible that, since Roosevelt himself had lately returned from a 10,000-mile cruise on the U.S.S. *Houston* through the Caribbean and the Panama Canal to Cocos Island and Hawaii, and back to Portland, Oregon, Hopkins was not called upon to do much of the talking.

A Congressional election was then coming up, and this was to be the first real test of the New Deal with the voters. Roosevelt's political opponents, who had been rendered relatively speechless during the 'honeymoon' period of 1933, were now regaining the powers of public protest, and violent criticisms of the 'spending orgy' and the conversion to 'State socialism' were

being heard throughout the land. The Republicans knew that they had no hope of regaining any real power in 1934, but they were energetically starting the counter-revolution which might come to triumph in 1936. A minor amusement in the course of this campaign was provided when Hopkins learned that his brother Lewis was running for the post of coroner of Tacoma on the Republican ticket. When Hopkins was informed of this he said: 'I thought that party was buried two years ago. Why do they need a coroner now?' A few days before the election Hopkins sent the following affectionate telegram to his brother:

Well, Lew, Tuesday is the bad news. I hear your campaign for a lost cause was magnificent, but that you confused the voters so that they are not sure which ticket you are running on so that they will all vote for your opponent, which is as it should be. Now, Lew, the telegraph companies have form messages for defeated candidates. Don't fail to observe this old-time custom. The least your supporters if any can do is provide a respectable autopsy. The nation is going to lose a great coroner.

The Democrats won that election by an overwhelming margin and the Republicans found themselves feebler as a minority in the 73rd Congress than they had been at any time since before the Civil War. This was an emphatic vote of confidence for the New Deal and particularly for the Work Relief Programme. Roosevelt immediately started to discuss a formidable expansion of that programme along the lines that had been established under C.W.A. The Hopkins star was now definitely in the ascendent.

One afternoon, while driving with Aubrey Williams and others of his staff to a race-track near Washington, Hopkins suddenly said: 'Boys—this is our hour. We've got to get everything we want—a works programme, social security, wages and hours, everything—now or never. Get your minds to work on developing a complete ticket to provide security for all the folks of this country up and down and across the board.'

They went to work in the Walker-Johnson Building and in the St. Regis Hotel. The day before Thanksgiving, Hopkins headed south with the programme in his pocket—a programme based on one that he and Harold Ickes had jointly drawn up. He conferred first with Senator Byrnes in South Carolina, and then went on to Warm Springs to see the President and Rexford Tugwell and Donald Richberg, who had succeeded Frank Walker as Executive Director of the National Emergency Council. They played around for a while in the swimming-pool, tossing a water-polo ball back and forth—leading a reporter watching from the crest of a nearby hill to remark: 'They seem to be practising passing the buck'; then they got down to work on the 1935 development of the New Deal. The next day the *New York Times* published an article by Delbert Clark, saying:

The fire-eating Administrator of Federal Emergency Relief, Harry L. Hopkins, may safely be credited with spoiling the Thanksgiving Day dinners of many conservatives who had been led to believe that President Roosevelt's recent zig to the right would not be followed by a zag to the left.

Not that Mr. Hopkins had any idea that his E.P.I.A. (End Poverty in America) plan would leak out unauthorized, but now that it has leaked out it will bear examination.

From the fragmentary advices in Washington, what Mr. Hopkins proposes to the President is about as follows:

An expansion of the subsistence homesteads and rural rehabilitation programmes to include as many families as need such accommodations or are in a position to accept them.

A large-scale removal of families from submarginal (unprofitable) land to home sites where they can live on a more civilized scale.

Federal advances of funds to both categories to equip their homesteads with tools, live stock, etc.

An expansion of the programme already in progress on an experimental scale to give factory work to the idle, through what the F.E.R.A. softly calls 'canning centres', 'needlecraft centres', or the like.

A large-scale, low-cost housing programme to shelter those unable for one reason or another to move to subsistence homesteads, since it appears there is no purpose entirely to depopulate the large cities.

A social-insurance programme to give security in the future.

When the new Congress convened a month later Roosevelt announced the new Relief Programme. He said:

The Federal Government must and shall quit this business of relief.

Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute workers.

I am not willing that the vitality of our people be further sapped by the giving of cash, of market baskets, of a few hours of weekly work cutting grass, raking leaves or picking up papers in the public parks. We must preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed from destruction, but also their self-respect, their self-reliance and courage and determination. This decision brings me to the problem of what the Government should do about approximately five million unemployed now on the relief rolls.

It is my thought that with the exception of certain of the normal public building operations of the Government, all emergency public works shall be united in a single new and greatly enlarged plan.

With the establishment of this new system we can supersede the Federal Emergency Relief Administration with a co-ordinated authority

which will be charged with the orderly liquidation of our present relief activities and the substitution of a national chart for the giving of work.

I do not know whether Hopkins helped with the preparation of that message, but it certainly shows his influence. The President laid down six fundamental principles for work relief:

- (1) The projects should be useful.
- (2) Projects shall be of a nature that a considerable proportion of the money spent will go into wages for labour.
- (3) Projects which promise ultimate return to the Federal Treasury of a considerable proportion of the costs will be sought.
- (4) Funds allotted for each project should be actually and promptly spent and not held over until later years.
- (5) In all cases projects must be of a character to give employment to those on the relief rolls.
- (6) Projects will be allocated to localities or relief areas in relation to the number of workers on relief rolls in those areas.

When the Work Relief Bill of nearly five billion dollars was presented to the Congress there were wails of protest from the Republican minority and some signs of revolt by Southern Democrats, but the Bill passed the House of Representatives quickly and overwhelmingly. In the Senate, however, it encountered rough going. The days of legislation by the 'rubber stamp' method were unquestionably over. There was much pious talk in the Senate and the Republican Press about the Legislative branch maintaining its integrity *vis-à-vis* the Executive—and the words Fascist and Communist dictatorship were hurled about recklessly then, as later. But the argument had nothing to do with ideology. There was no real dispute over the propriety of spending the taxpayers' money on such a vast scale for work relief. It boiled down simply to the question: Why should the Congress yield to the White House absolute control over the spending of these billions which could yield such rich returns in pork-barrel patronage? The leading proponents of this question were Democrats rather than Republicans, the latter being glad to go along on anything that was opposed to Roosevelt. The opposition to the Bill was strengthened enormously by the unrefuted claim that Roosevelt was asking for a blank cheque. As Walter Lippmann wrote:

The Senators were not told who was going to administer the programme. They were not given definite information about the scope or character of the programme. They were not even furnished a thorough, cogent, and considered argument in favour of the Bill. . . .

The Senate was confronted not with a policy, but a mystery. This aroused the opposition of Senators who do not believe in work relief, of

Senators who conscientiously object to voting money and powers blindly. It was the opportunity of Senators who for partisan reasons were glad to frustrate the President, of Senators who wished to get at the pork barrel.

Hopkins was called before the Senate Appropriations Committee, but he evidently did not help much to clarify matters, for the Associated Press subsequently reported so much dissension and confusion in the Committee that one member who did not wish his name used predicted the Bill would be completely redrafted from beginning to end. The truth was that Hopkins himself did not know what was really in Roosevelt's mind. He noted, after a private talk with the President: 'We went over the organization of the work programme—more charts in pencil—he loves charts—no two of them are ever the same, which makes it a bit baffling at times.'

The two men most frequently mentioned as Administrators of the Relief Programme were, obviously, Hopkins and Ickes. But it was part of Roosevelt's technique not to let anyone know—including the two men themselves—which one he favoured. Thus, neither of them was really in a position to go before the Senate and fight for the Bill. Neither of them knew just exactly where he stood or with what authority he might speak either to the Congress or to the Press. There was no definite spearhead of opposition to various amendments proposed, and the Administration leaders on the Senate floor could only compromise here and there to safeguard the main interests of the Bill. It was finally passed, after two months, with restrictions which were highly disappointing to Hopkins. One of these restrictions, sponsored primarily by Senator William E. Borah, has a melancholy ring in view of subsequent developments: 'No part of the appropriations . . . shall be used for munitions, warships, or military or naval material.' (Roosevelt had already used P.W.A. funds for naval construction, including the aircraft carriers *Enterprise* and *Yorktown*, but the isolationists were already cherishing the belief that the way to keep out of war was not to prepare for it.) The most important amendment of all in its political implications was one providing that 'any Administrator receiving a salary of \$5,000 or more per annum in this programme shall be appointed by the President *by and with the advice and consent of the Senate*'. (Italics mine.)

This, of course, spelled just one word: patronage. It provided some new education for Hopkins in the political facts of life. In his early dealings with the Congress, particularly on the sore subject of the minimum wage, he had encountered vehement assertion of States' Rights by the conservative Democrats. But it was a very different matter when it came to patronage privileges in connection with the disbursement of Federal funds. The Senators wanted to keep control of these privileges in their own hands rather

than let the States' Governors get first licks at the enormous gravy spoon. Hopkins had been able to cope with the political demands of the Governors and Mayors, sometimes by resorting to the primitive tactics of telling them to go to hell. But he could not do that to the Congress. He knew that from here on out he must clear each appointment in each State with the appropriate Senators, and he must pay heed to the recommendations of James A. Farley and the Democratic National Committee as to who should be 'taken care of'. This was the real basis of the political coloration of the Works Progress Administration. I believe that this was the nearest that Hopkins ever came to quitting the job in Washington, and that Roosevelt talked him out of it, persuading him that he could square his conscience with the realities of the two-party system of government. Hopkins said later: 'I thought at first I could be completely non-political. Then they told me I had to be part non-political and part political. I found that was impossible, at least for me. I finally realized there was nothing for it but to be all-political.' So the altruistic welfare worker—the lover of Keats—developed into one of the toughest of politicians.

With the passage of the Work Relief Bill, Roosevelt was brought face to face with some difficult political problems of his own. He left for a Caribbean vacation just as the Bill was assured of passage, at the end of March, and when it became known that Hopkins was on the Presidential train, headed South, the Press jumped to the conclusion that the F.E.R.A. Administrator had stolen the inside track. The controversies between Hopkins and Ickes had by that time been widely advertised, and Roosevelt knew that whichever of these men he appointed to the top job would be a prime target for the snipers' fire. Whereas, if he passed over them both and named a new man, it would imply repudiation of the whole Relief Programme up to date. He settled the problem in a superbly characteristic manner: he called back to Washington the moderate, reliable Frank Walker—who was everybody's friend and nobody's target—and formed a triumvirate of Walker, Ickes, and Hopkins to run the gigantic show.

I have neither the knowledge nor the physical strength to set down in detail the whole intricate details of the workings of the new tri-headed organization. I can only attempt to describe, in a general way, what was the division of responsibility.

Walker directed the *Division of Applications and Information*, which 'received all suggested plans for the useful expenditure of public funds, no matter what the source of these suggestions may be', and sorted, checked, studied, and tabulated these plans, then passed them on to

The Advisory Committee on Allotments, of which Ickes was named Chairman, and which was to recommend projects to the President for approval. This Committee was directed 'to meet in round-table conference at least

once a week'. It was composed of the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Labour; the Directors of the National Emergency Council, the Progress Division, Procurement, the Bureau of the Budget, Soil Erosion, Emergency Conservation Work, Rural Resettlement, Relief and Rural Electrification; the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army; the Commissioner of Reclamation; the Chiefs of the Forest Service, Bureau of Public Roads, Division of Grade Crossing Elimination, and the Urban Housing Division; together with representatives of the Business Advisory Council, Organized Labour, Farm Organizations, the National Resources Board, American Bankers' Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. When this Committee—which must have required quite a large round table—made their recommendations, the projects went to the President's desk for final approval.

The third division of the organization—the Hopkins part—was given the name *Works Progress Administration*. Its original terms of reference, as one reads them, are not entirely clear. It was assigned various co-ordinating, investigating, recommending, regulating and reporting functions, but only as a sort of afterthought in the Executive Order establishing W.P.A. did the President give it authority also to 'recommend and carry on small useful projects designed to assure a maximum of employment in all localities'. That was a loophole for Hopkins—and Roosevelt was well aware of it—which assumed continental proportions. Those 'small projects' represented an expenditure eventually of over ten billion dollars.

Such was the cumbersome high command of the Relief Programme: Ickes at the head of an enormous committee and with P.W.A. as an operating agency in his Department; Hopkins with responsibility for the millions of individuals on the relief rolls and with W.P.A. as the major operating agency; and Frank Walker squarely in the middle as Chief Accountant, custodian of facts and figures and keeper of the peace between the two jarring New Dealers. Thus, with this apparently over-elaborate and diffuse set of controls, Roosevelt enforced at least the semblance of harmony in operations, but, more importantly, established a kind of political insurance for the relief projects. He certainly did this the hard way for himself, for he imposed upon himself apparently staggering obligations in the maintenance of personal relations with all the diverse elements involved, including organized labour and the American Bankers' Association; but he was supernally confident of his ability to do this, and events proved that his confidence was not misplaced. In the first three years of this programme something like a quarter of a million individual projects—ranging from suspension bridges to sewing-circles—passed through Walker's office to Ickes's committee and thence across the President's overcrowded desk, from which the vast majority of the projects approved were passed, to Hopkins who converted them into actual man hours of work. The operation of relief was not all directed by

Hopkins; there were sixty different agencies involved, including, of course, P.W.A. and the important Farm Resettlement Administration which, to Hopkins's regret, was moved from his area of authority and placed in the Department of Agriculture, under the direction of Rexford Tugwell. But Hopkins was the guardian of the entire relief rolls, and it was thus his responsibility to see to it that the millions of destitute unemployed individuals were given work by some agency—and his W.P.A. was by all odds the biggest of the Federal employers and spenders.

At this point it may be well for me to confess that I was one of the large number of Roosevelt supporters who, during the New Deal years, could not understand what was the difference between W.P.A. and P.W.A. and why there should have been two of them with the same three initials. Actually, the difference between the two organizations was fundamental: it was the difference between two opposed philosophies; it was essentially the difference between Hopkins and Ickes. The former had the point of view of a welfare worker—that the main object was to get the greatest possible number of people to work in the shortest possible space of time and that the productivity of the work that they performed was a matter of only secondary importance. Ickes had the point of view of a business man (albeit an exceptionally Liberal one); he believed that the best way to relieve unemployment on a long-range basis was to 'prime the pump' by subsidizing private enterprise for the construction of massive, self-liquidating projects. Ickes was proud of the amount of heavy, durable materials that went into the P.W.A. projects, such as Bonneville Dam; whereas Hopkins boasted of the small percentage of the W.P.A. dollar that went for materials and the consequently large percentage that went directly into the pockets of the workers on relief. Since the Hopkins point of view was the one that prevailed with Roosevelt, it would have seemed logical to have merged P.W.A. into W.P.A. and thereby end the confusion; but if this had been done Ickes would undoubtedly have resigned in a cloud of sulphur, and Roosevelt was always ready to go to almost any lengths to forestall a resignation in his own official family.

It was (and, as this is written, still is) Ickes's conviction that the confusion of initials was deliberate, that Hopkins picked W.P.A. for his new organization, instead of reviving the former C.W.A., so that the public would in its alphabetic bewilderment give him credit for the achievements of P.W.A. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the interminable criticisms of Hopkins's 'leaf-raking' projects had got under his skin, and he sought to develop projects which could be pointed to with pride as of lasting value to the nation. This led to a new form of cut-throat competition between Hopkins and Ickes: when the possibility of an important new project appeared—for example, the reconstruction and modernization of the sewage system in Atlanta, Georgia—there would be warfare between P.W.A. and

W.P.A. for possession of it. There would be political manoeuvring, propaganda campaigns, lobbying among the Georgia delegation in the Congress, etc., until the dispute had to be referred to the harassed umpire, Frank Walker, who would usually render what Ickes has described as a 'Solomonic verdict', giving half of the project to each agency. Since this decision usually satisfied neither contestant, the dispute would end with both Ickes and Hopkins executing sweeps around Walker's flanks to the President himself, and he would be forced to decide which of them would enjoy the prestige to be derived from laying the sewer-pipes. (In the case of the Atlanta project, it was Ickes who won out; but Hopkins was not often thus defeated.)

In this connection, I intrude a personal recollection of Roosevelt which fixed itself in my memory as a revelation of one of the facets of his incomprehensible character. Early in the war I had been on a long airplane flight to visit one of the remote outposts of the Office of War Information Overseas Branch, of which I was Director. The return trip was very rough and I got the sensation in my ears that one sometimes has after swimming. After my return, I spent the week-end at Shangri-la, Roosevelt's retreat in the Maryland hills. I was still inclining my head and shaking it, as though to pour the water out of my ears. The President asked what was the matter with me. I told him about the long, bumpy trip.

'I didn't know you'd been away,' he said. 'What did you go there for?'

I explained that there had been trouble in our outpost office and I had gone to fire the man in charge of it. I hastened to add, to the President of the United States, that the man in question was not in any way disloyal or corrupt—merely not the right personality for the particular job. Roosevelt looked at me with that expression of wide-eyed innocence that he could always assume and asked: 'And did you fire him?'

'Yes, sir,' I said.

Then he looked at me, sharply. His face now expressed wondering incredulity.

'How did you do it?' he asked.

My answer was pretty lame: 'Well, sir—I just asked the man up to my hotel room, and then I said to him: "Jack—I—I'm terribly sorry, but—I've got to ask for your resignation." Fortunately, he was very decent about the whole thing and resigned.'

Roosevelt now had an expression of open amazement and said: 'I can't believe it. I can't believe you had the courage to fire anybody. I thought you were a complete softy—like me.'

That scrap of highly unimportant conversation can indicate why those who knew Roosevelt well could never imagine him assuming the role of dictator. He could be and was ruthless and implacable with those whom he considered guilty of disloyalty; but with those in his Administration who

were inefficient or even recalcitrant or hopelessly inept, but loyal, he was 'a complete softy'. He wasted precious hours of time and incalculable quantities of energy and ingenuity trying to find face-saving jobs—or 'kicking upstairs' methods—for incompetents who should have been thrown out unceremoniously.

Roosevelt's methods of administration—typified in his handling of the Work Relief organization—were, to say the least, unorthodox. They filled some practical-minded observers with apprehension and dismay, and some with disgust; they filled others with awe and wonder. I am sure that no final appraisal of them can be made for a long time to come; but there is one thing that can be said about these methods—whether they were good or bad, sensible or insane, they *worked*.

While preparing this book I interviewed Harold Smith, who was Director of the Budget from 1939 to 1946. Smith was a modest, methodical, precise man, temperamentally far removed from Roosevelt and Hopkins. But I know of no one whose judgment and integrity and downright common sense the President trusted more completely. Harold Smith was thoughtful and observant and a careful keeper of records which some day will be of inestimable value to students of the Roosevelt era. In the course of a long conversation he said to me: 'A few months ago, on the first anniversary of Roosevelt's death, a magazine asked me to write an article on Roosevelt as an administrator. I thought it over and decided I was not ready to make such an appraisal. I've been thinking about it ever since. When I worked with Roosevelt—for six years—I thought, as did many others, that he was a very erratic administrator. But now, when I look back, I can really begin to see the size of his programmes. They were by far the largest and most complex programmes that any President ever put through. People like me who had the responsibility of watching the pennies could only see the five or six or seven per cent of the programmes that went wrong, through inefficient organization or direction. But now I can see in perspective the ninety-three or four or five per cent that went right—including the winning of the biggest war in history—because of unbelievably skilful organization and direction. And if I were to write that article now, I think I'd say that Roosevelt must have been one of the greatest geniuses as an administrator that ever lived. What we couldn't appreciate at the time was the fact that he was a real *artist* in government.'

That word 'artist' was happily chosen, for it suggests the quality of Roosevelt's extraordinary creative imagination. I think that he would have resented the application of the word as implying that he was an impractical dreamer; he loved to represent himself as a prestidigitator who could amaze and amuse the audience by 'pulling another rabbit out of a hat'. But he was an artist and no canvas was too big for him.

He was also, of course, a master politician, and most artists are certainly not that; but, by the same token, you rarely find a professional politician who would make the mistake of expounding an original idea. The combination of the two qualities in Roosevelt can be demonstrated by the fact that it required a soaring imagination to conceive Lend Lease and it required the shrewdest kind of manipulation to get it passed by the Congress.

It was often said by business men during the Roosevelt Administration: 'What we need in the White House is a good business man.' But in the years of the Second World War there were a great many patriotic, public-spirited business men who went to Washington to render important service to their country, and they learned that Government is a weird world bearing little resemblance to anything they had previously known—a world in which the only competitive struggle was for authority and prestige instead of for profits. The more analytical of these business men came to the conclusion that it was no accident that not one of the great or even above-average Presidents in American history had been trained in business. (Abraham Lincoln once tried to run a grocery store and failed dismally. Thereafter, he never tried commerce again, but went where he belonged—into politics.)

There were even some business men who observed that the New Deal was not what they had feared it to be: the prologue to Communism in America. It was, in fact, as Roosevelt conceived it and conducted it, a revolution of the Right, rising up to fight in its own defence. Although, in one election after another during his Administration, his bitter opponents raised the charge, 'If That Man wins—this will be the last free election ever held in this country', free elections somehow managed to continue, and more voters than ever went to the polls, giving no evidence whatsoever that they were forced there by bayonet points compelling them to vote in strict obedience to the Democratic (or Communist) party line. I think that the best statement on this subject was written by Gerald W. Johnson in *Roosevelt: Dictator or Democrat?* Speaking of Roosevelt as a traditional American, he wrote:

No man has shattered more precedents. No man has torn down more ancient structures. No man has altered more rapidly and radically the whole American scheme of things. Yet no man believes more implicitly that the building of America was, on the whole, a pretty good job.

People to whom this seems doubtful should ponder the fact that nobody has been more bitterly disappointed in Mr. Roosevelt than the extreme radicals. No Republican has denounced him with such invective as Huey Long used to pour out for hours in the Senate. The crustiest member of the Union League Club has never hurled at him such objections as the Communist Press used constantly until suddenly it became

apparent that whereas he needed them not at all, they needed him desperately. The reason for this radical hatred is not far to seek. It arises from the fact that he who they had hoped would be the executioner of capitalism, because he applied the knife to it ruthlessly, may be, in fact, a surgeon, from whose operations capitalism may emerge, not dead, but stronger than ever and possessed of a renewed lease of life. The radicals may not be certain of this, but they certainly fear it, and their fears are patently well founded. . . .

Call it what you will, call it patriotism, or call it merely an intelligent interest in the perpetuation and betterment of the nation, *a desire to improve upon the existing system is the very antithesis of a desire to demolish it.* Pride in it, pride that goes to the point of condoning even those villainies through which great things were done, is certainly not likely to be fruitful of a desire to demolish it. The political extremist may be the most honest of men, but he is always a despairing man. No matter how bright his vision of the ideal social order may be, his view of the existing order is hopeless; and that gives rise to his wish to demolish it.

Now Franklin D. Roosevelt has been called many things in the course of a long political career, but it is not on record that anyone has called him a despairing man.

The non-despairing quality—this quality of effulgent faith in the people—illuminated the New Deal. The critics of the New Deal, in the face of Roosevelt's tremendous electoral triumphs, could justify themselves only by concluding that the masses of the American people were lazy, shiftless, ne'er-do-well panhandlers who would vote for any demagogue who promised them a hand-out. The standard cartoon in the conservative Press pictured the man on W.P.A. relief as a hopeless derelict leaning on a shovel, and the young man or woman who received aid from the National Youth Administration as a cynical Red, and the farmer who benefited from Rural Resettlement as a piece of contemptible white trash; but more than twenty millions of American citizens were at times directly dependent on relief and immeasurably many more—contractors, manufacturers, wholesalers, shopkeepers, landlords, etc.—were indirectly dependent. Thus, Roosevelt's opponents were, in effect, giving mortal insult to a large section of the American people, and were thereby helping to identify him as the champion of the people's dignity. As it turned out, this became a great asset to our national security: when war came, the extraordinary prestige and popularity of Franklin D. Roosevelt was the most powerful weapon in our arsenal.

There is no evidence that Harry Hopkins had any idea, certainly not before the Munich crisis of September, 1938, that he was helping to prepare and condition the country for war. But, despite the prohibitions against any

military activities which had been written into the Works Relief Bill, W.P.A. accomplished a great deal of construction—airports, highways, bridges, etc.—that had deliberately strategic importance. In the beginnings of the works programme, Hopkins encountered great difficulty in meeting engineering problems. He and his enthusiastic staff were long on understanding of human needs, but short on technical knowledge, and it was difficult to employ competent civilian engineers at the Civil Service wage scale. One of the principal executives in W.P.A., Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, a Reserve Officer, urged Hopkins to borrow personnel from the Corps of Engineers of the Army. Hopkins was at first cool to this suggestion; he knew nothing of the Army and was inclined to be suspicious of all brass hats, feeling that they would have no sympathy with the sociological purposes of relief. But, as criticism of W.P.A. multiplied, and after one especially glaring example of bad engineering had made the headlines, Hopkins told Westbrook to go ahead and see what he could do about getting an Army officer to serve as Chief Engineer of W.P.A. Roosevelt approved of this, and the War Department, with some reluctance, agreed to lend Hopkins the services of Colonel Francis C. Harrington, who was then studying at the École de Guerre in France. Harrington remained with W.P.A. until his death in 1940 and did a memorable job. Westbrook has written:

For the first two months after Harrington reported Hopkins saw very little of him. He was not even invited to some of the most important staff meetings. Harrington pitched into his work, however, with great zeal and began to get real results. I took every opportunity to bring Hopkins and Harrington together, and finally Hopkins began to realize the latter's great worth and potentialities.

The rest of the story is well known. Within six months after Harrington reported for duty he had Army engineers in every region and many assigned to important specific projects. Their work was excellent and Hopkins gave them full credit.

There is no doubt that the experience gained by engineer officers in W.P.A. played a large part in qualifying them for the outstanding parts that so many of them played in World War II. Furthermore, the experience of Hopkins with these officers gave him a knowledge of the Army that he could not have otherwise possessed, and, I think, prepared the way for the close co-operation that was so effective during World War II.

When General George C. Marshall became Deputy Chief of Staff in 1938 he made a considerable study of the Relief Programme as it had affected the Army. He discovered that W.P.A. and P.W.A. between them had spent about \$250,000,000 on War Department projects. This figure may seem

diminutive, but it looked tremendous at the time. (It was not far from the average annual expenditure for the War Department for the preceding fifteen years; which indicates the awful aptness of the statement that, in peacetime, 'we Americans treat our Army like a mangy old dog'.) When he saw what opportunities the Relief Programme had offered—and particularly when he talked to officers who had been associated with W.P.A.—General Marshall deplored the extent to which the War Department had failed to take full advantage of these opportunities; but it seemed that some of the ageing Generals had been afraid of the Congressional criticism they might incur if they became involved in dealings with such vulgar, radical fellows as Hopkins. Marshall himself never had any such qualms.

Among the Army engineers who came into W.P.A. were Brehon B. Somervell, who was Commanding General of the Army Service Forces in the Second World War, and there were many others whom Marshall marked for advancement.

In its issue of May 16, 1942, the *Army and Navy Register* said:

In the years 1935 to 1939, when regular appropriations for the armed forces were so meagre, it was the W.P.A. worker who saved many Army posts and Naval stations from literal obsolescence.

But more important than that to our national security—more important than the vast works of strategic importance built by W.P.A. under the direction of Army engineers—were the things that were saved from obsolescence within the relief workers themselves, including their self-respect and their essential patriotism and, most importantly, their skills.

THE PRESIDENTIAL BEES

SOME of Hopkins's associates recall that it was early in 1935 that he first began to consider the possibility that he might become a candidate for the Presidency—not, of course, in 1936, when Roosevelt would surely run for a second term, but in 1940, when Roosevelt would retire. It was taken for granted by everyone in the Administration, the President included, that the second term would be the last one. Few if any were those who could conceive that the pressure of world events might become strong enough to break the third-term tradition, although some of Roosevelt's opponents charged repeatedly that he was plotting to make himself permanent Dictator. So far as I know, there is no actual proof that Hopkins had the Presidential bee in his bonnet before 1936 but, as has been seen, he was an extremely ambitious man, and once he had established a position for himself he started restlessly to look toward the next step upward.

He was becoming increasingly prominent as a front-page figure, and increasingly close to the President and to Mrs. Roosevelt, who was undoubtedly more deeply interested in the Relief Programme than in any other phase of Government activities. In her constant, tireless trips about the country (the subject of so many repetitious jokes at that time) her principal concern was with the 'ill housed, ill clad, ill nourished', the beneficiaries of the work that Hopkins was doing, and it was this work that she brought repeatedly to her husband's attention. Most appealing to Roosevelt were Hopkins's repeated, widely publicized fights with various dignitaries in the States—Huey Long of Louisiana, Gene Talmadge of Georgia, William Langer of North Dakota, Martin Davey of Ohio—for in these the Federal Government appeared as the champion of probity and the State authorities as players of politics.

On March 15 Hopkins noted:

The Ohio politicians have been raising campaign funds through our office which pleases me not at all.

And the next day:

The evidence is complete on Ohio—the political boys went too far this trip and I shall take great delight in giving them the 'works'. Took the evidence to the President this morning—he wanted to get into the scrap and asked me to prepare a letter for him to sign to me—instructing me to take over the State. He later signed it and approved one of my own which was pretty hot. The President doesn't take a week to decide things

like this nor does he need the advice of the politicians—in fact, no one was consulted about an action which will throw into the ash can a Democratic Governor and his political machine. In fact, I think the boss liked the idea of their being Democrats.

Davey blasted Hopkins as one 'who could be expected to tear down the Democratic party'. But Hopkins said: 'Politics has no business in relief, and wherever it gets in we intend to get rid of it damned fast.' Of course, Roosevelt was well aware that such publicity was extremely helpful to the Democratic party—or, at any rate, to his own Administration which would face the electorate the next year—and it was doing no harm to Hopkins, either.

Far less pleasing to the President were the increasing reports of bickerings between Hopkins and Ickes. He liked fights, but not within his own official family. After the triumvirate commanding the Work Relief Programme was formed in the spring, and despite the pacifying influence of Frank Walker, the Hopkins-Ickes 'feud' received more and more attention. On July 3 Roosevelt issued a statement spelling out in detail the division of responsibility between the two: roughly Ickes was to handle the projects costing individually more than \$25,000, Hopkins those costing less than that. With the result that when W.P.A. undertook to build a million-dollar highway, or airport, the job would be divided on paper into forty separate projects.

At the end of September, Roosevelt went on a trip which took him across the country and then, again aboard the cruiser *Houston*, to Cocos Island and back through the Panama Canal. On this trip he took along both Ickes and Hopkins, to compel the quarrelsome boys to learn to fish and to love each other.

In the ship's paper, *The Blue Bonnet*, during this cruise, appeared the following news item under the heading 'Buried at Sea':

The feud between Hopkins and Ickes was given a decent burial today. With flags at half mast . . . the President officiated at the solemn ceremony which we trust will take these two babies off the front page for all time.

Hopkins, as usual, was dressed in his immaculate blues, browns and whites, his fine figure making a pretty sight with the moon-drifted sea in the foreground.

Ickes wore his conventional faded greys, Mona Lisa smile and carried his stamp collection. . . .

Hopkins expressed regret at the unkind things Ickes had said about him and Ickes on his part promised to make it stronger—only more so—as soon as he could get a stenographer who would take it down hot.

The President gave them a hearty slap on the back—pushing them both into the sea. 'Full steam ahead,' the President ordered.

Of course, that particular bit of shipboard badinage could have been written by no one but the President himself. It provides pretty good evidence of the kind of joshing humour that prevailed in the Roosevelt entourage—humour suggestive of the atmosphere of the Elks' Club rather than of a potential Berchtesgaden or Kremlin.

During this gay cruise, on a ship that was to go to its death in the Java Sea six years later, Roosevelt received news of Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia, the beginning of the series of European Fascist aggressions. Hopkins noted:

No luck at fishing though it was a gorgeous day. I think we were out too far, for the rest of the party did fairly well. Back at six.

This evening cocktails as usual—Pa Watson doing the honors with what appeared to be powerful Martinis. The President was irritated because the State Department wanted to hold up his Neutrality proclamation and during dinner wrote the note at the table instructing its release at once. The Department had wanted to await the League's action but F.D.R. would have none of it. He wanted to act first. 'They are dropping bombs on Ethiopia—and that is war. Why wait for Mussolini to say so.' The President said that world sympathy was clearly with Ethiopia. His certainly are. He scanned the news dispatches and everything favourable to Ethiopia brought a loud 'Good'. He went over the large war maps with great care—places every important town—the railroads and the mountains and rivers. To bed early.

On returning to Washington, Hopkins wrote to his brother Lewis:

I am just back from the trip and am in no mood to do any work. I am terribly sorry that the trip out west did not materialize, but the President at the last moment asked me to go with him, and, of course, there was nothing to do but go. I had a perfectly grand time, saw a part of the country that I had never visited before, and am really rested.

If it would please you any to know it, this letter will also advise you that we are going to get our full quota of men to work some time in November. It has been a tough job loaded down with Government red tape of an almost unbelievable variety. They have tied pink ribbons on everything but the telephone poles and may have to do that yet!

The President got a great reception everywhere he went, and unless the Republicans can trot out somebody better than any I have seen suggested, I think there is no question but that he will be re-elected. For my own part, however, I have no desire to remain in Government service for ever. Don't be surprised if you hear of my getting out sometime before another year is out. . . .

Just what he meant by this last hint, I do not know. His political activities were constantly increasing, and they were not those of a man who still considered himself a transient in Government. However, he was also suffering more and more ill health; he had developed a duodenal ulcer which resulted in the imposition for a while of rigid diet and total abstinence, and he probably had despairing moods. He was certainly becoming less tolerant of the mounting attacks against W.P.A. and himself personally, and the wisecracks with which he retaliated were sharp and well aimed, but not always politic. Hopkins lacked the gift for picturesque invective possessed by Harold Ickes and General Hugh Johnson. He had neither the ability nor the inclination to find gaudy words to express his meaning. He was addicted to the naked insult. Hugh Johnson once wrote of him that 'he has a mind like a razor, a tongue like a skinning-knife, a temper like a Tartar, and a sufficient vocabulary of parlour profanity—words kosher enough to get by the censor, but acid enough to make a mule-skinner jealous. . . . He's just a high-minded Holy Roller in a semi-religious frenzy.' One of the many States' Governors against whom Hopkins directed his skinning-knife was Alfred M. Landon of Kansas; when a reporter mentioned that Landon had balanced the State budget, Hopkins said: 'Oh, yeah—and he is taking it out of the hides of the people!' This remark was given wide circulation and undoubtedly was of some help to Landon in winning the Republican nomination for President in 1936, a development which proved to be no misfortune for Roosevelt.

That year of 1936 was one in which an inestimable amount of breath was expended and conservative blood pressure raised—and all of it, as it turned out, added up to the winning of eight electoral votes. Seldom has there been more political passion to less avail. An organization known as the Liberty League was formed to spearhead the drive against the New Deal; its membership was composed largely of pompous bankers and industrialists who were veritable caricatures of capitalism at its most reactionary. Its principal spokesman, tragically enough, was the embittered Alfred E. Smith, who had been Hopkins's (and Roosevelt's) hero and inspiration in liberal politics. A Talburt cartoon of the time showed how the 'Topeka Tornado' (Landon) had blown Al Smith, Herbert Hoover, and William Randolph Hearst into the same stewpan.

The forces of reaction were making desperate attempts to re-form their lines behind the respectable but unexciting Landon, and their principal hope was to identify the New Deal with Moscow in the public mind. The epithets 'Communist' and 'Bolshevik' were hurled at the Roosevelt Administration, and most of all at Hopkins, who was granted the dubious satisfaction of seeing himself and his work programme become a violent issue in the campaign. The Washington correspondent of the *Daily Oklahoman* wrote:

No. 2 man in the United States Government just now is salty Harry Hopkins, czar of all he surveys in the relief world and confidant of President Roosevelt.

Although he holds no Cabinet post, despite the fact that his job is 'temporary' and not overlooking the classification of his department as 'emergency'—the scrappy Hopkins holds more power in his hands than almost any other man beside the President.

In a Senate debate over a new one and a half billion dollar appropriation for work relief, Senator Dickinson, a Republican of Hopkins's native state of Iowa, exploded:

If Congress passes this bill giving Hopkins this huge amount, we will be raising an American Caesar in our midst. This bill is simply a starter for Hopkins. . . . He has his eye on the presidency. This is a laudable ambition, but I am against his using the taxpayers' money to build a political machine. The use of public money in politics is a national scandal.

The *Chicago Tribune* used a masthead and published a lead editorial which Hopkins had enlarged and framed. Under the bold-faced heading, 'Turn the Rascals Out', it said:

Mr. Hopkins is a bull-headed man whose high place in the New Deal was won by his ability to waste more money in quicker time on more absurd undertakings than any other mischievous wit in Washington could think of.

In the *Akron Times Press* and many other newspapers throughout the country appeared a political advertisement featuring a photograph of an anonymous 'W.P.A. worker', who bore a striking resemblance to one of those advertising photographer's models who appear over and over again as genial railroad engineers (proudly displaying their split-second accuracy watches) or as genial foremen (dashing home with the announcement, 'Look, hon—as a result of my Correspondence Course I've got a \$20 raise'). The heading of this 'statement' by a 'W.P.A. worker' was: '*If you knew what I know about W.P.A., you'd vote Republican, too!*'

And it continued:

I had to register democratic, and get my friends and relations to register democratic. On top of that, we have to subscribe to a New Deal political paper, and kick in every time someone wants to sell a ticket to a political shindig. And we do it, *or else*. . . . The whole trouble is with bosses put in by the New Deal, not one in a hundred knows what he is doing *or why*. But you can't blame them. They weren't put on the job to

lay sewers or fix highways. Their real trade is politics, and believe me, they work it all the time.

The Detroit priest, Father Charles E. Coughlin, who was later to become one of the arch isolationists, denounced Roosevelt as 'a scab President' leading 'a great scab army'.

The *New York Herald Tribune* published, every day, a blast by an elegant and strictly amateur commentator, Mrs. Preston Davie, who had never been heard of before as a political analyst, and who was not again in evidence in that capacity; every day Mrs. Davie ended her diatribe with an ominous warning—'Only twenty-seven (or thirteen, or three) more days to save the American Way of Life.'

Reading through newspaper clippings of that silly period, one arrives at one of two conclusions: either the Republic faced in 1936 its most critical test—and failed in that test and therefore collapsed utterly—or the bulk of the Press and the business community was in a state of utter but fortunately temporary insanity. However, the same may be said of almost any tense national election, and that may be a healthy thing—although it would appear possible that there might be times in the life of a nation when organized attempts to promote mass hysteria could involve substantial dangers.

Hopkins sent repeated, elaborate instructions to all W.P.A. units informing all workers on the rolls that they were not to be intimidated in any way, shape or manner by politicians, nor compelled to indicate support of any political party or candidate, or to contribute to any campaign funds—and that, on Election Day, they were to vote as they pleased. These notifications had some pathetically humorous consequences, particularly in the Southern States, when W.P.A. workers who could not afford to pay the poll tax went to the polls and displayed letters from the Honourable Harry L. Hopkins which, they felt, gave them full authority to vote.

Hopkins spent a large part of 1936 on the road, beating the drum for W.P.A. and for Roosevelt. His innumerable speeches were not prepared—so that there were no reading copies—and were considered insufficiently important to be reported at length in the oratory-crowded Press. But at one of them, in Los Angeles, a transcript was made by stenographers from the local W.P.A. office, then under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Donald H. Conolly of the Army Engineers. Hopkins started off with one of those jokes that are calculated to get an audience into a warmly amiable mood:

I gained six pounds this summer and am looking pretty well after all the things people have called me, and the reason is I don't worry any more. A fellow told me the story about the eighteen-year-old girl that had her first date. Her father sent for her and told her there were certain

things she should know. 'This young fellow is very apt to hold your hand, and, daughter, that is all right. Then he will want to put his arm around you, and that is all right. Then he will want you to put your head on his shoulder—you must not do that, because your mother will worry.' So the young girl went out and the next morning her father asked her how the evening had gone. She replied: 'Well, Dad, everything happened just as you said it would; he held my hand, then he put his arm around me, then he wanted me to put my head on his shoulder, but I said: 'Hell, no!—you put your head on my shoulder and let *your* mother worry . . .'

I am getting sick and tired of these people on the W.P.A. and local relief rolls being called chisellers and cheats. It doesn't do any good to call these people names, because they are just like the rest of us. They don't drink any more than the rest of us, they don't lie any more, they're no lazier than the rest of us—they're pretty much a cross-section of the American people . . .'

I want to finish by saying two things. I have never liked poverty. I have never believed that with our capitalistic system people have to be poor. I think it is an outrage that we should permit hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people to be ill clad, to live in miserable homes, not to have enough to eat; not to be able to send their children to school for the only reason that they are poor. I don't believe ever again in America are we going to permit the things to happen that have happened in the past to people. We are never going back again, in my opinion, to the days of putting the old people in the almshouses, when a decent dignified pension at home will keep them there. We are coming to the day when we are going to have decent houses for the poor, when there is genuine and real security for everybody. I have gone all over the moral hurdles that people are poor because they are bad. I don't believe it. A system of government on that basis is fallacious. I think further than that, that this economic system of ours is an ideal instrument to increase this national income of ours, not back to 80 billion where it was, but up to 100 billion or 120 billion. The capitalistic system lends itself to providing a national income that will give real security for all.

Now I want to say this. I have been at this thing for three and a half years. I have never been a public official before. I was brought up in that school of thought that believed that no one went on the public payroll except for political purposes or because he was incompetent or unless he had a job that he didn't work at. One of the most insidious things is the propaganda that something is wrong about one that works for the people. I have learned something in these three and a half years. I have taken a look at a lot of these public servants. I have seen these technical

fellows working for three or four thousand a year—not working seven hours a day but working fifteen hours a day. I have seen these fellows in the Army Engineer Corps. The motivation can't be money—they don't get very much. I have seen them work just as hard as any engineers in America and just as qualified and just as competent, and I have come to resent an attitude on the part of some people in America that you should never be part of this business of public service. I am proud of having worked for the Government. It has been a great experience for me. I have signed my name to about \$6,000,000,000 in the last three and a half years. None of it has stuck to the fingers of our administrators. You might think some of it has been wasted. If it has been wasted it was in the interest of the unemployed. You might say we have made mistakes. I haven't a thing to apologize for about our so-called mistakes. If we have made mistakes we have made them in the interests of the people that were broke.

When this thing is all over and I am out of the Government the things I am going to regret are the things I have failed to do for the unemployed. I don't know whether you would have liked the job. Every night when you went home and after you got home and remembered there was a telegram you didn't answer, the fact that you failed to answer the telegram and the telephone call may have resulted in somebody not eating. That is the kind of a job I have had for the last three and a half years, and still have. When it is all over, the things I am going to be proudest of are the people all over America, public officials, volunteers, paid workers, thousands of people of all political and religious faiths who joined in this enterprise of taking care of people in need. It has been a great thing. I am not ashamed of one of them and I hope when I am through they are not going to be ashamed of me, and as I go around this country and see the unemployment and see the people who are running this show of ours, I am tremendously proud of this country of ours and I am tremendously proud that I am a citizen of it. Thank you very much.

Colonel Conolly wrote to Hopkins telling him what a profound impression this speech had made, saying that some who had heard it were advising Jim Farley that the same speech should be repeated all over the country. It is evident that Farley was not greatly impressed by these reports, for in the final stages of the campaign Hopkins was not encouraged to make speeches; in fact, he was muzzled. Farley himself was a target for criticism at this time—the word 'Farleyism' being used by the Republicans to suggest the corruption of political machines. Thus, Farley and Hopkins were linked together in editorials and cartoons as twin conspirators in the heinous plot to 'buy' Roosevelt's re-election with relief funds. Of course, Farley was no New

Dealer at heart and eventually gained the same degree of respectability as Al Smith in conservative circles. It was therefore particularly galling to him to be confused in any way with Hopkins, whom he considered a radical, and who, he was convinced, was a major political embarrassment to the President.

Hopkins made a savage reply on the radio to Landon's charges against the Relief Programme. He said that Roosevelt's Administration had given the country 'peace and rapid recovery' instead of 'riots and tear-gas', the latter a crack at the Hoover Administration. He said the W.P.A. workers should be given a 'vote of thanks' by the nation 'instead of being lambasted and caricatured as a bunch of slow-motion leaf-rakers'.

Shortly thereafter the muzzle was applied to Hopkins, and he suffered acutely in silence during the last weeks before election as the attacks against him personally and the Relief Programme in general increased steadily in sound and in fury.

At this time Hopkins's one and only book, *Spending to Save*, was published. It appears to have been largely the work of ghost writers. Although the reviews of it in the Press were, naturally, somewhat coloured by the political bias of each paper, they seem to have been in the main fair and calculated to help the book's sale. For example, Lewis Gannett said, in the Republican *New York Herald Tribune*: 'The Works Progress Administrator tells his story proudly. I think he has a right to his passion and his pride.' The pro-Landon *Kansas City Times* said: 'The chapters on the work of the relief administration are important in revealing the imagination and the vast efforts that went into the various forms of relief. In many respects, it is an inspiring record.' But the *Times* added: 'There is no admission of mistakes—and mistakes are inevitable in such a huge enterprise; no reply to the charges of political administration.' However, the comments on his literary output were of scant interest to Hopkins. He wanted to get out and talk—and shout—and that he was not permitted to do. It seems ridiculous that anyone as well informed as Hopkins was about sentiment throughout the country should have believed for an instant that Landon had a chance to win. But people in Washington are bound to become jittery as the day of solemn verdict approaches, for then they are judged, and there is no hope of appeal. Hopkins was particularly sensitive because this was his first experience as an issue in an election: if the opposition could convict him of malfeasance in the public's eye, he might be responsible for the defeat of Roosevelt, and it would never do him any good to know that he had actually been not guilty.

In its poll of public opinion, the *Literary Digest* announced that Landon would win the election easily, carrying thirty-two states with 370 Electoral Votes, while Roosevelt would carry only sixteen states with 161 Electoral Votes. The *Literary Digest*, it may be remembered, had never previously

been wrong in predicting the outcome of a national election. The Gallup and the Roper Polls, then relatively unknown quantities, disagreed violently with their well-established competitor; Gallup gave Roosevelt a minimum of 315 and a maximum of even 'more than the 472 he polled in 1932'; Roper figured the percentages: Roosevelt—61.7; Landon—38.3. The final score of 523 for Roosevelt and eight for Landon marked the end of the *Literary Digest* and the start of successful careers for Gallup and Roper.

On election night Hopkins and his wife, together with Dorothy Thompson, Mrs. Howard Wilson (Miss Thompson's sister), and Lawrence Westbrook, were in the Iridium Room of the Hotel St. Regis as the returns were coming in. Miss Thompson, who was then a columnist on the *Herald Tribune*, was wearing a Landon sunflower. So was practically everybody else in the room, with the obvious exception of the Hopkinses and Westbrook. Miss Thompson has described this scene in a letter to me:

The room was filled with much-dressed-up supper guests who were dancing in dim lights to a Russian balalaika orchestra. Every soul in the room was obviously for Landon. The screen that had been set up flashed, however, only landslides for F.D.R., except for one New Jersey county which had gone overwhelmingly for Landon. The returns from this county were reported over and over again, every time to applause, and Harry started to chuckle in his throat at the idiotic way in which the management was trying to keep up his guests' morale. Finally, however, the returns were all for F.D.R., and the dancing Republicans simply ceased looking at the screen. When, somewhere around midnight, Landon conceded the election and his telegram was flashed on the screen, no one even stopped dancing to look. Harry whispered: 'My God, they don't know what's going to hit them', and laughed outright. I didn't awfully like this. But I did think the behaviour of the crowd was preposterous, and said to Harry and Lawrence: 'Get up and propose a toast to the President of the United States.' Harry said: 'Here? Are you crazy? We'd probably be lynched.' I was obstinate and insisted. I wasn't for Roosevelt (nor against him) in that campaign, and Harry said, slyly: 'Why don't you do it yourself?' I said: 'If you won't drink a toast to your own candidate, why should I?' He said: 'Because you are the stickler for the proprieties.' I said: 'All right; if you think I'm afraid, I will.' So I got up, rapped on my champagne glass, and said: 'Ladies and Gentlemen,' in as full a voice as I could command. A few people stopped and looked around, and I said, lifting my glass: 'I should like to propose a toast to the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt.' Harry, Lawrence, and my sister, had meanwhile, of course, stood up, and we all raised our glasses. At that moment the orchestra, which had paused

for a moment, started to play again, and everybody started to dance, not an eye looking in our direction. We drank our toasts and Harry choked on his, he was so amused, and spurted champagne just past my nose.

I think that was the first time I was ever really for Roosevelt and, as ever after, it was not so much he as his opponents who made me so. I thought I had never seen such rotten sportsmanship. After all, the decision was made, the people in the room would have to accept it, so why not with better grace?

Still, I thought Harry's own feeling a little hilariously vindictive. Whereas I was perturbed by the attitude of the crowd, he was delighted with imagining the further chagrins they would feel before the next Administration was over.

I did not see Harry for a long time after that. I thought he became progressively more mellow and—tolerant.

Westbrook has told me that after Miss Thompson sat down, she 'publicly cast off her sunflower—for ever'. In 1940 she supported Roosevelt against her old friend, Wendell Willkie, and in 1944 she gave a speech for Roosevelt against Dewey which many people consider one of the most powerful and effective campaign speeches they ever heard over the radio.

The following day Hopkins returned to Washington. On the train with him and Mrs. Hopkins and 'Pa' Watson was Helen Essary, who reported in the *Washington Times* that he said, among other things: 'What a day this is! What a day! I tell you I'm the happiest man in the world. I was supposed to be the millstone around the President's neck. Am I rejoicing: Am I!' But, in this expansive moment, he was far from ready to forgive and forget, to let bygones be bygones. During the next three years he had one purpose in mind: to make the New Deal permanent—and he believed that he was the chosen instrument for the accomplishment of this mission. He continued to pursue that objective until the world's and his own grave illness compelled him to change.

During the winter of 1936-7 there were many rumours about Washington that he was going to leave the Government service and accept one of several 'attractive offers' from private industry. It is quite probable that there were some industrialists who would have paid Hopkins plenty to get him out of the Government, but he denied the reports as 'cockeyed'. More reasonable sounding was the persistent report that the President planned to establish a new Cabinet post—a Secretary of Public Welfare, or something like that—and give the job to Hopkins.

On January 15, 1937, while Roosevelt was preparing his Second Inaugural Address—'I see one-third of a nation ill housed, ill clad, ill nourished'—two thousand marchers, marshalled by the 'Workers' Alliance of America, circled

the White House, chanting: 'We don't want promises; we want jobs . . . President Roosevelt, keep your promises . . . President Roosevelt, we've just begun to fight . . . Give the bankers home relief; we want jobs!' But the protests and rumours were washed away by another of the natural calamities which were sent periodically to test and strengthen the New Deal. The great waters rose in the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi and overflowed their banks. A vast programme of emergency relief and rehabilitation had to be organized and put into effect within a few days. Less than two weeks after the floods started Hugh S. Johnson wrote in his column: 'Never in our history have one-tenth so many people been affected by a great disaster and certainly never before have affected people been so skilfully relieved.' He gave the credit for this to General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff, General Edward Markham, Chief of the Engineer Corps, Admiral Cary T. Grayson, of the Red Cross, and Harry Hopkins, whom he described as 'a doer of good deeds, executor of orders, go-getter, Santa Claus incomparable, and privy-builder without peer, but . . . not so hot as a reorienter of economic universes'.

Largely as a result of the shock occasioned by the floods, the Congress appropriated nearly a billion dollars for relief during the next five months, and there were no more protest marchers around the White House for a long time. However, as the waters receded Roosevelt provided another spectacular front-page story, and this without any aid whatsoever from Divine Providence. On February 5 he presented to the Congress a 'Plan for the Reorganization of the Judicial Branch of the Government', which came instantly to be known as the 'Supreme Court Packing Scheme'. This was the most startling—and, to many, the most alarming—development of Roosevelt's adventurous Administration, and it was the first major battle that he lost. Evidently Hopkins knew nothing about this sudden move, and had no part in preparing it—he was away from Washington on a flood-survey trip during the week preceding the Message—but as soon as it became a hot controversial issue (as it did almost immediately) he was called upon to defend it over the radio. In his broadcast on March 1, Hopkins said:

It is a plain fact at the present time that unless the complexion of the Supreme Court can be changed two or three elderly judges living in cloistered seclusion and thinking in terms of a bygone day can block nearly all the efforts of a popularly elected President and a popularly elected Congress to correct these ills. . . . Those who oppose this plan are not afraid *for* democracy. They are afraid *of* democracy.

In the spring of 1937, in the rancorous atmosphere produced by the Court fight, Hopkins went before the Congress with a request for another appropriation. He received a slap from the House of Representatives, which

inserted a clause in the Bill cutting his salary from twelve to ten thousand dollars a year. The *Baltimore Sun* commented on this:

It was a remarkable outburst in the House yesterday that cut Harry Hopkins's salary from \$12,000 to \$10,000. This was pure spite, for what is a saving of \$2,000 a year in a job like that?

But while the business has no monetary significance, it is highly significant as revealing the emotional state of members. They must hate Hopkins with a frantic hatred when they are driven to do as childish a thing as cutting \$2,000 off his salary to express their anger and resentment.

No member voiced on the floor the real reason for this feeling toward Hopkins, but there is no mystery about it. They hate Hopkins because they are afraid of him; and they are afraid of him because they think he is capable of building up an organization in their individual districts to fight them, if they do not vote according to his orders.

There is a widespread belief among members that Hopkins is a vindictive man. Whether this is true or false makes little difference; for as long as members believe it they will act on the belief. Unquestionably this feeling had something to do with the 'ear-marking' that turned the relief bill into a pork barrel, and it is likely to influence legislation in many ways. It is one factor that must be kept in mind by anyone who hopes to understand the course of the House during the remainder of the session.

Less objective in comment on this salary slash was columnist Franklyn Waltman of the *Washington Post*. He said:

Nothing that has happened around here in a long time has given us so much pleasure . . . it was a pleasant sight to see someone slap the smartalecky Harry Hopkins down.

In 1937 a vote hostile to Hopkins in the Congress could have been achieved only by a coalition of the minority Republicans with the conservative (mostly Southern) Democrats. The opposition of the latter to him was, of course, based on his espousal of the minimum wage. It was also based on the fear that he might be a candidate for the Democratic nomination in 1940. That was a possibility which was beginning to receive considerable attention in the Press. General Johnson wrote:

Harry Hopkins who, up to recently, was just a loyal, modest, and highly efficient go-getter, is changing in several respects. In the first place, he has become No. 1 boy in the inner circle of the New Deal economists. . . . In the second, his personal staff of adulating waterboys has filled his head with the ineffable nonsense that he has political possibilities—heir apparent No. 42.

But the *Aberdeen* (South Dakota) *News* was not so sure that this was 'ineffable nonsense'. It said, editorially, that Hopkins

undoubtedly is closer to Roosevelt than any of his Cabinet members or unofficial advisers. Hopkins is the only prominent New Dealer who came to Washington in 1933 who has done a good enough job of his difficult assignment to keep from embarrassing his superior. . . . Who, then, at this early stage, has any better right for consideration as a (presidential) candidate than Mr. Roosevelt's right-hand man—Harry Hopkins?

His own home-town paper, *The Sioux City Journal*—for which his father, Al Hopkins, had worked—viewed his candidacy with restrained local pride:

Mr. Hopkins's first qualification for the job is the fact that he is extremely liberal, even charitable. He can hand out money from the United States Treasury in a way to gladden the hearts of voters in city, in town, in country. He is most generous, having given away billions already and being willing to dispense more billions as the need arises.

In the December 1937 issue of *Forum Magazine* there appeared an excellent article on Hopkins by Raymond Clapper, one of the ablest and fairest American columnists, who was killed in action at Eniwetok in the Pacific in 1944. Clapper wrote:

Some of his friends have talked of him as a presidential possibility. Mr. Hopkins is too realistic about himself to take this seriously.

For once, Raymond Clapper was wrong—or maybe not wrong, merely friendly. Hopkins did take himself seriously as a candidate at that time, and one of the last requests that he made before his death was that, if anything should be written about him, there should be no attempt to disguise the fact that he once had ambitions for the highest office and that he worked and schemed to further them.

It is impossible to tell whether his ambitions were impelled primarily by the normal politician's hunger for power and glory or by a natural desire for revenge. My guess is that the latter goad was the stronger. Although he liked to picture himself as thick-skinned and impervious, he was actually extremely sensitive. His pride had been hurt by the frequent statements that he was a liability to Roosevelt, but of far more importance in his will to hit back was the injury done to his idealistic, Iowan concept of the purity of the democratic process. Some men when confronted with the discovery that various Congressmen were more interested in feeding themselves out of the pork barrel than in feeding the hungry people, would have elected to quit

in disgust, and some did just that. But Hopkins did the opposite: he developed the fierce determination to possess himself of the Big Stick with which to smite the venal politicians hip and thigh.

I cannot pretend to know just when Roosevelt first considered Hopkins as a possible successor, but it is quite clear that after 1936 he began to toy with the idea, to say the very least. (To say the very most, the President eventually acted as an unofficial but extremely competent campaign manager for Hopkins.)

The summer of 1937 produced a tragic interruption in Hopkins's career and almost put an end to it. He knew that his wife was dying of cancer, and he suspected that he, too, was suffering from this disease which had killed his father. He took Mrs. Hopkins to Saratoga Springs for a final holiday. They were entertained there by the Swopes and other friends, and each pretended to the other that it was all very carefree and gay; but awareness of death was in both of them. A few weeks later Mrs. Hopkins died, and a few weeks after that Hopkins went to the Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minnesota, where a large part of his stomach was removed. The analysis showed that he did have cancer. It never recurred, but the operation produced nutritional maladjustments which made him prey to various weird diseases that afflicted him over and over again during the following years and ultimately proved fatal.

After the death of Barbara Hopkins, and before Hopkins himself caved in and went to the Mayo Clinic, he had a telephone call from his implacable antagonist, Harold Ickes, who had lost his own wife by death two years previously. Ickes told Hopkins that he was alone at his farm in Maryland, and invited him to come out and stay for a while if he wanted to get away from Washington and from all associations which involved harrowing memories. Hopkins accepted this invitation—and this was one isolated occasion when the feud was suspended. Describing this to me, Ickes said, with a sort of reluctant wistfulness: 'Harry was an agreeable scoundrel, when he wanted to be.'

Hopkins left the Mayo Clinic about New Year's 1938, and went to Florida, to stay at the house of Joseph P. Kennedy. The President then wrote him:

Missy has told me that you telephoned on Saturday night. I am sorry I had not returned from the speech, as it would have been grand to have talked with you.

I hope so much that you are not trying to hurry things up. It seems to me almost incredible that you should be walking around so soon. However, it is, of course, grand news.

Joe Kennedy's sounds like an ideal spot for peace and quiet and recuperation.

We all had great fun with Diana at Christmas-time. She is a lovely youngster and stole the show that day. As you know, of course, she is now at Jimmy's 'political' farm in Massachusetts, where Jimmy and Bets say they are all having a grand time.

The figurehead picture is bully and I am really awfully glad to have it. Thank you ever so much.

Do keep us in touch with where you are and how you are, and take good care of yourself.

While in Florida, Hopkins was able to do some work with Aubrey Williams and Corrington Gill, and was accused of politicking in connection with the primary campaign of Senator Claude E. Pepper. He returned to Washington in April, after an absence of some six months, and was invited to spend ten days in the White House, where his daughter, Diana, had been living since her mother died. Roosevelt took over the supervision of Hopkins's health and attempted to control his habits. He started to build him up in more ways than one. If Hopkins had not previously been told that he was Roosevelt's candidate for 1940, he was unquestionably told so now. There are notes of an extraordinary private conversation in the spring of 1938.

Roosevelt started off on the subject of the Supreme Court. He said that it had been the custom each year when the Court convened, early in October, for the Secretary to the Chief Justice (then Charles Evans Hughes) to telephone the White House and announce that 'the Court is in session', whereupon the President would send a message inviting the Justices to call upon him. When they arrived, he would greet them in the Blue Room, whence they all proceeded into the Red Room, where the President and Chief Justice would sit on a couch and take turns conducting the general conversation. Always on these occasions, Roosevelt said, Justice McReynolds would tell a story about the hot temper of Woodrow Wilson and of the mistakes in his Mexican policy.

Roosevelt said that in October, 1936, he was away campaigning, but returned to Washington to be present for the annual Supreme Court visit. He knew the Court convened on Monday; he read it in the newspapers; but there was no telephone call to the White House. After waiting three days, he had Marvin McIntyre get in touch with Justice Stone's secretary to find out what was going on. McIntyre was informed: 'There will be no visit to the White House this year.' This was interpreted as a deliberate snub. 'And remember,' said Roosevelt to Hopkins, 'this was six months before the Court fight started.' (It was, however, more than a year after Roosevelt had started to assail the 'Nine Old Men' for thinking in terms of the horse-and-buggy era.)

Roosevelt then discussed his next appointment to the Supreme Court in

the event that Justice Brandeis resigned. An obvious selection would be Felix Frankfurter, to whom the President was both friendly and grateful, but the need was for a man from west of the Mississippi, since that entire area was then unrepresented on the Court. (As it turned out, Frankfurter was appointed.) After which the conversation settled down to the subject in which Hopkins was most interested: the identity of the Democratic nominee in 1940.

I gather from Hopkins's notes that Roosevelt did not entirely rule out the possibility that he might seek a Third Term. He seems to have left a very slight margin of doubt about it in the event of war. But he spoke of his own 'personal disinclination' and the strong opposition of Mrs. Roosevelt to a Third Term. He told Hopkins that there were financial reasons for his wish to return to private life—that his mother was digging into capital to keep the place at Hyde Park going. (I cannot decipher the financial figures that Hopkins jotted down in this connection.)

Coming down to individuals, Roosevelt stated his opposition to these men as candidates: Cordell Hull, Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, Paul McNutt, Frank Murphy (then Governor of Michigan), and George Earle (then Governor of Pennsylvania). The only apparent reasons noted were that Ickes was too combative and Hull too old. There were also some comments on Hull's direction of the State Department, but the notes are not clear as to just what Roosevelt said.

Roosevelt mentioned Robert M. La Follette. The note on this was 'fine—later—Secretary of State soon'—which is particularly interesting in view of the fact that La Follette subsequently became identified with the extreme isolationist group and therefore violently opposed to Roosevelt's foreign policy.

There appears to have been more discussion of Jim Farley than of any of the others. Roosevelt considered him 'clearly the most dangerous' of the candidates. He knew that Farley was actively campaigning for the nomination, that he might run that year for Governor of New York State and, if he won, he might well be nominated and elected President in 1940. Roosevelt was against Farley on two main counts: his opposition to the New Deal and his attitude toward foreign affairs.

Then the President came to Hopkins himself, dwelling first on the liabilities. There was the circumstance of his divorce, but Grover Cleveland had survived a much more damaging scandal on his record, and the second Hopkins marriage, tragically ended, had been a conspicuously happy one. On the question of Hopkins's health, Roosevelt was aware that the Mayo Clinic doctors had said the odds were two to one against a recurrence of cancer, but he also was aware that the Presidency is a killing job and that Hopkins had better get himself completely recovered by 1940. He recalled

that he himself would have been able to shed the brace from his left leg if he had not been persuaded by Al Smith to leave his cure and return prematurely to public life in 1928.

Having considered these liabilities, Roosevelt expressed the belief that Hopkins would be elected and would do the best job as President of any of those then in the running. He then discussed strategy, saying that he would appoint Hopkins Secretary of Commerce and Louis Johnson Secretary of War. He felt that Hopkins should 'keep back a little', stating that although his own aspirations for the 1932 nomination had started in 1930, he had not begun to work actively for it until the autumn of 1931.

This conversation ended, Hopkins noted, with an expression by Roosevelt of 'assurances and hopes'.

Some months after this conversation Jim Farley wrote in a private memorandum that 'Roosevelt is a very strong character, and he might insist on naming his successor'. (It seems strange that, knowing Roosevelt, Farley should have used the word 'might'.) It was Farley's guess that the President favoured 'Harry Hopkins, Robert Jackson or Frank Murphy, in the order named'. Farley listed as his own selections, John Nance Garner (then Vice-President), Hull, and Farley—also 'in the order named'. In the Hopkins notes on his intensely confidential talk with Roosevelt there is no mention of either Jackson or Garner; in the case of the latter, it seems evident that the President had ruled him out as a possibility long before.

Hopkins told a few friends, all under oaths of strictest secrecy, that Roosevelt had definitely given him the green light and the campaign was on. Bernard M. Baruch advised him that he should go into the Cabinet as Secretary of War rather than Commerce. Baruch, acutely conscious of the storm warnings heard from abroad in that year of the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish Civil War, the Anschluss, and Munich, believed that the War Department was to become the most important of all agencies and that Hopkins, at the head of it, would have immeasurable opportunities to gain distinction. I do not know whether Hopkins was given any choice in the matter; some of his friends believe that he was, but the only notes I have seen suggest otherwise. It is probable that Roosevelt himself believed that Hopkins would be better off in the Commerce Department, as it would help him to establish some respectability for himself among the more conservative elements, and particularly the business community, where he needed it most.

Actually, the inclusion of Hopkins in the regular Cabinet seemed to be no promotion whatsoever. As Relief Administrator he received far more publicity than did Daniel C. Roper, then Secretary of Commerce, and had far more contact with masses of voters. But too much prominence at this time might be detrimental. There was a Congressional election coming up in

1938, and it seemed possible that, in view of the Supreme Court fight and the unpopular purge attempt, the Administration might suffer serious reverses at the polls. A hostile Congress—even with the Democrats still in control—would be bound to concentrate its fire on W.P.A. and on Hopkins personally. Ammunition had been provided by a series of articles in the Scripps-Howard papers by Thomas L. Stokes, 'exposing' the political activities of W.P.A. on behalf of Senator Alben W. Barkley in Kentucky. Stokes later won the Pulitzer Prize for this series.

There were a great many senators and representatives who piously approved the Stokes articles, as slams at the hated Harry Hopkins, and who secretly thanked heaven that this investigation had been conducted in Kentucky and not in their own states. There were not many members of Congress at that time who had never used W.P.A. in one way or another to shore up their own political fortunes. Just as post-office employees have been used from time immemorial to beat the bushes on behalf of the 'right' candidates, so it was inevitable that local politicians all over the country would find ways and means of taking advantage of the vast W.P.A. organization. Hopkins hated and resented these activities, but he most certainly knew about them and he made only occasional attempts to stop them, and to that extent he was culpable. Had Hopkins been hauled before a Congressional investigation of W.P.A., he could have done enormous damage to the reputations of many of his inquisitors, but in the process of doing so he would have ruined himself politically. Thus, it was important to get him out of that particular beam of limelight. But he must not be relegated to dignified obscurity. The 'build-up' must go on. A Presidential aspirant, like a movie star, must keep in the public eye, otherwise people will not recognize his name when they see it on the ballot. That is why Roosevelt never mentioned the name of his opponent in a speech. 'There are a great many people who never heard of him,' the President would say. 'Why should I advertise him?' You may call that cynicism, if you will, or you can call it the plain truth. To one who observed Roosevelt in political action it seemed that he had a better grasp of the fundamental realities and the ultimate finesse of this art, or science or trade, than did all of his enemies and all of his friends put together. Although the astute but limited Jim Farley has promulgated the doctrine—which I am sure he himself believes with all his heart—that he 'made' Roosevelt and was rewarded only with base ingratitude, the fact is all too obvious that this particular shoe was on the other foot. Nor was Farley the only one whose name will be mentioned in the indexes of the history-books solely because he managed to hitch his wagon to the ascendant Roosevelt star.

There is no question that in 1938 Roosevelt did all he could—and that was a very great deal—to aid the Hopkins build-up. When the President was

photographed at a baseball park, or on the back platform of a train, or on a fishing cruise, he had Hopkins at his elbow. This was not by accident. There were many people who went along with the President when he appeared in public who did not feature prominently in the news photographs. Indeed, it was a matter of discretion as well as courtesy to make oneself inconspicuous when the flash-bulbs were popping unless the President distinctly asked one to be with him. It was plain to see that while Hopkins was receiving this preferred treatment, other potential candidates were not.

Mrs. Roosevelt, who often reflected her husband's views in her column, 'My Day', wrote the following significant reference:

It was good to see Mr. Harry Hopkins yesterday and to have him spend the night with us. He is one of the few people in the world who gives me the feeling of being entirely absorbed in doing his job well. . . . He seems to work because he has an inner conviction that his job needs to be done and that he must do it. I think he would be that way about *any job he undertook*. He would not undertake it unless he felt that he could really accomplish something which needed to be done. (The italics therein are mine.)

On September 12, 1938, Hopkins and Howard Hunter were with Roosevelt on his railroad car at Rochester, Minnesota, when the President listened to Adolf Hitler's Nuremberg speech of that date, two weeks before the betrayal of Czechoslovakia. (Roosevelt was in Rochester because his son James was undergoing an operation at the Mayo Clinic.) Also listening to that Hitler speech, in Prague itself, was William L. Shirer, who wrote, in his *Berlin Diary*: 'I have never heard Adolf so full of hate, his audience quite so on the borders of bedlam. What poison in his voice . . .' Thereafter Roosevelt, who could understand the German language, among other things, told Hopkins to go out to the Pacific Coast and take a look at the aircraft industry with a view to its expansion for war production.

Shortly after Pearl Harbour, Hopkins wrote the following note:

This letter which Colonel Wilson gave me was the result of a secret survey I made in 1938 for the President on the capacity of airplane factories to build military airplanes.

The President was sure then that we were going to get into war and he believed that air power would win it.

About this time the President made his startling statement that we should have 8,000 planes and everybody in the Army and Navy and all the newspapers in the country jumped on him.

The letter referred to by Hopkins was a report that Colonel Arthur R. Wilson sent to the War Department from the West Coast, where he and

Colonel Conolly, the local W.P.A. Director, had been with Hopkins on his visits to airplane factories. (Five years later Wilson was Commander in Casablanca when the Conference was held there and Conolly was Commander in the Persian Gulf area at the time of the Teheran Conference.) Wilson acted as liaison officer between the Army General Staff and W.P.A. during the pre-war years, when the armed forces were being starved to death by the pacifist-minded Congress, and he was understandably excited when he wrote:

Mr. Hopkins sang the same tune he did in Washington—that the Army and the Navy are sitting pretty to get a lot of money in the next relief bill for the national defence *if* they can sell the idea to the President. . . .

Mr. Hopkins thinks that the War Department should present a big programme which will include the manufacture of modern armament, airplanes, perhaps the employment of men in all arsenals so they can go at top speed—all this without regard to the present rules of relief labour and material . . .

The point is that Mr. Hopkins has the ear of the President as no other man, probably—rates higher than a great many of the Cabinet. And as we have talked about before, the way, or rather the entry to the President is through Mr. Hopkins. . . . The Chief of Staff or the Deputy (should) get an appointment with him. . . . This question is not a matter of weeks and general staff studies, but a matter of fast action and days.

As a direct result of this, after Hopkins returned to Washington he was visited by the new Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General George C. Marshall; this was the beginning of a friendship that was deep and enduring and important. In May 1945, a few days after the German surrender, Hopkins wrote Marshall that he was leaving the Government, and Marshall replied:

You have literally given of your physical strength during the past three years to a degree that has been, in my opinion, heroic and will never be appreciated except by your intimates.

For myself I wish to tell you this, that you personally have been of invaluable service to me in the discharge of my duties in this war. Time after time you have done for me things I was finding it exceedingly difficult to do for myself, and always in matters of the gravest import. You have been utterly selfless as well as courageous and purely objective in your contribution to the war effort.

After he became Secretary of State, Marshall told me that he believed that his appointment as Chief of Staff in 1939 had been primarily due to Harry

Hopkins. It was Marshall's impression that Roosevelt did not develop complete confidence in him until after the war had actually started. For three years before Pearl Harbour, and for at least a year thereafter, Hopkins was Marshall's principal channel of communication with the White House.

When in the preparation of this book I wrote to General Wilson about his contacts with Hopkins in 1938, he replied:

I remember well the events leading up to my memorandum as a member of the General Staff when it was evident that a sleepy War Department plus an overzealous attitude on the part of many W.P.A. officials backed by a local, rather than a national minded Congress, was spending millions in useless projects and letting the national defence starve. After several personal talks with Harry Hopkins, who shared my views and was very critical of the lack of plans of the War Department for sharing in the 'relief money' (they were going after it with pitchforks when they should have been using shovels), I wrote a memorandum to General Marshall, who had just recently been made Deputy Chief of Staff and who was in a mood and in a position to change some of the thinking of the War Department, urging that more use be made of relief funds to further the national defence. You may know that after his meeting with Harry Hopkins several millions of dollars of W.P.A. funds were transferred (secretly) to start making machine tools for the manufacture of small-arms ammunition. This was before Hitler declared war in Europe; and this one move put the production of small arms ammunition at least a year ahead when England went into the war and started to place orders in this country for the manufacture of small-arms ammunition.

Thus, there was at least one tangible, immediate result of the Wilson memorandum. But the total efforts at rearmament at that time were pitifully small; it is evident from the dismal record of unpreparedness in 1938, 1939, and well into 1940, that neither Roosevelt, Hopkins, Marshall nor anyone else got very far with the plan to rearm a nation which believed that the way to avoid war was to deny by legislative action the possibility of it. The ominous events in Europe and Asia were only serving to make the Congress more isolationist in temper and more truculent in its relationship with the White House. Congress wanted no relief funds spent for armaments. It must be added that Hopkins himself, with his ambition focused on new goals, did little to advance the interests of national security at this time. He was working for the election of a Democratic Congress in November and for the ultimate promotion of his own candidacy. In a speech at Chautauqua, he made further attempts to ingratiate himself with the business community:

I can say from personal knowledge that the Government is not, and never has been, opposed to business. It has no desire whatever to harass or punish business. It fully realizes that business must succeed, and must be able to work with Government, if our economic system is to be preserved. It seeks an understanding and a meeting of minds, not only as to present points of conflict, but as to methods which will assure for the future, on the one hand, justice and fair dealing to all the people, and on the other, the confidence, success, and legitimate profits of legitimate business enterprise.

Those worthy sentiments received far less publicity than did a remark, attributed to Hopkins: 'We shall tax and tax, and spend and spend, and elect and elect.'

This was published first by Frank R. Kent and then by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner in their syndicated columns and by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*. (Alsop and Kintner, be it said, described the quotation as 'probably apocryphal'.) Hopkins stated categorically that he had said no such thing: 'I deny the whole works and the whole implication of it.' But the phrase was too juicy to be cancelled. It was given national circulation and enjoyed a very long run; indeed, as this is written, nearly ten years later, it is still quoted by Roosevelt's domestic enemies when their hatred of the New Deal regurgitates. It was the subject of intense investigation when Hopkins appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee. Kent, Alsop, and Krock were called upon to testify. All of them wrapped themselves in the cloak of journalistic immunity and refused to reveal the 'source' of this remarkable quotation. Kent, the only one who had actually talked to the 'source', did not even appear in person before the Committee, but wrote a letter explaining: 'I was first told of the remark in New York by a friend of Mr. Hopkins who is also a friend of mine. It was repeated with a good deal of emphasis as part of a conversation that occurred between Mr. Hopkins and this mutual friend in August (1938) at one of the New York race tracks. This friend is a man of reputation and standing.' But, wrote Kent, after the remark had been published and Hopkins had denied it: 'I called up the friend who had told me and asked if he would let his name be used to substantiate the truth. Somewhat alarmed at the prospect of a controversy, he was much averse to this. He gave several personal reasons why it would only embarrass him and asked me not to use his name. I told him that if that was the way he felt, of course I would protect him—and I have.'

When Krock was on the stand he admitted that he had not interviewed any of the eyewitnesses to the conversation in question, including Hopkins, but said that the phrase 'seemed to me a concentrated gem of Mr. Hopkins's philosophy'. The Krock testimony, as set forth in the record of the hearings,

provides a fairly good example of the sanctimoniousness with which the American Press can seek to justify its occasional abuses of the sacred right of freedom of the Press. A bit of dialogue:

Mr. KROCK: I made what seemed to me serious efforts to discover whether it was a chance remark, in which event I would not have printed it. It was a most logical statement, it seemed to me, of what Mr. Hopkins might have said.

Senator CLARK of Missouri: Do you not think the balance of credibility would be very strongly on the side of a prominent, responsible officer of the Government, when he comes into a hearing of this sort and makes an explicit, categorical denial, as against an anonymous, clandestine, and mysterious witness, who has not manhood to come forward with a confirmation of the statement which it has been said he made, and which has been printed by you and Mr. Kent?

Mr. KROCK: Senator, I think that is a tenable position for you to take.

The 'anonymous, clandestine, mysterious witness' in the case was Max Gordon, a successful New York theatrical producer. He met Hopkins at the Empire City Race Track one summer's afternoon. Also present were Heywood Broun and Daniel Arinstein, the transportation specialist who, in 1941, made a prodigious but futile attempt to straighten out traffic on the Burma Road. Both of them reported their versions of the momentous conversation, which was extremely offhand and perhaps somewhat bored on Hopkins's part, and neither recalled that he had made the famous 'tax and tax' statement or any other statement worthy of quotation. According to Gordon's recollection of the race-track conversation, even though Hopkins didn't actually say those precise words, 'that's what he meant'!

Thus are the eggs of canards laid. They are happily hatched out by presumably reputable journalists, and when they have taken wing the denials seldom catch up with them. This particular one created a great deal of trouble for Hopkins and produced considerable wear and tear on his frazzled nervous system, but it did not greatly effect the course of events. It was too late for the elections of 1938 and by 1940 much larger circumstances had supervened. But the unworthy bias which impelled it is of much more enduring importance than the incident itself. (Years later Krock came to the defence of General Eisenhower, who was the intended victim of another canard. Krock wrote that the discussion in which the General made the imputed remarks was 'of the private and informed character that important public men should be able to engage in without distortion through "leaks".')

Just before the 1938 elections Hopkins went to Hyde Park with the President and issued predictions which proved to be grotesquely over-optimistic. For one thing, he predicted that Frank Murphy, running for re-

election as Governor of Michigan, would win by half a million votes. The election was close and Murphy lost. Furthermore, the fabulous Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives were reduced from 244 to 93, and in the Senate from 58 to 46. Of course, these majorities were still formidable, but the coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans was forming with sufficient strength to serve notice on Roosevelt that Capitol Hill was capable of revolt; the hostility that had been generated was to be a severe handicap to him in his attempts to get increased appropriations for the Army and Navy as war approached. The expected Congressional demands for investigations of the Relief Programme were immediately raised. The swashbuckling headline hunter, Martin Dies, Chairman of the Committee for the Investigation of un-American activities, announced that he would ask the new Congress for one million dollars to finance a full-dress investigation of W.P.A. and P.W.A. He stated his determination to rid the Government of such subverters as Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, Frances Perkins, and other 'Communists and fellow travellers'.

There were two polls of public opinion on Hopkins taken in December, 1938, just before his appointment as Secretary of Commerce. The Gallup question and results as published were:

Hopkins has been mentioned for the post of Secretary of Commerce.
Would you approve of his appointment?

Yes — 34 per cent.

No — 66 per cent.

These figures were followed by the inconspicuous, parenthetical admission that 'approximately four voters in every ten, however, said they had formed no opinion'. Thus, the figures for those in favour should have been approximately 20.4 per cent and those opposed 39.6 per cent, with 40 per cent saying 'Don't know.'

The Roper poll taken at the same time was more detailed.

What is your opinion of W.P.A. Administrator Harry Hopkins?
Do you feel that:

	Total %	Sex		Economic Level	
		Male %	Female %	Highest %	Lowest %
He has done a fine job and should be kept in for higher office	9.4	11.2	7.6	3.7	13.0
He has made mistakes, but on the whole has handled a difficult job well	31.5	33.8	29.2	29.5	32.9

	Total %	Sex		Economic Level	
		Male %	Female %	Highest %	Lowest %
He has done a fairly good job, but not good enough	15.0	16.5	13.5	20.0	11.0
He has done a bad job and should retire to private life	12.5	16.1	8.9	24.2	8.3
Don't know	31.6	22.4	40.8	22.6	34.8

Here it will be seen that those generally in favour represented 40.9 per cent, those opposed 27.5 per cent, with fewer confessing ignorance. It is understandable that Hopkins—and Roosevelt as well—always preferred the Roper to the Gallup polls, and fortunately Roper proved to be phenomenally accurate in his forecasts of votes. (In 1936 his margin of error was .9 per cent; in 1940, .5 per cent, and in 1944, .3 per cent.) Roosevelt was always keenly aware of the importance of the 'Don't know' percentage, which was larger on the lower economic levels and therefore more inclined to be his supporters. He believed that, in national elections, there were many who had every intention of voting for him, but who answered 'Don't know' for fear of provoking controversy and even jeopardizing their jobs. In the case of an appointment such as that of Harry Hopkins, he presumed that the thirty or forty per cent who did not know how they felt about it also did not greatly care, and there would be neither dancing nor riotous mobs in the streets when he made known his choice.

On the day that the Gallup Poll on Hopkins was published newspapermen asked him whether, if he were named Secretary of Commerce, he would accept the post. He emitted his characteristic short, sharp laugh—a laugh that seemed to have an exclamation point at the end of it—and said: 'Don't kid me, boys. This is the Christmas season and I'm accepting anything.' Later that same day Roosevelt announced the appointment, and the following day, Christmas Eve, Hopkins went to the White House to be sworn in by Justice Stanley Reed of the Supreme Court, in the presence of President Roosevelt. Six of Hopkins's close associates were there—Aubrey Williams, Colonel Harrington, David Niles, Ellen Woodward, Corrington Gill, and Malcolm Miller—and his secretary, Mary Van Meter, who went on with him to the Commerce Department. There was pride over this promotion in the W.P.A. staff and there was also lamentation. Hopkins commanded a degree of loyalty and devotion in his staff that approached the Jesuitical. Many of them believed him to be the only man in Washington who was really whole-souled in his concern for human welfare; they loved him for the slings and arrows that he had withstood; they loved him for the very

eccentricity of his administrative methods. They hoped that his successor in W.P.A. would be Aubrey Williams, for Hopkins and Williams had been an unusual team in that they paralleled rather than complemented one another; Williams was also taut and sharp, intolerant of cant, contemptuous of red-tape and 'channels'. Roosevelt did not appoint him, for he believed that Williams would provide the same kind of target as Hopkins for Congressional criticism—and this proved to be the case, for in the position of National Youth Administrator, which he now assumed, he was subjected to continuous, savage attack.

As Administrator of W.P.A. the President named Colonel Harrington, and it was a politic choice. For one thing, Harrington was serving for his Army pay, and therefore his appointment did not have to be confirmed by the Senate, as would have been the case with a civilian appointee; for another thing, as a regular officer he was less likely to be confused with Communism.

Hopkins and his six-year-old daughter, Diana, were guests in the White House over the holidays, and he had a conversation with Mrs. Roosevelt for which he was forever grateful. Solicitous about Hopkins's health, Mrs. Roosevelt asked him what provision he had made for Diana if he were to die. It appeared that he had done nothing about making a new will since the death of his second wife a year earlier, so Mrs. Roosevelt told him he must attend to this immediately and said that she would like to be named guardian of Diana. Hopkins described this conversation in a letter to his daughter years later. He wrote:

At that time I discussed with her the amount of my insurance and financial affairs and she said she would undertake to see that you got a good education and have a little money when you were through your schooling.

Mrs. Roosevelt has always believed that the main business of a modern education is to teach people not only to live in this world with other people, but for girls to have the kind of education which would enable them to earn their own living.

Mrs. Roosevelt was quite right about my being disturbed about your care in the event that anything happened to me, and, naturally, I was greatly relieved at her offer, which was made with great sincerity. She had become very fond of you during the time you had lived at the White House. I was, naturally, quite overcome by her suggestion, not only because it was an offer that would relieve my mind, but because I was sure it was one that would be very good for you.

Hopkins made out a new will in accordance with Mrs. Roosevelt's warm-hearted suggestion, and she took care of his small daughter until his marriage to Louise Macy in July, 1942.

News of the appointment of Hopkins as Secretary of Commerce received what is known as a 'mixed reception' in the Press—and it was George S. Kaufman who once defined the term 'mixed reception' as meaning 'good and rotten'. The *Chicago Daily News* said: 'Surely, this is the most incomprehensible, as well as one of the least defensible, appointments the President has made in his six and one-half years in the White House.' Said the *Los Angeles Times*: 'By neither training nor experience is Hopkins acquainted with the problems which arise in the Commerce Department, nor is it likely he has much sympathy for them.' The *Cincinnati Times Star* was more philosophical: 'We fail to see ground for excitement in the appointment. . . . Obviously Hopkins isn't up to Cabinet size. But how many members of Mr. Roosevelt's official family are?' Raymond Clapper called this a 'well-earned promotion' and added: 'Hopkins may prove a notable success in Commerce—but if he does, he will have to change roles in a way that will stamp him as the most versatile character actor of these times.'

The *Lansing (Michigan) State Journal* summed up its views with the words: 'The nomination offends common sense.' Perhaps the shrewdest comment of all was made by Senator Davis (Republican) of Pennsylvania, who said: 'I think that the President saw that the Department of Commerce had been a pretty good route to the Presidency (i.e. for Herbert Hoover) and he was training Harry.'

There was one cartoon that warmed Hopkins's heart. It showed him as the man who had spent nine billion dollars of public funds without a penny of it sticking to his fingers.

Since most of the editorial blasts against Hopkins appeared on Christmas Day, it is improbable that any great numbers of people paid any attention to them; it is also not entirely impossible that Roosevelt timed it that way. By the time the holiday season had passed, and the new Congress had convened, Hopkins was established in the grandeur of the Commerce Building, far from the raffish atmosphere of Relief Headquarters, where he had spent the past five happy and fruitful if costly years. He was now dignified. When photographed at his massive and relatively clean desk, in his enormous panelled and vaulted office, he did not appear lounging in shirtsleeves: he sat erect, wearing not only a coat but a waistcoat. He had, however, another hurdle to cross: his appointment must be confirmed by the United States Senate. 'God bless you, Harry; may we always be friends,' was the cordial greeting of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg when Hopkins appeared for hearings as to his fitness before the Senate Commerce Committee. It is likely that Vandenberg meant just what he said, even though he ultimately voted against Hopkins. There were, however, several men of Hopkins's own party, notably Senators Guy M. Gillette and Millard Tydings—intended victims of the unsuccessful purge—who did not disguise their opinion of

Hopkins as a 'White House termite', even though eventually they voted for Hopkins or abstained from voting at all.

At the outset of his hearings before the Senate Committee he surprised his chop-licking inquisitors by a display of disarming candour. Senator Josiah Bailey, the Committee Chairman, questioned him at great length about political speeches he had made in his supposedly non-political role as an administrator of relief. Hopkins replied: 'I do not want to duck that question. I do not want to imply I withdraw the contents of those speeches, but if I had the road to go over again I would not have made them as Relief Administrator.'

During the hearings there were long hours of nagging, hair-splitting questioning by Senator Hiram Johnson of California—under which Hopkins appears to have displayed commendable patience and self-control—but the passages between him and other Republican Senators, Vandenberg and Wallace White, were characterized by a degree of courtesy and good humour that is not always evident in such Congressional investigations. (Vandenberg, by the way, was, like Hopkins, the son of a harness-maker.) Here is one passage from the record:

Senator VANDENBERG: I think, perhaps, before going into any W.P.A. phase, I would like to ask you about one other matter which is of personal interest to me. Mr. Hopkins, in the *New York Times* of May 18, 1938, after you had appeared as a witness before the Senate subcommittee which was considering testimony on the W.P.A. appropriation, you were quoted as follows:

Asked if he had studied Senator Vandenberg's plan of returning relief distribution to the States, and requiring the States to provide twenty-five per cent of relief funds, Mr. Hopkins answered: 'I have not seen it, but I am opposed to it anyway; it is a Republican measure, and I naturally assume it is no good. That is a pretty good assumption to go on in relief matters. Of course, I am opposed to anything Senator Vandenberg would introduce.'

(Laughter, followed by applause from the audience.)

Senator VANDENBERG: Is that a fair quotation? Do not disappoint your friends out here in the audience who are clapping their hands.

Mr. HOPKINS: Senator, I really do not recall it.

Senator VANDENBERG: Well, I think it is rather interesting if you did say it, because—well, I would not quarrel with you about—

Mr. HOPKINS (*interposing*): I might have said it, Senator. I do not deny having said it.

Senator VANDENBERG: Well, it is going to be somewhat important to

find out what you did say on some of these occasions, and I am wondering how close that comes to your statement.

Mr. HOPKINS: I think that was pretty close, Senator. (*Laughter.*) Very close; yes. (*Applause on the part of the audience.*)

Senator VANDENBERG: Therefore it becomes important, in the first place, if that is your state of mind, and we will eliminate what you think about Senator Vandenberg—

Mr. HOPKINS (*interposing*): I think very well of Senator Vandenberg.

Senator VANDENBERG: Well, that is not of any importance. But if it is a good assumption to go on, that anything that emanates from a Republican source is worth condemning before you have heard it, I wonder how you are going to deal as Secretary of Commerce with the business of America, which is still occasionally in the hands of Republicans. . . .

Mr. HOPKINS (*referring to the quoted statement*): That was a political aside, Senator.

Senator VANDENBERG: Well, now, let me come to another political aside. I am very much interested in the statement made June 27, 1938, by your deputy, Mr. Aubrey Williams, who was addressing a relief conference in Washington. In the course of his address Mr. Williams said, in part: 'We have got to stick together. We have got to keep our friends in power.' Do you remember the reports of that statement?

Mr. HOPKINS: Yes; very well.

Senator VANDENBERG: Did you approve it?

Mr. HOPKINS: No; I did not approve it. I think it was an indiscreet remark on Mr. Williams's part.

Senator VANDENBERG: Did you censure Mr. Williams for it in any way or suggest to the public that you did not approve of it?

Mr. HOPKINS: Well, I think Mr. Williams happens to be a very great man and a very good public servant, to whom this country is greatly obligated; but I think, perhaps, that all of us doing jobs around here are entitled to some indiscretions. And I think Williams was entitled to one.

Senator VANDENBERG: Do you reserve a few for yourself, as we all do, I assume, in the same connection? (*Laughter.*)

Hopkins was ill at ease and somewhat evasive at one point in the hearings when Vandenberg asked if he had ever registered as a member of the Socialist Party. Hopkins said he had voted for Wilson in 1916, for Cox in 1920, for La Follette (Progressive) in 1924, for Smith in 1928, and thereafter for Roosevelt. He eventually admitted that he might have registered as a Socialist in a New York municipal election many years before, as 'I was then profoundly moved by a desire to see reforms in New York City and to see the United States keep out of war'. (This last was undoubtedly a shrewdly chosen point, for Vandenberg at the time was a leading isolationist.)

Except for that one bit of uncertainty, Hopkins made an excellent showing, and impressed the Committee with his downright honesty. At the end of the first day's hearings, Senator White said to him: 'After listening for twenty-one years to witnesses at Congressional hearings, I am about to award you first place as a witness.' Hugh Johnson wrote: 'It was Harry Hopkins whom this Committee saw and heard. It was all of him—the best and worst of him without any false whiskers of bluff, pretence, alibi or excuse. It was as his friends have heard him either in "moments of relaxation" or on some other hot spot—able, brilliant, candid, intense, impulsive, in some things impractical, and above all things, personally loyal. . . .' That, from the pen of one of Hopkins's worst domestic enemies, is a better characterization of him than many of his friends could write.

At the same time that Hopkins's appointment was being considered the Senate was also considering Roosevelt's appointments of Frank Murphy as Attorney-General and Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court. Both of them got through the Senate more easily than Hopkins, the latter being confirmed, after three days of hearings and a week of some truculent debate, by a vote of 58 to 27. Five Democrats voted with the Republicans against him and at least three others deliberately abstained. The next day the *New York Herald Tribune* said editorially and despondently: 'If the President sits unrepentant in the White House, splashing the nation's money . . . demanding more and higher taxes and displaying not the faintest evidence of any fundamental change of heart or mind or outlook, how can the most willing of business men see any salvation in the shouting of one repentant sinner in the Commerce Department?'

Hopkins went faithfully to work to prove that the process of transmogrification had really set in. His old haunts and cronies knew him not. His good friend, Heywood Broun, attempted to give him a helping hand on the road to respectability. Broun wrote: 'Not by any stretch of the imagination could Hopkins be called a radical. He is not dedicated to revolutionary changes in the political and economic structure of America. . . . His devotion to American democracy is complete and uncompromised by any reservations. To sum it all up, a strong, able, and progressive person comes into the President's official family.' This, particularly as coming from Broun, failed to convey much reassurance to the business community, but Hopkins tried hard to make new friends in Chamber of Commerce circles. The names that began to appear with increasing frequency in his daily engagement-book tell the story: Averell Harriman, of the Union Pacific; Howard Coonley, President of the N.A.M.; General Robert E. Wood and Donald Nelson, of Sears Roebuck; E. A. Cudahy, Cudahy Packing Co.; Franklin W. Hobbs, Arlington Mills; James D. Mooney, General Motors; Clarence Francis, General Foods; William L. Batt, S.K.F.; Edward R. Stettinius, U.S.

Steel; M. B. Folsom, Eastman Kodak; Sidney J. Weinberg, Goldman, Sachs; Carle C. Conway, Continental Can; John D. Biggers, Libbey-Owens-Ford; and, of course, Bernard Baruch and Jesse Jones. Significantly, one old associate who moved with Hopkins into his new world was David K. Niles, who had been his chief political adviser and campaign strategist. In the Commerce Department, Niles was flanked by two energetic young men, Victor Sholis and Fred Polangin, in promoting Hopkins as an ascendant statesman. It was their purpose to 'play up' Hopkins's grass-roots background and his experience as a hard-headed, two-fisted executive, and to 'play down' his career as a social worker, this last being suggestive of starry-eyed idealism if not of sinister radicalism. Their greatest publicity asset was the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. This included many of the men whose names have already been mentioned. Some of them—notably Harriman, Stettinius, and Batt—were close friends of Hopkins and associated with him throughout the war; they came to be known, among less friendly business men and also among inveterate New Dealers, as 'Hopkins's tame millionaires'.

Because of his desire to identify himself as an Iowan, Hopkins selected Des Moines as the scene of his first major speech as Secretary of Commerce. When he appeared there, at the Des Moines Economic Club, he was accompanied by Harriman, who acted as a sort of chaperon or guarantor of economic stability. The Hopkins speech, broadcast nationally, was a persuasive document, and generally reassuring to business men, but it was too carefully prepared, too meticulously conciliatory to all groups, to be a characteristic expression of Hopkins himself. It was the kind of speech which appeared to have been written by a large committee rather than by the individual speaker; it was synthetic, characterless. The political overtones and undertones of this Des Moines speech were so obvious to any trained observer that Farley referred to it as 'Hopkins's Acceptance Speech'. Near the end of this lengthy oration Hopkins took some cognizance of the perilous state of the human race as of February, 1939. He said:

We find ourselves in a world which seems to have gone almost crazy in a welter of hates and fears, and in which a new and competitive philosophy has suddenly emerged. A world in which dictatorships—both red and black—have swept aside with ruthless decision almost all of the liberties and freedoms that have made life beautiful and wholesome. It is said that in respect to some of the harsh brutalities of life these dictatorships are vastly more efficient than the democratic government with which we are familiar. I suppose that it is true that they can raise armies and manufacture guns and mobilize military power more quickly and more destructively than a democratic nation.

But he had no solution to offer than the obvious, isolationist one that the United States must be sure to put and keep its own house in order.

While in Iowa, Hopkins visited his old friends, Robert and Florence Kerr. He told them that he was anxious to buy a farm in Iowa, and they worked on his behalf on the investigation of properties around Grinnell, and they also looked into the legal aspects of the proposal that he re-establish his voting residence in his native State. Kerr reported discouragingly that the mere purchase of property would not be enough. Iowans were inclined to be suspicious of such measures. Hopkins would have to prove the sincerity of his intentions by moving all his household goods and his daughter to Iowa, and visiting there himself just as often and for as long as his official duties would permit; it would help further if he were to rejoin the local Methodist Church and also to join some local clubs and emphasize repeatedly through publicity that Iowa was his home and that he intended to return and live there permanently as soon as his term as Secretary of Commerce should come to an end. 'I know,' said Kerr, with authority, 'you don't want to do these things.'

This situation amused Roosevelt, who said: 'We've got to pass the hat to raise the money to buy that farm for Harry.'

Hopkins finally took a two-year lease on a farm near Grinnell, Iowa, and then rented it in turn to the tenant farmer who had been operating it. As a strictly absentee landlord, Hopkins derived a profit of two or three hundred dollars a year from his farm, but he never lived on it and visited it only once.

After his return to Washington following the Des Moines speech, he wrote to his brother Lewis:

I had a very delightful trip to Iowa, although I was feeling pretty miserable all the time I was there, since I had a touch of the flu before I started. I met some of our old friends and all of them asked about you. I am greatly tempted to get a house out there so that I will have some place to call my own. I can't think of any place in the country in which I would rather spend my declining years than that little college town, and now that I am approaching fifty I might as well get ready for it.

Hopkins could be excused from the charge of arrant hypocrisy in those remarks only on the ground that he was a sick man. The 'touch of the flu' developed into a complexity of nutritional diseases which laid him low and, a few months later, nearly killed him. During the next year and a half before his resignation as Secretary of Commerce he spent no more than thirty days off and on at his office. He did conduct a certain amount of business from his house, largely through Edward J. Noble, who had taken leave of absence as Chairman of the Board of Life-Savers (Candy) Corporation to serve first with the Civil Aeronautics Authority and then with Hopkins as Under

Secretary of Commerce. The public relations men in the Department worked overtime to keep Hopkins in the news, issuing statements to suggest that he was still a dynamo of activity. But it was a masquerade, and it provided, in my opinion, the one serious blot on Hopkins's public record. To begin with, the fact that he had cancer in 1937 was completely hushed up. Hopkins might possibly have been able to justify this concealment on the ground that his operation had been successful. However, on his own admission, the Mayo Clinic specialists had told him the odds were two to one against recurrence of the disease, and those odds seem hardly long enough in the case of one who aspired to be President of the United States. Fortunately, the question of Hopkins's health became an academic one in so far as the people's interest was concerned. Near fatal illness drained him of all personal ambition and converted him into the selfless individual who rendered such great service to the President during the war years.

Early in March, 1939, Hopkins was still feeling worn out and spent from that 'touch of flu', and he was glad to accept an invitation from Bernard Baruch to spend a few days at Hobcaw Barony near Georgetown, South Carolina, a beautiful and largely wild place, full of live oaks, spanish moss, magnolias, camellias, azaleas, many kinds of game and fish—and the serene wisdom, the overwhelming prestige, and the unshakeable self-confidence of its owner. In the cultivation of his own political garden Hopkins could do no better than seek out the advice and counsel (and, above all, the support) of Bernard Baruch, who held the title of Elder Statesman Number One longer than any man had since Thomas Jefferson.

But when Hopkins visited Hobcaw, Baruch was not inclined to give much attention to political prospects or business conditions at home. His concern was with the gathering calamity abroad. He scoffed at a statement made on March 10 by Neville Chamberlain that 'the outlook in international affairs is tranquil'. Baruch agreed passionately with his friend, Winston Churchill, who had told him: 'War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you (the United States) will be in it. You (Baruch) will be running the show over there, but I will be on the sidelines over here.' (That last prophecy was proved inaccurate.) Baruch talked to Hopkins of the realities of the situation as he had seen them in Europe and reported them privately to Roosevelt; he talked of the amount of misinformation that was being collected and transmitted by our official representatives in Europe; he talked of the woeful state of our unpreparedness and of the measures that had been taken to meet production problems in the First World War. Years later Baruch said: 'I think it took Harry a long time to realize how greatly we were involved in Europe and Asia—but once he did realize it, he was all-out for total effort.' And he added: 'Harry didn't want much to listen to me, but I kept at him.'

Chamberlain's assurance of tranquillity held good for just about as long

as his later proclamation that Hitler had 'missed the bus'. On March 14 Czechoslovakia was broken in two by the Nazi Fifth Column, and the following day Hitler and his army marched from the surrendered Sudeten bastion to Prague, in contemptuous violation even of the humiliating assurances he had given at Munich. Europe and the world were again plunged into a state of crisis which might mean war at any moment. Churchill gave a speech to his constituents, some of whom were complaining that he was disloyal to the Prime Minister and to the cause of peace in his attacks on the Munich agreement. He said:

To suppose that we are not involved in what is happening is a profound illusion. Although we can do nothing to stop it, we shall be sufferers on a very great scale. We shall have to make all kinds of sacrifices for our own defence that would have been unnecessary if a firm resolve had been taken at an earlier stage. We shall have to make sacrifices not only of money, but of personal service in order to make up for what we have lost. This is even more true of the French than of ourselves.

After the visit to Hobcaw, Hopkins underwent exhaustive tests and X-rays to make sure that there was no recurrence of cancer; there apparently was none. Dr. George B. Eusterman wrote from the Mayo Clinic to Dr. Kenneth Johnson:

If we can get our distinguished patient to give us a little more co-operation with respect to a more hygienic mode of living this would pay big future dividends.

But Hopkins himself was then too discouraged about his health to take much interest in Café Society or in the situation in Europe.

At the end of March Hopkins went to Warm Springs with the President. He wrote a description of this visit:

We left Washington early in the afternoon of Wednesday, March 29—Mrs. Roosevelt had invited Diana to stay at the White House while I was in Warm Springs—so promising real live ducks for Easter—I kissed my adorable one good-bye and for the first time in two weeks stepped out of doors on my all too wobbly legs. I had a room in the President's car and slept the afternoon through—and now more than a week has passed and I am feeling ever so much better.

There is no one here but Missy—the President and me—so life is simple—ever so informal and altogether pleasant. And why not—I like Missy—the President is the grandest of companions—I read for hours—and sleep ever so well. The food as ever around the W.H. menage is medium to downright bad.

The President wakes up about eight-thirty—breakfasts in bed—reads the morning papers and if left alone will spend a half-hour or so reading a detective story. I would go in about nine-thirty—usually much talk of European affairs—Kennedy and Bullitt our ambassadors in London and Paris would telephone—Hull and Welles from the State Department so we had the latest news of Hitler's moves in the international check-board. His secretaries and *aides* would come in at ten-thirty with mail, a schedule of appointments—gossip of the Foundation—light chit-chat for half an hour when the President dressed before going to the pool for his daily treatment at eleven. He may keep an appointment before eleven—gets in his little car—drives by the Press cottage for an interview—this takes about twenty minutes—after the pool he will drive by the golf links—home for lunch at one.

Lunch has usually been F.D.R. with Missy and me—these are the pleasantest, because he is under no restraint and personal and public business is discussed with the utmost frankness. The service incidentally is as bad as the food. There are thousands of men in America who get infinitely better care than the President—this in spite of the fact that he is crippled. I would fire them all.

He will sleep a bit after lunch—and at three drive over the countryside with a guest—visit his farm—look at the new tree plantings—back around four-thirty for an hour's dictation. Then relax till dinner at seven. The ceremonial cocktail with the President doing the honours—gin and grapefruit juice is his current favourite—and a vile drink it is! He makes a first rate 'old fashioned' and a fair martini—which he should stick to—but his low and uncultivated taste in liquors leads him woefully astray. Missy and I will not be bullied into drinking his concoction, which leads him to take three instead of his usual quota of two.

Dinner therefore is gay—as it should be—and the President reminisces long over the personal experiences of his life—he tells incidents well—though he has a bad habit of repeating them every year or so. I fancy Missy has heard them all many times, but she never flickers an eyebrow.

After dinner the President retreats to his stamps—magazines and the evening paper. Missy and I will play Chinese checkers—occasionally the three of us played, but more often we read—a little conversation—important or not—depending on the mood. George Fox comes in to give him a rub down and the President is in bed by ten.

The above is interesting—aside from Hopkins's random style and his peculiar addiction to the embellishment 'ever so'—in that it shows that he was still after five years something of a stranger in the Roosevelt entourage. It also shows how quickly Roosevelt could pass from a state of utter relaxa-

tion to one of historic action. On April 14, a few days after his return from Warm Springs, the President addressed a message to Adolf Hitler, in which he said:

You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war.

Nothing can persuade the peoples of the earth that any governing power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its own or any other people save in the cause of self-evident home defence.

In making this statement we as Americans speak not through selfishness or fear or weakness. If we speak now it is with the voice of strength and with friendship for mankind. It is still clear to me that international problems can be solved at the council table.

Hitler's reply to that, two weeks later, was a derisive speech to the Reichstag which led Senator William E. Borah to suggest with some satisfaction that, in the German Fuehrer, Roosevelt had met his match. At the same time the War Department received a long report from the Acting Military Attaché in the American Embassy in Berlin, expressing the expectation that if Germany could not coerce Poland through negotiations she would attack within the next thirty days. He added:

The present situation when viewed in the light of an active war which Germany is now in the process of waging becomes clear. It is an economic war in which Germany is fighting for her very existence. Germany must have markets for her goods or die and Germany will not die.

From which it is evident that the Military Attaché was not only attending to his job of observing the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe; he was also listening faithfully to Goebbels's propaganda and reflecting it in his official reports.

The extent to which Roosevelt suspected the accuracy of his official sources of information—as well as the extent to which he was interested in odd details—is revealed by a bit of highly unimportant correspondence that passed between him and Hopkins during that same critical period. Roosevelt sent Hopkins the following memorandum:

Will you get for me a memorandum on the relative cost of living in Caracas, Venezuela, as compared with Washington, D.C.—in terms of American dollars? The State Department tells me that for a given income of say \$2,000 in Washington, the same person would have to be paid about \$5,000 in American money in order to live in the same way in Caracas. I don't believe it.

In having this looked up, don't let the State Department know about this query.

The reply to the President came not from Hopkins, but from Willard L. Thorp, and proved that the State Department's information was correct.

This report covered more than five typewritten pages of details on the cost of living in Venezuela, such as: 'Bottle of catsup (14 oz.) . . . 98 c.' I feel sure that Roosevelt read all of this with utmost interest and perhaps with some disappointment that he had not caught the Foreign Service off base.

After returning from Warm Springs with the President, Hopkins was again too ill to go to his office and a few days later he left Washington for another rest, this time at the home of his friend, Roy Carruthers, in Versailles, Kentucky. There, with Mr. and Mrs. John Hertz, he attended the Keeneland Race Track and paid a visit of homage to the great horse, Man o' War. Thereafter, for a while, he was able to do some work in Washington, and to give some replies in person rather than through press agents to the increasing criticisms of his absences from his desk in the Commerce Department. (All of the camouflage in the world could not fool the Washington newspapermen, who knew that, when Hopkins was really working, he was accessible to them and unfailingly talkative.)

It was at this time—June, 1939—that Hopkins first spoke publicly of his advocacy of a Third Term for President Roosevelt. When he told a United Press reporter that he was determined to urge Roosevelt to seek the Democratic nomination in 1940, the reporter asked: 'How is President Roosevelt going to get around the Third-Term bugaboo?' Hopkins answered: 'You have got the answer when you say "President Roosevelt".' Some of those who were close to Hopkins at this time have told me that by now Hopkins was hoping to get the Vice-Presidential nomination and thus be Roosevelt's running mate on the Democratic ticket. His attempts to re-establish himself as an Iowan would seem to support that. However, I have no record of that nor of the President's possible attitude toward such a suggestion. There is a private memorandum written by Hopkins on May 28, 1939, which gives an indication of Mrs. Roosevelt's attitude—as follows:

I had luncheon today with Mrs. Roosevelt at the White House. She asked Diana to come with me, and together with two or three of her friends we lunched out on the porch. After luncheon we went out in the gardens—Mrs. Roosevelt had her knitting—and discussed for three hours the State of the Nation.

Mrs. Roosevelt was greatly disturbed about 1940. She is personally anxious not to have the President run again, but I gathered the distinct impression that she has no more information on that point than the rest

of us. She feels the President has done his part entirely. That he has not the same zest for administrative detail that he had and is probably quite frankly bored. She thinks that the causes for which he fought are far greater than any individual person, but that if the New Deal is entirely dependent upon him, it indicates that it hasn't as strong a foundation as she believes it has with the great masses of people. Mrs. Roosevelt is convinced that a great majority of the voters are not only with the President, but with the things he stands for, and that every effort should be made to control the Democratic Convention in 1940, nominate a liberal candidate and elect him. She has great confidence in his ability to do this, if, and it seems to be a pretty big 'if' in her mind, he is willing to take his coat off and go to work at it.

Early in June, Hopkins had to rent his one and only morning coat and striped trousers for the ceremonies attendant upon the visit to Washington of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, whom he was to meet again during the Blitz in London in January, 1941. (He had no morning coat on that occasion.)

During the Royal Visit, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote in her column, "My Day", of an encounter with Queen Elizabeth and Diana Hopkins and, with characteristic considerateness, she had this passage typed out on White House stationery and signed it so that Diana might have it as a souvenir of this experience. The description follows:

The young people in the Cabinet group have been given the opportunity to meet Their Majesties. Only one very young member, Diana Hopkins, has not as yet had this opportunity, and I told the Queen that I thought Diana envisioned her with a crown and sceptre:

With true understanding, she responded that perhaps the child would be more satisfied if she saw her dressed for dinner, as that might be more like her dream, so this has been arranged.

At 7.45 little Diana Hopkins and I were waiting in the hall for Their Majesties to come out of their rooms on their way to the British Embassy for dinner. Diana is a solemn little girl and she was speechless when the King and Queen came down the hall. She made her little curtsy to each one and when they asked her questions she managed to answer, but her eyes never left the Queen. After it was over I said: 'Diana, did she look as much like a fairy queen as you expected?' With a little gasp she said: 'Oh, yes.' And she did, for the Queen's spangled tulle dress with her lovely jewels and her tiara in her hair made her seem like someone out of a story-book.

During the tense summer of 1939, at the suggestion of Ross McIntire, Hopkins spent most of his time at Delabrooke, a beautiful old pre-Revolu-

tion house on the Patuxet River in Maryland some fifty miles south-east of Washington. His sons Robert and Stephen spent part of their holidays with him there. Robert has written me:

We were both amazed at how sick he was. His letters never indicated this. When we first arrived he was quite active. We went out fishing in the motor launch almost every morning. He took a nap each afternoon. Then he began having trouble with his legs. The muscles in his calves seemed to tighten up. Soon he didn't have the strength to step into the rowboat. He spent more and more time in bed.

On about July 5, the President came up the river on the *Potomac*. He was due to arrive at six in the evening. Dad sent Stephen and me up on the roof of Delabrooke so that we could let him know as soon as we sighted the *Potomac*. This would give him time to dress. I remember, at this point, that Dad was furious when Lottie dressed Diana up in a little starched white dress. He made her change into a playsuit. The President's ship arrived exactly on schedule. We went aboard and the *Potomac* headed out for the Chesapeake Bay, where we were to fish. . . .

Apparently Ross McIntire put Dad on a pretty rugged diet. This was a source of frustration for Dad. He constantly talked about the rich and wonderful foods that he couldn't have. He talked about delicious ways of preparing steaks and seafood, and then would sit down to a dinner of strained vegetables. Still he maintained his sense of humour. On more than one occasion I can remember him saying: 'Well, it's time for me to have my spinach'—whereupon he would whip out a hypodermic and give himself a shot in the leg.

On August 22, Hopkins went again to the Mayo Clinic. On August 25 Roosevelt wrote to him:

Your birthday has come and gone and although I had it very much on my mind to send you a ribald radio, things began to pop in Europe and I let the day pass by. This is to send you my congratulations and every kind of good wish for many happy returns of the day.

I am delighted that you are at Mayo's. It was the only wise thing to do.

Why don't you stop off at Hyde Park on your way back if I am there—which means if there is no war in Europe. Things are looking a little brighter today.

Do telephone me to let me know how you are.

As ever yours,
/s/ F.D.R.

PS.—I am counting on you to help entertain the — who will be back this Fall if there is no war. However, don't pray for a war! (The

name deleted was of two friends of Roosevelt's whom Hopkins found boring.)

While the crisis developed and finally burst in Europe, Roosevelt kept in touch with Hopkins and with his doctors by telephone. His condition was very grave. On August 31 Hopkins wrote to the President:

It was so good to talk to you the other night. You sounded so cheerful and encouraging in spite of the fact that the world seems to be tumbling around our heads. I think your letter to Hitler was grand and I am sure it is having a very real effect on the present delays. The thing I am disturbed about more than anything else is the danger of another Munich, which I think would be fatal to the democracies.

They are not through with my tests here yet and I doubt if they will be for another two or three days, but I don't imagine I will be out of here until after Labour Day at least. It looks more and more like a dietary problem. I am sure there is nothing wrong with my stomach.

I will be in touch with you during the next few days and will surely accept your cordial invitation to come to Hyde Park if the doctors here will prescribe it. The place is full of your acquaintances, all of whom ask about you.

It is a matter of tragic record that whatever the 'delays' produced by Roosevelt's letter to Hitler, they did not last more than a few hours after that letter was written. The Germans attacked Poland that night and thereby started the Second World War.

Hopkins's brother Emory, of Portland, Oregon, wrote him a letter which contained the following prescient paragraph:

The war will, of course, change all our lives more than we can now anticipate. You may be called upon for a still bigger job of organizing and administrating than the W.P.A. was. I hope your health will permit you to carry on any job that may come your way.

However, Hopkins was not then concerned with any thoughts of changes in his life which the war might bring about; he was concerned only with the increasingly slim chance that his life could be saved. On September 8, he sent a letter to his brother Lewis, which caused the doctor to travel East with all possible haste. This letter, indicative of near-despair, was as follows:

I am sorry I haven't written you before, but I have been undergoing some pretty heroic treatments here and have no conclusive news to give you. On the positive side, I think this can be said—I am not absorbing proteins and fats in any adequate manner. My protein count, or whatever you call it, is one-third normal. This is in spite of a very well-regulated

diet. In other words, nothing that I can take by mouth seems to have any difference, so they are pushing a variety of things intravenously and intra-muscularly, including some material which they are using experimentally here.

I have had a very serious edema in my feet which is fairly well cleared up. My eyesight is going back on me, and I have lost about thirty pounds from my top weight a year ago. I weigh about 130 pounds now. Of course, if they can find the technique to assure the absorption of proteins and fats, my weight naturally will go back up.

They have found no evidence of a recurrence of my old difficulty, although there are one or two suspicious signs, but in the main the doctors tell me that they believe a recurrence is not in the picture. They simply haven't ruled it out as yet.

I have no idea how long I am to be here, but I am going to stay until the doctors either can or cannot get absorption of protein and fats. If they can't, then of course there is nothing more than can be done about it here or, for that matter, anywhere else. I assume they will make a deduction from that that I have other difficulties not directly associated with malnutrition. I am quite confident however that they are going to break through this and find a treatment that will substantially clear up the whole business.

This thing began about nearly a year ago and has grown progressively worse through the months until I finally quit work entirely on the 4th of July. I have been in bed most of the time since then. I have a general feeling of well-being, excellent appetite, no nausea or headaches, and have had no diarrhoea since I have been here.

Doctor Eusterman told me he was writing you today and I will let you know later about my progress. I wouldn't be surprised if I stayed here another two or three weeks, but at times I get pretty discouraged about it, particularly about the doctor's ability to find an adequate treatment for my difficulties. The best I can tell you is that I have a very severe malnutrition. But I am relaxed and altogether comfortable and, as you know, getting the best possible care. Needless to say I have the greatest confidence in the physicians here.

A letter which Hopkins wrote from the Mayo Clinic to his daughter, Diana, suggested that he thought this might be the last communication he would ever have with her:

I had hoped that I would be back home with you long before this, but I am going to stay here for a few days more visiting with old friends of mine. Some day when you are older you will learn of what a fine place this is.

I hope you are swimming every day and have given up the use of water wings, because no little girl ever learned to swim with water wings. I haven't forgotten that you want to go to the Fair, and somehow, some way we will get up there before school begins. I wish ever so much you were here with me and see this lovely farming country. Here are endless numbers of real cows and herds of cattle.

I presume you have finished "Hittie" by this time. I do hope the poor doll finally landed in the museum without too much damage.

Do take care of yourself and Mr. and Mrs. Hunter and Lottie and Mary at the same time and remember me to all of them.


As for yourself, ever remember that I love you very much.

Hopkins's son, David, was informed at this time that his father had about four weeks more to live. And Roosevelt told friends: 'The doctors have given Harry up for dead.' Hopkins himself believed he could not live more than a few weeks. However, Roosevelt proceeded to assume charge of the case himself. Ever intolerant of the defeatist attitude he indignantly rejected the possibility that Hopkins's life could not be saved. He turned the problem over to the U.S. Navy, and Dr. McIntire called in Admiral Edward R. Stitt, Surgeon-General of the Navy and one of the greatest authorities on tropical diseases. Hopkins was moved from Rochester to Washington to become a guinea-pig for all manner of bio-chemical experiments; it was a tremendous ordeal, but it was ultimately successful in prolonging a few weeks' margin of life into six years of memorable accomplishment.

Hopkins offered the President his resignation as Secretary of Commerce, but Roosevelt wouldn't hear of it, saying: 'Why, you'll be back in your office in a couple of weeks and going great guns!' It was eight months before Hopkins could emerge from his Georgetown house, and the records indicate that he did not again put in a full day's work in his office at the Commerce Department until nearly a year later, when he went there to clean out his desk preparatory to retirement. His life had been saved, for the time being, but his career as a political aspirant had ended for ever—a development which produced a great improvement in his character and which makes the task of a friendly biographer considerably more agreeable from here on.


I would add that, during the five years that I spent as a transient with a temporary visa in the realm of politics, I came to the conclusion that Lord Acton's oft-quoted statement, 'Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely', is one of those pontifical pronouncements which do not bear analysis. In a democratic society the desire for power and the ruthless pursuit of it may have a corruptive influence; that was true of Pericles and it was true even of Abraham Lincoln; but the realization of power and of the responsibility that it entails can and often does produce an ennobling effect.

(In such obvious modern instances as Hitler and Mussolini, Boss Tweed and Al Capone, and various business men and labour leaders whom one might name, it is not unreasonable to assume that they were sufficiently corrupt to begin with. Certainly, the man who aspires to absolute power is corrupt, *per se*.) The rise of Franklin Roosevelt to power was due more to the extraordinary circumstances of the times than to any clever conspiracy; but Harry Hopkins, in the promotion of his own slender chances, was impelled to connive, plot, and even to misrepresent, and this was undoubtedly the least creditable phase of his public career. In the war years, when, with no more authority than Roosevelt's personal confidence in him, he achieved tremendous power in the shaping of historic events, he became and remained one of the most incorruptible of men.



PART I

1940—THE IRREVOCABLE ACTS



THE PHONY WAR

WHEN the Second World War started the defences of the United States consisted primarily of a scrap of paper called the Neutrality Law, which the Congress had passed and which President Roosevelt had signed 'with reluctance'. That piece of legislation, passed originally in 1936, was carefully designed to prevent us from getting into war in 1917. It was purely retroactive, as though its framers believed that it would restore life to the brave men who had died at Chateau Thierry and in the Argonne. It was born of the belief that we could legislate ourselves out of war, as we had once legislated ourselves out of the saloons (and into the speakeasies). Like the Prohibition law, it was an experiment 'noble in motive' but disastrous in result.

The Second World War started with Hitler's brutal invasion of Poland from the West, followed by the Russians' march into Poland from the East. Britain and France declared war on Germany, in fulfilment of their pledge to Poland, but for nearly nine months there was scant fighting by the Western Allies except for isolated naval engagements. The Soviet Union attacked Finland and gained certain territorial advantages thereby, but Hitler remained quiescent and allowed his neighbours to remain in a state of quivering security during the autumn and winter of 1939-40. This became known as the period of 'the phony war', and it was the heyday of isolationism in the United States. It was one crisis in Roosevelt's career when he was completely at a loss as to what action to take—a period of terrible, stultifying vacuum.

In October, 1939, Hopkins wrote from his sickbed to his brother Emory in Portland, Oregon. He said:

The only interest here, as everywhere, is the war, and I believe that we really can keep out of it. Fortunately there is no great sentiment in this country for getting into it, although I think almost everyone wants to see England and France win.

In those two sentences Hopkins unconsciously stated the greatest problem that Roosevelt had to face in his entire Administration, the greatest problem any President had faced at least since Lincoln made the determination, against the urgent advice of almost all of his Cabinet, to send relief to Fort Sumter. I believe that Hopkins's tendency was naturally isolationist; he was certainly a pacifist, as were so many other Liberals; he had only the vaguest concept of the deadly peril to American security that Roosevelt saw in the world situation.

In his speech to a Canadian audience at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, a year previously, Roosevelt had said:

We in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigor of our commerce and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace whether we choose it or not.

When Roosevelt said that, as when he made the Quarantine Speech, he was accused by the isolationists of exaggerating dangerously for the purpose of creating undue alarm. 'What European general staff,' they asked, 'could possibly be concerned with the Western Hemisphere?' But Roosevelt in his own mind was not exaggerating in any of his pre-war speeches: he was erring on the side of understatement. Although he was no great authority on military strategy, and gave almost unqualified freedom of decision during the war to his Chiefs of Staff, the knowledge that he did possess was basic. The first point in his military credo was that an ocean is not necessarily a barrier—it is a broad highway. His considerable knowledge of geography and of navigation gave him understanding of the importance of the bases from which traffic on that highway could be controlled. His thinking was, of course, essentially naval, which meant that he did not look very far beyond the bridgeheads secured by Marines; however, he knew what the essential bridgeheads were—the British Isles, France, the Iberian Peninsula, the North and West Coasts of Africa, and, in the Pacific, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and the Marianas. Early in 1939 some unidentified Senator told the Press that, in the course of a secret White House conference on the European situation, the President had said: 'Our American frontier is on the Rhine.' That quotation was hailed joyously in Britain and in France, and with threatening indignation in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The isolationists at home set up angry howls of protest. When questioned about it at a subsequent Press conference, Roosevelt denounced the quotation as a 'deliberate lie' and referred to the anonymous informant as 'some boob'. Nevertheless, whether or not Roosevelt actually made the statement, he most certainly did believe that America's eastern frontier was on the Rhine and it was on this belief that he acted when he risked political suicide in his efforts to break through the Neutrality Law to get aid to those who fought against Axis aggression. He was unable to get such aid through effectively in time to keep the frontier on the Rhine; but he was able to help incalculably in keeping it on the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar.

When war actually broke out in Europe, Roosevelt was tame enough in his first public statements to satisfy the most timid. He said:

This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take accounts of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience. . . .

I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end.

This last may be denounced as, at worst, deliberately misleading or, at best, as wishful thinking. The inescapable fact is that this was what Roosevelt felt compelled to say in order to maintain any influence over public opinion and over Congressional action. Two weeks after the war started he called Congress into Extraordinary Session to repeal the Arms Embargo provisions of the Neutrality Law and thus permit the sale of war material to England and France on a 'cash-and-carry' basis. Even this meagre concession had to be asked for on the grounds that the embargo provisions were, 'in my opinion, most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and, above all, American peace'. It is my belief—and this is pure speculation—that at this time and up to the fall of France Roosevelt was wishfully hoping that Britain and France would prove indomitable in the West, that the Soviet Union would keep Germany contained in the East, that this stalemate would last until the German people would become fed up with 'guns before butter' and revolt, thereby bursting the Nazi bubble so that peace would be restored without the need for American armed intervention. It seems quite evident that Roosevelt did not have full comprehension of the real, paralysing force of the Nazi fury, nor of the imminence of the danger to the United States, until the *Blitzkrieg* was hurled into France in the spring of 1940. At that point, I am sure, he became convinced—and this is not speculation—that if Britain fell disastrous war for the United States would be inevitable, that Germany would attack the Western Hemisphere, probably at first in Latin America, as soon as she had assembled a sufficient naval force and transport and cargo fleet (not too long a process, with all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe at Germany's disposal) and that Japan would concurrently go on the rampage in the Pacific.

One major factor in Roosevelt's thinking as the war began is a matter of certainty: his greatest fear then and subsequently was of a negotiated peace, another Munich. Here again was demonstration of the fear of fear itself. He communicated his concern to the British Government through extra-official channels (specifically, Lord Beaverbrook) and he started his historic correspondence with Winston Churchill—whom he addressed as the 'Naval

Person'—recognizing in him his foremost British ally in awareness of the folly of any attempt to do business with Hitler. (Churchill's cables to Roosevelt were usually addressed to 'POTUS', the initials of 'President of the United States'.) Roosevelt's fear of a negotiated peace was based on the conviction that it would be dictated by the same craven considerations that dictated the surrender at Munich—fear of Nazi might and fear that, if Nazi might were eliminated, Germany would no longer be a buffer state between Russia and the West. It was obvious to Roosevelt, as it should have been to any other informed observer, that Hitler wanted a negotiated peace because it would work in so many ways to his advantage:

(1) It would further strengthen his position in Germany, providing conclusive proof to the German people that he could hoodwink Britain and France into selling another small country into slavery (in this case, Poland) rather than to risk actual war.

(2) It would give Germany time to consolidate her gains in Czechoslovakia and Poland and further to increase her rearmament, particularly in the building of submarines, airplanes and the Siegfried Line.

(3) It would tend to push public sentiment in Britain and France—and most of all in the United States—back into the peacetime isolationist ruts, and thereby retard if not nullify all efforts in the democracies to prepare for war.

(4) It would convince the Russians—and the Japanese—that the Western democracies were completely spineless and decadent, as Hitler and Mussolini had so long and so loudly proclaimed them to be.

Thus, Roosevelt was on sure ground when he urged that a negotiated peace would give Hitler the one or two years' respite that he needed to prepare for conquest of Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the major part of the Atlantic world; but, when the European Allies asked Roosevelt, as France in effect did, 'What will *you* do to back us up?'—he could only reply that he had virtually nothing to offer more tangible than his personal good will. He could utter brave words, but when deeds were called for he was hogtied by the prevailing isolationist sentiment.

Since I use the word 'isolationists' frequently in these pages, perhaps it would be well to clarify it. Actually, in the first year or more of war the ranks of the isolationists included the overwhelming majority of the American people who would have been glad to see the European war end on almost any inconclusive terms merely as a guarantee that the United States would not be drawn into it. Public opinion on this score was much more nearly unanimous and more clearly expressed than it had been in 1914-17. It is true that in the First World War there was substantially more pro-German sentiment in the United States: large numbers of German-Americans then still held close cultural and emotional ties with the Fatherland,

for the Hohenzollern brand of imperialism, while objectionable to the average American, did not inspire the same horror and loathing as Nazism. The American people were, in a way, more truly neutral in 1914 than they were twenty-five years later. However, Americans in 1939 were fortified with the experience that the previous generation had conspicuously lacked, the experience of involvement in European war, and they wanted no more of it. The impulse to let 'Europe stew in its own juice' was a very powerful one, and an entirely understandable one, for there were too many Americans who considered that their country's only reward for coming to the aid of Britain and France in 1918 was to be given the name of 'Uncle Shylock'. (As Roosevelt remarked many times, 'We fortunately never had a chance to find out what our "reward" would have been if Germany had won that war.') Thus isolationist sentiment in 1939 was not limited to Americans of German birth or descent, or to those who loved German music and admired German science and industry, or to those who were pure pacifists: it was representative of the entire American people save for a diminutive minority of those who believed that a victory for Hitler would put the security of our own country and our own constitutional democracy in deadly peril. The first wartime Roper poll, taken in September 1939, gave eloquent testimony to the state of the nation's thinking. It was as follows:

Which of these comes closest to describing what you think America should do about the present European war?

	Sex		Age		
	Total %	Male %	Female %	Under 40 %	Over 40 %
Enter the war at once on the side of England, France, and Poland.	2.5	3.6	1.3	2.1	2.8
Find some way of supporting Germany.	.2	.2	.1	.1	.3
Take no sides and stay out of the war entirely, but offer to sell to anyone on a cash-and-carry basis.	37.5	43.0	32.2	37.8	37.2
Do not enter the war, but supply England, France, and Poland with materials and food, and refuse to ship anything to Germany.	8.9	9.0	8.7	8.8	9.0
Stay out now and for as long as we can, but go into war on the side of England and France if they are in real danger of losing, and in the meantime help that side with food and materials.	14.7	16.1	13.3	15.4	14.0
Have nothing to do with any warring country—don't even trade with them on a cash-and-carry basis.	29.9	23.6	36.1	29.9	29.9
Other—Pro-Ally	.6	.8	.6	.7	.6
Other—Pro-Germany	—	—	—	—	—
Other—Favouring neither side	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.5	2.2
Don't know	3.9	1.9	3.7	3.7	4.0

It will be seen that the extreme interventionist sentiment was limited to 2.5 per cent of the population. Isolationist sentiment was, of course, much stronger among women than among men. The sectional break-down of this analysis showed very little difference between the New England and Middle Atlantic States and those in the Middle West, but far more interventionist sentiment below the Mason-Dixon Line and, somewhat surprisingly, in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States. (It should be remembered that this public-opinion poll did not contemplate the possibility of war with Japan, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis not having been formed at that time.)

The all-out isolationist faction which would have 'nothing to do with any warring country' was close to thirty per cent and this remained a pretty constant figure through all of the opinion tests that were made over such issues as Selective Service, the destroyers-for-bases deal, Lend Lease, etc. This thirty per cent represented the hard core of isolationists, and included in it were such strange bedfellows as all the native Fascist organizations, which hailed Hitler as the champion against Bolshevism, and all the members of the Communist party and their fellow travellers; for this was the age of that colossal anomaly, the Nazi-Soviet mutual non-aggression pact. The Fascist groups and individuals were unimportant numerically, but they had an altogether disproportionate capacity for noise-making (like the Communists) and they were by no means a negligible force in spreading the propaganda line as dictated by Goebbels from Berlin.

Immeasurably stronger were the racial and religious groups who favoured extreme isolationism. I do not believe that the German-Americans should be included among these, for the great majority of them were appalled by what Hitler had done to the land of their forefathers, and those who joined or even tolerated the German-American Bund were fortunately few in number. The Scandinavians, particularly in the North Middle West, were considerably more emphatic than the Germans in championing strict neutrality, but this sentiment was later affected by the invasion of Denmark and Norway. The Italian-Americans as a group were not necessarily in favour of Fascism, but they admired the seeming accomplishments of Mussolini in restoring Italy to the dignity of a great power, and there were many of them who were mortally offended by Roosevelt's reference to the 'stab in the back'. The more rabid Irish-Americans, who constituted a potent political force in some of the larger metropolitan areas, were, as always, inclined to cheer for anyone who was fighting against England, and they were at this time given effective leadership by the violent pamphleteer and radio star, Father Charles E. Coughlin. Because of Father Coughlin and the activities of such subversive organizations as the Christian Front, as well as the sentiments of so many Irish- and Italian-Americans, the Catholic Church became identified to a certain extent in the public mind with the cause of extreme isolationism.

However, the Polish-Americans, who formed an important part of the Catholic community, were, of course, bitterly anti-Nazi as well as anti-Communist.

Organized labour, the greatest unit of support for Roosevelt, was now an uncertain quantity. The unions under Communist domination dutifully followed the party line of all-out isolationism, and so did those under the control of John L. Lewis, the bitterest Roosevelt-hater of them all. The great bulk of labour, while unquestionably anti-Nazi, was also anti-war, fearing that United States involvement would retard or even destroy the gains made by labour under the New Deal. I believe that much the same sentiment had prevailed in the Labour party in Great Britain before the war; it had certainly prevailed in the C.G.T. in France.

The chief leadership and the essential financing of isolationism as a political faction were provided by men and women who belonged to no particular group: there were a number of business men, like General Robert E. Wood, Jay Hormel, and James D. Mooney, who simply believed that Hitler was going to win and that the United States had better plan to 'do business' with him; and there were technicians, of whom the arch example was Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, who were so impressed with the technological achievements of Hitler's regimented State, as contrasted with the hopeless inefficiency of democracy, that they believed Fascism constituted 'the wave of the future'. It was such as these, together with assorted sufferers from the virulent xenophobia of the Hearst-Patterson-McCormick Press, who formed the America First Committee, the ultimate spearhead of isolationism.

There were, in addition, considerable numbers of liberals, and many of them in the Roosevelt Administration itself, who opposed the President's un-neutral policy because of a pacifistic fear that involvement in war, or even preparation therefor, would produce an interruption in social progress and an assault upon civil liberties such as that which occurred under A. Mitchell Palmer, Alien Property Custodian and Attorney-General in the Wilson Administration. As I have indicated, Harry Hopkins would undoubtedly have been included with his friends Senator Robert M. La Follette and Robert M. Hutchins in this category of liberal isolationists had it not been for his fervent conviction that Roosevelt could not possibly be wrong on any major issue. It was the liberal group—and, to a much lesser extent, the Communists—who made the greatest appeal to youth in the country, and inspired so many 'Keep Us Out of War' demonstrations on so many university campuses.

There was another and extremely important element in the thinking of liberals and of countless middle-of-the-road Americans whose political affiliations were hazy, but whose impulses were essentially decent: that was

profound distrust of the reactionary leaders in Britain and France who had gone to Munich once and might well go there again. Here was an honest and intelligent sentiment which dishonest and dangerously stupid men could exploit. The records of calculated British propaganda in America in the World War as they had been set down by such thoughtful and reasonable writers as Walter Millis and Quincy Howe evoked too many malodorous memories. Before the advent of calamity in Western Europe and of Winston Churchill, the Allied cause did not have a good smell even in the nostrils of those who hated Fascism and all its evil works. The same general sentiment applied—although to a far lesser extent, because of public ignorance of the area—to the Kuomintang régime in China. It was not easy to answer the question: Should American boys die fighting Fascism in Europe and Asia in order to defend neo-Fascism? The unworthy Frenchmen who raised the cry, 'Why should we die for Danzig?' raised more echoes in American hearts than Goebbels or Gayda ever did. Early in 1939 that understanding, objective, sharp-witted Scot, Robert Bruce Lockhart, author of *British Agent* and many other books, went on a lecture tour of the United States. In a later book, *Comes the Reckoning*, he wrote:

The effect of my lectures, like that of most British lecturers, was insignificant, if not indeed harmful, and the only benefit of my tour was self-education.

Lockhart summarized the average American's attitude toward Britain's problems in these words:

We Americans went into the last war to save democracy. We pulled you out of a hole and we received very grudging thanks. At Versailles and after Versailles you trampled on democratic ideals. Now, largely through your own fault, you are in trouble again and you want our help. Well, we've learnt our lesson.

Lockhart later became Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive, which was attached to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. Perhaps because of his own experience and his remarkably realistic appraisal thereof, the British sent no lecturers to the United States during the entire war, except when specifically requested to do so by the American authorities. The mistakes of the First World War were not repeated.

What Lockhart encountered may be described as the essential 'grass-roots' sentiment, which was strongly represented in the Congress together with all the various prejudices and fears that always beset little men. There was another powerful influence in the Congress: this was the kind of crossroads chauvinism which afflicts minor politicians who know they can always get

applause by indulging in eagle-screaming—the kind of picayune parochialism which contends that all ‘furriners’, particularly Englishmen and Frenchmen, are slick deceivers who are out to pull the wool over the eyes of poor, innocent, gullible Uncle Sam the while they deftly extract the gold from his teeth. I am not suggesting that Congress was dominated by this spirit, nor that the Republicans had any more of it than the Democrats; but it was always there and always highly vocal, and such forceful isolationist leaders as Senator Burton K. Wheeler (Democrat, of Montana) and Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Republican, of Massachusetts), knew well how to mobilize it.

When I speak of the ‘isolationists’ from now on I shall refer particularly to those in the Congress who were in a position to block the Roosevelt measures and, from their rostrum on Capitol Hill, to publicize what they considered his attempts to dupe the American people into a war which they believed was none of our business. It was a curious fact that these extreme isolationists were not pacifists in the sense that they opposed war as such; indeed, their attitude toward the Soviet Union—and also, in some cases, toward Japan—was one of extreme belligerency. They seemed to be in favour of fighting under two essential conditions: (1) That all battles be staged on our own home grounds, in the Western Hemisphere (otherwise, it would be a ‘foreign’ war); and (2) that in the war we keep ourselves pure, and therefore ‘100 per cent American’, by having no allies whatsoever. Evidently it was felt that we had made a terrible mistake in 1918 by fighting in France together with allies who had turned out to be ingrates, and so we must be careful never to do that again. The Roosevelt doctrine was that if we were to get into a war we should fight it as far from our own shores as possible and with the greatest number of allies, regardless of ideology, that we could enlist, accepting whatever risks there might be of potential ingratitude after the common enemies had been disposed of.

The myopic form of Congressional isolationism can best be expressed by two quotations of the period. The first was from Representative John G. Alexander, a Minnesota Republican. In a letter to the President on Selective Service he wrote:

Why take our youth from their homes and out of the wholesome environment in which most of them are living, and transplant them into the lonely, inhospitable and disturbing and discouraging arena of a training camp? Their mental, moral, and physical well-being is too important to be disregarded in that way. . . . Mr. President, we want no foreign wars; we want none of our American boys to fight in foreign lands or seas; we want only to prepare to protect and defend our own shores and border.

The other quotation was from Senator Robert A. Taft:

I do not know what the Germans may do, and no one knows what they may do until they are freed from the present war and have an opportunity to show. When they do, we can adopt the same methods. We can take the same steps that may be necessary to meet the particular kind of German 'blitzkrieg', if there is such a blitzkrieg, at the time we find out what it is.

In other words, we were to fight only (1) when the enemy, having previously disposed of all of our potential allies, had arrived at our shores or 'border', and (2) after he had revealed to us all of the new weapons and tactics that he proposed to employ for our destruction. These two quotations might well be printed at the start of the most elementary textbooks used at West Point and Annapolis in order to teach student officers what they must first contend with in their careers of service to the United States.

In his constantly delicate and difficult relations with the Congress in matters of Foreign Policy, Roosevelt was constantly careful to avoid what Tolstoy called 'the irrevocable act'. He now carried a heavy share of responsibility for the future history of the world. If he were to go before the Congress with a request for action on an issue of international importance and were defeated, it would involve more than gleeful editorials in the *Chicago Tribune* and possible losses for the Democratic party at the next elections; it could well involve utter, world-wide disaster. The melancholy story has been told of the meeting in the President's study one evening a few weeks before war broke out in Europe at which Roosevelt and Cordell Hull told Vice-President Garner, Senator William E. Borah, and other Senators of their conviction that war might be averted by immediate amendment of the Neutrality Act; Hull argued the point with tears in his eyes, but Borah brushed him off with the statement that his private sources of information assured him there would be no war ('Germany isn't ready for it'); and Garner ended the meeting by saying cheerfully to Roosevelt: 'Well, Captain, we may as well face the facts. You haven't got the votes, and that's all there is to it.' Roosevelt did not forget that experience, and neither did Hull, who had more respect than Roosevelt had for the dignity and authority of the Congress. Before Roosevelt asked for anything else in the next two years, he was extremely careful to make sure that he had 'the votes'. He hesitated to take a chance which might result in an adverse vote—or even a fairly close vote—in the Congress and thereby render aid and comfort to the Germans and Japanese and discouragement and demoralization to those who fought them. It is not easy for the average citizen to appreciate the extent to which every word, every implication, uttered by the President of the United States, as well as every action committed by him, may bolster the

courage or deepen the despair of hundreds of millions of people in lands overseas. But Roosevelt appreciated it. His cautious policy of one step at a time often infuriated the extreme interventionists, who asked: 'Why doesn't he go to Congress and demand a declaration of war *now*?' Had he done so in the summer of 1940, for example, when Britain was fighting alone, he would undoubtedly have been repudiated by the Congress, and that might well have been the signal to the British people that their cause was hopeless and that they had better come to terms with Hitler. I think that the criticism aimed at Roosevelt by the interventionists caused him more temporary irritation than that hurled at him day after day by the isolationists. Shortly before Christmas 1939 someone sent him a copy of a poem written by Joseph Warren in 1775, the first verse of which was as follows:

Lift up your hands, ye heroes,
And swear with proud disdain;
The wretch that would ensnare you
Shall lay his snares in vain.
Should Europe empty all her force
We'll meet her in array
And fight and shout and fight
For free Amerikay.

The correspondent—name unknown to me—who sent that to the President explained that 'according to Carl Sandburg, the pronunciation "Amerikay" was customary with both Lincoln and Jeff Davis'.

Roosevelt sent a copy of this verse to Hopkins with the following letter:

Those verses by Joseph Warren, written in 1775, are interesting as showing that a matter of four million people with few resources thought even in those days that they could lick the world. I fear that today altogether too many people in Amerikay want, as they did then, to 'fight and shout and fight'. Some of us believe there would be more shouting than fighting.

Roosevelt, normally one who interpreted his Constitutional powers in the broadest possible terms, might have used the immediate impact of European war to assume authority far beyond that of the normal peacetime President. But he did just the opposite. In a Press conference following his Proclamation of Limited Emergency, on September 8, 1939, he clarified his intentions by saying:

There is no intention and no need of doing all those things that could be done. . . . There is no thought in any shape, manner or form, of putting the Nation, either in its defences or in its internal economy, on a war

basis. That is one thing we want to avoid. We are going to keep the Nation on a peace basis, in accordance with peacetime authorizations.

Those were probably the weakest words that Roosevelt ever uttered. He was outdoing even Warren G. Harding by getting the country 'back to normalcy' before the war had really started. He was revealing the woeful weakness of his own Administration, especially in the three Departments that mattered most in a time of international crisis—the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department.

It is always easy to poke fun at the State Department—indeed, it ranks second only to the Congress as a target for those who like to indulge in the inexpensive pastime of ridiculing our Government—but it is considerably less easy to understand the peculiar difficulties which afflicted the Department in 1940 and thereafter. Cordell Hull had set as his worthy goal the prevention of a Second World War. He was deeply injured when Borah contemptuously dismissed the Department's information as inferior to his own; for Hull, any reflection on his Department constituted an affront to his personal honour and pride—and, as an old soldier of Tennessee, he had plenty of both. Hull's admirable crusade for reciprocal trade was frustrated by the war, and he found himself largely restricted to the maintenance of hemispheric solidarity—in itself a form of isolationism, according to the Roosevelt concept—as a means of keeping the State Department a factor of importance in the Federal Government. While the British Foreign Office was organized on a basis that contemplated the constant possibility of war as 'continuation of policy by other means', the State Department was compelled by twenty years of isolationism to operate on the principle that the Alpha and Omega of American foreign policy is to *keep out of the war*. When this became impossible the functions of the State Department, except in regard to neutral countries, became atrophied. This was a bitter pill for Hull to swallow, and he never did fully digest it. He was extremely jealous of his reputation as one officer of the Administration who had been guilty of no conspicuous blunders and who had been spared the criticism lavished on all the others, including the President himself. However, in times of desperate emergency, when drastic, daring action had to be taken quickly, Roosevelt was bound to become impatient with anyone whose primary concern was the maintenance of a personal record of 'no runs—no hits—no errors'. To an ever greater extent Roosevelt bypassed Hull to deal directly with Sumner Welles, or to assign what should have been State Department functions to the Treasury Department, the War Department, or to any other agency or individual who might get things done, including eventually Harry Hopkins, the archetype of what Hull called 'the extreme Left fringe' surrounding the President. Hull believed that he had been selected by Roosevelt as the man to succeed him at the end

of the Second Term, and this belief was assiduously cultivated and encouraged by James A. Farley—as is discussed elsewhere in these pages. Although Hull had conducted no campaign on his own behalf (Farley was doing that for him), he felt that he had been betrayed, if not by Roosevelt, then by Hopkins and the 'extreme Left fringe'. However, unlike Farley, he finally stood by Roosevelt in the campaign of 1940, and was a powerful force in his reelection; and Roosevelt did not forget this.

Unquestionably, the most lasting and most deplorable element in the distant relations between the White House and the State Department was the President's close association with Sumner Welles—an association based on long friendship and genuine admiration. I cannot pretend to give the reasons for the animosity that existed between the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. But there is no question of doubt that their conflict became to ugly and so extremely dangerous that it eventually compelled the resignation of Welles, which was a serious loss to Roosevelt, for he placed great dependence on Welles's judgment, particularly in all matters relating to the framing of the ultimate peace. These are circumstances of which it is not agreeable to write, and impossible for a contemporary to write without evidence of bias in one form or another. However, history will achieve no complete understanding of Franklin Roosevelt's Administration without knowledge of the intramural feuds which so frequently beset it. (I do not believe that even history will ever be able to understand why he tolerated them to the extent that he did.)

The War Department was weakened by a more obvious and even more impolite running battle between the Secretary, Harry H. Woodring, and Louis A. Johnson, Assistant Secretary. Woodring was isolationist at heart, while Johnson believed in all-out armament. Their severe clashes were hardly helpful to the Army at a time when its needs were most desperate.

The Navy Department was in much better shape, although its Secretary, Charles Edison, was frail in health and insufficiently enthusiastic about his job. Furthermore, Edison appears to have been singularly complacent about the world situation. On June 21, 1940—the very day when Hitler dictated his armistice terms to Pétain's stunned representatives in the forest of Compiègne—Edison wrote to Hopkins urging the use of airships (dirigibles) for the increase of trade with South America. In that letter Edison wrote: *'We may safely assume, I feel, that as soon as the present situation clears in Europe, Germany will immediately resume her South American airship service, even despite her lack of helium or possibly with Russian helium.'* (The italics are Hopkins's.)

The Navy, like the War Department, was to a lamentable extent cowed by the force of isolationist sentiment on Capitol Hill and was trained to be timid in requests for appropriations. The officers most successful in the

Department in peacetime often were those whom Congress identified as the most economy-minded—and sailors or soldiers who are economy-minded rarely win wars.

The officer personnel in both services were anything but blind in devotion to the policies of their Commander-in-Chief. In the Army there was a tendency among officers of both ground and air forces to admire Germany for her achievements in building up these arms. This led in some extreme cases to the hope that Germany would conquer England, thereby providing historic demonstration of the superiority of land and air power over sea power. Obviously, these sentiments were not shared by Navy officers, but, for many of them, the main interest was in the Far East, rather than Europe, and it was their hope that if the United States must go to war the main battleground would be the Pacific.

There was another reason for the weakness of Roosevelt's position during the period of the Phony War, and it was probably the most important reason of all: he was in the last year of his second term as President, and it is one of the classical weaknesses of our American Constitutional system that a President who is approaching the end of his tenure of office can exercise little authority in the conduct of foreign affairs. The old theory that politics 'ends at the waterline' is nonsense. In times of partisan struggle for power there is no point at which politics ends, and this was particularly true in 1939-40, when all domestic issues became indistinct and insignificant in the shadow of war. If Roosevelt had indicated in 1939 or early 1940 that he *would* run for a Third Term, then he would have become a candidate rather than a President; his own party would have been divided into pros and cons and the Republicans would have been united in attacking his every policy, foreign and domestic. If he had indicated he would not run again, then his authority would have become negligible at home and non-existent abroad. His only solution was to shroud his intentions in mystery; in addition to which, it is apparent that for a long time he himself did not know just what these intentions were. This was a period of impotence when, with all of civilization in peril, the leader of the most powerful nation on earth had to wait, day after anxious day, for his own course of action to be shaped by events over which he had no control. It was particularly agonizing for one of his venturesome spirit to be unable to act boldly or even cautiously to plan action in face of impending calamity, of which the blitzkrieg in Poland had given a suggestion. The world now knew how the Nazis could strike—how their air force could paralyse communications—that their tanks were not, as had hopefully been reported, made of ersatz steel. But the French could only crouch behind the Maginot Line, and the British behind the Royal Navy, and the Americans behind the Neutrality Law. And Roosevelt was, for once in his life, deedless and, so far as he was able to say anything of any

consequence, speechless. Early in January, 1940, he sent for Sumner Welles, who has written: 'He admitted frankly that the chances seemed to him about one in a thousand that anything at all could be done to change the course of events.' The one chance as Roosevelt then saw it was to send Welles to Europe to talk to the heads of Government in Germany, Italy, France, and Britain, to determine 'the possibilities of concluding any just and permanent peace', but not any 'temporary or tentative armed truce'. If Roosevelt believed there was any possibility that Hitler would agree to disarm—or even to give up one acre that Germany had seized—he most certainly was thinking wishfully. Welles returned from his mission with discouraging reports about everything except the temper of the British, but with much useful information on the personalities of the men he had met, and Roosevelt was one who knew how to use such information. It was always of tremendous importance to him to be able to size up the characters of the leaders of both enemy and friendly states.

One may wonder why Welles did not also go to the Soviet Union at the time, but Roosevelt 'did not feel that a visit to Moscow would serve any useful purpose'. Indeed, then, the prestige of the Soviet Union was so low that it was counted as only a potential victim of Germany and not as a valid aggressive factor. Russia was then involved to the discredit of its arms in the Winter War with little Finland and was making a woefully unimpressive showing. There was no hint revealed of the eventual magnificence of the Red Army in action. Many people have assumed that this was an act of deliberate deception on Russia's part—simulating weakness in order to mask her real strength—but a remark made by Joseph Stalin, printed later in this book, indicated that the weakness then was real.

The war in Finland caused intensification of the isolationist activities of the Communist party in the United States and led to a singular episode at the White House: An American Youth Congress held a convention in Washington in February, 1940, and the delegates assembled on the south lawn of the White House on a raw, rainy day to hear a speech by the President. It was one of the few occasions in his life when Roosevelt was booed and hissed to his face by an audience of Americans. He referred to a resolution, passed by one of the councils of this Youth Congress, against the granting of American aid to Finland on the ground that such action was 'an attempt to force America into the imperialistic war'.

Roosevelt said:

More than twenty years ago, while most of you were very young children, I had the utmost sympathy for the Russian people. In the early days of Communism, I recognized that many leaders in Russia were bringing education and better health and, above all, better opportunity

to millions who had been kept in ignorance and serfdom under the imperial régime. I disliked the regimentation under Communism. I abhorred the indiscriminate killings of thousands of innocent victims. I heartily deprecated the banishment of religion—though I knew that some day Russia would return to religion, for the simple reason that four or five thousand years of recorded history have proven that mankind has always believed in God in spite of many abortive attempts to exile God.

I, with many of you, hoped that Russia would work out its own problems, and that its government would eventually become a peace-loving, popular government with a free ballot, which would not interfere with the integrity of its neighbours.

That hope is today either shattered or put away in storage against some better day. The Soviet Union, as everybody who has the courage to face the facts knows, is run by a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world. It has allied itself with another dictatorship, and it has invaded a neighbour so infinitesimally small that it could do no conceivable possible harm to the Soviet Union, a neighbour which seeks only to live at peace as a democracy, and a liberal, forward-looking democracy at that.

It has been said that some of you are Communists. That it is a very unpopular term these days. As Americans you have a legal and constitutional right to call yourselves Communists, those of you who do. You have a right peacefully and openly to advocate certain ideals of theoretical Communism; but as Americans you have not only a right but a sacred duty to confine your advocacy of changes in law to the methods prescribed by the Constitution of the United States—and you have no American right, by act or deed of any kind, to subvert the Government and the Constitution of this Nation.

Those words, which appear to have been very carefully chosen, and the boos that greeted them, provide eloquent testimony to the weirdness of the atmosphere that prevailed during the Phony War. For Roosevelt was the President who had first established friendly relations with the Soviet Union, after sixteen years of attempts by the U.S. Government to ignore its existence, and who subsequently rendered decisive aid to the Russians when they became victims of the savage forces they had sought to appease.

During this winter of the Phony War, Churchill paid his respects to the neutral nations of Europe who sought to buy immunity from German aggression by appeasement. He said: 'Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough the crocodile will eat him last.' Churchill evidently liked to use the crocodile as the symbol of Nazi voracity. Years later, when he was explaining the North African operation to Stalin, he drew a picture of a

crocodile on a sheet of Kremlin paper and said: 'We shall strike him here, in the soft underbelly (the Mediterranean), while at the same time we hit him here, in the snout (northern France).'

In March, 1940, Hopkins was sufficiently recovered to get out of bed for a few hours each day and go downstairs and even, when the weather was sunny and warm, go out for an occasional drive. But he was still very weak. He wrote to Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, asking for help in obtaining some seeds for his garden. Among them were petunias, begonias, ageratums, candytufts, sweet alyssum, pansies, forget-me-nots, calliopsis, bachelor buttons, and white and yellow rose bushes. He told Wallace: 'This is to be the extent of the kind of thing I am going to be able to do this spring.' (In the years that I knew Hopkins I never saw him take any interest in a flower.)

THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

IN their swift invasion of Norway the German ground troops were transported secretly to many points on that long and complicated coastline under the very eyes and guns of the British Home Fleet. This was the contemptuous answer to Neville Chamberlain's stupendously unfortunate remark about Hitler having 'missed the bus'. When the British attempt to intervene in Norway proved a fiasco an elder Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, described it as 'another tragedy of too little—and too late'. Those few words formed the epitaph on the grave of wishful thinking in the democracies. They were burned into the very soul of Franklin Roosevelt. They had a continuing effect through the years on all those who were involved in the direction of the Allied war effort. They created the sense of desperate urgency which the desperate times demanded. As crisis after crisis burst it was repeated that 'Never again must we be *too little and too late!*' But we almost were. The margin between victory and defeat proved to be very narrow indeed: it was no wider than the English Channel—no wider than one street in Stalingrad—no wider than the Solomons' 'Slot'. The invasions of Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, marked the beginning of the end of the Phony War, and with the invasions of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France on May 10, the period of impotence at last came to its overdue conclusion. In the course of the next six months Roosevelt made by all odds the most momentous decisions of his career—and he made them, it must be remembered, without previous authorization by Congress and against the earnest advice of most of his associates and friends.

On the day that the Germans marched—or, rather, hurtled—into the Low Countries, Chamberlain resigned and Winston Churchill was at last called to Buckingham Palace to accept the post of the King's First Minister. (He thereupon became, in his correspondence with Roosevelt, the 'Former Naval Person'.) He told the House of Commons: 'I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat.' Anthony Eden, who had been out of the Cabinet for a year before the war started because of his opposition to Chamberlain's policies, was brought back to prominence as Secretary of State for War in the new Coalition Government. The British people now had leaders worthy of them.

On May 13, the Dutch Army surrendered and the German blitzkrieg began to turn westward toward the classic battlefields of Northern France. The Ardennes again became the scene of massive German victory. The hapless French Commander in Chief, General Gamelin, was replaced by General Weygand, and Churchill broadcast to the world: 'We may look

with confidence to the stabilization of the front in France.' But the world looked in vain. The famous 'sickle' movement was in full stride and within two days of Churchill's reassurance the mobile columns had cut through north of the Somme to the English Channel at Abbeville, had then swung north-eastward along the coast to Boulogne and Calais and were within sight of England. The Germans under Hitler had accomplished in eleven days what they had failed to do in the four years of bitter fighting in the First World War. It was a brilliant campaign of calculated panic which led to fierce demoralization. On May 28, King Leopold of Belgium surrendered. Weygand attempted to form a line of defence on the Somme. For a time there was great question in the public mind whether Hitler would attack this line and strike southward to Paris or would direct his catapulting force across the Channel for the invasion of England.

When the blitzkrieg in the West was in its fifth day, Churchill sent Roosevelt a cable which was full of dark forebodings for the German conquest of Europe with 'astonishing swiftness'. He contemplated the possibility of heavy bombing of Britain and of paratroop attacks. He predicted that Mussolini would burst into the war to collect his share of the 'loot of civilization'. (This was twenty-five days before Mussolini did so.) He asked the President to proclaim a state of 'non-belligerency' for the United States, which would mean supplying all kinds of aid but no armed action. The aid that Churchill wanted immediately included the lease of forty or fifty destroyers, several hundred warplanes, anti-aircraft guns, and steel. He asked for American diplomatic co-operation to persuade the Irish Free State to take measures to prevent German invasion. He asked for co-operation in preventing further Japanese aggression in South-East Asia. In connection with the latter, Churchill suggested the U.S. Navy use Singapore as a base. Most important of all in this cable, Churchill said that, if necessary, Britain would fight on alone. In a cable sent five days later (May 20) Churchill said that if Britain went down, he and his Government would perish with it, and he could not be responsible for the terms that might be imposed on whatever form of British 'authority' the Germans might decide to recognize. Roosevelt did not discount these and subsequent cabled reports from Churchill as exaggerations. During these weeks when horror was piled upon horror, Roosevelt believed that if Churchill erred at all in his estimates he erred on the side of optimism; but Roosevelt rarely objected to that kind of error.

British troops in Boulogne and Calais managed by determined if ultimately hopeless resistance to delay the German advance just long enough to permit the flooding of the waterlines at Gravelines, which in turn could be defended by French troops for a few days. Those few days were of historic importance, for within ten miles of Gravelines was the final objective of the sickle movement, Dunkirk, the last remaining port of evacuation. Had the Germans

managed to reach it, at the rate they had maintained since the blitzkrieg started, they would have completed the destruction of the French forces of the north as well as the entire British and Belgian armies—while the bulk of the French Army sat, helpless and innocuous, in the unmolested Maginot Line. But in this one, last stage of their timetable the Germans failed, and they thereupon turned their main attention away from the English Channel to the Rivers Somme and Aisne and the drive on Paris.

A sense of terror swept through the civilized world as a result of these bewildering events, these incredible achievements of mechanized barbarism. The horrible confusion and hysteria of the civilians of the Low Countries—driven to panicked flight along narrow roads by the Fifth Column and machine-gunned and bombed as they fled by the screaming Stuka dive-bombers—communicated itself to peoples far from the scene of combat. It was the supreme triumph of what Edmond Taylor has correctly called the 'Strategy of Terror'. It seemed to many that the boasts of Nazi propaganda were not mere bombast, after all; the Germans *were* super-men, and nothing would ever be able to stop them. There was a perceptible lifting of hearts when announcement was made of the evacuation at Dunkirk—but those with any knowledge of military reality could derive little immediate satisfaction from this remarkable achievement, for the three hundred and thirty thousand men taken off the beaches had been forced to leave all of their heavy equipment behind them and there were pitifully inadequate replacements in Great Britain. It was at that point that the United States became the decisive strategic factor in the war.

There could be no further doubt in the minds of Roosevelt or his Chiefs of Staff that, with virtually all of the British Army's equipment lost and with metropolitan France doomed, the survival of the United Kingdom and of any remnants of French power would depend on the extent of the supplies produced in and delivered from the United States. These supplies could be financed for the time being, a matter of a few months, on the 'cash-and-carry basis'; but when the last dollar of Britain's dwindling reserve had been spent Roosevelt would be faced with the choice of finding some other basis for furnishing aid (undoubtedly at the American taxpayers' expense) or of conceding victory to Germany.

On June 4, William Bullitt, the American Ambassador in Paris, had lunch with Pétain and reported to Roosevelt that the old Marshal had said that the British would permit the French to fight without help until the last available drop of French blood should have been shed, and that then, with quantities of troops on British soil and plenty of planes and a dominant fleet, the British after a very brief resistance, or even without resistance, would make a peace of compromise with Hitler, which might even involve a British government under a British Fascist leader.

However, on that same day, Churchill electrified the British people and most of the world with one of the greatest of all his great speeches. He seldom imposed upon his listeners the burden of having to read between his lines and one could hardly misinterpret the exact meaning of these thundering words:

We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.

This was the great rallying cry for the slowly awakened people of Britain—who themselves had been afflicted with isolationism and complacency—and it was the first open call for help from America. Roosevelt made an attempt to answer it in his Charlottesville Speech on June 10, the day that Italy entered the war. Timid souls in the State Department blanched with horror when, on his own initiative and without consultation with anyone, he inserted the words 'the hand that held the dagger has plunged it into the back of its neighbour'. They felt that he was going much too far. But he was all too well aware that he could not possibly go far enough. In that same speech, he gave to the world a tremendous assurance, for which he had no Congressional authority, but on which he eventually made good:

In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defence.

This was the first pledge of aid to the 'opponents of force'—the first proclamation of the policy which led to Lend Lease and to the all-out production 'without which', as Stalin said at Teheran, 'our victory would have been impossible'.

When news of this speech was broadcast to France, Premier Reynaud cabled his desperate appeal to Roosevelt for 'aid and material support by all means short of an expeditionary force'. But Roosevelt ultimately could offer in reply only assurances of 'my utmost sympathy' and promise that the United States Government would not 'recognize the results of conquest of territory acquired through military aggression'. By means of some subtle

and possibly questionable legal shenanigans worked out by Henry Morgenthau's lawyers in the Treasury Department, about a hundred and fifty American warplanes were flown to Canada and there loaded aboard the French aircraft carrier *Béarn*, but they never reached their destination; they and the carrier were at sea when France surrendered and they and a lot of useless French gold spent the war idly in the Caribbean island of Martinique.

The day after the Charlottesville Speech Churchill and Eden made a sudden trip to France to confer with Reynaud and others near Tours. Weygand told Churchill very bluntly that France could no longer conduct what he called 'co-ordinated war.' Reynaud was determined to continue the fight under any and all circumstances and was supported vigorously by his new Under Secretary for War, General Charles de Gaulle. Admiral Darlan was in favour of sending the French Fleet to Canada.

Years later, after the European war had ended, Edouard Herriot was interviewed by the *New York Times*, and he said that on this occasion, June 11, 1940, Churchill had broken down and wept like a child, but clenched his fists in fierce determination and said that he almost hoped that Hitler would now turn to attempt an attack on Britain and thus give Weygand an opportunity to stabilize the front on the Somme. Churchill promised that he would make more attempts to induce the Cabinet to send squadrons of R.A.F. fighter-planes to France. He said:

Great Britain refuses to abandon the contest unless utterly crushed. If the French Army is obliged to stop fighting, England will carry on in the hope that Hitler will be ruined by his very victories. With its Air Force and its Fleet, the British Empire can last out for years, and can impose upon Europe the most stringent of blockades.

Churchill sent a full report of this meeting to Roosevelt. He said that the aged Marshal Pétain, who had been 'none too good' even in 1918, appeared to be now ready to negotiate an armistice with Hitler. On June 13 Roosevelt cabled Reynaud that the French message of June 10 'has moved me deeply', and 'the magnificent resistance of the Allied armies has impressed the American people profoundly'. He repeated the assurances he had given both to Reynaud and Churchill that the U.S. Government 'is doing everything in its power to make available urgently required material to the Allied Governments and we are redoubling our efforts to do still more, because of our support of and faith in the ideals for which the Allies are fighting.' Roosevelt said he was 'heartened' by Churchill's statements that the British would go on fighting and by Reynaud's declaration that France would not abandon the battle for democracy, 'even if it means slow withdrawal to North Africa and the Atlantic'. The President, as always, emphasized the importance of naval power, saying that, 'as Admiral Darlan well knows',

vital materials from the outside world were essential for the maintenance of all armies and therefore the British and French fleets must 'continue mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans'.

Churchill cabled the President expressing his enthusiasm for this 'magnificent' message, and begged that it be made public, so that the French and British people, and also the Germans, would fully appreciate the uncompromising position taken by the United States of America. Roosevelt quickly replied through Kennedy that the Prime Minister had evidently misinterpreted his message. He emphasized the fact that, under the Constitution, he could make no commitments beyond the material aid already announced.

That same day, June 13, the day before the fall of Paris, Churchill again flew to France in a final effort to beg the French Government to fight it out on any and every line that could be established, and in the event of bitter necessity, to evacuate itself to North Africa and continue the war from there while the French Fleet merged with the Royal Navy.

Reynaud informed Churchill that it was hopeless to continue fighting unless the British gave him more squadrons of R.A.F. fighter planes.

According to General Sir Hastings Ismay, Personal Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister: 'Before we left for the meeting at Briare, Air Marshal Dowding, Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command, had given the Cabinet the most solemn warning that if any more fighter squadrons were sent to France he could not guarantee the security of the British Isles.' Some of Churchill's associates feared that he would not heed this warning because of his emotional attachment to France as well as his sense of obligation to an ally; but he refused Reynaud's request. When he was told of Weygand's prediction, 'In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken', Churchill filed those words in the back of his mind for possible future reference. Reynaud was thereupon compelled to yield to Marshal Pétain, who immediately started to sue for a separate peace. When Churchill and his party had returned from Tours to London (flying, incidentally, over German-held territory) he sent a cable to Roosevelt saying that France might still be saved by a Presidential announcement that the United States would, if necessary, enter the war. Roosevelt replied again that he could make no such commitment; only Congress could make such a commitment. Churchill was well aware of that, but in the moment of desperation he was ready to try anything. He now knew that Britain must fight alone and that the first phase of the coming decisive campaign would be an all-out battle for control of the air over England itself; the second phase would be fought on the waters of the Channel, and Churchill repeated several times in cables his hope that the President could arrange for the lease of American destroyers to the British.

In the days while the venerable defeatist, Pétain, was negotiating with Hitler, the cables between the White House and Downing Street continued, but now it was Roosevelt who was asking most of the anxious questions. First, the President wanted to know when Churchill expected that the German attack against Britain would start. The answer was: In all probability immediately. Then Roosevelt asked what would be done with the British Home Fleet in the event of successful German invasion. He expressed the hope that the fleet would be disposed among bases such as Newfoundland, Aden, Capetown, and Singapore, stating that the American Fleet would assume responsibility for the defence of the Western Hemisphere, including Canada. Roosevelt said: 'As naval people, you and I fully appreciate that the vital strength of the Fleet and command of the seas mean, in the long run, the saving of democracy and the recovery of those suffering temporary reverses.'

The reply from London contained ugly truths dressed up in immaculate terminology. Roosevelt was informed that of course the Royal Navy or any part of it would never be surrendered to Hitler, and that all surviving units of the Home Fleet would be disposed in overseas bases as the President suggested; however, it was pointed out, every available British armed ship would be violently engaged in the defence of the British Isles, and therefore the very fact of successful German invasion would presuppose the total destruction of the Home Fleet.

That was precisely what Roosevelt wanted to hear. He knew now that the former Naval Person was determined that if Britain were to go down she would go with colours flying and guns blazing and with no servile requests for terms. Being a naval person himself, he now began to feel confident that with such determined spirit and with such a fleet she would not go down. He further asked what were the intentions as to the transfer of the seat of Government from London to Canada or some other point in the Commonwealth in the event of successful invasion. He wanted to be assured that the British would do what the Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians, Czechs, and Poles had done and set up a Government in Exile—which Pétain had failed to do. He received only an equivocal reply on this point. But when Harry Hopkins went to London, seven months later, he learned the truth: *the British Government did not have even a skeleton plan for evacuation to Canada or anywhere else overseas*. Churchill believed that if the United Kingdom fell the Empire would be ended—at least temporarily—and the leadership of the remaining units of the British Commonwealth would pass to Washington.

The Dominion Governments were sending messages to London at that time urging that the Royal Family, or at least the two young Princesses, be sent to a place of safety at once, so that the institution of the Crown be

continued regardless of the fate of the home islands. This request was not accepted. Queen Elizabeth said: 'The Princesses could not leave without me—and I could not leave without the King—and, of course, the King will never leave.'

There was a plan for the evacuation of London, worked out in utmost detail, according to which most of the Government would move to Malvern, in the West of England. I do not know whether Churchill has ever committed himself as to his own personal opinion of this plan, but members of his staff at that time have expressed the conviction that he never had any intention of quitting London under any circumstances whatsoever. If the Nazis succeeded in taking London—which he was pleased to call 'this Imperial City'—they would take him with it, or anything that might be left of him.

I cannot quote in full the cables that passed between Downing Street and the White House at this time because, although I have read them, they are not part of the Hopkins papers. Those from the British end made the following further points:

The only British hope of defeating Germany was in the retention of the United Kingdom itself as a base, and to that end every resource and every life would be directed. If the United Kingdom were conquered, and the Fleet destroyed, then North and West Africa as well as Europe would inevitably fall under German domination. All that the British could do in the Mediterranean would be to deny the Germans use of the Suez Canal, not by defending, but by destroying it. Germany would have a formidable naval striking force with the Italian Fleet and substantial units of the French Navy joined to her own. Furthermore, with all the shipyards of Western Europe at her disposal, Germany would have enormous naval productive power. Hitler's triumphs in Europe would undoubtedly stimulate the Japanese to acts of aggression against French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, thereby gaining for themselves bases for attacks on other points, including British and American territory. Churchill expressed the belief that the whole world situation could be greatly helped if the United States Government would proclaim that any violent attempt to alter the *status quo* in the Far East would 'produce a state of belligerence' or (toning it down a little) would 'not be tolerated'.

Roosevelt repeated (not once, but several times) that, for constitutional reasons, he could not give any assurance that the United States would declare war no matter what the provocation, short of direct attack upon the United States itself. But he made it quite clear that if Britain fell his own purpose would be to do all that he possibly could 'more than mere words, but short of war'; for he knew that with Britain and her Navy gone all of our traditional concepts of security in the Atlantic Ocean—the Monroe Doctrine, the principle of Freedom of the Seas, the solidarity of the Western

Hemisphere—would become mere memories, and the American people would be living constantly 'at the point of the Nazi gun'.

In the notes that he made for a speech at a secret session of the House of Commons on June 20, Churchill stated that if Britain could get through the next three months she could get through the next three years. He placed great stress upon superiority in air power and said that the issue depended primarily upon the outcome of the impending air battle of Britain. He expressed the opinion that nothing would so stir the people of the United States as fighting in or over England. He felt that the best provocation to the American people to enter the war would be furnished by the heroic struggle of the British people. He paid tribute to Franklin Roosevelt and said that all depended upon the British people maintaining a resolute bearing and holding out until the election issues were settled in America. (Although Churchill constantly warned his associates and the people in general against wishful thinking, he was humanly incapable of resisting the temptation to indulge himself in that agreeable vice now and then; neither, as I have said, was Roosevelt.)

With the signing of the Armistice in the forest of Compiègne the British Government faced the problem of the French Navy. The decision was taken, 'with aching hearts', to destroy all possible signs of this Navy which would not voluntarily join with the British or consent to move out of German reach and be demilitarized for the duration of the war. Various alternatives were presented to the ships at Oran, in Algeria, among them the possibility that they might be 'entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated'. The proposals made at Oran were refused by the French Admiral Gensoul and the British Navy attacked with guns and naval aircraft. The damage done and the loss of life were heavy—although one valuable cruiser escaped to Toulon. This action provided powerful ammunition for Nazi anti-British propaganda in France throughout the next four years, but it had a tremendous effect on world opinion, particularly in the United States. It served forcibly to underscore Churchill's defiant assurance that 'we will fight them in the streets' and 'never surrender'. It exerted a particular effect on Roosevelt, who, it is reasonable to assume, knew of the action well in advance.

The President had scraped the bottom of the barrel in American arsenals for half a million rifles, eighty thousand machine-guns, a hundred and thirty million rounds of ammunition, nine hundred 75-mm. guns and a million shells, as well as some bombs, T.N.T., and smokeless powder, all to be shipped to Britain. This was done by means of more legal manipulation in a 'damn the torpedoes' spirit. It was done at a moment when many men close to the White House were shouting almost hysterically that this represented suicide for Roosevelt and quite possibly for the nation—that Britain was

finished and that all this material would merely fall into the hands of Hitler, who would turn it against us in our own relatively defenceless state. But it was done, and it was of inestimable value to Britain in her hour of greatest need. These shipments were of such vital and immediate importance that Churchill gave instructions that their delivery be treated as a 'military evolution'. Trucks and vans were awaiting them at the dockside, so that at the instant of unloading they could be rushed to various strategic points exactly as though they were arms delivered to sorely beset troops fighting to hold a precarious beach-head. The British Home Guardsman, who had been preparing to meet German invasion with a pitchfork or a flail, now had a rifle in his hands and ammunition in his belt. He felt much better. He felt, in fact, unbeatable.

When the blitz was at its height Churchill said in a Secret Session speech:

The deployment of the enemy's invasion preparations and the assembly of his ships and barges are steadily proceeding, and at any moment a major assault may be launched on this island. . . . Upwards of seventeen hundred self-propelled barges and more than two hundred seagoing ships . . . are already gathered at the many invasion ports. . . . I am confident that we shall succeed in defeating and largely destroying this most tremendous onslaught by which we are now threatened, and anyhow, whatever happens, we will all go down fighting to the end.

It is perhaps a bit of unnecessarily grim speculation, but I believe there were some in England—and I should not be surprised if Churchill were one of them—who later regretted rather wistfully that Hitler never tried that invasion. As a member of the staff remarked later to Hopkins, 'it would have been a hell of a fight'. The British were deficient in modern weapons, but they had millions of anti-tank grenades, made with beer-bottles containing T.N.T. and sulphur, and they were literally spoiling for a chance to hurl them. They knew that the President of the United States, however limited his and their means, was with them, at least in spirit. This consideration was worth far more to their morale than the paper that it was not written on.

This, then, was Roosevelt's first tremendous wartime decision: to back the seemingly hopeless cause of Britain with everything that he could possibly offer in the way of material and moral encouragement. This decision was entirely on his own. There was no time in his Presidential career when he met with so much opposition in his own official family or when his position in the country was less secure. His two principal ambassadorial advisers, Bullitt in France and Kennedy in Britain, were bleakly defeatist about Britain's chances. Bullitt, passionately pro-French, felt that the British had betrayed their allies because of Churchill's refusal to send the final R.A.F. fighter strength to France. Kennedy vehemently advised the President

against 'holding the bag in a war in which the Allies expect to be beaten'. But Roosevelt made his decision and proclaimed it—let it be remembered—on the brink of a Presidential political campaign, and even before he had announced that he would run for a Third Term or before he knew that the Republican nominee would be Wendell Wilkie instead of Robert A. Taft, Thomas E. Dewey or Arthur H. Vandenberg, all of whom were then avowed isolationists. In this decision Roosevelt was influenced undoubtedly by strategic considerations: he well knew the importance of the United Kingdom as a base and of the Royal Navy as a weapon for the defence of the Western Hemisphere. But there were considerations of morality which were even more important to him. His inability to offer any kind of satisfactory reply to the desperate calls for help from France had given him, I believe, the bitterest sense of defeat that he had ever experienced. He was determined not to repeat the national humiliation. He was now asserting leadership of the American people—and most of the people, be it said, were glad of it, for they had been shocked and stunned by the impact of events.

The vast mail that came into the White House in those days was full of fear, not of any known peril, but of the awful uncertainty and confusion that beset the people. Many letters carried pitiful appeals from mothers and wives to the President to: 'Tell the country that you won't send our boys into any foreign wars. Promise us they won't be sent out of the Western Hemisphere.' (As though it were preferable to have the war in this part of the world and the boys to perish in the Brazilian jungles or the Alaskan wastes.) There were letters that expressed fear for our national honour and the future of our freedom. One such was from Hopkins's old friend, William Hodson, Commissioner of Welfare in New York City, who had been so largely responsible for bringing Hopkins to the attention of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Hodson wrote:

There can be no doubt that America is on the brink of disaster, and I am conscious of the appalling responsibility which the President and all his advisers are assuming in this dark hour. I hope that the President will speak out and tell America the worst, as Churchill has done in Great Britain, so that we may steel ourselves for the trials ahead which the American people do not fully understand.

What can be done at this point by the citizens to bring about immediate American help to the Allies in every possible way? What can the citizens do to support and sustain the President's effort to reorganize and enlarge the armaments of the country without delay?

It seems to me that there is still a lethargy and inertia, which may confuse and deaden our efforts, unless we hear quickly the clarion call, which only the President can give. God grant that we are not already too late!

Hodson was killed two and a half years later in the crash of an Army airplane *en route* to North Africa, where he was to organize the first programme of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. He had lived to see the war reach its turning-point at Midway, El Alamein, and Stalingrad. But Roosevelt never clearly sounded 'the clarion call' which Hodson and many others demanded; he waited until the Japanese war lords sounded it for him. He has been criticized for this by many thoughtful people, including his most loyal 'lieutenant', Henry L. Stimson. Perhaps history will find him at fault for not having laid his cards on the table in 1940 or 1941 and demanded a showdown with Congress as to whether or not the United States should enter the war and fight. I do not know about that. I can only express the belief that had he done so he would have been badly defeated, and Germany and Japan between them would have conquered all of Europe and Asia, including the Soviet Union, by 1942. I hesitate even to guess what the results of this would have been in the Western Hemisphere. Not that it matters. For better or for worse, history never needs to be seriously concerned with what *might* have happened. Whatever Franklin Roosevelt might have done that he did not do, the fact remains that the decisions he made in 1940, on his own authority and without clarion calls, involved commitment of the United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the world. It was a coincidence, but an appropriate development of the pattern of history, that Roosevelt should have proclaimed his decision at Charlottesville, Virginia, in the presence of the genius of Thomas Jefferson, who had boldly and without Congressional authority set the young United States on the way to continental dominance and thereby, he hoped, had given it strength to avoid the entanglements of the Old World.

THE CHAIN REACTION

IT is often erroneously believed that propaganda is nothing but a maze of words dreamed up by fiendish minds for the purpose of deceiving and cajoling, lulling or frightening. But the only propaganda that really matters is that which proclaims action or which threatens it, and in the latter case the action must always follow or the propaganda boomerangs. The devastating Nazi propaganda campaign, the strategy of terror, was not the mere creation of Goebbels's phrase-factory; it was the sequence of events—the blood purges, the pogroms, the rearmament, the annual Black Mass of force-worship at Nuremberg, the concentration camps, the reality of the Fifth Columns operating with brazen, contemptuous candour behind the frontiers of intended victims all over Europe and the Western Hemisphere; finally, it was the sudden application of overwhelming force itself and the proof that 'resistance is futile'. Hitler dancing a jig on the grave of the 1918 Armistice—Hitler paying magnanimous tribute at the tomb of his late colleague, Napoleon Bonaparte—these illustrated events provided the supreme peak in the course of Nazi propaganda. If the strategy of terror were enough in itself to conquer the world, Hitler need fear no future battles. But there are some peoples whom it is dangerous to alarm, and the first of these was the British, the second the Russians, and the third the Americans.

One of the most forcible and persuasive although unwitting purveyors of Nazi propaganda was the famous American hero, Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh. Largely because of personal tragedy, and the refusal of the more sensational Press (which was also the most vehemently isolationist section of the Press) to allow him and his family to lead anything resembling a normal life, Lindbergh had lived for several years in Europe before the war. He had seen the flabby weakness of the Britain of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, and the chaotic disunity of France, and the apparent deficiency of Russian industry, as contrasted with the superb organization and regimentation of Hitler's and Goering's Germany, which presented a model of efficiency to his technological mind. He was given every opportunity by Goering to study the building of the mighty Luftwaffe. Because he had an exceptional understanding of the power of machines—as opposed to the principles which animate free men—he came to the seemingly logical conclusion that Nazi Germany was invincible and that Britain, France, the United States, and everybody else should wake up and, facing the facts of modern life, yield to 'the wave of the future'. A retiring and taciturn and cold man by nature, as well as by force of cruel circumstance, Lindbergh

became a violent and eloquent crusader for the cause of isolationism. He was undoubtedly Roosevelt's most formidable competitor on the radio.

When the blitzkrieg in the West was at its height Roosevelt asked the Congress for a programme which would involve, among other things, the production of 50,000 warplanes for the Army and Navy. He said:

The brutal force of modern offensive war has been loosed in all its horror. New powers of destruction, incredibly swift and deadly, have been developed; and those who wield them are ruthless and daring. No old defence is so strong that it requires no further strengthening and no attack is so unlikely or impossible that it may be ignored.

Lindbergh denounced this as 'hysterical chatter', adding:

We are in danger of war today, not because Europeans attempted to interfere in our internal affairs, but because Americans attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of Europe.

Our dangers are internal. We need not fear invasion unless Americans bring it through their own quarrelling and meddling with affairs abroad. If we desire peace, we need only stop asking for war. Nobody wishes to attack us, and nobody is in a position to do so.

Lindbergh did not say much publicly at this time of what he had seen of German might and of British, French, and Russian weakness. But when he recited facts and figures at private meetings he could generally scare the living daylight out of his listeners, and some of them were impelled to write to Roosevelt urging him to command Churchill to surrender at once to prevent the impending carnage. But one of Lindbergh's listeners had a somewhat different reaction. This was Dr. Vannevar Bush, formerly Dean of Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, now President of the Carnegie Institute in Washington. The effect upon Dr. Bush of the scaring process was not at all what Lindbergh had intended. He was impelled to action by the very threat which Lindbergh so forcefully presented. Bush was in consultation and correspondence with various like-minded men of science, among them Presidents James B. Conant of Harvard, Karl T. Compton of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Frank B. Jewett of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. They had discussed a plan for the mobilization of American scientists to work on new weapons to meet and overcome the awful challenge that Nazi technology had presented to the free and civilized world. Bush had been named spokesman for this group, principally because he was the one who happened to be in Washington, but he proved to be (in the words of Conant) 'an ideal leader of American scientists in time of war . . . his analysis of a tangled situation and his forceful presentation of a course of action produced results far removed from his official sphere of influence'.

Bush had no quick access to anyone on the higher levels of Government, but he knew that the man to see *en route* to Roosevelt was Harry Hopkins and he accordingly went to him with his plan for a National Defence Research Council. Hopkins was already interested in the subject, for the Bureau of Standards of the Commerce Department was engaged in research, and through the Bureau of Patents he had received a suggestion along somewhat similar lines offered by Lawrence Langner, a public-spirited New Yorker who divided his time between the practice of patent law and directing the Theatre Guild (Langner's proposal was for a National Inventors' Council to stimulate development of new weapons and equipment, and this was established).

Always receptive to new ideas that were both daring and big, Hopkins was immediately impressed with Bush's proposal and with Bush himself. There were certain points of resemblance between the two men. Bush was also thin, quick, sharp, and untrammelled in his thinking. He knew what he was talking about and he stated it with brevity and, like Hopkins, with a good sprinkling of salt. He had prepared a succinct Memorandum outlining his proposals. Hopkins read it with approval and then arranged an appointment for Bush to talk with the President about it. When Bush went to the White House he was prepared to answer all kinds of questions and meet probable objections, but he found that Roosevelt had already studied the Memorandum with Hopkins and, after uttering a pleasantry or two, wrote on it, 'O.K.—F.D.R.' and Bush was out of the President's office a few moments after he had entered it.

Subsequently Bush, in consultation with Hopkins, drafted a letter to himself for the President's signature. That letter, with a few additions which provided for close co-operation between N.D.R.C. and the military authorities, was signed by Roosevelt on June 15, the day after the fall of Paris, when it seemed that Christian civilization was coming to an end. It was the day when Churchill sent his most desperate cable, asking the President to announce that the United States would if necessary enter the war, and when Roosevelt made his discouraging reply to Reynaud. Included in that letter to Dr. Bush were these words:

Recently I appointed a special committee, with Dr. Briggs of the Bureau of Standards as Chairman, to study into the possible relationship to national defence of recent discoveries in the field of atomistics, notably the fission of uranium. I will now request that this committee report directly to you, as the function of your Committee includes this special matter, and your Committee may consider it advisable to support special studies on this subject.

The function of your Committee is of great importance in these times

of national stress. The methods and mechanisms of warfare have altered radically in recent times, and they will alter still further in the future. This country is singularly fitted, by reason of the ingenuity of its people, the knowledge and skill of its scientists, the flexibility of its industrial structure, to excel in the arts of peace, and to excel in the arts of war if that be necessary. The scientists and engineers of the country, under the guidance of your Committee, and in close collaboration with the armed services, can be of substantial aid in the task which lies before us. I assure you, as you proceed, that you will have my continuing interest in your undertakings.

Such was the authorization to Vannevar Bush to go ahead with his plans—which he did without delay and without ceremony. And such is the story of how Hitler's Strategy of Terror, relayed through Lindbergh, influenced the establishment of the organization which was responsible for the development of the atomic bomb.

As a footnote on Lindbergh, who had derided Roosevelt's call for 50,000 warplanes as 'hysterical chatter': he eventually proved himself highly useful in experimental work for the Air Force; his precise recording mind retained all the intelligence material that had been so hospitably offered to him in Germany and he applied it effectively. He was of great service as a civilian in testing some of the more than 300,000 warplanes that this nation actually did produce before victory in 1945. Incidentally, Lindbergh of all people should have known this much about his own countrymen: you may say to the average American (if there is one) that some other country has a better form of government than ours, or a superior culture, or a purer religious faith, and he is apt to reply, without much interest, 'Maybe you've got something there, brother'; but try to tell him that some other country can outdo us in the manufacture and use of any kind of gadget and he will be up in arms.

Another object of the chain reaction to the strategy of terror was a group of men in New York City who had been officers in the First World War and who had formed the Military Training Camps Association to keep alive the 'Plattsburgh idea'. One of them was Grenville Clark, a distinguished lawyer, Chairman of the Board on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association, a Republican and an old friend of Franklin Roosevelt's. At a private meeting during the days of Dunkirk, Clark came forth with the startling proposal that the nation must conscript its manpower. It was a supremely daring suggestion and a seemingly hopeless one at a time when young men all over the country were demonstrating against increased armament. Never before had the United States enacted a draft law until it was in a war and actually fighting. But Clark and his associates prepared the

first draft of the Selective Service Bill and persuaded Senator Edward R. Burke, of Nebraska (one of the most isolationist of the States) and Representative James W. Wadsworth, a Republican from up-state New York, to sponsor the Bill in Congress. It was, of course, highly desirable to give it a bi-partisan appearance, and the words 'Selective Service' provided an effective euphemism. Clark made an appointment to see the President on May 31 to urge him to come out in favour of Selective Service, and also to name Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Judge Robert P. Patterson as Under Secretary. This appointment did not come off. General Watson called Clark and told him that it was inconvenient for the President to see him at that time, and that his appointment had been shifted to Harry Hopkins, who would be glad to talk with him. Clark, however, was afraid that Hopkins would merely advise him to call off the whole dangerous Selective Service project, at least until after the November election. Since Clark had no intention of retreating under any circumstances, he concluded it was best not to talk to Hopkins. Some three weeks later Clark and Hopkins did meet and talked for two hours. Hopkins made no commitments on behalf of the President in support of Selective Service—this being an 'irrevocable act' which Roosevelt wished to avoid until he was sure he could win the vote in the Congress—but Hopkins gave Clark his own personal encouragement and at least the intimation that Roosevelt would support the Bill when he felt that the time was right for him to do so. Indeed, Roosevelt by then had already decided on the appointments of Stimson and Patterson, two of the foremost champions of Selective Service.

This was one of Hopkins's first appearances in a role that was to become of major importance—the confidential contact man between Roosevelt and private citizens who were advocating some policy of which the President approved, but which he did not want to advocate publicly for political reasons at the time. There was more than one occasion when Roosevelt wanted to be 'attacked' for inactivity and thus 'goaded' into action by public demand.

In these same grim days at the end of May, Hopkins participated in the formation of the National Defence Advisory Commission, the parent of all the war production, food production, priorities, and price control organizations. This was the beginning of the mobilization of manpower for civilian purposes, as was Selective Service for the military. The N.D.A.C. was composed of the following:

William S. Knudsen, Industrial Production.
Sidney Hillman, Labour.
Edward R. Stettinius, Industrial Materials.
Leon Henderson, Price Stabilization.

Ralph Budd, Transportation.

Chester C. Davis (Grinnell 1912), Farm Products.

Dr. Harriet Elliott, Consumer Protection.

William H. McReynolds, Secretary.

Later, Donald M. Nelson became associated as Co-ordinator of National Defence Purchases.

It will be seen that there was no chairman. For the next year and a half Roosevelt was criticized bitterly for his failure to appoint any one man head of the production effort. He steadfastly and perhaps stubbornly refused to do so until a month after Pearl Harbour. I have never known what his real reasons were for this delay.

There was some preliminary dispute as to just where the N.D.A.C. would be placed in the Government structure. The Under Secretary of Commerce, Edward J. Noble, believed that it belonged logically in the Commerce Department, and I imagine that Hopkins was not opposed to having it under his own direction. But the President decided that the new agency should be kept independent, placed in that limboesque area known as the Office of Emergency Management. Roosevelt thereby established the pattern for his war administration: the special war agencies were for the most part set up by themselves, apart from the permanent structure, with their Directors reporting to the President rather than to any Cabinet officer. Thus, the war agencies—or 'defence agencies', as they were known in the euphemistic days before Pearl Harbour—formed a kind of Government within a Government. Roosevelt was criticized also for this, particularly by members of his own Cabinet, who saw all that power and all those funds going to the new mushroom agencies. But Roosevelt's two main reasons for this policy are quite clear:

(1) The Congress was inclined to view with suspicion any increases in the authority, personnel, and money of the permanent Departments—for it is traditional that once a new function gets into a permanent agency it is extremely difficult to get it out. Temporary agencies can simply be abolished when the emergency ends. For instance, there were logical arguments that the administration of price control be put in the permanent Securities Exchange Commission or war manpower in the Department of Labour; but Roosevelt knew that the Congress would be much more likely to support these highly unpopular measures if they were so segregated that they could be cancelled at any time.

(2) Of greater importance was Roosevelt's conviction that the regular Departments were not geared to meet the extraordinary demands of war. Bound by convention, tradition, red tape, and bureaucratic fear of irregularity, they moved at glacial pace—when the times demanded jet propulsion.

The 'career man' in Government is inclined to consider the interests of his career above the immediate problems of any given moment, his cardinal principle being: 'Never stick your neck out.' In peacetime patience is a requirement as well as a virtue in a Civil Servant who knows that haste makes waste and waste makes you liable to Congressional investigation; whereas in wartime impatience is essential. Impatience was rife in the temporary agencies which were run and staffed to a large extent by temporary men and women whose main concern was to do all they possibly could to help win the war in the shortest possible time and then 'get the hell out of Government service forever'. Such temporary people, Republicans and Democrats alike, started swarming toward Washington as the German Panzers swarmed into France—and it must be admitted that some of them showed remarkable aptitude for picking up the petty jealousies and wranglings and wanglings that sometimes beset bureaucracy. Harold Smith, wartime Director of the Bureau of the Budget, talked to me years later of Roosevelt's method of handling these emergency problems in administration, and said:

The President was the only one who really understood the meaning of the term *total war* and the necessity for it. The others believed you could fight a war with one hand and carry on domestic business pretty much as usual with the other. Roosevelt saw the Cabinet officers not as members of his own staff, but as theatre commanders, each with his own special area, interests, problems and demands. You couldn't expect any one of them to see the picture whole, as the President had to do. That is where Hopkins became so valuable after he left the Department of Commerce. Hopkins's sole job was to see everything from the President's point of view. He was bound by no preconceived notions, no legal inhibitions and he certainly had absolutely no respect for tradition.

Smith expressed the belief that if Roosevelt had had ample time to prepare for war—and the authority to do so—he might have reorganized the Departments to meet the emergency, which would certainly have involved some drastic changes in personnel. But there was not ample time and Roosevelt had to improvise as best he could.

In *Arsenal of Democracy*, Donald Nelson wrote:

But let's think back to that June of 1940: Who among us, except the President of the United States, really saw the magnitude of the job ahead, the awful mission of the United States in a world running berserk? I can testify that all the people I met and talked to, including members of the General Staff, the Army and Navy's highest-ranking officers, distinguished statesmen and legislators, thought of the defence programme as

only a means for equipping ourselves to keep the enemy away from the shores of the United States. None of us—not one that I know of, except the President—saw that we might be fighting Germany and Japan all over the world. He took his stand against the advice of some of this country's best minds, but his foresight was superior to theirs, and this foresight saved us all.

Hopkins was certainly one of the many who had no comprehension of total war, but he was beginning to learn from Roosevelt, as he indicated in a Press conference near the end of May. Asked by Nicholas Gregory of the *New York Herald Tribune* what he thought of the war situation in general, as it affected the United States, he replied:

We cannot go on sitting here and saying that the war is so many miles away and we do not need to worry about it because we are a rich country and it will not affect us or our economic life. We cannot get ourselves into an economic vacuum here. We must get realistic, and put our minds on it, and decide what we are going to do and then make every move necessary to carry out that decision.

Mr. Hermann, of *The American Banker*, asked: 'Just how far can we project that?'

Hopkins replied: 'To any point you want to put it—just as far as you want to go.'

Mr. Hermann then started to ask: 'Even if——'

Hopkins did not permit him to finish saying '— if it means our getting into the war?' He interposed:

Hell, I mean the tough implications! Suppose that Germany wins the war in the next two months and does on the economic fronts what they have done on the military fronts. What will they do in South America, presuming they win, and then, what are we going to do about it? Or—suppose this war lasts two or three years. What effect is that going to have on the economy of this country? This is not a matter of sitting down at the dinner-table and talking about it. . . . I belong to the school that does not talk about things—you *do* them.

Hopkins now began to acquire experience in war production and allocation, subjects with which he was to gain so much familiarity in so little time. He became closely associated with Major-General James H. Burns, of the Army Ordnance Department, and this association remained throughout Lend Lease, the Victory production programme, the programme of aid for the Soviet Union, and the work of the Munitions Assignment Board. John

J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War under Stimson, has written of Burns: 'He gave inspiration and impetus to the programme in a manner for which he forever deserves well of his country.' Burns was what Hopkins liked most—a 'doer'—and he worked fast. Early in June there was a conference between Knudsen, Louis Johnson, and Burns at which Knudsen—the able, genial automotive production man, with no experience in weapons—kept asking: 'How many pieces do you want?' The word 'pieces' referred to such items as heavy bombers, bullets, paratroop boots, tanks, etc. The Army's estimates on everything had been so deliberately timid and modest, due to the fear of ever asking for more than a minimum, that the sudden rush of Congressional appropriations caught its officers unprepared. They did not know how many 'pieces'. But Hopkins advised Burns to ask for everything. Working with his staff incessantly for twenty-four hours, Burns produced a new programme which included provision for, among other things, construction of the 50,000 warplanes for which the President had asked. This programme was rushed through the General Staff and presented to Knudsen within two days after he had requested it.

It is difficult to exaggerate the bewilderment and frenzied uncertainty that prevailed in Washington in those days. It was ridiculous, in a way, and in a way it was intensely inspiring; it presented the concentrated picture of a great people groping, without direction, for the opportunity of service. Among the many patriotic industrialists called to Washington was Robert T. Stevens, one of the country's leading textile manufacturers. When he arrived he had only the vaguest idea of his duties, but Donald Nelson told him: 'Look around in the War and Navy Departments and find out what their requirements are in textiles and figure out a way to meet them.' Stevens found out about the needs for uniforms, blankets, black-out curtains, etc., which required no special talents, and then he began to think that perhaps he was called upon for the exercise of his own imagination. Trying to consider every phase of war activity that might involve the use of textiles, he thought of parachutes. It then occurred to him that with French and Italian manufacture of silk closed to us, our only source was Japan, and, while he knew next to nothing about the international situation, it seemed conceivable to him that this source might be shut off also. He therefore felt that perhaps we should start stockpiling silk. He learned that the average requirement was four parachutes per warplane—figuring the heavy bombers (eleven men) plus the pursuit planes (one man) plus the essential reserves. He consulted the procurement officers in the Army and Navy and was told that they estimated they would need a total of 9,000 parachutes for the coming year, 1940-41—6,500 for the Army Air Corps, 2,500 for the Navy. Stevens did some multiplication of his own and told the officers that he figured they would need 200,000 parachutes instead of the 9,000 for which

they were asking. They asked him how he had arrived at this fantastic figure. He replied: 'The President has asked for 50,000 warplanes. I just multiplied that by four.'

So the number of parachutes on the production programme was boosted from 9,000 to 200,000, and later this figure was increased into the millions. This may have been an extreme case, but in 1940 the extreme case was the typical one. I do not cite this in any sense of discredit to the procurement officers involved, but simply as an instance of the extent to which the normal peacetime, indoctrinated concern for the sanctity of the taxpayers' money can in time of peril endanger the taxpayers' lives, not to mention the security of the Republic itself.

It is important to remember that Roosevelt established the parent agencies for war production, war manpower, price control, food production, transportation, etc., without the need for any legislation by the Congress. In this, he reverted to a law passed in the first World War, just as in the creation of the Vannevar Bush organization, N.D.R.C., he reverted to authorizations dating from the Civil War. In both ultra-modern instances he used antiquated and generally inadequate legislation as his authority for action, because he did not want to risk possible conflict with the Congress on any issue other than what he considered the main one—which was Selective Service. As Commander-in-Chief in a time when the national security was imperilled, he had to put first things first: he may have been wrong in his judgment of what were the first things, but—right or wrong—he had to take action, in the national interest, and he took it. His personal position, as has been indicated, was far weaker than at any other time in the New Deal or war years. Whatever unity and harmony and even loyalty there had been in his Administration was to a serious degree disrupted by the Third-Term issue and the selection of the Vice-Presidential nominee. During the most critical weeks of May and June it was not known whether Roosevelt would run again, or, if he did, whether he would be able to overcome the obstacles of isolationist sentiment and of popular respect for the tradition established by George Washington and solidified by Thomas Jefferson.

Outside of the Service Departments—which, as has been said, were at the time in enfeebled condition—the Treasury was the only one that was functioning on an emergency basis. Indeed, in his prolonged dealings with the French and British Purchasing Commissions, and in his promotion of aid for China, Henry Morgenthau had been exercising some of the most vital functions of the War Department and even of the State Department, not by a process of usurpation, but by default.

In mid-June Roosevelt was bitterly attacked from both sides of the political fence when he appointed Stimson and Frank Knox, both distinguished Republicans, to serve as Secretaries of War and Navy. Both men had

expressed themselves very vigorously in favour of Roosevelt's foreign policy and in opposition to the isolationist tendencies of their own party. Indeed, Stimson, as Secretary of State under Hoover, had laid the foundation for that policy when he advocated collective resistance to the first act of Fascist aggression, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Stimson had been much too far ahead of his time in a timorous, shortsighted world, and Roosevelt admired him all the more for that. Knox, publisher of the *Chicago Daily News*, had run as Vice-Presidential nominee with Landon against Roosevelt four years previously and had been one of the hardest-hitting critics of the New Deal, but he had also been a fellow Rough Rider and lifelong friend of Theodore Roosevelt, and, as such, capable of unorthodoxy. Both Stimson and Knox had held the rank of Colonel in the First World War and both could recognize national peril when they saw it, even at a considerable distance.

When Roosevelt called Knox on the long-distance telephone and invited him to take over the Navy Department, Knox accepted, but expressed the conviction that it would be unwise to make announcement of it until after the Republican Convention, which was then about to assemble in Philadelphia. He said that he wanted to attend this convention and fight for a non-isolationist policy and a non-isolationist candidate, Wendell Willkie, which would obviously be in the national interest, for it would remove this highly dangerous issue from the Campaign. Roosevelt replied that it was all-important that the announcement be made *before* the Convention, for the following reasons:

The entry of Knox into the Cabinet must be publicly recognized for what it was—an act of pure patriotism, animated by the belief that the conduct of the whole defence effort and of foreign policy in general should be placed above all partisan considerations. This would be difficult if not impossible if Knox waited until after the Convention when the issue was joined. If the Republican party espoused an isolationist policy and nominated an isolationist candidate, then his entry into the Democratic Administration would be interpreted as an act of disgruntlement and bad sportsmanship. If, on the other hand, Willkie and the non-isolationists won out at Philadelphia, Knox could hardly desert with good grace the candidate and principles he had fought for, and thus his services would be denied to the President at this critical time.

Stimson, also notified by telephone, indicated his acceptance under certain stringent conditions, the chief of which was that all traces of the warring factions in the War Department be eliminated and that Grenville Clark's proposal of Robert P. Patterson be approved. Roosevelt agreed.

Announcement of the appointment of these two public-spirited men was made on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, and it brought roars of

protest from leading Republican politicians, who charged a 'double-cross' and demanded that Stimson and Knox be 'read out of the party'. Farley and other leading Democratic politicians decried the appointments as a betrayal of party regularity. Ickes was angry because he wanted to be Secretary of War himself.

It is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which Stimson and Knox strengthened Roosevelt's hand in dealing with the immediate problems of 1940 and the longer-range problems of aid to Britain and the building up of our armed forces, as well as in the eventual fighting of the war. Of the two men, Stimson bore appreciably heavier responsibilities because of the President's predilection for the Navy. Stimson, with General Marshall at his side, had to start very close to scratch in the creation of a gigantic Army and Air Force establishment. He surrounded himself with civilian *aides* of remarkable ability—the Under Secretary, Judge Patterson, and Assistant Secretaries, John J. McCloy and Robert A. Lovett. Knox was similarly wise and fortunate in the selection of his Under Secretary and (in 1944) successor, James Forrestal. None of these men was naturally sympathetic with the New Deal philosophy. Undoubtedly most of them never changed in their antipathy to Roosevelt's domestic policies; even so, they provided a memorable example of devotion and of superb capability in the service of the Roosevelt Administration in wartime.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark, had been appointed by Roosevelt shortly before the outbreak of the European war in 1939, and had been his advisers on all matters relating to world strategy. Both of them were military philosophers, possessed of the long view on major problems, and both had the sense of statesmanship that enabled them to consider the political as well as purely military aspects of the global situation. Stark had been on duty in the Navy Department most of the time during the pre-war years, particularly as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He had exceptional qualities as a staff officer, but lacked the quickness and the ruthlessness of decision required in wartime, and after Pearl Harbour he was relieved by Admiral Ernest J. King, who lacked neither. Stark served out the war most faithfully and usefully in London, as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe; his contribution to the formation of Grand Strategy was immeasurable, as will be seen in later chapters.

As a result of his years in the Bureau of Ordnance, Stark had made many friends on Capitol Hill, and had the confidence of Congressmen who regarded him as a man modest in his demands. Marshall gained confidence by his quiet assurance, mastery of facts, and exceptional courtesy, although he was suspect when he talked in terms of armoured divisions and long-range bombers, for this seemed to suggest that he might have in mind

taking the offensive, instead of concentrating on the work of building and manning coast-defence fortifications. Faced with stupidity and short-sightedness which would have driven a weaker man to despair, Marshall maintained at least the semblance of calmness and patience; but it can never be doubted that he endured intense inward suffering, not from frustration for himself, but for the integrity and security of the Republic. There can be few people of any Allied nation who came in contact with Marshall during the war who would question the statement made to him by Secretary Stimson on the day of Germany's unconditional surrender: 'I have seen a great many soldiers in my day and you, sir, are the finest soldier I have ever known.'

If public opinion had been indicative of indifference and lethargy in the days of the Phony War, giving way to confusion and fear approaching hysteria during the blitzkrieg, it began rapidly to assume a more intelligent and respectable appearance once Churchill in Britain and Roosevelt in the U.S. had made evident the pattern of policy for the immediate future. The knowledge that Britain would fight alone and America would extend all possible aid as a non-combatant clarified the situation in the public mind, at least until the next crisis should arise; and that represented far more clarification of issues than the people had had at any time since Munich. Roosevelt now discovered that he was gaining popular support for his policies to a gratifying and surprising extent. He was given unprecedented support by the Press, the great majority of which had opposed him with mounting fury throughout the New Deal. Most of the widely syndicated columnists were with him, although there were exceptions, notably the increasingly intemperate General Hugh S. Johnson. Leading Republican newspapers, such as the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Boston Herald*, the *Chicago Daily News*, *Des Moines Register*, and the *San Francisco Chronicle*, which had been among his severest critics on domestic issues, now gave wholehearted approval to his measures of aid for Britain. The great American foreign correspondents had for years been warning of the menace of German and Japanese imperialism. There was no group in or out of Government who had been so consistently accurate in their estimates. Now it was possible to broadcast their warnings all over the country, and the voices of Edward R. Murrow and Fred Bate from London, William L. Shirer from Berlin, Elmer Davis from New York, Raymond Gram Swing from Washington, among many others, did more to help Roosevelt form public opinion than any voice but his own.

Organizations of private citizens began to become active in the mobilization of public opinion. The largest of these had started on a small scale in September, 1939, when various members of the League of Nations Association got together to form a committee to support Roosevelt's request for

repeal of the Arms Embargo provisions. The Chairman of this 'Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Law' (what a title!) was the distinguished and widely beloved Kansan, William Allen White, whom no one could accuse of being a tool of British Imperialism or of the New Deal. A staunch Republican and admiring biographer of Calvin Coolidge, White was also one of the great friends and private counsellors of Franklin D. Roosevelt. After Congress had repealed the Arms Embargo, the first White Committee was dissolved, its object having been achieved; but it was revived in May, 1940, and was called the 'Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies'. It was the first organization to combat isolationism on a national scale. White certainly was no interventionist and it is significant of the spirit of the times that he stipulated that the Committee should accept 'no munition-makers' money, no international bankers' money, and no money from the steel interests'—these being the interests which were popularly supposed to impel nations to war. White had written when the Phony War was in its last stages:

What an avalanche of blunders Great Britain has let loose upon the democracies of the world! The old British lion looks mangy, sore-eyed. He needs worming and should have a lot of dental work. He can't even roar. Unless a new Government takes the helm in Britain, the British Empire is done. These are sad words to say, but the truth is the truth.

Early in May, White was urging aid for Britain because, with the British Fleet intact, 'we could have two years in which to prepare for the inevitable attack of the totalitarian powers upon our democracy, which must come unless Great Britain wins this war'. When a new Government did take the helm in Britain, White came forth as one of its firmest and most valuable friends.

Father Coughlin wrote of the White Committee in his journal, *Social Justice*:

Like thieves who operate under the cover of night, there are in our midst those who operate beneath the cloak of protected auspices to steal our liberty, our peace and our autonomy. . . . 'The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies' is a high-sounding name composed of high-handed gentlemen who are leaving no stone unturned to throw everything precious to an American to the dogs of war. . . . Sneakingly, subversively and un-Americanly hiding behind a sanctimonious stuffed shirt named William Allen White, these men form the most dangerous fifth column that ever set foot upon neutral soil. They are the Quislings of America. They are the Judas Iscariots within the apostolic college of our nation.

They are the gold-protected, Government-protected, foreign-protected snakes in the grass who dare not stand upright and speak like men face to face.

With such tributes as that, the White Committee soon had chapters operating vigorously in all the States and was putting on coast-to-coast radio broadcasts by such public figures as President James B. Conant, of Harvard, Henry R. Luce, the publisher, and Mrs. Dwight W. Morrow, the mother-in-law of Colonel Lindbergh. My own first contribution to the campaign was a full-page advertisement, under the headline 'STOP HITLER NOW', which was published in newspapers throughout the country on June 10, the day Italy entered the war. This advertisement was given public endorsement by President Roosevelt (whom I did not then know) and evoked the sneering question 'Stop Hitler? With what?' from Dr. Joseph Goebbels in Berlin. I made the somewhat strong statement in this advertisement that 'Anyone who argues that the Nazis will considerably wait until we are ready (to go to war) is either an imbecile or a traitor.' This subjected William Allen White to many protests, including one from his friend, Oswald Garrison Villard, who wrote that he and millions like him felt there was no danger to the United States and 'we are just as loyal, just as sincere, and just as earnest Americans as Sherwood or anybody else'. White was impressed with these protests and ticked me off for having gone too far. But it was not long before such epithets as mine were commonplace. The great debate was on and it surged and seethed and was brought to an end only by the Japanese bombs on Pearl Harbour.

In the more violent isolationist arguments was the ugly undercurrent of accusation that what the country faced was a Jewish plot to get us into war. Lindbergh eventually brought this out into the open with his statement that the only people who favoured American intervention were the Roosevelt family, the British, and the Jews. Obviously, the Jewish community had ample reason to be anti-Nazi, but it was by no means unanimous in opposition to isolationism. There were Jews, particularly on the upper economic levels, who supported the America First Committee because their fear of Anti-Semitism in America far transcended their resentment of Nazi barbarism in Europe; and there were some Jews who were just as ready as anyone else to 'do business' with a victorious Hitler.

The strength of the White Committee was that it could not be successfully attacked as 'un-American', although there were many like Father Coughlin who tried to do so. It could be identified with no group or faction or partisan interest; in fact, most of its founders were, like White himself, Republicans. It was bitterly assailed by the Communists from the Left, as well as by the Fascist 'lunatic fringe' organizations on the extreme Right. Thus, it enjoyed

a certain respectability in the eyes of the mass of the American people in the middle.

The White Committee and its numerous offshoots—notably the Fight For Freedom Committee—never dented the hard core of American isolationism, but it did exert an effect on the thinking of millions who were neither isolationist nor interventionist, and it helped immeasurably to promote popular acceptance of Selective Service, the destroyers-for-bases deal, and Lend Lease. Most importantly, this Committee, because of its bi-partisan nature, acted as an unofficial liaison channel between the rival political camps of Roosevelt and Willkie for the achievement of agreement on the development of foreign policy.

Here indeed, in the field of American politics, was one of the most important consequences of the German blitzkrieg; it brought about the nomination of Wendell Willkie, instead of a Republican isolationist; it provided the final push that was needed to impel Roosevelt to run for a Third Term; it was by all odds the most important factor in Roosevelt's re-election.

THE THIRD-TERM CAMPAIGN

THE question has often been asked: Just when did Roosevelt finally and definitely decide to seek a Third Term? So far as I know, that question will never be answered authoritatively. One may speculate endlessly and fruitlessly as to what went on in that mysterious mind. It is safe to say that if there had been no international crises he would not have run; but one might as well say that if there had been no flood Noah would never have elected to land on the top of Mount Ararat. Anyone who watched Roosevelt closely would know that in all matters relating to politics he had most acute powers of calculation and he used them with utmost care and finesse. It is true that he burned his fingers badly on the Supreme Court packing issue when, following his smashing victory in the 1936 election, he suffered from an access of overconfidence, and his exasperation resulting from defeat on this issue led him to burn his fingers again in the attempted purge. These experiences had a very sobering effect and led him to be if anything over-cautious in his handling of issues arising from the calamitous world situation. The Third Term was such an issue, and he studied it from every conceivable angle, and most of all in relation to his own position in history, a subject of supreme importance to him and one of which he was rarely forgetful. It seemed in the spring and early summer of 1940 that he would have little to gain in the way of glory from four more years in the White House, whereas he might have a vast amount to lose. He had already been by any standards one might apply a memorable President. He firmly believed that the New Deal achievement would stand out on the record as a remarkable one; but now the New Deal was no longer new or exciting or urgent, and all the signs indicated that it must yield at least temporarily to a phase of reaction. Indeed, from 1938 on it became evident that if Roosevelt should run again on purely domestic issues he would be none too sure of winning the election, and if he did win, he would face the reasonable certainty of a Congress determined to block him at every turn and at last possessed of the power to do so. It was a bleak prospect, and although Roosevelt never revealed his innermost thinking on this to any man, I feel sure that for a long time he was determined to avoid it. In this, I am speaking of a third *consecutive* term. There was another possibility that, I believe, was not absent from Roosevelt's mind. From chance remarks that he made to various friends, it would seem that he contemplated the possibility that, after four years of retirement, and of conceivably blundering mismanagement of the public interests by a reactionary Congress and a possibly reactionary administration in Washington,

he might be called back to run for a Third Term in 1944. But he was in no hurry to cross that remote bridge until and if he should come to it.

All of this thinking, I repeat, was based solely on domestic considerations, and these became of less and less importance, especially to Roosevelt himself, after Munich. It was then that the Third-Term issue began to come out into the open, and the Cabinet officer who brought it out first was Harold Ickes. Having gone to Europe during the summer of 1938—he was on his honeymoon there following his second marriage, which took place in Dublin—Ickes had talked with Chamberlain, Churchill, and Attlee in England and then gone on to France. He has told me:

'Everywhere I went I heard the same thing: "War is inevitable"—"War is imminent". It was Mrs. Ickes's first visit to France and she was enchanted with it, and when we sailed away and looked back at that lovely coastline she said sadly that we might never see it again—or, if we did, it might not still be France, it might be a province of Germany. During the voyage home I thought hard about this war prospect and about the Presidential election in 1940. I considered in my mind the whole field of candidates, and I came to the conclusion there was only one man big enough to handle the world situation: Roosevelt. When I got home I came out for a Third Term and I went right on urging it at every opportunity. The President did not give me one word of encouragement on this. But he also did not tell me to stop. I was then the only one in the Cabinet for Roosevelt. Most of the others were candidates themselves—Hopkins, Hull, Farley, Wallace, Garner—you couldn't throw a brick in any direction without hitting a candidate.'

As I have said in a previous chapter, Hopkins was publicly urging a Third Term in June 1939, despite the determined opposition to it of Mrs. Roosevelt. Farley has recorded his own vigorous opposition to it—and Hull's and Garner's—and has stated that the President told him in the summer of 1939: '*Of course I will not run for a Third Term.*' (The italics are Farley's.) I cannot question Farley's accuracy or Roosevelt's sincerity. However, Roosevelt's intention (at that time) not to run himself certainly did not imply any lack of interest in the selection of his successor. Farley quotes Garner as having said at about the same time: 'Jim, the two of us can pull together to stop Roosevelt', and there can be no doubt that Roosevelt was determined to stop the two of them from gaining control of the Democratic party, for he believed they represented the forces of reaction and isolationism. Farley has often protested that his antipathy to a Third Term was based on his respect for the sanctity of tradition, and no doubt this is true—but he may have had other reasons in mind, and one of them may have been the fact that both he and Roosevelt were natives of New York State. The Constitution provides that candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency should not come from the same State. Since Farley, on his own admission, was not entirely

indifferent to his chances of winning the nomination as candidate for President or, tailing that, for Vice-President, it is obvious that he was personally concerned in preventing Roosevelt from becoming again the Democratic Candidate.

Any politician as knowledgeable as Farley must have been fully aware that there was no real possibility that Garner could be nominated and elected; but Garner, with the Texas delegation solid for him, would be an important factor in the Democratic Convention, and it is quite plain that, with Roosevelt out of the picture, Farley planned to swing the Garner strength to the support of Hull for President and himself for Vice-President. The great question was: How to get Roosevelt out of the picture? That proved to be a problem that neither Farley nor anyone else could solve.

The outbreak of the European War gave Roosevelt a legitimate reason to declare a moratorium on all political discussions involving himself for the time being. Impenetrable silence on this subject then settled down about the White House, and at Press conferences, whenever a reporter asked the President about his Third-Term intentions, Roosevelt would tell him, in effect, or in so many words, to go stand in the corner. I do not know to what extent these matters may have been discussed between Roosevelt and Hopkins, who was bedridden throughout this period. It is doubtful that Roosevelt ever went to see Hopkins, for the Hopkins house in Georgetown was tiny and the stairs very narrow and steep. But Hopkins was in touch with Roosevelt's state of mind through frequent telephone calls and visits from Mrs. Roosevelt and Marguerite Le Hand, 'Missy', who had been Roosevelt's trusted secretary for many years. I know that Roosevelt was then teeming with plans for his retirement in 1941: he was going back to Hyde Park to work on his papers, among other things, and Hopkins was to go with him to collaborate on the history of the New Deal. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Inc., had already been set up, and Roosevelt had arranged with Frank Walker, Treasurer of the Library Committee, that Hopkins be given a job there. Incidentally, when Walker heard of these plans from Roosevelt, he knew that the Hopkins for President in 1940 boom had ended—Walker having been one of the very few of Roosevelt's confidants who knew of the part the President was playing in promoting this boom.

On January 22, 1940, Hopkins told me he was virtually certain that Roosevelt would decide to run for a Third Term, but three months later, April 23, he expressed grave doubts about it. He said then that the President seemed disinclined to do anything about the nomination or to permit any of his friends to do anything, which would have meant that it would go to the Farley faction by default. (Hopkins himself was, of course, completely out of the running by this time.) Hopkins asked me if I really believed Roosevelt should run. I answered emphatically: 'Yes. It's his duty to run.' He then asked

me what were my reasons for this conviction, and I made the obvious answers: The United States was the only power that could prevent the world from going to hell, and Roosevelt was the only man with the personal strength and prestige as well as intelligence to lead the United States in the way it should go. Hopkins then said to me: 'I wish you'd sit down and write all of that to the President, emphasizing the "duty" part of it.'

'But,' I said, 'he'd pay no attention to a letter from me. He wouldn't even read it.'

'You'd be surprised,' said Hopkins, 'how many letters from private citizens he does read and how seriously he takes some of them.'

Hopkins urged me to persuade the greatest possible number of my friends who felt as I did to write similar letters to the President, and I did so. These letters were not acknowledged, even by the customary note from a secretary saying: 'The President has directed me to express his appreciation . . .' I doubt that any or all of them exerted the slightest influence on Roosevelt's final decision. Farley has written that it was some time after May 17 that he began to believe that Roosevelt had made up his mind; Edward J. Flynn, another professional Democratic politician, has said much the same thing. Pending the appearance of further evidence (which is always possible, but I should judge, highly unlikely), it may be assumed that it was Hitler and Mussolini—and also Churchill—who made up Roosevelt's mind for him. Had the Phony War still continued, with no sign of a break—or, after it did break, had the British Government advised the White House that it must sue for peace in the event of the fall of France—then nothing but over-inflated personal vanity could have induced Roosevelt to seek a Third Term; granted that Roosevelt had his full share of personal vanity—no man would run for President of the United States in the first place without it—he also had the ability to form a highly realistic estimate of the odds against him and, taking the most cynical view of the prospect, and leaving all questions of patriotic duty out of it, he would best serve the interests of his own present prestige and his ultimate place in history by retiring gracefully before the storm broke and thereby leaving the reaping of the whirlwind to his successor. However, as long as Britain held out, and as long as there remained a chance that German victory might be prevented, Roosevelt wanted to stay in the fight, and sincerely believed that there was none among all the available candidates as well qualified to aid in the prevention as he.

On May 10, the day of the attack on the Low Countries, Hopkins went to his office in the Commerce Department—and, as nearly as I can make out, this was the second time he had appeared there in ten months. That evening he went to dinner at the White House. He was feeling miserable, and Roosevelt prevailed on him to stay there overnight. He remained, living in what had been Lincoln's study, for three and a half years. Later, Missy Le

Hand remarked: 'It was Harry Hopkins who gave George S. Kaufman and Moss Hart the idea for that play of theirs, *The Man Who Came to Dinner*.' From then on his work was done in his room at the White House. After breakfast in the morning and after dinner in the evenings and at odd times during the day he talked with the President about the shocking cables that were coming in from Europe. Hopkins undoubtedly had little real understanding of the full import of this news, but Roosevelt was teaching him. On Sundays they usually went cruising on the yacht, *Potomac*. On June 20 Hopkins went with the President for a four days' stay at Hyde Park, during which the news arrived of France's surrender, together with some of the cables from Churchill which have been mentioned in a previous chapter. A week after the return to Washington, Hopkins went to Chicago to discuss arrangements for the Convention with Mayor Edward J. Kelly. Acting without express instructions from Roosevelt, but also without prohibition, Hopkins was now moving to take charge of the Third-Term nomination himself.

The Republican Convention had met in Philadelphia, and after a period of deadlock between Robert A. Taft and Thomas E. Dewey, had nominated Wendell Willkie. This represented an extraordinary triumph by a group of suddenly organized amateur zealots over the steam-rolling political bosses of the Republican party. These bosses distrusted Willkie, despite the fact that, as President of the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, he was one of the few business men who had ever fought against a New Deal agency (the Tennessee Valley Authority) and won at least a moral victory in his fight. For one thing, he was deeply suspect because he had formerly been a Democrat. For another thing, the isolationist fetish was so strong in the Republican hierarchy that anyone who opposed it must, they felt, be tainted in some sinister way with the poison of Rooseveltism. Furthermore, they did not know whether Willkie would prove to be the kind of amenable, controllable time-server that they preferred to have in public office. (They found out later!) On the eve of the Republican Convention, Walter Lippmann shocked many conservative readers of the *New York Herald Tribune* and other dignified papers by putting the case thus strongly:

For eighteen months the Republican party has been walking in its sleep. At no one of the critical junctures of this period has the party understood the situation or proposed measures to deal with it or offered the country positive leadership. There have been many individual Republicans, of course, who were aware of what was going on. But they have been in a helpless minority and, as an organized party, the Republicans have had no policy at all. A year and a half ago when they were told that war was coming, the politicians said that this warning was

'ballyhoo' and 'warmongering.' . . . One can, I think, search the speeches of Mr. Taft and Mr. Dewey, and search them in vain, for any evidence of foresight as to what has happened, for a single proposal which was sought, in advance of the Administration, to strengthen the national defence. The speeches of Messrs. Taft and Dewey during these critical months make Mr. Chamberlain seem like a farsighted and strong statesman.

This was precisely the kind of support from sober authority that Willkie needed. Luckily, the old Republican steam-roller proved to be a rusty, rattle-trap vehicle, directed by 'sleepwalkers', and the Willkie forces prevailed, backed as they were by the unmistakably spontaneous enthusiasm of the more independent Republican voters for the rugged, untrammelled and picturesque candidate.

Roosevelt considered Willkie the most formidable opponent for himself that the Republicans could have named. Willkie had the glamour which previous Republican opponents had so conspicuously lacked. What is more, Willkie had no previous political record to attack, as did those who, for isolationist reasons, had opposed every move toward national defence. Nevertheless, despite Roosevelt's respect for Willkie as a dangerous competitor, he considered this nomination a 'Godsend to the country', for it tended to remove the isolationist-interventionist issue from the campaign (at least, until the final days), and thereby prevented the splitting of the people into two embittered factions. It guaranteed to the rest of the world—and particularly to the warring nations—a continuity of American foreign policy regardless of the outcome of the election. The importance of this consideration could hardly be overestimated. To begin with, Willkie came out in favour of Selective Service, thereby eliminating that extremely controversial issue.

Another important issue came up—the destroyers deal. As we have seen, Churchill had first told Roosevelt of Britain's desperate need for destroyers in a cable written five days after he became Prime Minister. After the fall of France, Joseph Alsop, the Washington columnist, urged Benjamin Cohen to use all his influence in support of the transfer of fifty or sixty U.S. destroyers of First World War vintage to the British, saying that without such naval reinforcement Britain might not be able to hold the Channel against invasion. Cohen conveyed this to his chief, Harold Ickes, who took it up with the President. Ickes noted: 'I spent a lot of time arguing with the President that, by hook or by crook, we ought to accede to England's request. He said that, considering the amendment that was put into the last Naval Appropriations Bill (June 28, 1940) we could not send these destroyers to England unless the Navy could certify that they were useless to us for

defence purposes.' The Amendment referred to was an expression of Congress's profound distrust of Roosevelt: it provided that no item of military material could be turned over to a foreign Government without the certification by the Chief of Staff (Marshall) or the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) that it was useless for the defence of the United States. This put Marshall and Stark in the embarrassing position of being able to countermand orders of their Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the destroyers, Stark could not certify them useless, for he had lately testified to their potential value before Congressional Committees which had asked him: 'Why should we go on, year after year, wasting the taxpayers' money keeping those old "boats" in cold storage?' Thus was created one of the vacuums that abounded in Washington in those days, and Roosevelt welcomed anyone, in the Government or out of it, who would rush in to fill them. Many of these vacuums were filled by the Secretary of the Treasury, ranging far outside his own province, and, although the destroyers deal represented a purely naval and diplomatic matter, it was the Secretary of the Interior, of all unlikely people, who was among the first to rush in.

Various suggestions were made to the President for new legislation to be asked of Congress to free his hands—but he was having none of that. He was determined to find a way to circumvent Congress on this problem, and he found it. There were concurrent negotiations for the granting of leases for American bases on eight British possessions in the Western Atlantic. Roosevelt decided that these could be used as a *quid pro quo* for the destroyers, thereby enabling Stark to certify that the total measure would strengthen rather than weaken America's defence, which was, of course, the truth. Churchill at first resisted this. He wanted the transfer of the bases to be a spontaneous gesture by His Majesty's Government—an expression of Britain's gratitude for American aid—and not merely part of a sordid 'deal'. He had to yield on this, but he insisted that the two most important bases, Bermuda and Newfoundland, should remain free gifts, apart from the deal, 'generously given and gladly received'—an academic point, as it turned out.

The progress of these secret negotiations—announced to the Congress as an accomplished fact on September 3—was known to Wendell Willkie, who had privately approved of it (through William Allen White) and agreed not to make a campaign issue of Roosevelt's action. Indeed, Willkie's main criticism was on the ground that the transfer of fifty over-age destroyers was not nearly enough aid for Britain, which was very different from the criticisms which might have been heard had the Republican nominee been, for instance, Senator Taft. As it was, isolationists accused Roosevelt of having taken the first long treasonous step toward delivering the United States back into the British Empire, but the American people as a whole were not greatly interested, for by the time the deal was announced the air Battle of

Britain had started and the swapping of a few old destroyers for a few dots on the map seemed a relatively trivial matter.

The agreements between Roosevelt and Willkie on foreign affairs were strictly circumscribed and even those went by the board before the campaign ended. Otherwise, Willkie was loudly and vigorously out for the kill. Even before his nomination, he had challenged Roosevelt to run for a Third Term, saying that he wanted the privilege of meeting and beating the toughest opponent the Democrats could name. His cry was: 'Bring on the Champ!' A shrewder politician would not have said that. The people interpreted Willkie literally as saying: 'The hell with the Third-Term Tradition. Let's make this a *real* fight!' That dramatized the contest—made it an exciting sporting event—and the more popular excitement there was in a campaign, the better it always was for Roosevelt. When Roosevelt agreed to run people took it not so much as violation of a tradition as acceptance of a challenge to an old-fashioned, bare-knuckled slugfest.

The Democratic Convention opened in Chicago on July 15. Previous to it, there were meetings at the White House of pro-Roosevelt (which meant anti-Farley) Cabinet officers and Congressional and party leaders to discuss ways and means. Roosevelt was urged to put in an appearance at the Convention himself, but refused. When asked about strategy and organization of his supporters as opposed to the Farley faction, he seemed rather vague, saying only that the Convention should have its own way and he would accept its verdict. Everyone knew, of course, that if the Roosevelt forces did not control the Convention, Farley would. At one of the meetings Roosevelt was asked: 'Suppose at some point we want to know your directions on strategy—whom do we ask?' Roosevelt thought for a moment and then replied: 'In that event, if I were you, I'd consult Jimmy Byrnes.' However, when Secretaries Frances Perkins, Ickes, Wallace and the rest arrived in Chicago they found, to the dismay of some of them, that Roosevelt headquarters had already been firmly established in a Blackstone Hotel suite by Harry Hopkins. Here was the Chicago end of the private line to the White House. (The telephone had been installed in the bath-room, that being the only part of the suite where privacy could be ensured.) The Farley offices—which would normally have been Democratic National Headquarters—were across the street in the Stevens Hotel, which made it convenient for the bewildered leaders of the State delegations, reducing the distance that they had to walk going from one rival headquarters to the other to receive their conflicting instructions. Be it said that most if not all of these local leaders greatly preferred Farley to Hopkins, whom they considered the kingpin of the Left-wing New Dealers and therefore the avowed enemy of the regular Democratic organization. Their chief complaint against the New Dealers was that they were political amateurs

with no knowledge of or respect for the sacred traditions of party regularity. As Edward J. Flynn has written, 'Many of the appointments in Washington went to men who were supporters of the President and believed in what he was trying to do, but who were not Democrats in many instances, and in all instances were not organization Democrats' (e.g. Stimson, Knox, Fiorello La Guardia, William S. Knudsen, Felix Frankfurter, John G. Winant, etc.).

Hopkins carried in his pocket three pencilled paragraphs in Roosevelt's handwriting on a sheet of yellow, ruled paper. It was addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, William B. Bankhead, Temporary Chairman of the Convention. It read:

DEAR WILL,

When you speak to the Convention on Monday evening will you say something for me which I believe ought to be made utterly clear?

You and my other close friends have known and understood that I have not today and have never had any wish or purpose to remain in the office of President, or indeed anywhere in public office after next January.

You know and all my friends know that this is a simple and sincere fact. I want you to repeat this simple and sincere fact to the Convention.

To the best of my knowledge, that is the only instruction that Roosevelt put in writing before the Convention. There was a change of plan on this; the message was not delivered by Bankhead on the first day, Monday, but by Senator Alben W. Barkley, the permanent Chairman, on the evening of the second day. This was the signal for the fifty-three-minute 'demonstration' led by Mayor Kelly's notorious 'voice from the sewers'. The machine Democrats obediently climbed aboard the band-wagon. The vote on the First Ballot was Roosevelt 946, Farley 72, Garner 61, Tydings 9, Hull 5 (fractions omitted). This was on Wednesday, the third day of the Convention. Again quoting Flynn: 'They did not support Roosevelt out of any motive of affection or because of any political issues involved'—or, it might be added, any sympathy with or even understanding of his objectives—but rather they knew that opposing him would be harmful to their local organizations. The Roosevelt name would help more than it could hurt, and for that reason these city leaders went along on the Third-Term candidacy.' They were given an even more bitter pill to swallow when Hopkins announced that the President's choice for his Vice-Presidential running mate was Henry Wallace, and for some time they gave rebellious evidence of refusing to choke this one down. Even some of the President's most loyal adherents were shocked at this selection; Ickes, who might well have accepted the Vice-Presidential nomination himself, threatened to bolt the party, and it later took all of Roosevelt's powers of persuasion to hold him in the fold. In the White House, on the evening of the fourth and last day, Roosevelt had be-

come so angered by the sordid shambles in Chicago that he was actually preparing a draft of a speech refusing the nomination. (He had not yet publicly stated that he would run if nominated.) Hopkins, who was not even a delegate to the Convention and got in only by courtesy of a badge from Mayor Kelly designating him a Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms, was feverishly telephoning the White House almost from minute to minute while the radio in the President's study blared forth the raucous expressions of discord. One impassioned delegate shouted into the microphone: 'Just because the Republicans have nominated an apostate Democrat (Willkie), let us not for God's sake nominate an apostate Republican (Wallace).' However, the insurrection was not quite strong enough to stop Wallace's nomination on the First Ballot, and Roosevelt relaxed and started to dictate his acceptance speech with the aid of Sam Rosenman, for whom this was one of the worst nights of his life. At the Convention, Wallace wanted to give an acceptance speech of his own, but Hopkins harshly advised him not to show himself—there had been enough hostile demonstrations broadcast already. The Convention closed with numerous Resolutions of Thanks to various dignitaries who had participated, not including Harry Hopkins.

The job that Hopkins had to do at this dreadful display of democracy at its tawdriest was disagreeable and thankless. He was under fire from all sides, friend and foe alike. But he had assumed this job on his own initiative because it had to be done and there was no one else who had the courage or perhaps the effrontery to do it without written instructions from the President. He handled it only by dint of supreme toughness and a demonstration of political ruthlessness which must have caused some of the professional politicians to reconsider their estimate of him as an amateur. Hopkins knew, however, that his dilemma in Chicago was only a minor projection of Roosevelt's. In ordinary times Roosevelt would probably have enjoyed a knock-down drag-out political Donnybrook against such opponents as Farley and Garner and legions of ward-heelers and he would have handled it without much perceptible difficulty. But this Convention was staged against a background of world catastrophe, of which the delegates had scant conception, and Roosevelt, in his distaste for the whole vulgar proceeding, displayed none of his customary adroitness in controlling the unruly situation. It was a lucky thing for him and for the country that he had Hopkins there to absorb so much of the hatred that was generated.

After Chicago, it became all too clear to Hopkins that he must resign as Secretary of Commerce, and if he had not had the idea himself, there were plenty of Roosevelt's friends ready to convey it to him. He was more of a political liability than ever: he was no longer in the conspicuous role of champion of the underprivileged—unemployment was beginning to go down as the defence effort increased—and, because of his long illness, he had

little to show for himself in the way of accomplishment as a Cabinet officer. On August 22 he submitted his resignation in a letter which stated his physical inability to perform his duties under the rigorous demands of war—which seems an odd excuse in the light of his subsequent activities:

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

The tenth of May 1940 was an important and fateful date.

It seemed to me then that our situation was similar to that of the British before the outbreak of war. In the months preceding that event many Englishmen believed the conflict could be avoided by concession. Others thought there was no immediate threat from Germany; that defence preparation could be delayed with safety. Still others maintained that anyone who wished to strengthen the defences of Britain was a 'warmonger'.

The experience of Britain has shown that where the national interest and security are at stake we are justified in making only the most pessimistic assumptions. To do otherwise is to be too late at every stage, to invite attack when it suits the aggressor, to face conflict half prepared.

The only questions at this time are with regard to the character, pace, and magnitude of our defence effort. We must build armaments, and because of your foresight and determination, this is being done. We must marshal our complete economic strength for the task of defence. This means that instead of retreating from our social and economic objectives, we should push forward vigorously with a programme to abolish poverty from the land. To do less would be to undermine our security. That you have resolved these fundamental questions in your own mind; that you are now leading the nation in its gigantic effort to defend itself—is the surest guarantee of peace for America.

I wanted to resign last May, because it seemed to me that you and the country needed the services of Cabinet officers whose strength permitted vigorous and continuous assumption of the duties required of them. You indicated then that I should remain throughout the summer in the hope that I would completely recover my strength. This recovery I have not fully accomplished; therefore, I feel that I must resign as Secretary of Commerce, the resignation to become effective in the immediate future.

An expression of good will and appreciation from me to you at this time is unnecessary. My abiding devotion and affection for you and Mrs. Roosevelt cannot be authenticated in any exchange of letters.

Roosevelt replied as follows:

I have your letter of August twenty-second and I fully understand all that you say and much that you have left unsaid.

In giving me this letter of resignation it is possible only for you to

break the official ties that exist between us—not the ties of friendship that have endured so happily through the years. I am accepting your resignation, therefore, to take effect at a date to be determined later, and I repeat that this resignation is accepted only in its official sense.

In other words, you may resign the office—only the office—and nothing else. Our friendship will and must go on as always.

There was a cordial exchange between the old feudists, Ickes and Hopkins. Ickes wrote:

I can understand your reasons (for resigning), but I shall miss you. We haven't always seen eye to eye on every matter, but I hope that you have never doubted my personal feeling toward you. Even when we have differed you have added zest to my life.

Hopkins replied:

Your nice note to me need not have been sent. True, our relations from time to time have been strained and difficult, but now that the time has come for me to leave the Government I think I should sum up my feeling this way. No one has battled as consistently for the New Deal and for the President, week in and week out, as have you. You have never failed the President and liberals of this country in a single instance that I can recall, and I think that is important and nothing can ever take that away from you. There must go with such a record a personal intellectual integrity that few people possess. The truth of the matter is that this morning the things I think about you are the many pleasant associations we have had—the trip to Cocos Island, that little holiday we took together in Florida, dinner with you and Jane, and the warm cordiality of our informal evenings with the President. I have completely washed up in my mind as I leave the Government many of the unpleasant rivalries or clash of personalities which made our relations at times unsatisfactory. Those are over for me just as I am sure they are for you.

Vannevar Bush, whom Hopkins had helped to get started with the N.D.R.C., wrote: 'I was very sorry to hear that the change is to be made, for the very selfish reason that I sincerely regret that our pleasant associations are soon to cease in a formal manner.' Hopkins thanked him and added: 'I will be seeing you soon.' This association certainly did not end, for Hopkins never lost interest in the fission of uranium.

In addition to his formal letter, Hopkins wrote one in longhand to the President which represented one of his rare outpourings of the heart:

A public letter of resignation is almost a vulgar institution. Why don't

you abolish it? At any rate, I have told you little that is in my mind and heart as I leave the Government's service.

I think of the things that have made my years with you the happiest time of my life. The first exciting days—the exaltation of being part of Government—our first formal dinner at the White House when I met Cardoza and another Bob Jackson tried to sell me some old underwear—and Cocos Island—did you ever see anything so green? Then there were those cigarettes in my pocket—it seems to me in all decency you should forget that one.

And one day you went to church with me when the going wasn't so good—and life seemed ever so dark.

Those nine old men—a better fight none of us ever took in——

And there was always New Year's Eve—and the warm glow of Auld lang syne—with champagne. That's about the only time we get champagne around your house. Or am I wrong?

I've always been getting on and off trains—and I saw America and learned to know its people. I like them. Whenever I was with you there were the everlasting Secret Service men—they seemed to be always at a dog-trot—how many miles do you suppose they have dog-trotted beside your car?

You remember the day we got you up a blind road in Nevada and Mac (Marvin McIntyre) wanted to give up his life if the car rolled over the hill? And people at trains with nice faces that smiled. All of them work hard for a living and are devoted to you.

And one day two nice people came to visit you—he was a King—and I hope will be for a long time and she was a Scotch girl who got to be a Queen. And after dinner that night you and Missy and I talked it all over till 2 a.m.

Then there were picnics! I suppose the Roosevelts have always had picnics—cold weather and nothing to drink.

I never knew there were so many mayors and governors and congressmen and senators and county auditors and school boards and irrigation districts in the world. I have met them all. One of them had me arrested and you thought it was funny and promised to visit me in jail.

I presume Henry Morgenthau will ever go to the bathroom when he gets ahead—and 'Dollar Watson' will talk about the Powder River.

The cheese store on 42nd St—and fresh fish in Iowa—and maps and rivers and forests and Admirals and dams and power plants—funny things that no President ever talked about before.

All these things I think of—and Mac and Steve and Tommy and Ben and Rex and Felix and Sam and Missy—I know they are important, because I remember them—and they are good.

This letter is simply to say that I have had an awfully good time—and to thank you very much. And by the way—my weather bureau tells me that it will be fair tomorrow.

The 'blind road in Nevada' referred to an occasion when the President and Hopkins were inspecting a W.P.A. project. When the President's car teetered on the brink of a steep hill, the frail Marvin McIntyre rushed to hold it up single-handed. The allusions to Morgenthau and Watson refer to poker game habits. The 'cheese store on 42nd St.' was neither a cheese store nor on 42nd Street: it was the delicatessen of Barney Greengrass, known as 'The Sturgeon King', patronized by Sam Rosenman, who often brought special food to augment the President's Spartan White House diet; it came to be a standing joke that when Roosevelt had some special delicacy put before him, he would say: 'I suppose this came from that cheese store on 42nd Street.' The final reference to the weather meant that Hopkins had information from the Middle West expressing confidence that Roosevelt would win the 1940 election.

There was no doubt that Hopkins hated to leave the Government, for he was well aware that, despite the sincerity of Roosevelt's assurance that he could not resign from their friendship, the President was dependent for advice and counsel upon those who were deeply and continuously involved in high-level activities and associations, and one who is on the outside can quickly lose touch with the rapidly changing course of events and of policy. Although his standing invitation to stay at the White House remained, Hopkins went to New York and took a suite, bedroom and sitting-room, at the Essex House. He was planning then to take the job at the Hyde Park Library and, vaguely, 'to do some writing on the side'. But he was soon back in the fray. Early in October I went to see him at his hotel, and he said: 'The President has to give a speech on Columbus Day. It's supposed to be one of those routine State Department speeches about Western Hemisphere solidarity, directed primarily to South America. But the President wants to talk to the American people about Hitler. So far as he is concerned, there is absolutely nothing important in the world today but to beat Hitler.' Hopkins looked at me sharply as though he might be expecting me to dispute this point, which I did not. Then he asked me: 'What do you think the President ought to say?'

Somewhat flabbergasted, I expressed some views and we talked about them for a while and then Hopkins said: 'Come on—let's go and see Sam Rosenman.' I had never met Rosenman, but had heard of him as one of those vague figures in the background of the Roosevelt palace guard. Although there was always criticism of these extra-official people—the term 'Brains Trust' persisted long after its original members had melted away—I could never understand why the President of the United States should not have the

same right as anyone else to choose his own personal friends and even on occasion to listen to their advice; but the very suggestion of a 'palace guard' has an eternally sinister connotation.

Born in San Antonio, Texas, Rosenman graduated from Columbia Law School, entered New York politics and served in the State Legislature and, in 1929, became Counsel to the new Governor. In 1932 he was appointed and later elected Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, but in his spare time he worked for the President in all sorts of helpful capacities, receiving for this work neither glory nor pay. From 1940 on he was a constant commuter between New York and Washington, until finally, in 1943, he retired from the Bench at Roosevelt's request and became Counsel to the President, working full time in the White House. Roosevelt loved him, and with good cause.

When Hopkins and I went to see him he was living on Central Park West, a few blocks from Essex House. We found him in his dining-room, the table littered with papers, including notes from the White House and material that Roosevelt had dictated. At first I did not know why I was there, but I soon found out that I had been pressed into service as a 'ghost-writer' (another sinister term). I also found out what an unsubstantial wraith a ghost-writer really is; when working for Franklin D. Roosevelt his one purpose was to haunt the White House, day and night, until a speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt (and nobody else) had been produced. Hopkins and Rosenman were practised hands at this work, and I became so interested in their talk that I forgot to be impressed and even started arguing. After a considerable amount of discussion Rosenman suddenly slapped a pencil on the dining-room table and said: 'Well, gentlemen—there comes a time in the life of every speech when it's got to be written.' So this was my induction. From that moment on, for the next five years, Hopkins, Rosenman, and I worked closely together on all the major Roosevelt speeches until the President's death. (There were a few exceptions when one or another of us was out of the country or ill and therefore unavailable; but at least one of the trio was always there.)

At this time Willkie was barnstorming up and down the country, giving several speeches a day, shouting himself hoarse, conducting a vigorous, aggressive, but largely aimless campaign. The Public Opinion polls showed him trailing by a substantial margin. He made an appealing, gallant appearance to the crowds who heard him—but, as always, these crowds were largely composed of Republicans who would vote for him anyway; over the radio, which had become the supreme test for a Presidential candidate, his speeches sounded harsh, hurried, and diffuse—short-range blasts of birdshot rather than pin-pointed high explosive shells. The trouble was that he had no precise issues to emphasize: he attacked Roosevelt's domestic and

foreign policies in general terms, but did not promise to repeal any of the New Deal reforms or to stop aid to Britain or to advocate appeasement of Germany or of Japan, which had by now become formally a partner in the Axis. It seemed that the one real target for attack was the arrogance of Roosevelt in considering himself worthy of a Third Term—and, as an incidental but popular target, the appointment of the President's son, Elliot, to be a Captain in the Army Air Corps. It was a strictly *ad hominem* attack, and it extended to the personalities of the Administration. What Willkie was saying, in effect, was: 'You can trust me to do the same thing, only better'—or, as the more embittered members of the Republican Old Guard put it, 'Me, too.' Willkie was extremely effective in one way: by giving the Republicans the kind of dynamic leadership they had lacked for twenty years, he aroused many long-dormant voters and impelled them to the polls instead of to the Country Club or the Great North Woods on Election Day; thus, he swelled his own party's strength, but he could make no appreciable dent in Roosevelt's on any issue other than that of American involvement in war. In his zestful lambastings of Roosevelt, Wallace, Madame Perkins, Ickes, Morgenthau, Hopkins and the rest—Hopkins was out of the Government, but back in the White House—Willkie was most careful to avoid any attacks on Cordell Hull. Indeed, Hull's prestige was so great at the time that Willkie made it clear that, in the event of his election, he would urge Hull to continue in office as Secretary of State. This inevitably weakened the Republicans' position, for while their orators could hammer away at the Administration with charges of boondoggling, leaf-raking, wilful waste, strangling of free enterprise—points which had been belaboured in 1936 with negligible success—they could not prosecute the attack directly against the conduct of Foreign Affairs, which was the most overwhelmingly important factor of all.

During the first weeks of the campaign Roosevelt gave Willkie what is known as 'the silent treatment'. In his Acceptance Speech (the speech to the Chicago Convention that he almost did not deliver) Roosevelt had said:

I shall not have the time or the inclination to engage in purely political debate. But I shall never be loath to call the attention of the nation to deliberate or unwitting falsifications of fact . . .

This, of course, left the door wide open for Roosevelt to start campaigning whenever he felt the moment was propitious. In the meantime Willkie was compelled to roar across the land, conducting a unilateral debate, without reply. In the Columbus Day Speech, October 12, Roosevelt never even alluded to the existence of a political campaign. This, of course, was all carefully calculated. Willkie repeatedly challenged 'The Champ' to get up on the same hustings with him and fight it out in the old-fashioned Lincoln-Douglas manner. But Roosevelt appeared to be too preoccupied with world

events to be paying attention—and he had ample reason for this, in view of the manifold perils suggested by the formation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, the blitz on England, the increase in U-boat warfare in the Atlantic and the indications of new explosions in South-Eastern Europe. The strain on Willkie's temper and natural good humour thus deliberately imposed was becoming intolerable.

Early in October, four weeks before Election Day (which that year was November 5), the Democrats were becoming more and more worried. The impact of the vast sums spent by the Republicans was being felt. The great majority of the Press was pro-Willkie—such newspapers as the *New York Times* and *Daily News*, and the Scripps-Howard chain, which had supported Roosevelt previously, having now turned violently against him. The White House mail was full of letters protesting the tendency of the Press to minimize or even to suppress news favourable to Roosevelt, while devoting headlines, columns, editorials, and cartoons to the deification of Willkie. These letters begged the President to expose these partisan malpractices in his broadcasts, the radio being considered much fairer.

The Democratic party itself, however, was no devoted band of loyalists, united against the forces of entrenched greed. The Democratic machine, such as it was, had been seriously weakened by the dissensions at Chicago. After the Convention, Farley had 'taken a walk', as Al Smith had done before him, and the National Chairmanship had been taken over by Ed Flynn, a most agreeable man and successful leader in a highly specialized district (the Bronx, New York City), but hardly at that time a national figure. The most spirited element in the Democratic campaign was the newly formed Independent Committee, headed by Senator George W. Norris and Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, but this Committee—more 'amateurs', according to the professionals—was working for the election of Roosevelt without regard for the regular Democratic organization. The local politicians were not much worried about Roosevelt's election; they felt that this problem could be left to the 'Great White Father' himself. They were concerned about the Congressmen, the Governors, Mayors, County Supervisors, etc., and they were loudly demanding that the President come down from his high horse of world statesmanship and start fighting and save the party. Roosevelt, however, stuck to his plan to limit himself to five frankly political speeches in the final two weeks of the campaign. In the first of these speeches, in Philadelphia on October 23, he said:

I consider it a public duty to answer falsifications with facts. I will not pretend that I find this an unpleasant duty. I am an old campaigner, and I love a good fight.

This was the signal that was needed to proclaim that 'the Champ' had

gone into action. This Philadelphia speech, re-read after seven years, does not appear to qualify as one of Roosevelt's better efforts. But it was effective at the time, and the gleeful roars of the partisan crowd in Convention Hall that greeted each precision punch were as important when broadcast as anything specific that he said. Roosevelt did not once mention Willkie's name in this speech, nor at any other time during the campaign, nor did he ever mention Dewey four years later. Shortly after this speech Willkie broadcast from the *New York Herald Tribune Forum* and listeners noted that he sounded shaken. Willkie's confidence in the triumph of his cause had been almost fanatical, but by now the politicians, supported by newspaper publishers for whose opinions he had more respect, were beginning to bring home to him the possibility that defeat stared him in the face. Aside from his own personal ambition, which had led him to seek the nomination and to drive himself unsparingly in the campaign, he would have been less than human if he had not come to believe his own words and those of other Republican orators to the effect that the re-election of Roosevelt would be an unutterable calamity, to be prevented by any and all means, fair or foul. His principal advisers in the first part of the campaign were the same 'amateurs' who had backed him for the nomination and helped him to win it—honourable, intelligent men like Russel Davenport, who despised the Old Guard reactionaries and isolationists as they despised the 'cynical men' (like Hopkins) of the free-spending New Deal. The Republican National Chairman, Congressman Joseph W. Martin, and other hard-boiled veterans of innumerable 'smoke-filled rooms', scorned these amateurs, and told Willkie vehemently that his high-minded advisers were making him an easy mark for Roosevelt. The Republican professionals begged Willkie to abandon this nonsense about a bi-partisan foreign policy—to attack Roosevelt as a warmonger—to scare the American people with warnings that votes for Roosevelt meant wooden crosses for their sons and brothers and sweethearts. Willkie succumbed to these heated urgings from men who loved him no more than the professional Democrats loved Roosevelt, but who knew they must win with him or suffer another four years in the political wastelands where no flowers of patronage could bloom. When Willkie started to shout charges that American boys were already on the transports—that we should be involved in a foreign war within five months if Roosevelt won—the campaign really descended to the lower depths and became, for two impassioned weeks, pretty much of a national disgrace. Willkie knew that these charges were contemptible, and when some of them were repeated to him by the isolationist Senator Bennett Champ Clark, during Willkie's testimony in favour of Lend Lease a few months later, he dismissed them with disarming candour by saying: 'In moments of oratory in campaigns we all expand a little bit.'

However, there was no doubt about the immediate efficacy of Willkie's

discreditable attacks on the war issue. The advice of the Republican professionals that the only way to get votes was to terrify people proved unhappily sound. The effects of this were felt powerfully in the White House during the last week of October. I had to read the letters and telegrams and reports that flooded in and, being a neophyte in such matters, I was amazed and horrified at the evidences of hysteria. Of all the communications, the most disturbing were those from newspapermen who, even though most of them worked for Republican papers, were personally devoted to Roosevelt and were doing all they could privately to help him. They reported mounting waves of fear throughout the country which might easily merge into tidal proportions by Election Day and sweep Willkie into office. There were all sorts of other reports from all over: notices from insurance companies to policy-holders that Roosevelt's election would make their policies relatively worthless; telegrams to doctors warning that Roosevelt's election would mean the socialization of medicine; an extremely solvent bank advertised in the *Chicago Tribune*: 'In a last stand for democracy every Director and officer of this Bank will vote for Wendell Willkie'—a warning to depositors that they had better do likewise if they wanted to protect their money. There were various other scarecrows designed to frighten workers, farmers, housewives. Some of these, however, had been set up by the Republicans in 1936 and had fooled practically no one. The fear of war was another matter; it was something new and unreasoning and tending toward a sense of panic. Or, at any rate, so the reports indicated. Reading them, it was difficult to avoid the dismaying thought that perhaps the American people were ready to stampede along the road which led to Bordeaux and so to Vichy even before the Panzers arrived on our home soil; it seemed possible that the Strategy of Terror had won its greatest victory here, that the Nazis had made good their boast that the conquest of the Western Hemisphere would be an 'inside job'. Even more alarming reports were coming into Democratic National Headquarters in New York and were relayed, perhaps in somewhat magnified form, from there to the White House. All the messages said much the same thing: 'Please, for God's sake, Mr. President, give solemn promise to the mothers of America that you will not send their sons into any foreign wars. If you fail to do this, we lose the election!'

Strangely enough, the previous Willkie arguments which had most effectively bruised Roosevelt had tended to charge him with a kind of isolationism. Willkie likened Roosevelt to Leon Blum, who had attempted to steer France toward social progress rather than preparedness; he identified himself with Winston Churchill, whom he quoted often, Churchill having made some remarks a few years before in disparagement of the American New Deal. Willkie tried to assign to Roosevelt a share of the guilt for the Munich surrender and the fall of France, and full guilt for the torpedoing of the

London Economic Conference seven years earlier. Most of all Willkie blamed Roosevelt and his 'Socialistic' Administration for the present military weakness of the United States—and those accusations stung Roosevelt worse than any others, because he knew all too well just how frighteningly weak we were. Roosevelt spent a great deal of time answering these earlier accusations, even though they hardly tallied with the later charges that American troops were already on the transports headed for Europe or Asia or both. The diversity of Willkie's attack and its fine disregard for consistency were bewildering even to Roosevelt, and he was forced for a time to take a defensive position, where he was at his worst.

On October 28 Roosevelt went to New York City and made a regular campaign tour of four Boroughs, speaking at two ceremonies, the ground-breaking for one tunnel and the dedication of another, both timed conveniently for this occasion by La Guardia. There were short speeches also at Hunter and Fordham Colleges, at the Queensbridge Housing Project and Roosevelt Park, and the grand wind-up with a rally at Madison Square Garden that evening. The night before, Mussolini had contributed to the drama of the moment and, although this was certainly not his intention, had thereby helped Roosevelt, by launching his shameful and ultimately (for Italy) disastrous invasion of Greece. But Roosevelt did not denounce this; he made no further reference to a 'stab in the back', for by now the Italian-American vote was of substantial importance, particularly in New York and other large cities. He said: 'I am quite sure that all of you will feel the same sorrow in your hearts that I feel—sorrow for the Italian people and the Grecian people, that they should have been involved together in conflict'—an unassailably safe statement. Ironically enough, two paragraphs later in the same speech he quoted Theodore Roosevelt's famous term, 'weasel words'.

That Madison Square Garden Speech was one of the most equivocal of Roosevelt's career. The first two-thirds of it was a reply to Willkie's charge that the Administration had neglected our national defence, Roosevelt reading the record of Republican opposition to all attempts to increase the armed force and to give aid to embattled Britain. The last third of the speech was a reply to the charge of warmongering. Here, Roosevelt went to the length or depth of taking credit for the Neutrality Law and other measures which he had thoroughly disapproved and had fought to repeal and had contrived by all possible means to circumvent. While boasting of the Neutrality Law as part of the Administration record, he deliberately neglected to make any mention of his own Quarantine Speech; in a campaign as irrational as this one he felt it necessary to soft-pedal the fact that he had been ahead of other world statesmen in telling the world the truth.

This speech was brightened by one fortuitous catch-phrase. Citing the

voting records of such prominent Republicans as Congressman Joe Martin, Hamilton Fish, and Bruce Barton, the three names fell into such a euphonious pattern—Martin, Barton, and Fish—that Roosevelt repeated the phrase later in the speech, and when he did so the crowd roared the names with him. Two days later, in his Boston Speech, Roosevelt mentioned Martin, and immediately someone in the gallery shouted: 'What about Barton and Fish?' and the crowd thereupon took up the chant. American crowds love to indulge in organized exercises of derision. Willkie said later: 'When I heard the President hang the isolationist votes of Martin, Barton, and Fish on me, and get away with it, I knew I was licked.' (I must say that I doubt that statement; it was a virtue of Wendell Willkie's that he never knew when he was licked.)

The day after the New York appearance Roosevelt was back in Washington for a momentous ceremony: the drawing of the first numbers under the Selective Service Act. This lottery would determine the names of the first 800,000 men—roughly, 5 per cent of the total registrants—to be drafted into the Army. This would have been a tense, nervous occasion at any time; with the current state of the world, and with the word 'warmonger' being thrown about so recklessly, it was all the more harrowing. Roosevelt had to choose his words with extraordinary care. This was no moment for trick phrases. The nation was listening breathlessly for the broadcast announcement of the fateful numbers as they were drawn. With his marvellous gift for finding homely, old-fashioned words to fit new circumstances, Roosevelt did not refer to Selective Service as a 'draft'—certainly not 'conscription'—he called it a 'muster', thereby evoking race memories of the rugged farmers of Lexington and Concord taking their flint-lock muskets down from above the fireplace. Roosevelt had prepared himself with letters from leaders of the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths, supporting Selective Service as a democratic procedure, and he quoted from these in his broadcast. The best of these—and, in view of the uncertainty of the Catholic attitude, the most important—was from Archbishop (later Cardinal) Francis J. Spellman, who wrote:

It is better to have protection and not need it than to need protection and not to have it. . . . We really cannot longer afford to be moles who cannot see, or ostriches who will not see. . . . We Americans want peace and we shall prepare for a peace, but not for a peace whose definition is slavery or death.

Those were stronger words in justification of Roosevelt's position than any he had uttered himself in this campaign.

It seemed as though the fear-of-war hysteria, as expressed in the messages to Washington, reached its peak on this day. The Gallup Poll indicated that Willkie was steadily gaining in strength. Roosevelt himself was inclined to shrug this off on the theory that Gallup's conclusions could be coloured by wishful thinking as well as those of anyone else. But the Democratic leaders were becoming more and more jittery and attributing everything to the peace mania. It seemed that Roosevelt had gone about as far in the New York speech as one could go in the provision of reassurance, but the frightened politicians protested that he had not gone far enough: they demanded that he provide absolute guarantee to the mothers of America that their sons would not fight.

On October 30 we were on the Presidential train going up into New England, with stops for short speeches at New Haven, Meriden, and Hartford, Connecticut, and Worcester, Massachusetts, and the final speech at the Boston Arena. That Boston Speech was a terrible one to prepare and also to remember. Every time the train stopped more and more telegrams were delivered stating almost tearfully that if the President did not give that solemn promise to the mothers he might as well start packing his belongings at the White House.

Roosevelt, as always, worked hard on the speech between stops. He sat in a low-backed arm-chair in his private car, the latest draft of the speech on his lap, with Missy Le Hand, Grace Tully, Hopkins, Rosenman, and me all working with carbon copies. We came to a passage which gave assurance to the mothers and fathers that their 'boys' would be well fed and well housed in the Army and their health well guarded. Hopkins handed the President a telegram from Ed Flynn containing the usual urgent request.

'But how often do they expect me to say that?' Roosevelt asked. 'It's in the Democratic Platform and I've repeated it a hundred times.'

Whereupon I remarked: 'I know it, Mr. President, but they don't seem to have heard you the first time. Evidently you've got to say it again—and again—and again.'

So it was put in as follows:

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

That passage has been given almost as much quotation (in the isolationist Press) as Roosevelt's somewhat complementary observation that 'the only thing we have to fear is fear itself'.

Rosenman, whose duty it was to remember everything, mentioned the fact that the Democratic Platform had added the words 'except in case of

attack'. Roosevelt said he could see no need to tack that on now. 'Of course, we'll fight if we're attacked. If somebody attacks us, then it isn't a foreign war, is it? Or do they want me to guarantee that our troops will be sent into battle only in the event of another Civil War?' He was plainly sick and tired of these jugglings of euphemisms, as well he might be.

The Boston Speech provoked a political issue over the use of a personal pronoun. As a gesture to the Boston Irish, Roosevelt paid tribute to one of them, Joseph P. Kennedy, who had just returned from his post at the Court of St. James's. Roosevelt described him as 'my Ambassador'. Both Hopkins and Rosenman protested this, asking if it would not be better to say 'our Ambassador'. But Roosevelt insisted that 'my' was correct, and he was technically right, for an Ambassador is the personal representative of the head of one State to the head of another. That explanation did no good whatever once the fatal pronoun was out. Every Republican orator from then on pointed to the word 'my' as proof of Roosevelt's colossal egotism and dictatorial ambitions.

Before the Boston Speech, Roosevelt went for a rest and quiet dinner at the apartment of his son John on the Charles River. An adjoining building was some sort of club for undergraduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They had displayed a huge banner inscribed with the words 'WE WANT WILLKIE!'—and when the President was pushed out in his wheelchair, the students chanted: 'Poppa—I wanna be a Captain!'—which was the popular taunting reference to the commission given to John Roosevelt's brother, Elliott. While waiting for the President to come out at that time I was collared by Boston police because I could not give a satisfactory explanation of my presence there. While being led away I was fortunately spotted by General Watson and Captain Callaghan, the Naval Aide, and rescued. They turned me over to Colonel Starling, of the Secret Service, and I rode to the Arena in the open Secret Service car which, bristling with sub-machine guns, followed the President's car through the Boston streets. Passing through Back Bay, the crowds seemed none too friendly and there were occasional catcalls and boos for Roosevelt. But after the turn from Boylston into Tremont Street, and thence through Scollay Square, the crowds increased tremendously in numbers and enthusiasm.

After this Boston Speech—which, I think, ranks below even the one at Madison Square Garden—the President seemed to return to form. On October 31 he was able to give some attention to the war, having only one non-political speech to make, at the Dedication of the National Health Centre in Bethesda, Maryland. The following morning the Presidential train left for Brooklyn. We all felt cheerful on that trip—it was an undefined feeling that the worst was over—and the speech that night was a vast improvement over its unworthy predecessors in this strange campaign. Roosevelt

had abandoned the defensive, he had stopped listening to the Party prophets of calamity, he was going into the attack with the confident buoyancy and vitality that were his.

The fearsome labour leader, John L. Lewis, in one of the ugliest speeches on record, had proclaimed that he and the millions of workers who presumably did his bidding would vote for Willkie; moreover, he promised that if Roosevelt were to win the election he would quit the Congress of Industrial Organizations, of which he was then President, and go sulk in his tent. So now it became a personal issue between Lewis and Roosevelt. This was more like it! It is my opinion that Roosevelt had not really been able to put his heart into the contest against Willkie, who presented so indistinct a target; but a battle to discredit John L. Lewis loomed as a real pleasure. Willkie had no more in common with Lewis politically, ideologically or sociologically than he had with such implacable Tory die-hards as Tom M. Girdler or Ernest T. Weir, but he was stuck with this discordant support and could not disown it. The Republican dilemma was illustrated by a story told ruefully (after the Election) by Albert Lasker, a highly successful advertising man and a vigorous force in the Republican National Committee. With the campaign in its final frantic stages, Lasker went to Chicago to gather a group of prominent business men about the dinner-table and extract from them some hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Republican fund. It was no easy job, for all present had undoubtedly contributed heavily already, and some of them were none too enthusiastic about Willkie's tendencies to say 'Me, too,' on the New Deal reforms and aid for Britain. During the evening the radio was turned on and the assembled company listened to John L. Lewis broadcast his Hymn of Hate against Roosevelt. At the end of it there were a few moments of pained silence, broken by Lasker, who said: 'Now, gentlemen—having heard that speech in our support, you will understand why the need of the Republican party is truly desperate.' He was given the funds for which he asked.

In the Brooklyn Speech, Roosevelt said:

There is something very ominous in this combination that has been forming within the Republican party between the extreme reactionary and the extreme radical elements of this country.

There is no common ground upon which they can unite—we know that—unless it be their common will to power, and their impatience with the normal democratic processes to produce overnight the inconsistent dictatorial ends that they, each of them, seek.

No elements in American life have made such vicious attacks upon each other in recent years as have the members of this new unholy alliance against each other.

I do not think that some of the men, even some of the leaders, who have been drawn into this unholy alliance realize what a threat that sort of an alliance may bring to the future of democracy in this country.

I am certain that the rank and file of patriotic Republicans do not realize the nature of this threat.

They should remember, and we must remember, what the collaborative understanding between Communism and Naziism has done to the processes of democracy abroad.

Something evil is happening in this country when a full-page advertisement against this Administration, paid for by Republican supporters appears—where, of all places?—in the *Daily Worker*, the newspaper of the Communist Party.

Something evil is happening in this country when vast quantities of Republican campaign literature are distributed by organizations that make no secret of their admiration for the dictatorship form of government.

Those forces hate democracy and Christianity as two phases of the same civilization. They oppose democracy because it is Christian. They oppose Christianity because it preaches democracy.

Their objective is to prevent democracy from becoming strong and purposeful. We are strong and purposeful now and intend to remain so.

These were strong words and one may perhaps call them unfair ones considering that their hapless victim was a man of the character of Wendell Willkie. But they were at the time unanswerable, and this was the kind of fighting talk that the people wanted to hear from the President rather than arrays of statistics summoned for purposes of defence.

One relatively minor item which greatly enlivened the preparation of the Brooklyn speech was a clipping from Arthur Krock's column in the *New York Times*. Krock, writing in the tone of a benevolent uncle, was warning the Republican party that some of its orators were indulging in excesses which did more harm than good to the cause. He recommended that such well-mentioned zealots should be discreetly curbed. He cited, for example, this statement made by a Philadelphia Judge in the course of a campaign speech:

The President's only supporters are paupers, those who earn less than \$1,200 a year and aren't worth *that*, and the Roosevelt family.

When this incredibly ill-advised remark was read aloud on the train to Brooklyn the chortling was unbridled, for it was hastily estimated that this definition of 'pauper' applied to approximately half of the total population of the United States. What made the blunder even more welcome was the fact that, had Krock not printed it in a friendly admonition to the Republi-

cans, no one in the Roosevelt entourage would ever have heard of it. The President used this quotation as the keynote of his peroration. He said:

'Paupers' who are not worth their salt—there speaks the true sentiment of the Republican leadership in this year of grace.

Can the Republican leaders deny that all this all-too-prevailing Republican sentiment is a direct, vicious, unpatriotic appeal to class hatred and class contempt?

That, my friends, is just what I am fighting against with all my heart and soul.

I am only fighting for a free America—for a country in which *all* men and women have equal rights to liberty and justice.

I am fighting against the revival of government by special privilege—government by lobbyists—government vested in the hands of those who favour and who would have us imitate the foreign dictatorships. . . .

And I will not stop fighting.

After the Brooklyn Speech we left for Cleveland, where on the following night Roosevelt was to wind up his campaign. Hopkins, Rosenman, and I had adjoining compartments in the car next to the President's, and these formed the main workshop. There were four secretaries on duty—Grace Tully, Dorothy Brady, Roberta Barrows and Ruthjane Rumelt. In other cars forward were other members of the White House staff, the Press and radio representatives, the communications car, and, of course, masses of Secret Service men. There was a dining-car in the middle of the train which was a sort of Press club, and it was a fine place to go to get ideas for the speech then in progress. The White House correspondents provided extremely pleasant and stimulating company, and some of those who worked for the most staunchly Republican papers were most helpful in suggesting what points Roosevelt should make. Many of these correspondents were tired of Roosevelt and annoyed by him, but when it came to a choice between him and Willkie or (especially) Dewey, they were for him.

The Cleveland Speech was considered to be of decisive importance, it being the last Saturday night of the campaign and the occasion for a résumé of all the points at issue, but there had been no time for any real preparation until we boarded the sleeping-cars after the Brooklyn Speech. Fortunately, the President's train always travelled slowly. There were three reasons for this: (1) Security, to reduce the chances of serious accident; (2) to give people along the right of way a good chance to watch the train go by; and (3) Roosevelt's repugnance for speed in any vehicle in which he was travelling (he liked to look at every detail of the scenery; when passing through a small town, he could often tell you what were its principal local problems and how it voted in the last election).

Hopkins, Rosenman, and I went through all the speech material that had been brought from the White House: passages dictated by the President at random moments, drafts written and submitted by various people in the Government, innumerable suggestions in letters and telegrams from Roosevelt's supporters all over the country. (It might be added that in this week of intensive campaigning not one of us read or listened to any of Willkie's speeches. We merely looked at the headlines and talked to the newspapermen to learn if he was making any new, important points.) The best suggestions in the assembled material came from Dorothy Thompson, then still with the *New York Herald Tribune*, and Dean Acheson, who had walked out of the New Deal in its first year, but was now giving strong support to the President, and some of these suggestions were used in the Cleveland Speech.

Hopkins was too ill to continue work and went to bed about 2 a.m., but Rosenman and I worked the rest of Friday night, having a series of sandwiches brought in from the dining-car, then slept for about an hour in beds littered with toast crusts and gobs of cottage cheese. On Saturday the President gave short speeches at Batavia, Buffalo, Rochester and Dunkirk, in New York State, and Erie, Pennsylvania. He inspected airplane plants. When we gathered for lunch in his car he looked grey and worn and sagging. I was shocked at his appearance and thought: 'This is too much punishment to expect any man to take.' I almost hoped he would lose the election, for it seemed that flesh and blood could not survive another six months—let alone four years—in this terrible job.

During that lunch on the train he started reminiscing about his old sailing days along the New Brunswick and New England coasts, and told long, rather dull stories about Maine lobstermen that everybody else present had heard many times before, and I saw for the first time his powers of recuperation in action. The greyiness of his face gave way to healthy colour, the circles vanished from under his eyes, the sagging jowls seemed to tighten up into muscles about his jawbone. By the end of a brief, light lunch he was in wonderful shape and was demanding: 'Now! What have you three cut-throats been doing to my speech?' He worked with us for the next six hours, pausing every so often when warned that the train was about to slow down; then he would put on his leg braces and walk out to the back platform on the arm of General Watson, to greet the crowd that had gathered at some small station to see him. It was always the factory workers and their womenfolk who were most emotional in their enthusiasm. They surged out on the tracks and ran after the train shouting 'God bless you!' The faith these people had in this man—come hell or high water—was wonderful to behold, and I felt ashamed of myself for having misinterpreted the hysteria of the past days in Washington as representing the voice of America.

When you have seen such scenes often enough you may tend to become cynical about them, and that is when you are wrong.

The crowd in Cleveland was the most vociferous of the campaign, and with reason, for this was far and away the best speech. Indeed, Rosenman, who worked with Roosevelt on speeches over a course of seventeen years, believes this was the second-best campaign speech he ever made—first place being held by the speech at the Teamsters' Union Dinner in September, 1944. Because there has been so much talk about the ghost-writing of Roosevelt's speeches (and there will be more on that subject throughout these pages) it may be wondered why the speeches were not more uniform in quality. The answer to that is that the speeches as finally delivered were always the expression of Roosevelt himself: if he were in a confident, exuberant, affirmative state of mind, the speech was good and sometimes great; if he were tired, and defensive, and petulant, all the ghost-writers on earth couldn't equip him with impressive words.

In the Cleveland Speech he made his first and last reference to the Third-Term issue. It was a glancing reference and produced a surprising reaction from the crowd. Roosevelt said that, when the next four years are over, 'there will be another President'—at which point the crowd started to shout 'No ! No !' Thinking remarkably quickly, Roosevelt thrust his mouth close to the microphone and went right on talking, so that the shouts which suggested that he might be elected permanently should not be heard over the radio.

After Cleveland, there was not much more to do except to close up the President's final speech to be delivered from Hyde Park at 11 p.m. on Election Eve. That final speech was pretty much the same in three campaigns for re-election—in 1936, 1940, and 1944. It was short and non-partisan, a moving reaffirmation of faith in the democratic process, expressing assurance that, regardless of the outcome of tomorrow's balloting, 'the United States will still be united'. These speeches were pure Roosevelt. No mere politician, and certainly no mere ghost-writer, could put into them the same degree of conviction and the same deep spiritual quality that he conveyed. It was natural for Roosevelt's enemies to assume that his professions of religious faith must be hypocritical; but those who knew him best—including some irretrievable agnostics—knew that one could joke with him on almost any and every subject, but not this one (another one was his family). He could be called extremely irreverent in regard to many temporal sacred cows, but not in regard to his own religion or that of any other formally religious man. I really believe, extreme as it may seem to say it, that he regarded these non-partisan speeches at the end of a rowdy campaign as a form of expiation for any excesses of which he might previously have been guilty. He regarded them literally as 'last words' by which he would prefer to be remembered in the event of his defeat.

For this 1940 speech, even before the intensive campaign started, he had said that he wanted to close with a Prayer for the Nation which he remembered had been in an Episcopal Book of Common Prayer in use when he was at Groton School. The Library of Congress was put to work to locate this, and had dug up all sorts of old Prayer Books with various Prayers for the Nation. Each had been submitted to the President and he had examined it and said: 'No—that's not the one I want.' He would recite parts of the prayer from a memory that went back more than forty years.

When we returned to the White House, from Cleveland, we found that several more Prayer Books had been sent over from the energetic Library and one of them—published, as I recall, in the 1880's—proved to be the one he wanted. It was a beautiful prayer, containing these words:

Bless our land with honourable industry, sound learning, and pure manners. Save us from violence, discord, and confusion; from pride and arrogancy, and from every evil way. Defend our liberties, and fashion into one united people the multitudes brought hither out of many kindreds and tongues.

Hopkins made one negative contribution to this speech which revealed an old sore. The President had included a quotation from the Cleveland Speech that 'freedom of speech is of no use to the man who has nothing to say and freedom of religion is of no use to the man who has lost his God', and added 'a free election is of no use to the man who is too indifferent *or too lazy* to vote'. Hopkins urged that the italicized words be stricken out. He said: 'I don't think you ought to insult the people in this speech.' After some argument, Roosevelt agreed. Later I said to Rosenman that I couldn't understand why Hopkins had made such an issue of this, since there undoubtedly were far too many people who were too lazy to vote. Rosenman said: 'I guess that word gets under Harry's skin. It reminds him of the accusations that most of the people who went on W.P.A. did so only because they were too lazy to work.' I am sure this was correct; Hopkins was one who never forgot nor forgave such slurs.

On Sunday evening the President and Hopkins were to go by train to Hyde Park, and Rosenman and I were flying back to New York. Before we left we offered somewhat self-conscious best wishes. 'It has been grand fun, hasn't it!' said Roosevelt, with more warmth than accuracy. 'And, don't forget—the Missus is expecting you and Dorothy and Madeline for supper Tuesday evening.' As if anyone could forget an invitation to Hyde Park to listen to the returns on Election Night! (Dorothy was Mrs. Rosenman and Madeline my own wife, whom the President had met once, but who was, of course, known to him immediately by her first name.)

The final Gallup Poll showed Willkie so close to Roosevelt that, if the

'trend' continued, the challenger might well have overtaken 'the Champ' by dawn on Election Day. The Roper Poll showed Roosevelt 55.2 per cent, Willkie 44.8 per cent, which was one-half of 1 per cent away from the final result.

I suppose that on the day before every Presidential Election in American history each rival camp has been nerve-racked with rumours that, at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour, the opposition would come out with some unspeakable charges of corruption or personal scandal which could not possibly be answered and exposed until too late. I do not know whether this has ever actually happened, but it will probably always be expected, making for that much extra tension. I know I sat constantly at the radio that Election Eve. I heard a transcribed Republican broadcast that was blood-curdling. It was addressed to that overworked audience, the mothers of America, and delivered in the ominous, insidious tones of a murder mystery programme: 'When your boy is dying on some battlefield in Europe—or maybe in *Martinique*—and he's crying out, "Mother! Mother!"—don't blame Franklin D. Roosevelt because he sent your boy to war—blame *yourself*, because *you* sent Franklin D. Roosevelt back to the White House!' There was nothing new in that, however; that sort of threat had been uttered many times. (Martinique was mentioned because it was then the strongest Vichy outpost in the Western Hemisphere, and there were rumours, not entirely baseless, that American troops might be sent to seize it.)

The Democrats had possession of the Election Eve air waves from 10 p.m. to midnight, and devoted these two hours to short speeches by Roosevelt, Hull, Carl Sandburg, Alexander Woolcott and Dorothy Thompson, mixed in with a great deal of entertainment from Broadway and Hollywood. The Republicans had the radio from midnight to 2 a.m. There were no shocking last-minute surprises, and the next day 49,815,312 people went to the polls and voted—most of them, in all probability, having made up their minds before a single word of oratory had been uttered by either candidate. To one who had never before known anything from personal observation of the inner workings of politics it was overwhelming to think of this vast mass moving into the privacy of the balloting-booth; they had been given every opportunity to listen to all the charges and counter-charges, all the *ad hominem* thrusts and ripostes, all the promises and all the threats, all the formulae for a better future and the warnings that this was the 'last stand for democracy'; and now they could rest their eardrums and go on their own to render the verdict on which there could be no appeal short of armed rebellion.

On Election Night, after a stand-up supper at Mrs. Roosevelt's cottage, we drove through the Hyde Park woods, beloved by Franklin Roosevelt, to the big house, to listen to the election returns. In a little room to the left off

the front hall sat the President's mother, with several old lady friends. They were sewing or knitting and chatting. A radio was on, softly, but they seemed to be paying little attention to it. In the big living-room there was another radio going and a large gathering of weirdly assorted guests. The President was in the dining-room in his shirtsleeves, with his sons and his Uncle Fred Delano and members of his staff. Large charts were littered on the dining-table and news tickers were clattering in the pantry. The Roosevelt boys were excited, but not their father. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt moved about from one room to another, seeing to the wants of the guests, apparently never pausing to listen to the returns. If you asked her how she thought things were going she would reply, impersonally: 'I heard someone say that Willkie was doing quite well in Michigan,' in exactly the tone of one saying: 'The gardener tells me the marigolds are apt to be a bit late this year.'

My wife and George Backer and I joined Hopkins in his bedroom. He had a small, \$15 radio, similar to the one he later gave Churchill. He had a chart and had been noting down a few returns, but most of it was covered with doodles. The first returns early in the evening indicated that Willkie was showing unexpected strength, and Hopkins for a time seemed really worried; I have been told that early in the evening even Roosevelt himself was doubtful of the outcome, but I saw no signs of that. After ten o'clock the sweep of Roosevelt's victory was so complete that there was no point in trying to keep the exact score. Later the President and all the guests went out on the front porch to greet a parade of Hyde Park townspeople, one of whom carried a hastily improvised placard bearing the legend 'Safe on 3rd'. Roosevelt was particularly elated because he had carried his own home district, normally solidly Republican, by a vote of 376 to 302. That was the best he ever did on Election Day in Hyde Park.

Of all the political battles in which he had been involved this campaign of 1940 is, I believe, the one that Roosevelt liked least to remember. It was no clean-cut issue between two philosophies or ideologies, nor even between two contrasted personalities. It had the atmosphere of a dreadful masquerade, in which the principal contestants felt compelled to wear false faces, and thereby disguised the fact that, in their hearts, they agreed with one another on all the basic issues. I have said that Willkie presented an indistinct target. This was not because he was evasive, an artful dodger; he was, in fact, the exact reverse—a toe-to-toe slugger; but as a candidate he presented two images which seemed to move farther and farther apart. One image was Willkie as a symbol of reactionary opposition to the New Deal—the Wall Street lawyer, the public utilities holding companies tycoon—whereas the other image was Willkie himself. He was then a relatively unknown quantity—to Roosevelt, at any rate—but he was beginning to establish the identity which later became so clear: a fighting liberal—even

something of a free-thinker of the old-fashioned Robert G. Ingersoll school—possessed of a fierce bull-in-a-china-shop hostility toward the ikons of Toryism which caused him to become more cordially hated by the extreme reactionaries even than Roosevelt himself.

Although Roosevelt had obvious advantages in this campaign, the chief of them being his long experience in public life as compared with Willkie's total lack of experience in elective or even appointive office, Willkie had one substantial advantage of his own—freedom from responsibility. The challenger could later dismiss his statements as 'campaign oratory'; the President of the United States, in the midst of an unprecedented world crisis, knew that he could not. Willkie could say that if Roosevelt were elected we might well be in a war by April; Roosevelt could not truthfully say that we would not, no matter who was elected. Day by day Roosevelt had to read the intelligence from Tokyo, Madrid, Athens, Moscow, Chungking, and everywhere else—he had to confront the sombre facts of Britain's position, which, in a matter of months or even weeks, would become utterly hopeless without some new form of aid as drastic as Lend Lease—and he could not step up to the rostrum at Madison Square Garden and recite these facts to the people. Perhaps he might have done a better and more candid job of presenting his case. For my own part, I think it was a mistake for him to go so far in yielding to the hysterical demands for sweeping reassurance; but, unfortunately for my own conscience, I happened at the time to be one of those who urged him to go the limit on this, feeling as I did that any risk of future embarrassment was negligible as compared with the risk of losing the Election. I burn inwardly whenever I think of those words 'again—and again—and again'.

Roosevelt probably meant it when, in the Philadelphia Speech, he said: 'I am an old campaigner and I love a good fight.' But he certainly was not enjoying himself when, a few days later, he was impelled to make those lame, equivocal speeches in Boston and New York. By then this was a fight that he despised. It left a smear on his record which only the accomplishments of the next five years could remove.

THE WHITE HOUSE

ONCE during the early New Deal years Hopkins said: 'If you want to get ahead in Washington, don't waste your time trying to cultivate the favour of the men with high-sounding titles. Make friends with the office boys. They're the real Big Shots. If you want to get something done in some Department, concentrate on the office boy. If he likes you, he will put you through straight to the one man who can do what you want. If he doesn't like you, he will shunt you off on to somebody who will give you a note to somebody else and so on down the line until you're so worn out and confused you've forgotten what it was you were asking for in the first place.'

During the war years, when Hopkins lived in the White House, he said impatiently to a persistent petitioner: 'Why do you keep pestering *me* about this: I'm only the office boy around here!'

I am sure that he was unconscious of any connection between these widely separated statements; but it was certainly there. One might say that Hopkins became, by his own earlier definition, the supreme office boy of them all. He was, of course, a channel of communication between the President and various agencies of the Administration, notably the War Department, and the ready means of informal contact with foreign dignitaries. (A British official once said to me: 'We came to think of Hopkins as Roosevelt's own personal Foreign Office.') He also acted in the capacity of a Buffer State. He kept problem-laden officials away from Roosevelt; one of his most frequent statements was: 'The President isn't going to be bothered with anything as nonsensical and unimportant as that if I can help it!' It was this function that made many of Roosevelt's most loyal friends agree with his worst enemies that Hopkins was an unmitigated menace. For instance, when, for a period of some ten months, Harold Ickes did not have one private appointment with the President, he blamed it all on the vindictiveness of Hopkins. Whether this was just or unjust, it was certainly a comfort to Roosevelt to have someone around to take the blame. It cannot be said that Hopkins suffered unduly in the performance of this unsympathetic role. His loyalty to Roosevelt in the war years was the supreme justification of his continued existence, and he enjoyed every opportunity to exercise it. As Marquis Childs wrote:

Should the President on a dull day suggest casually to his friend and confidant, Harry L. Hopkins, that the national welfare would be served if Mr. Hopkins were to jump off the Washington Monument, the appointed

hour would find Mr. Hopkins posed for the plunge. Whether with or without parachute would depend on what the President seemed to have in mind.

Mr. Hopkins would know about that, for he has made a career of understanding, sensing, divining, often guessing—and usually guessing right—what is in Franklin Roosevelt's mind. It is a career that has taken him from the dull routine of social-service work to the upper reaches of diplomacy, where he has had a thrilling preview of the shape of things to come. And, what is more, history may show that he was one of the shapers.

Hopkins did not have to do so much sensing, divining or guessing while he lived in the White House. He could traipse down the upstairs hall in his old dressing-gown to the President's room and ask what his Chief wanted done or not done about any given problem, and then act accordingly, without having to reveal to anyone that he was guided not by his own prejudices or hunches but by Roosevelt's express instructions.

The suite occupied by Hopkins for so long in the White House was on the second floor, in the south-east corner. It consisted of one large bedroom, with a huge four-poster double bed, a small bedroom (used at first as office for Hopkins's secretary), and a bath. The whole suite had been originally one room, with three high windows looking across the long lawn toward the Washington Monument, the Jefferson Memorial, and the Virginia hills. This had been Abraham Lincoln's study, and there was a plaque over the fireplace stating that the Emancipation Proclamation was signed here. It was considered the best guest-room and had been assigned to King George VI during his visit in 1939.

There was a similar arrangement of rooms in each corner of the second floor. In the south-west corner the large room was Mrs. Roosevelt's sitting-room and the small one was her bedroom. The north-west suite was for guests and contained the massive furniture used in Lincoln's bedroom. The north-east suite was also for guests. It had been used by Queen Elizabeth and especially decorated for that occasion with beautiful prints of the court of Queen Victoria. This was Winston Churchill's bedroom during his visits in the war years. It was conveniently located for Churchill, being right across the hall from Hopkins.

The second floor was bisected from east to west by a long, dark, dismal hall. The eastern end was, for some reason, higher than the rest and approached by a short flight of steps, on which a rubber-matted ramp had been constructed for the President's wheelchair. This hall was furnished in a haphazard manner. There were low book-cases, containing some hundreds of modern books presented during the Roosevelt Administration by the

American Booksellers Association; otherwise, the White House possessed no library of its own. On top of the book-cases were silver-framed, auto-graphed photographs of crowned heads, most of them throneless. The hall could be equipped with a projection-booth and screen for the showing of motion pictures during the evening. Later, a regular projection-room was built along the colonnade leading to the new East Wing outside the House itself. The west end of the hall, partially shut off by a screen and some potted palms, was used by Mrs. Roosevelt for small tea-parties, and sometimes the President had dinner here with his family or members of his staff.

On the south side of the second floor, next to Hopkins's room, was a stuffy sitting-room, called the Monroe Room, because here the great Doctrine was written. Next to that was the President's Oval Study and off that his bedroom and bath. Across from the study, on the north side, were two smaller bedrooms, each with bath, which were usually allotted to Rosenman and me when we were there. On the wall of the room that I sometimes occupied was an original of a coloured cartoon. It was signed by 'McKay' and came, I think, from *Esquire* magazine. It showed the exterior of a suburban house. The mother was on the porch in the background. A little girl on the garden path was calling mother's attention to a nasty little boy who, with fiendish malice, was chalking an inscription on the sidewalk.

The caption was: 'Look, mother—Wilfred wrote a bad word!'—and the word was ROOSEVELT.

Before I ever went upstairs in the White House I had imagined it was permanently furnished like the ground floor and that living in it would be something like living in a museum. Such was certainly not the case. It seems that each new family that moves in can shift things around at will, convert bedrooms into offices or vice versa, and change not only the appearance but the very atmosphere of the place to suit its own tastes. President Roosevelt's Oval Study—which was the focal point of the nation and, in a sense, of the whole world—had, I believe, been used hardly at all except as a formal reception-room during the preceding Hoover Administration. On the walls were a great many of Roosevelt's old naval prints and portraits of his mother, his wife, and John Paul Jones; there was also a dreadful-looking mechanical pipe-organ device which someone had presented to him, but which he never learned how to operate.

The progressivism of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt certainly did not extend to interior decoration. They did not hold with the modern American theory that furniture, curtains, etc., should be ornamental first and utilitarian second, nor that a certain uniformity of *décor* should be observed, with due regard for period and style as well as colour scheme. To them, a chair was something to sit down on—and all that one asked of it was comfort; a table was something to put things on and a wall was something to be covered

with the greatest possible number of pictures of sentimental value. Thus the rooms occupied by the President and Mrs. Roosevelt in the White House came to be as nearly as possible duplications of the rooms at Hyde Park which seemed to have changed hardly at all in fifty years except as more enlarged snapshots of new children and ponies and sailboats were tacked up here and there. The other upstairs bedrooms in the White House contained some furnishings that might have come out of an old and ultra-respectable summer-resort hotel and some that appeared to have emerged from a W.P.A. Arts and Crafts Project. Although the appearance of these rooms must have given shudders of revulsion to any professional interior decorators who may have happened in—whether they were addicted to the Petit Trianon, Adam, early American, Rococo or Modern Functional schools—there was a general sense of unstudied comfort and also of literal democracy. Most of the rooms were dingy with the darkness of Southern mansions from which the sunlight is excluded by surrounding colonnades and big trees, but what the White House lacked in light it more than made up in warmth of hospitality. There was a remarkable air of small-town friendliness about the place which extended through all the varied members of the large staff, including the necessarily grim and suspicious Secret Service men and uniformed armed guards. You were made to feel really welcome.

On the third and top floor there were more guest-rooms, used largely for the overflow of grandchildren at Christmastime and other family reunions, and there was a small bedroom and sitting room occupied by Missy Le Hand which provided a pleasant retreat for those of us who were working in the White House. Missy was a lovely person and an extraordinarily level-headed one; the crippling illness which came upon her suddenly in 1941 and her subsequent death were severe blows for the President. In 1920 she had been in the stenographic pool of the Fleet Emergency Corporation and was called from that to work for Charles H. McCarthy, a friend of Franklin Roosevelt's and his manager in the unsuccessful Vice-Presidential campaign of that year. After the election of Warren G. Harding, and the retreat to normalcy and isolationism, Missy was invited by Mrs. Roosevelt to come to Hyde Park to help clean up a huge accumulation of correspondence. Subsequently, Roosevelt became Vice-President of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland; Missy Le Hand went with him as his secretary and continued in that capacity through his battle with infantile paralysis, his return to the practice of law, and his service as Governor of New York. In 1933 she went with him to the White House, Grace Tully going along as her assistant and eventual successor. Grace also had worked at first for Mrs. Roosevelt, starting during the campaign of 1928. When the Roosevelts moved into the Executive Mansion in Albany she went with them and remained with them. She was at the President's side in Warm Springs when he died, and later became

Executive Secretary of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Foundation.

The friendly atmosphere that prevailed in the White House was the creation of the people who were in it. When I looked at the faces of some of the past Presidents who glared down from the walls I could imagine that there had been times when the atmosphere was painfully austere. (There were doubtless other times when it was deplorably rowdy.) In the years of Franklin Roosevelt the whole place was obviously filled with the fierce loyalty and warm affection that he inspired. If you could prove possession of these sentiments in abundance, you were accepted as a member of the family and treated accordingly.

Roosevelt started his day with breakfast in bed—generally wearing an old blue sweater over his pyjama top or a blue cape with a red F.D.R. monogram on it. He wore the cape because a bathrobe was too difficult for him to put on; for the same reason, he wore a cloak out of doors in cold weather instead of an overcoat. The usher on duty—Mr. Crim, Mr. Searles or Mr. Claunch—brought him the morning's dispatches and the social schedule which, in peacetime, is formidable enough to ruin the stoutest digestion and to disrupt the most even temper, but which was gratefully abandoned in wartime. During breakfast he looked through the dispatches and read the newspapers with great speed, but with remarkable care, seldom missing anything of importance to himself. In addition to the Washington papers, he read the *Chicago Tribune*, the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, and the *Baltimore Sun*. For years friends tried to talk him out of reading the *Chicago Tribune*, but he evidently wanted to know the worst about himself. As he was finishing breakfast his personal staff came in—usually General Edwin M. Watson, Stephen T. Early, Marvin H. McIntyre, William D. Hassett, Rosenman and Hopkins, to discuss the work programme for the day—appointments, Press conferences, etc. The President's physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire, would also be present to watch him closely for any indications of ill health. These morning sessions covered a great deal of ground in a very short time, for all the *aides* participating knew Roosevelt so well, and he trusted them so fully, that beatings about the bush were unnecessary. They could gauge his state of mind and its probable results during the day. As they left the bedroom they could be heard muttering: 'God help anybody who asks him for any favours today', or, 'He feels so good he'll be telling Cotton Ed Smith that it's perfectly all right for the South to go ahead and secede.'

General Watson, always known as 'Pa', was a big, florid, jovial Virginian who was described by everybody as 'lovable' and by a few as somewhat simple-minded. The latter appraisal, sometimes carefully encouraged by Pa himself, was highly inaccurate. His soldierly bluntness and his personal sweetness masked a devastating astuteness in penetrating the disguises of others;

few if any were the phonies who succeeded in fooling him. He had been the President's Military Aide from the beginnings of the Administration and, in the ordinary course of events, would have been transferred long since to other duty in the Army; but he had become indispensable to Roosevelt as a tower of strength in every sense of the term. He had the highly responsible position of Presidential Secretary in charge of appointments. It was a difficult and delicate job, and the measure of his success in it was the respect in which he was held by innumerable importunate people who hammered at him continually for a share of the President's time.

Steve Early was the ranking veteran in point of service—he had been a close friend of Roosevelt's since the Democratic Convention of 1912—and he was the only one of the original staff still alive when Roosevelt died. When he finally retired in June, 1945, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by President Truman, and the White House correspondents were unanimous for once in agreeing that he had earned it. Early was, like Watson, a Virginian and passionately loyal to his Chief, but otherwise there was no resemblance between the two men; Early was quick-tempered and, being intolerant of the arts of diplomacy, felt no great urge to hide his emotions. (That may be the main reason for his survival.) A fine newspaperman himself, he was superlatively skilful in handling the President's frequently strained relations with the Press. In this his unassailable candour was his greatest asset. He was rigorously uninquisitive about White House secrets; he wanted to be told no military plans, he wanted to avoid reading speeches in advance lest they contain some important announcement on policy, so that he could truthfully tell the correspondents who were always on his doorstep: 'You know as much about that as I do.' He had sense enough to know that anyone working for Franklin D. Roosevelt did not need to indulge in the Press agent's practice of fabricating news, or minting slogans, but when he did have a story to release (and few were the days in the twelve years when he didn't) he knew how to 'play' it for the last ounce of front-page headline value. He suffered acutely from his Chief's tendency to snap back at the hostile Press, but there was nothing he could do about that. Early's assistant, Bill Hassett, was a man of great gentleness; he was scholarly and devoted and a good, quiet companion for Roosevelt when he wanted to get away from the hurly-burly of Washington.

Marvin McIntyre was another Washington newspaperman. An old friend of Josephus Daniels, he had served during the first World War as Chief of the Press Offices of the Navy Department, and it was then that he came into contact with Franklin Roosevelt. In the campaign of 1920 Louis Howe brought him into service on the staff working for the Vice-Presidential candidate, which qualified him for membership in the original Cuff Links Gang. (The name derived from the fact that the dozen or so members of

this group were given cuff links by Roosevelt as souvenirs of the unsuccessful campaign.) In 1932 McIntyre travelled about the country with Roosevelt as Press Officer and then became Secretary in charge of appointments in the White House. During the Second Term illness made it impossible for him to continue in this exacting job, and it was taken over by Pa Watson, but McIntyre continued to work for the President until his death in 1943. He was particularly valuable as a contact man between the White House and the Congress on Capitol Hill, two points on the same Avenue in the same city which sometimes seemed to be located on different planets.

Ross McIntire was well known in his capacity as White House physician, but received insufficient recognition for his achievements as Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery throughout the Second World War. Because of the enormous demands of this job in the war years, McIntyre left a large part of the daily clinical routine in the White House to his assistant, the highly competent Lieut. Commander George Fox, who had earned his way upward from the ranks in the Navy.

Aside from the Secretaries, there were a number of Administrative Assistants to the President, an anonymous and shifting group which included from time to time James Forrestal, James Rowe, David K. Niles, Lauchlin Currie, and Jonathan Daniels. Their function was 'to get information and to condense and summarize it for his (the President's) use'. They had 'no authority over anyone in any department or agency' and were expressly prohibited from 'interposing themselves' between the President and any other officer of the Government. The best description of the activities of these Assistants—known for their 'passion for anonymity'—has been written by one of them, Daniels, in his *Frontier on the Potomac*.

The most important permanent White House official was the Executive Clerk, Rudolph Forster, who, with his assistant and successor, Maurice Latta, was responsible for 'the orderly handling of documents and correspondence' and the supervision of the large clerical staff. Both Forster and Latta had been in the White House since the McKinley Administration. For them, individual Presidents came and went, but the office went on for ever, and so did the dozens and hundreds of State papers—laws, orders, commissions, etc.—which had to be properly signed and recorded and distributed every working day. It was a proud moment in Franklin Roosevelt's life when, in October, 1944, as he was about to leave on a campaign trip, Forster came to him and, with the air of one who was wilfully breaking all of the Ten Commandments, but prepared to take the consequences, warmly shook his hand and wished him good luck. Forster stood outside the Executive Offices and waved as the President's car pulled away and Roosevelt said, with real emotion in his voice: 'That's practically the first time in all these years that Rudolph has ever stepped out of character and spoken to me as if I were a human being instead of just another President.'

All of the *aides* on the White House staff were, in effect, officials of the President's 'household' and not officers in any chain of administrative command. Thus the President before 1939 had no real executive organization of his own. There was no one between him and the Cabinet officers through whom he could exercise authority. One might presume that the Vice-President would perform the function of Deputy President or Chief of Staff; the Constitution, however, provides that the Vice-President shall serve as President of the Senate and that the Powers and Duties of the Presidency shall devolve on him only in the event of the President's 'Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge' said Powers and Duties. Thus the innumerable lines of authority which converged in the White House ran not to the President's staff, but to the President's solitary person, and he had no Constitutional means of 'interposing' anyone between himself and the ten Cabinet members and the dozens of heads of agencies and missions who reported directly to him, and who were often reluctant to make an important move without his authorization in writing. When one Department came into conflict with another the President must resolve it according to his own judgment based on the information which came to him officially only through the contestants themselves—although, of course, he might be informed unofficially through the Press or through friends in contact with the omnipresent Washington 'grapevine'. It was a system which could not have existed in any well-ordered big business organization. When Department 'A' asked for an appropriation of three hundred million dollars, and Department 'B' protested that this request was so out of proportion that it would tend to influence the Congress to make cuts in 'B's' request for six hundred millions, the President could fairly appraise the merits of the case only by going through all the books of both Departments and figuring their legitimate needs down to the last penny. Of course, he could assign this figuring to the Treasury Department, but that itself might have been either Department 'A' or 'B' in the argument; if it were neither, and made its decision in favour of 'A', then 'B' could and often would bring the matter right back to the President for review.

In 1938 Roosevelt proposed a sweeping reorganization of the Government, the purpose of which was 'to make the business end, i.e. the Executive Branch, of the Federal Government, more businesslike and more efficient' and also to 'eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort' of the kind which produced the endless and often virulent jurisdictional disputes between Cabinet officers as well as lesser officials. This request for reorganization, however, came most unfortunately at a time when Roosevelt's prestige was low, following the Supreme Court fight and during the attempted purge. The cries of 'would-be Dictator' were raised, and it did Roosevelt no good to protest: 'I have too much historical background and too much knowledge of existing dictatorship to make me desire any form of dictatorship for a

democracy like the United States of America.' He was defeated in the Congress, but a year later he managed to have a part of the Reorganization Bill enacted into law.

On September 8, 1939, the day when Roosevelt issued his 'Limited National Emergency' Proclamation after the outbreak of war in Europe, he also issued an Executive Order which received scant attention in the Press and the vital importance of which has never been even remotely apparent to the American people. It provided for reorganization of the Executive Office of the President and involved the transfer of the Bureau of the Budget to that office from the Treasury Department. I have heard this action compared to the invention of the radio as an asset to Roosevelt in his exercise of authority, and that is not so much of an exaggeration as one might think. In the Director of the Budget he acquired an operational officer, with a large and potent organization, who was responsible solely to himself in carrying out his overall policies. The duties of this Director, Harold Smith, comprised far more than the mere keeping of books: he was enjoined, among other things, 'to keep the President informed of the progress of activities by agencies of the Government with respect to work proposed, work actually initiated, and work completed'. The Bureau of the Budget could and must send its agents into every Department of the Government—into every American mission abroad and every theatre of war—to find out for the President himself exactly how the money was being spent, and by whom, and with what results. Thus the Bureau was actually the President's personal intelligence service—or, as some disgruntled officers called it, 'his own private Gestapo'.

Harold Smith has said: 'Before the Bureau was moved over, I often thought of the Presidency as a stately colonial mansion, in which lived and worked the most powerful individual in the most powerful nation on earth. Attached to that stately mansion was an old, rickety shanty or "lean-to", which was the Executive Office, the only workshop available to that most powerful individual. When the Bureau was moved over we at least added one new wing with modern equipment and an adequate staff for one part of the work. But another wing should be added, and I believe it would have been added if Roosevelt had been given time enough to finish his job.'

The stately mansion in Smith's metaphor was the expression of the Presidential power as granted by the Constitution, and the shanty the expression of the manner in which the exercise of that power had been restricted by the Congress, ever jealous of its own prerogatives. The cries of 'dictatorship' raised against Roosevelt's reorganization proposals were much the same as those raised by the enemies of ratification of the Constitution, except that then the scare word used was 'monarchy'. The Federalists certainly fostered the principal of the strong Executive restrained from excess, but

not hobbled from action by the system of checks and balances. After the Administration of Jefferson, a strong President himself, but an apostle of decentralization, the original conception waned, being revived only when such strong individuals as Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson—aided by the exceptional circumstances of their times—chose to assert the power which had always been there from the beginning. Franklin Roosevelt came into office, as did Lincoln, amid such conditions of domestic crisis that power to act in a rapid and even arbitrary manner was thrust upon him while a frightened Congress representing a frightened people meekly rubber-stamped his drastic proposals for recovery. His ultimate measures of reorganization, which came fortuitously as the war emergency was mounting, did not add an iota to his Constitutional powers, but greatly facilitated his ability to exercise them.

Harold Smith died, from sheer exhaustion, in January, 1947, and I never did learn from him just what he had in mind for that unbuilt wing of the Executive Offices, but it involved the regularization by law of the function that had been improvised for Hopkins by Roosevelt. No great amount of love was lost between Smith and Hopkins, who was indifferent to the problems of dollars and cents for which Smith was responsible. To one like Smith, who liked to have everything tidy, Hopkins's harum-scarum methods were naturally disturbing, and Hopkins was impatient with Smith's determination to count the cost. But there was a considerable amount of respect between the two men, and the disputes they may have had were never permitted to trouble the President. As Smith saw the function that Hopkins should have performed—and which should have been duly provided for by Act of Congress—it was, roughly, that of a Cabinet Officer without Portfolio—a civilian Chief of Staff without much of a staff of his own, but with constant access to the President's mind and to all the official intelligence available to that mind—an adviser on policy freed of the special interests and prejudices imposed on any officer who had special responsibility for any one phase of the total Government effort. Hopkins came as close to filling that post as was possible in view of the fact that he had no legal authority whatever for it. Roosevelt could delegate all sorts of authority to him, but any Cabinet member who wanted to ignore this could do so, on firm legal grounds, and most of them did. The extraordinary fact was that the second most important individual in the United States Government during the most critical period of the world's greatest war had no legitimate official position nor even any desk of his own except a card table in his bedroom. However, the bedroom was in the White House.

As I have said, Hopkins did not originate policy and then convince Roosevelt it was right. He had too much intelligence as well as respect for his Chief to attempt the role of master-mind. He made it his job to provide a

sounding-board for discussions of the best means of attaining the goals that the President set for himself. Roosevelt liked to think out loud, but his greatest difficulty was finding a listener who was both understanding and entirely trustworthy. That was Hopkins—and this was the process that Rosenman and I watched over and over again in the preparation of the speeches and messages in which Roosevelt made known his policies to the nation and to the world. The work that was put in on these speeches was prodigious, for Roosevelt with his acute sense of history knew that all of those words would constitute the bulk of the estate that he would leave to posterity, and that his ultimate measurement would depend on the reconciliation of what he said with what he did. Therefore, utmost importance was attached to his public utterances and utmost care exercised in their preparation. In the previous chapter I have mentioned the Cleveland Speech, which took a night and a day to prepare, but such speed in preparation was unusual, even for a campaign speech, which was necessarily a creature of the moment. The important speeches sometimes required a week or more of hard labour, with a considerable amount of planning before the intensive work started. I don't know what was the record number of distinct drafts of a single speech, but it must have been well over twelve, and in the final draft there might not be one sentence that had survived from the first draft. There were, of course, numerous routine speeches of a ceremonial nature which were not considered of major significance—but in wartime even in these Roosevelt was aware that he had a world audience and that everything he said might be material for the propaganda which flooded the air waves. If such a speech were opening a Bond Drive, a first draft would be prepared in the Treasury Department; if it were launching a new campaign for funds for the Red Cross, the Community Chest, National Brotherhood Week, etc., the organization concerned would send in suggestions as to what it wanted the President to say. This submitted material was almost always so rhetorical, so studiously literary, that it did not sound at all like Roosevelt's normal style, and it had to be subjected to the process of simplification or even oversimplification that he demanded. He was happiest when he could express himself in the homeliest, even tritest phrases, such as 'common or garden', 'clear as crystal', 'rule of thumb', 'neither here nor there', 'arm-chair strategists', or 'simple as ABC'.

When he wanted to give a speech for some important purpose, whether it was connected with a special occasion or not, he would discuss it first at length with Hopkins, Rosenman, and me, telling us what particular points he wanted to make, what sort of audience he wished primarily to reach and what the maximum word limit was to be (he generally put it far too low). He would dictate pages and pages, approaching his main topic, sometimes hitting it squarely on the nose with terrific impact, sometimes rambling so

far away from it that he couldn't get back, in which case he would say: 'Well—something along those lines—you boys can fix it up.' I think he greatly enjoyed these sessions, when he felt free to say anything he pleased, uttering all kinds of personal insults, with the knowledge that none of it need appear in the final version. When he stopped dictating, because another appointment was due or it was time to go to bed, we would go to the Cabinet Room in the East Wing and start reading through all the assembled material. The President kept a special 'Speech Folder' into which he put newspaper clippings that he had marked, indicating either his approval of some sentiment expressed or indignation that such falsehood should get into print (he could not always remember what the marking signified). There were also all sorts of letters from all sorts of people, known and unknown, containing suggestions as to what he should say, and there were random bits of his own dictation, thoughts that had suddenly occurred to him during preceding days and weeks which might be useful some time. All of this material was sifted, and added to the newly dictated material with the aid of scissors and paste and a few connecting clauses, until something resembling a coherent speech was put together and fair copies of it made. It was generally two or three times too long. When the President was free to see us again we handed him this draft, and he looked immediately at the last page to see its number, whereupon he announced that at least 92 per cent of it must be cut. He then started to read through it, pausing frequently to dictate 'Insert A', 'Insert G', etc. Each time he decided to dictate something he said: 'Grace—take a law', a line he gladly borrowed from the Kaufman-Hart-Rodgers musical show, *I'd Rather be Right*, in which George M. Cohan played the part of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The President himself had never seen this show, but he enjoyed what he heard about it.

When he had finished dictating inserts the speech was far longer than it had been and farther from any coherent form. We then returned to the Cabinet Room and started a second draft. This process went on day and night. Sometimes while the work was in progress events would intervene—for instance, on a Sunday evening in July, 1943, we were at Shangri-La finishing up a speech devoted primarily to home-front problems—price stabilization, rationing, manpower, etc.—when news came of the fall of Benito Mussolini, and the speech had to be started all over again; this, however, was a pleasure for all.

Most of Roosevelt's work on speeches was done during the evening. We would gather for the standard cocktail ceremony in the Oval Study at 7.15. The President sat behind his desk, the tray before him. He mixed the ingredients with the deliberation of an alchemist, but with what appeared to be a certain lack of precision, since he carried on a steady conversation while doing it. His Bourbon Old-fashioneds were excellent, but I did not care for

his Martinis, in which he used two kinds of vermouth (when he had them) and sometimes a dash of absinthe. Hopkins talked him occasionally into making Scotch whiskey sours, although he didn't really like them. The usual canapes of cream cheese or fish paste on small circles of toast were served, also popcorn. Roosevelt was an extremely mild drinker—he did not have wine with meals, except at large, formal dinners, and I don't recall ever having seen him drink brandy or other liqueurs or a highball; but he certainly loved the cocktail period and the stream of small talk that went with it.

Dinner was generally served in the study about 7.45. It ill becomes a guest to say so, but the White House cuisine did not enjoy a very high reputation. The food was plentiful and, when simple, good—but the chef had a tendency to run amok on fancy salads. There was one favourite in particular which resembled the productions one finds in the flossier type of tea shoppe: it was a mountain of mayonnaise, slices of canned pineapple, carved radishes, etc. It was served frequently, and each time the President merely looked at it and shook his head and murmured sadly: 'No, thank you.' Once when this happened Sam Rosenman laughed and said: 'Mr. President, you've been in this House for eight years, and for all I know you'll be here eight years more—but they'll never give up trying to persuade you to find out what that salad really tastes like.' Roosevelt was always grateful for delicacies, particularly game, which friends sent in to enliven his diet. I never heard him complain about food or anything else in the way of service, but he did complain bitterly about the security supervision of every article of food sent to him. Once he said: 'I happen to be very fond of roasted peanuts. But if somebody wanted to send me a bag of peanuts the Secret Service would have to X-ray it and the Department of Agriculture would have to open every shell and test every kernel for poison or high explosives. So, to save trouble, they would just throw the bag away and never tell me about it.' Deeply moved by this, Rosenman and I went to the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 15th Street and bought a large bag of peanuts and sneaked it in to the President. He put it under his coat and ate the whole contents.

After dinner he sat on the couch to the left of the fireplace, his feet up on the stool specially built for him, and started reading the latest speech draft. Grace Tully sat next to him, taking more dictation, until Dorothy Brady or Toinette Bachelder came in to relieve her. Sometimes Roosevelt read the speech out loud, to see how it sounded, for every word was judged not by its appearance in print, but by its effectiveness over the radio. About ten o'clock, a tray with drinks was brought in. The President sometimes had a glass of beer, but more often a horse's neck (ginger ale and lemon peel). He was by now yawning and losing interest in the speech, and he usually went to bed before eleven. During these evening sessions the telephone almost never rang. Now and then a dispatch might be brought in, which Roosevelt

would read and pass on to Hopkins without a word or a change of expression, but otherwise one would have thought this House the most peaceful, remote retreat in a war-racked world.

After leaving the Study, we would spend most of the night in the Cabinet Room, producing another draft which would go to the President with his breakfast in the morning. Sometimes we would send a call for help to Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, who would come in late at night to help bring a diffuse speech into focus. More than once, before the White House windows were blacked out after Pearl Harbour, Mrs. Roosevelt saw the lights burning in the Cabinet Room at 3 a.m. and telephoned down to tell us we were working too hard and should go to bed. Of course, the fact was that she herself was sitting up working at that hour.

We had to get up early in the morning to be ready for summons in case the President wanted to work on the speech before his first appointment. We generally had breakfast on trays in Hopkins's room, and it was rarely a cheerful gathering. The draft that had been completed a few hours previously looked awful in the morning light and the judgment on it that we most often expressed was: 'I only hope that the reputation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt does not depend on this terrible speech.'

After the session in the President's bedroom, Rosenman and I went over to the Cabinet Room to await the summons. The signal bells announced the President's approach to his office, and we stood by the French windows leading out to the colonnade and watched him go by in his armless, cushionless, uncomfortable wheelchair, pushed by his negro valet, Chief Petty Officer Arthur Prettyman. Accompanying him was the detail of Secret Service men, some of them carrying the large, overflowing wire baskets of papers on which he had been working the night before and the dispatches that had come in that morning. When Fala came abreast of the wheelchair as it rolled along Roosevelt would reach down and scratch his neck. This progress to the day's work by a crippled man was a sight to stir the most torpid imagination; for here was a clear glimpse of the Roosevelt that the people believed him to be—the chin up, the cigarette-holder tilted at what was always described as 'a jaunty angle', and the air of irrepressible confidence that whatever problems the day might bring he would find a way to handle them. The fact that this confidence was not always justified made it none the less authentic and reassuring.

When I saw the President go by on these mornings I felt that nobody who worked for him had a right to feel tired. That was not an unusual feeling: it went all through the wartime Administration in Washington, extending to all sorts of people, some of whom disagreed with him politically and most of whom never laid eyes on him. It was, I think, Henry Pringle who, when working in a Government agency shortly after Pearl Harbour, suggested as a wall slogan for bureaucrats' offices: EXHAUSTION IS NOT ENOUGH!

The speeches had to be checked and counter-checked with various Departments and agencies, most of all with the Army and Navy; many speeches that were sent over to the War Department came back with corrections and suggestions pencilled in the handwriting of General Marshall. The work of the so-called 'ghost-writers' consisted largely of the painstaking, arduous verification of facts and figures. We felt 'The *New York Times* can make mistakes—the *World Almanac* can make mistakes—but the President of the United States must not make mistakes.' This constant thought imposed a harrowing responsibility. After 1940 the White House had its resident statistician—Isador Lubin, the Commissioner of Labour Statistics, who was constantly available and incalculably valuable to Roosevelt and to Hopkins in checking every decimal point.

Although the speeches were usually seen in advance by the War and Navy Departments, and sometimes (though not always) by the State Department, they were kept otherwise under close wraps of secrecy. There were always various eminent officials who wanted to know what the President was going to say. They were particularly anxious to make sure that he was going to include the several pages of material that they had submitted on their own particular Departments. They knew they could get nowhere with Hopkins in their quest of inside information, so they concentrated on Rosenman, who would fob them off with the misstatement: 'The President is weighing that in his mind right now.' We used to derive enjoyment from the thought of various important personages around Washington listening to the Presidential broadcasts and then as the strains of 'The Star-Spangled Banner' broke out at the finish, cursing: 'He didn't use a *word* of that stuff that I sent him.' It was even more enjoyable to picture the amazed expression of some anonymous citizen in Council Bluffs who had written a letter to the President and then heard something from that letter incorporated in a Fireside Chat.

On the final two days of preparation of a speech Roosevelt would really buckle down to serious work, and then what had seemed a formless, aimless mess of words would begin to assume tautness and sharpness. He studied every implication for its effect on various groups in the nation and on allies and enemies and neutrals. He paid a great deal of attention to the punctuation, not for its correctness, but for its aid or hindrance to him in reading the speech aloud. Grace Tully liked to insert a great many commas, and the President loved to strike them out. He once said to her: 'Grace! How many times do I have to tell you not to waste the taxpayers' commas?' He liked dashes, which were visual aids, and hated semi-colons and parentheses. I don't think he ever used the sonorous phrase: 'And I quote——' If he had to have quotation marks, he did not refer to them, knowing they would appear in the printed version.

In the final draft of a speech, every word was counted, and Roosevelt finally decided the precise number that he would be able to crowd into thirty minutes. His sense of timing was phenomenal. His normal rate was 100 words a minute, but he would say: 'There are some paragraphs in this speech that I can take quickly, so I can handle a total of 3,150 words'—and that did not mean 3,162. At other times he would feel that he had to be deliberate in his delivery, and the words would have to be cut to 2,800. This cutting was the most difficult work of all, because by the time we had come to the ninth or tenth draft we felt sure the speech had been boiled down to the ultimate monosyllable. However, we did as we were told, not so much because Roosevelt was President as because he was right; his estimates were rarely off more than a split second on his broadcasts. Speeches before audiences were difficult to estimate, of course, because crowd responses are unpredictable, but he was generally accurate even on these. In the Teamsters' Speech the roars of laughter and applause were so frequent and prolonged that the speech ran some fifteen minutes overtime, but that did not upset Roosevelt at all, despite the fact that, since it was a campaign speech, the Democratic National Committee had to pay the heavy excess charges.

When a speech was finally closed up, about six o'clock in the evening, the President was wheeled over to Dr. McIntire's office for the sinus treatments that were a regular part of his day. Then he went upstairs for cocktails and dinner, after which he chatted or worked on his correspondence or his stamp albums, without seeming to give much attention to the final reading copy of his speech, which was typed on special limp paper, to avoid rustling noises as he turned the pages, and bound in a black leather loose-leaf folder. But when he started to broadcast he seemed to know it by heart. When he looked down at his manuscript he was usually not looking at the words he was then speaking, but at the next paragraph, to determine where he would put his pauses and which of his large assortment of inflections he would employ. As one who has had considerable experience in the theatre, I marvelled at the unfailing precision with which he made his points, his grace in reconciling the sublime with the ridiculous, as though he had been rehearsing these lines for weeks and delivering them before audiences for months. Those who worked with him on speeches were all too well aware that he was no slave to his prepared text. He could and did *ad lib.* at will, and that was something which always amused him greatly. During the days of preparation Hopkins, Rosenman, and I would sometimes unite in opposition to some line, usually of a jocose nature, which the President wanted to include. It was our duty to make every effort to avoid being yes-men, and so we kept at him until we had persuaded him that the line should be cut out; but if he really liked it well enough he would keep it in mind and then *ad lib.* it, and later would be full of apologies to us for his 'unfortunate slip of the tongue'. He was almost

always immensely good-humoured about the arguments we offered him—he liked to appear persecuted and complain that ‘They won’t let me say anything of my own in my own speech’. There were times, however, when he was worn out and angered by something else, and then he would be cantankerous with us because we were the only convenient targets; we learned that on such occasions it was best to shut up and to revive our arguments later, after he had had some rest and felt better. Referring again to my experience in the theatre, I can testify that he was normally the most untemperamental genius I have ever encountered. That is one of the reasons why he was able to sleep so well at night.

During the campaign of 1940 Carl Sandburg came to call at the White House and had a long talk with the President, who said to him: ‘Why don’t you go down to Missy Le Hand’s office and dictate some of the things you’ve just been saying to me?’ Sandburg did so, and said, among other things:

The Gettysburg Speech of Abraham Lincoln or the farewell address of Robert E. Lee to his Army would be, in our American street talk, ‘just a lot of words’, unless we look behind the words, unless we see words throwing long shadows—and out of the shadows arises the mystery of man consecrated to mystic causes. . . .

If we go back across American history we find that as a nation among the other nations of the world this country has never kept silence as to what it stands for. For a hundred and fifty years and more we have told the world that the American Republic stands for a certain way of life. No matter what happened to the map of Europe, no matter what changes of government and systems went on there, no matter what old thrones and dynasties crashed to make way for something else, no matter what new philosophies and orbits of influence were proclaimed, America never kept silence.

Despite his strenuous avoidance of solemnity, and the frivolousness and irrelevance of his small talk when he was off the record, Roosevelt knew that he was the voice of America to the rest of the world. In the darkest days before and after Pearl Harbour he expressed the hopes of civilized humanity. Churchill’s was the gallant voice of the unconquerable warrior, but Roosevelt’s was the voice of liberation, the reassurance of the dignity of man. His buoyancy, his courage, his confidence renewed hope in those who feared that they had for ever lost it. Roosevelt seemed to take his speeches lightly, but no one knew better than he that, once he had the microphone before him, he was speaking for the eternal record—his words were, as Sandburg said, ‘throwing long shadows’.

In a Foreword to an anthology of Roosevelt speeches, Harry Hopkins wrote:

Roosevelt made many great speeches. But some were not so good. He occasionally did not try, because he was frankly bored. A President of the United States has to speak many times on subjects which do not interest him. He would prefer to read a book or go to bed.

This was particularly true of the last two years of Roosevelt's life, when he made just as few speeches as possible and rarely appeared to take a great deal of interest in those that he did make. The time of challenge when words were the only weapons had at last passed and great and terrible events were speaking for themselves. He seemed to relax to save himself for the time when events would cease and words would again become the instruments of international politics.

THE GARDEN HOSE

IMMEDIATELY after Election Day the major problem confronting Roosevelt was one that had not been mentioned either by him or by Willkie during the campaign: Great Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy in terms of dollar credits. Her balances which had amounted to four and a half billion dollars before the war were gone, including the holdings in America of British individuals which had been expropriated by His Majesty's Government and liquidated. It was obvious that Britain could not survive much longer without supplies from the United States and, under the 'cash-and-carry' law, she could not obtain these supplies without dollars. In the endless discussions of this problem Roosevelt began to say: 'We must find some way to lease or even lend these goods to the British', and from this came the vast concept which Churchill later described as 'a new Magna Carta . . . the most unselfish and unsordid financial act of any country in all history'.

In mid-November the German air force, defeated in the Battle of Britain, gave a shocking demonstration of its power in the intense raid on Coventry in which more than a thousand people were killed or wounded. This saturation bombing was extended to one British town after another, the propagandists in Berlin boasting that the whole island was to be systematically 'coventryized', while the blitz on London continued with deadly monotony. Toward the end of November the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, returned to Washington from a trip to London and saw the President. At a Press conference (on November 26) Roosevelt was asked:

QUESTION: Mr. President, did the British Ambassador present any specific requests for additional help?

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, I shall have to disappoint quite a number of papers; nothing was mentioned in that regard at all, not one single thing—ships or sealing-wax or anything else. (*Laughter.*)

It is doubtful that Lord Lothian was greatly amused at the time, for his country's stock was very low and Roosevelt did not appear to be in any hurry in coming to the rescue. There had been a notable British victory in the Mediterranean when torpedo aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm inflicted heavy damage on Italian ships lying in apparent security at their Taranto base. (This action, by the way, might have provided an intimation of what could happen at Pearl Harbour.) It was well known in British Government circles that General Sir Archibald Wavell, commanding the British forces in Egypt, had been so strongly reinforced with troops and tanks and aircraft

from the United Kingdom that he was ready to take the offensive against the Italians and drive into Libya. However, it was impossible to be greatly impressed by victories over Mussolini's reluctant legions, who were then being subjected to a severe and humiliating mauling by the surprising Greek Army. The German monster remained relatively quiet on land for the moment, but always absorbing new strength while preparing for the delivery of the next devastating attack. Any and all local victories that might be gained in the Mediterranean would be inconsequential unless the United States were to provide formidable aid before the 'invasion season' should be reopened on the English Channel in the spring.

It seemed to some alarmed British officials that Roosevelt, following his victory at the polls, had lost interest in the war situation—or, at any rate, was blithely wasting the time that was running so short. On December 2 the President left Washington as carefree as you please for a Caribbean cruise on U.S.S. *Tuscaloosa*, taking with him only his immediate staff—General Watson, Dr. McIntire and Captain Callaghan—with Harry Hopkins as the only guest, and it was noted that the party included no one especially qualified to advise or even consult on the grievous problems of Europe and the Far East. The White House announced that the main purpose of the cruise would be to inspect some of the new base sites recently acquired in the West Indies, but those most familiar with Roosevelt's vacation habits suspected that such inspections might be somewhat desultory and superficial, and that the main business of each day would be fishing, basking in the sun, and spoofing with cronies. This impression was borne out by the scraps of news sent back by the three Press Association representatives on the trip—Thomas F. Reynolds, Douglas B. Cornell, and George E. Durno. It seemed that this cruise was about the same as all others when Roosevelt had nothing graver to worry about than the Hopkins-Ickes feud.

At Guantanamo Bay a large stock of Cuban cigars was purchased. At Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Antigua, the President entertained British colonial officials and their ladies at lunch. Off Eleuthera Island he was visited by the Duke of Windsor, Governor-General of the Bahamas; he told the Duke that what the British needed most in their West Indian colonies was something along the lines of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

There was one serious meeting when the *Tuscaloosa* lay to just outside the territorial waters of Martinique and the U.S. Naval Observer there and the Consul came aboard to give the President a first-hand report on conditions on that potentially dangerous French island. During this brief conference many on board the *Tuscaloosa* were focusing their binoculars on the aircraft carrier *Béarn*, lying in the harbour of Fort De France, an ominous symbol of the French 'fleet in being' which was still under the flimsy control of the Vichy Government.

According to custom, evenings on board ship were devoted either to poker games or to movies, the latter including *Northwest Mounted Police*, starring Gary Cooper, Paulette Goddard, and Madeleine Carroll; *I Love You Again*, with William Powell and Myrna Loy; *They Knew What They Wanted*, with Carole Lombard and Charles Laughton; *Arizona*, with Jean Arthur and William Holden; and *Tin Pan Alley* with Alice Faye and Betty Grable—the last quite naturally being the favourite with the crew.

The records of the fishing on this cruise were pretty unimpressive. The largest catch by far was a 20-lb. Grouper which was hooked by Hopkins, but he did not have the strength to reel it in and turned the rod over to Dr. McIntire. A radio message was received from Ernest Hemingway saying that many big fish had been caught on a stretch of Mona Passage between Dominica and Puerto Rico; the President trawled here for an hour or more, using a feathered hook baited with a piece of pork rind as directed by Hemingway, but he failed to get a strike.

At stated points along the route Navy seaplanes landed alongside the *Tuscaloosa* and delivered the White House mail, including the quantities of State papers for the President's signature. One of these deliveries, on the morning of December 9, brought a long letter from Winston Churchill.

In upwards of 4,000 words, Churchill covered the broad picture and most minute details of the war situation from the North Sea to Gibraltar to Suez to Singapore. He dealt at great length with the critical problems of production and shipping and explained the dangers to both from the persistent attacks by bombers and U-boats. He stated Britain's present financial position in a few blunt words. He asked for more destroyers either by a process of gift or loan. He concluded this memorable document with an expression of confidence that the American nation would support Britain's cause and meet her urgent needs, but he offered no suggestions as to how the President was to go about accomplishing all this with the Congress and the people.

This message from the Prime Minister had a profound effect on Roosevelt, and it filled Hopkins with a desire to get to know Churchill and to find out how much of him was mere grandiloquence and how much of him was hard fact.

Three days after Roosevelt read that letter he received a radio message from Secretary Hull informing him of the sudden death of Lord Lothian. Roosevelt immediately sent a message through the State Department to King George VI, saying that he had been 'shocked beyond measure to hear of the passing of my old friend and your Ambassador'.

This was no perfunctory expression of routine regret. Lord Lothian had been a notably successful Ambassador. A Liberal, close associate of Lloyd George in the First World War, he was well qualified to talk Roosevelt's language, and in turn to interpret Roosevelt to Churchill. He had been able

to understand, as a less flexible Briton might have failed to do, the manifold domestic obstacles that beset Roosevelt's path, and he most scrupulously avoided adding to the President's embarrassments by making excessive, impatient demands. His loss at this particular moment was a severe one, for he seemed almost irreplaceable.

The following day, when homeward bound, Roosevelt held a Press conference with the three correspondents, and talked affably about some of the advantages and disadvantages that he had noted in the various base sites visited, but he gave them nothing in the way of news calculated to cause the slightest excitement in their home offices. It still seemed that he had spent two weeks in a state of total relaxation and utter indifference toward the prospects of world calamity.

That, however, was only as it seemed.

Hopkins said later: 'I didn't know for quite a while what he was thinking about, if anything. But then—I began to get the idea that he was refuelling, the way he so often does when he seems to be resting and carefree. So I didn't ask him any questions. Then one evening he suddenly came out with it—the whole programme. He didn't seem to have any clear idea how it could be done legally. But there wasn't a doubt in his mind that he'd find a way to do it.'

That 'refuelling' process was a vital function for Roosevelt. Nobody that I know of has been able to give any convincing explanation of how it operated. He did not seem to talk much about the subject in hand, or to consult the advice of others, or to 'read up' on it. On this occasion he had Churchill's remarkable letter to provide food for thought; but this—though it was a masterly statement of the problems involved, of which Roosevelt was already quite well aware—presented no key to the solution other than an expression of confidence that 'ways and means will be found'.

One can only say that Roosevelt, a creative artist in politics, had put in his time on this cruise evolving the pattern of a masterpiece, and once he could see it clearly in his own mind's eye he made it quickly and very simply clear to all.

On December 16, he returned to Washington, tanned and exuberant and jaunty. The next day he held a Press conference, starting off with his usual statement that 'I don't think there is any particular news . . .' Having thus paved the way, he said: 'There is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very overwhelming number of Americans that the best immediate defence of the United States is the success of Britain in defending itself.' Then he jumped back to the outbreak of the First World War and told an anecdote at the expense of bankers on the Bar Harbour Express. 'In all history,' he said, 'no major war has ever been lost through lack of money.' He went on to say that some people thought we should lend money to Britain for the purchase of

American material, while other people thought we should deliver it as an outright gift. Roosevelt described this kind of thinking as 'banal'. (Actually, there were very few people who seriously made such ridiculous suggestions, neither one of which would have stood a chance in Congress; but Roosevelt brought them into his introduction to show what a reasonable middle-of-the-roader he really was.) He said:

Now, what I am trying to do is eliminate the dollar sign. That is something brand new in the thoughts of everybody in this room, I think—get rid of the silly, foolish old dollar sign.

Well, let me give you an illustration. Suppose my neighbour's home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose . . .

I believe it may accurately be said that with that neighbourly analogy Roosevelt won the fight for Lend Lease. There were to be two months of some of the bitterest debates in American history, but through it all the American people as a whole maintained the conviction that there couldn't be anything very radical or very dangerous in the President's proposal to lend our garden hose to the British, who were fighting so heroically against such fearful odds. There were probably very few who had any expectation that we would ever get the hose back; there was indeed a devout popular hope that this new measure would eliminate the possibility of another twenty years of fruitless bickering and niggling over war debts.

Following the Press conference, Roosevelt determined to go on the air with a Fireside Chat to explain the seriousness of the war situation. He could not give much attention to the speech until after Christmas, which was always a real old-fashioned family festival in the White House, with aunts and uncles, children and grandchildren, stockings and packages galore, and invariably a highly dramatic reading by the President of 'A Christmas Carol'. In his message to the American people he said: 'Let us make this Christmas a merry one for the little children in our midst. For us of maturer years it cannot be merry.' This well-meant statement was not really true in Roosevelt's own case; for him, with his superhuman resilience, any occasion under almost any circumstances could be merry; I am sure his Christmas was merry when first he was felled by disease and had not yet regained the power to move.

In the preparation of the Fireside Chat (delivered on December 29) Hopkins provided the key phrase which had already been used in some newspaper editorial: 'We must be the great arsenal of democracy.' I have been told that the phrase was originated by William S. Knudsen and also by Jean Monnet. There was some debate over its use by the President, since it might seem to preclude the eventual extension of aid to the Soviet Union or to certain Latin American 'republics', but the phrase was too good to be stopped by

any quibbles. Roosevelt really enjoyed working on this speech, for, with the political campaign over, it was the first chance he had had in months and even years to speak his mind with comparative freedom. He had indulged himself once, six months previously, in the 'stab in the back' reference, but the political consequences of that were so awkward that he had felt compelled subsequently to confine himself to the most namby-pamby euphemisms in references to the international situation. Now, for the first time, he could mention the Nazis by name. He could lash out against the apostles of appeasement. He could say: 'We cannot escape danger, or the fear of danger, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.' He could speak plainly on the subject which was always in his mind—the disastrous folly of any attempt at a negotiated peace. He said:

A nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. . . .

Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history. . . .

All of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a Nazi gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.

That was Roosevelt's profound belief. It was an essential element in the formulation of all his wartime policies. He repeated it over and over again, but there were more than a few in the United States and in other countries who remained permanently convinced that Britain would have done better to come to terms with the Nazis, and China with the warlords of Japan.

As Roosevelt sat at the end of the long table in the Cabinet Room working on that speech and other speeches during the war years he would look up at the portrait of Woodrow Wilson, over the mantelpiece. The tragedy of Wilson was always somewhere within the rim of his consciousness. Roosevelt could never forget Wilson's mistakes, which had been made with the noblest will in the world, impelled by the purest concept of the Christian ethic. Wilson had advocated 'peace without victory', he had produced the Fourteen Points as a basis on which Germany could surrender honourably. The violation of these principles had plagued the post-war world, had led to the rise of Hitler and a Second World War, and there was no motivating force in all of Roosevelt's wartime political policy stronger than the determination to prevent repetition of the same mistakes.

The 'arsenal of democracy' speech was one of the most tightly packed of all the Fireside Chats. It had to cover the map of the world. There were innumerable points for inclusion, including the danger to Ireland and the Azores, the aid to Germany rendered by the Soviet Union and Sweden, the presence of our fleet in the Pacific, bottlenecks in production, the Monroe

Doctrine and B-29s (which were not mentioned by name). When, after days and nights of hard labour, the speech was in something like its final form, it was sent over to the State Department for comment—of which plenty was forthcoming. The Department's suggested insertions and deletions were marked on the draft with a red pencil.

At one point in the speech Roosevelt spoke of the agents of the Fifth Column operating throughout the United States and Latin America. Then followed the sentence: 'There are also American citizens, *many of them in high places*, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents.'

The words that I have italicized came back from the State Department circled in red to indicate they should be cut out. When Roosevelt read this draft and saw that mark, he asked: 'Who put this red line in here?' We explained that the State Department suggested it would be well to delete these dangerous words.

'Oh, do they!' he said. 'Very well. We'll change it to read—"There are also American citizens, many of them in high places—*especially in the State Department*—and so forth . . ."'

During the very last session on the speech, late in the afternoon of the day it was to be delivered, Hopkins said: 'Mr. President—do you feel that you could include in this speech some kind of optimistic statement that will hearten the people who are doing the fighting—the British, the Greeks, and the Chinese?' Roosevelt thought that over for a long time, tilting his head back, puffing out his cheeks as was his habit. At length he dictated: 'I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best information.' Rosenman and I wondered at the time what that 'latest and best information' could be. We learned later from Hopkins that it was no more than Roosevelt's own private confidence that Lend Lease would go through and his certainty that this measure would make Axis victory impossible. Otherwise, his secret sources of information were not a great deal better than were those of the *New York Times* or the *Chicago Daily News* and in some important respects shockingly inaccurate.

On the night when Roosevelt gave his Fireside Chat the Germans subjected London to one of the heaviest bombings of the war; this was the raid in which so large a part of the City was destroyed by fire, St. Paul's Cathedral escaping miraculously. The Germans used this psychological warfare tactic frequently on Roosevelt speeches, and so later did the Japanese. They timed the creation of some major disturbance in the hope that it would blanket the speech in the morning's news and mitigate the effect that Roosevelt's words might produce on American and British morale. But they needed far more bombs and bombers than they possessed to nullify the lasting effect of those words, 'the arsenal of democracy'.

The Lend Lease Bill was drafted largely in the Treasury Department by Edward H. Foley, General Counsel, and his assistant, Oscar Cox, who subsequently became General Counsel for Lend Lease and one of Hopkins's most brilliant *aides*. Important spadework on the whole British financial problem had previously been done by another Treasury lawyer, Herman Oliphant, who had literally killed himself in the process. The War Department had been working along similar lines, for both Stimson and Marshall had been determined to break through the legal restrictions preventing aid for Britain, not because of any sentimental attachment to the land of Shakespeare, Keats, and leafy lanes, but because it was their duty to promote the interests of our national security. An old statute of 1892 had been dug out of the files, whereby Congress authorized the Secretary of War to lease Army property 'when in his discretion it will be for the public good'. I do not know how it was arranged to give the Lend Lease Bill the significant designation, 'HR-1776', but it sounds like a Rooseveltian conception, for it was the veritable declaration of interdependence.

This was one of the few 'irrevocable acts' to which Roosevelt committed himself before Pearl Harbour. In asking the Congress to pass this revolutionary law, granting to him such tremendous powers over the lives and fortunes of his countrymen, he was running what then appeared to be by all odds the greatest risk of his career. The isolationists had not been set back by the election, for they considered that the American people had been compelled to choose between two interventionists. Indeed, with the formation of the powerful America First Committee, the isolationists became for the first time well organized, and also very well financed, and they were mobilized for the battle against Lend Lease. Certainly, the Congress provided favourable ground on which Roosevelt's opponents could fight him. Roosevelt knew this, and he knew the consequences if he should lose this battle. But he was confident that he would not lose it. His Administration was now far stronger than it had been during the terrible events of the preceding summer: Stimson and Knox were in, and Farley and Garner were out. Whatever Hull's previous feelings about the Third Term and his own prospects of being Roosevelt's successor, he had been active in the President's behalf in the campaign against Willkie, and he put his weight behind Lend Lease. Some of the New Dealers, such as Henry Wallace, who had been hesitant about supporting the President's foreign policy, were now realizing that this involved something more than a mere surrender to 'British imperialism'. So, for the first time in years, the Administration presented a united front to the Congress. Furthermore, Roosevelt had been given over twenty-seven million votes by the American people, and those votes were the kind of facts that Congressmen ignore at their peril.

There was still plenty of venom. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, who had


himself just been re-elected and was therefore safe from the voters for another six years (they defeated him in 1946), coined a slogan to the effect that Lend Lease would mean 'ploughing under every fourth American boy'. Roosevelt described this as 'the most untruthful, the most dastardly, unpatriotic thing that has been said in public life in my generation'. He added: 'Quote me on that.'

What Lend Lease meant primarily was the end of the period of sham in which the United States sought to protect its own security by bootlegging methods. The concept of where the interests of our national security began was determined not by Roosevelt alone, but with the emphatic concurrence of his constitutional advisers, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was their decision that since the British were holding positions vital to American defence, it was our duty either to strengthen the British by all possible means or to send our own armed forces to occupy these positions and defend them ourselves.

Lend Lease kept the Allied cause alive and fighting on all fronts for the two years needed for the United States to become a decisive force in actual combat. It further provided an historic precedent for meeting a comparable crisis abroad by methods short of immediate armed intervention.

PART II

1941—MORE THAN MERE WORDS



NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

AROUND Christmas 1940 Roosevelt was mulling over the numerous implications of the letter he had received from Churchill, particularly in relation to the strategic importance of Ireland and the part that the United States might play in negotiations with De Valera. The names of such eminent Irish-Americans as Joseph P. Kennedy and William J. Donovan were mentioned as possible emissaries. Roosevelt said:

'You know—a lot of this could be settled if Churchill and I could just sit down together for a while.'

'What's stopping you?' Hopkins asked.

'Well—it couldn't be arranged right now. They have no Ambassador here—we have none over there.'

The gleam of high adventure came into Hopkins's sharp eyes. 'How about me going over, Mr. President?'

Roosevelt turned that suggestion down cold. He pointed to all the work he had ahead of him—a State of the Union Message, a gigantic Budget, the Third Inaugural, the Lend Lease fight.

'It'll be of no use to you in that fight,' said Hopkins. 'They'd never pay any attention to my views, except to vote the other way. But—if I had been in England and seen it with my own eyes, then I might be of some help.'

Still Roosevelt refused to hear of such a proposal. However, Hopkins now had an idea that seemed to him eminently sound, and certainly intensely exciting, and he would not let go of it. He enlisted the aid of Missy Le Hand and of Justice Felix Frankfurter, who seldom offered any advice to Roosevelt after his elevation to the Supreme Court, but who was listened to when he did speak.

Roosevelt remained obdurate, and after days of intensive effort Hopkins was about ready to give up. We were working at the time on the Message to Congress. It was the one which proclaimed the Four Freedoms. Nobody ghost-wrote those. Roosevelt had mentioned them somewhat casually at a Press Conference six months previously when asked a question about his long-term peace objective. There were then five freedoms—two of them coming under the heading of 'Freedom of Speech'. Roosevelt had no name in mind for the Third Freedom, though he was clear about its social import, and Richard L. Harkness of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* suggested it be called, 'Freedom From Want'. After that Conference the Freedoms were forgotten until Roosevelt suddenly recalled them to us on New Year's 1941.

On the morning of January 5, Hopkins was in his room when Steve Early telephoned from the West Wing to say: 'Congratulations!'

'On what?' said Hopkins.

'Your trip!'

'What trip?' Hopkins suspected some ill-timed joke, inspired, no doubt, by Roosevelt himself.

'Your trip to England,' said Early. 'The President just announced it at his Press conference.'

Two days later Hopkins was off.

Roosevelt had told the Press that Hopkins would go 'as my personal representative for a very short trip—a couple of weeks—just to maintain—I suppose that is the word for it—personal relations between me and the British Government.'

The questions followed:

Q.: Does Mr. Hopkins have any special mission, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, no!

Q.: Any title?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no! . . .

Q.: Mr. President, is it safe to say Mr. Hopkins will not be the next Ambassador?

THE PRESIDENT: You know Harry isn't strong enough for that job.

Q.: Will he be on the Government payroll?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose they will pay his expenses—probably on a per diem, not very large—either for you or Hopkins! (*Laughter.*)

Q.: Will anyone accompany Mr. Hopkins?

THE PRESIDENT: No. And he will have no powers.

Q.: Will he have any mission to perform?

THE PRESIDENT: No; you can't get anything exciting. (*Laughter.*) He's just going over to say 'How do you do?' to a lot of my friends! (*Laughter.*)

(The boys seemed to have laughed easily in those days.)

Before Hopkins left Washington he was persuaded to have a long talk with Jean Monnet, whom he had never met, but with whom he was to become closely associated later on in the problems of production and eventually in the diplomatic mess which followed the Allied landings in North Africa. Monnet was one of the least obtrusive men in Washington during the early years of the war, but one of the most determined and most useful. A French business man, member of the famous Cognac family, he had been in America in 1938 and 1939, stimulating the production of fighting aircraft for France. He was in London as a member of the Allied Economic Co-ordinating Committee when France fell, and he then offered his services to the British Government. He was sent to Washington to work with Arthur Purvis on the British Purchasing Commission. He had the kind of calm, cool, reasoning

and self-disciplined mind which is supposed to be typically French, but which is all too seldom found in Frenchmen; he was positively Puritanical in his refusal to deviate from the straight line which led to his objectives. His advice to Hopkins was to waste no time with the Ministers of This or That in the British Cabinet, but to concentrate on Churchill, for 'Churchill is the British War Cabinet, and no one else matters'. Hopkins became a bit fed up with hearing about the almighty Churchill and exclaimed; 'I suppose Churchill is convinced that he's the greatest man in the world!'

A friend who was present said: 'Harry—if you're going to London with that chip on your shoulder, like a damned little small-town chauvinist, you may as well cancel your passage right now.' Hopkins, however, maintained his reservations about Churchill as he set off on the Pan-American Clipper to Lisbon. He also maintained the gnawing fear of air travel which had once caused him to refuse an invitation to make an inspection flight over Boulder Dam—saying, in explanation of his refusal: 'No, God-damn it, I'm scared!' Several people tried to thumb a ride with him on the Clipper, including Averell Harriman and the present biographer, but he preferred to travel alone.

He carried with him his official letter of authorization:

Reposing special faith and confidence in you, I am asking you to proceed at your early convenience to Great Britain, there to act as my personal representative. I am also asking you to convey a communication in this sense to His Majesty King George VI.

You will, of course, communicate to this Government any matters which may come to your attention in the performance of your mission which you may feel will serve the best interests of the United States.

With all best wishes for the success of your mission, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Enclosed with this was a letter from the President to King George VI:

YOUR MAJESTY:

I have designated the Honourable Harry L. Hopkins as my personal representative on a special mission to Great Britain. Mr. Hopkins is a very good friend of mine in whom I repose the utmost confidence.

I am asking him to convey to you and to Her Majesty the Queen my cordial greetings and my sincere hope that his mission may advance the common ideals of our two nations.

Cordially your friend,

(signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Hopkins mission received a largely unfavourable press, with many references to the travels of Colonel House twenty-five years before and to Hopkins's record as a free and easy squanderer of the taxpayers' money. Raymond Clapper, always more friendly than most of his colleagues, assumed that Hopkins was going in his capacity as a veteran welfare worker to make a study of the new democracy that was arising from the ruins in Britain and to make charts of social progress; in this guess, Clapper was uncharacteristically wide of the mark. At the other extreme was the Communist *Daily Worker*, which likened Hopkins to Colonel House, saying in its editorial that House had pledged 'American entrance into the first imperialistic war on the side of the Allies while Woodrow Wilson was assuring the American people that he would keep the country out of the war. . . . The secret diplomacy involved in the Hopkins appointment can put the American people on the alert—in insisting that no further aid be given British imperialism, since such aid brings the shadow of war closer and closer to our homes.' The *Daily Worker* urged the American people to shout loudly: 'The Yanks are *not* coming.'

(Less than seven months later Hopkins arrived in Moscow to talk to Joseph Stalin, and the same *Daily Worker* said, editorially:

The sending of Mr. Hopkins on this mission, his statements and pledges will meet the approval of the entire American people. . . . The time is long overdue for the people to inform their Representatives and Senators to establish unity to defend the country and to defeat the common enemy of mankind. The fact that concrete steps have been taken in this direction, through Mr. Hopkins's visits to London and Moscow, makes this unity imperative. Any voices raised to prevent these steps from being taken are helping Hitler, or are agents of Hitler and Fifth Columnists in the country.)

Shortly after Hopkins's departure, the suggestion was made that Wendell Willkie also make a trip to London. It was obvious that Roosevelt would heartily approve of this. There was far more news value in Willkie than in Hopkins; and, as the Lend Lease debate started, this evidence of solidification of bi-partisan foreign policy was all-important. When Willkie went to the White House on the eve of his departure Roosevelt was working on his Third Inaugural Address with Rosenman and me. We were in the Cabinet Room when it was announced that Willkie had arrived in General Watson's office. Roosevelt shifted into his wheelchair and was going through Missy Le Hand's office into his own to greet the man who had been his opponent in the recent bitter campaign. He looked into his office and saw that his desk was clean of papers. Then he stopped his wheelchair, and turned to us, and

asked us to give him a handful of papers from the litter on the Cabinet table. We asked: 'Which particular papers do you want, Mr. President?'

'Oh, it doesn't matter,' said Roosevelt. 'Just give me a handful to strew around on my desk so that I will look very busy when Willkie comes in.'

Some time later, when I came to know Wendell Willkie, I told him of that episode, and he was considerably amused. His comment was 'That's typical!' It was during this brief meeting of the two men that Roosevelt took a sheet of his personal stationery and, without apparent premeditation, wrote the famous message to Churchill in Longfellow's words:

Sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate!

Roosevelt never made a more graceful or effective gesture than that, and none of us who were with him in the White House at the time had any idea how he happened to think of it.

When Churchill was informed that Harry Hopkins was coming to visit him his first question was: '*Who?*' He was quickly informed by his Parliamentary Private Secretary, Brendan Bracken, who had met Hopkins at the Swoopes' house some years before and had watched his career with interest ever since. As the close friend and confidant of the Prime Minister, Bracken's position corresponded in one or two respects (but not more) to Hopkins's. When Churchill heard who his curious guest really was he ordered the unrolling of any red carpets that might have survived the blitz.

Hopkins was five days *en route*, travelling the last leg, Lisbon to Poole, on the South Coast of England, in a British Overseas Airways Clipper. In those days of the Neutrality Law, the Pan American Clippers, rating as merchant vessels, could not go into the ports of belligerent countries. Churchill sent Bracken to Poole to meet the airplane, but when the passengers disembarked Hopkins was not among them. Bracken went aboard, and found Hopkins still sitting, looking sick and shrunken and too tired even to unfasten his safety belt. He had to rest for a long time before he felt well enough to take the train journey to London. But then he began to perk up. He looked with great interest at the bomb damage on the South Coast, and felt, like every other American who reached England in those bleak days, that he had arrived on the other side of the moon. As the train moved through the countryside, which seemed as tranquil and untroubled as ever, Hopkins said to Bracken: 'Are you going to let Hitler take these fields away from you?' That was his first leading question about British intentions. Bracken answered, with authority, and with unaccustomed brevity: 'No.'

The Hopkins entry into London on Thursday, January 9, was described years later in a letter to the *Sunday Times* from Sir Eustace Missenden, General Manager of the Southern Railway:

Mr. Churchill had given instructions that the best was to be done, and arrangements were made for the most modern Pullman cars to be formed in the train. The conductors wore white gloves; a good meal, with liquid refreshment, was available, together with papers, periodicals, etc. Mr. Harry Hopkins was obviously impressed.

It was late afternoon and the engine driver put up a grand performance, but when nearing Clapham Junction the siren was heard, and during that period Clapham Junction was particularly favoured by the Luftwaffe. However, on we went, and within one minute of the train's arrival at Waterloo, just after 7 p.m., hundreds of incendiaries showered down on the line between Clapham Junction and Waterloo, blocking all tracks for several hours. The intense relief on the faces of the train crews will always be remembered as they watched the waiting car spring into life, carrying our distinguished visitor on his way to Downing Street.

He was met at the station by Herschel V. Johnson, Chargé d'Affaires at the American Embassy. Although Hopkins was invited to dinner at 10 Downing Street that first evening, he felt too tired to face Churchill, and had dinner with Johnson in his room at Claridge's Hotel, where he could hear the anti-aircraft batteries blazing away in Hyde Park. Johnson, who was ranking American diplomat in London during the interval between Ambassadors Kennedy and Winant—and later Minister to Sweden and Representative on the United Nations Security Council—has told me that before Hopkins's arrival he had been in a state of deep pessimism as to American ability to appreciate the serious urgency of Britain's plight. About all that he received officially from home was a series of admonitions to maintain strict observance of the Neutrality Law and to do or say nothing that might bring down isolationist criticism on the State Department. Having been through almost six months of intensive blitz, and having himself narrowly escaped death more than once when bombs landed in and around Grosvenor Square, he had begun to feel a certain sense of frustration and impotence as of one who is a guest in an upstairs room of a burning building and is told to be careful to take no sides as between the Fire Department and the flames.

'I was immediately heartened,' Johnson has said, 'by the sincerity and the intensity of Harry Hopkins's determination to gain first-hand knowledge of Britain's needs and of finding a way to fill them. Some other Americans who had come to London devoted themselves to investigations to determine if the British really needed the things they were asking for. Harry wanted to find out if they were asking for *enough* to see them through. He made it

perfectly clear that he did not know how or where he was going to begin, or what his methods would be, but he knew precisely what he was there for. He made me feel that the first real assurance of hope had at last come—and he acted on the British like a galvanic needle.'

Another American whom Hopkins wanted to see and did see at the beginning of his London visit was Edward R. Murrow, of the Columbia Broadcasting System. From the outbreak of war, when he had lain in the Mayo Clinic, believing that he was soon to die, Hopkins had listened to Murrow's grim voice announcing; 'This—is London . . .' in a tone which seemed to suggest the thuds of the German bombs. When Murrow was summoned to Claridge's to see Hopkins he thought he was being granted an interview, which proved to be the case, except that he, Murrow, was the one interviewed. Hopkins plied him with searching questions, most of them concerned with personalities and with public morale rather than with physical conditions. All that Hopkins told him of his own mission was: 'I suppose you could say that I've come here to try to find a way to be a catalytic agent between two prima donnas' (which was not for quotation). Hopkins then believed that the formidable egos of Roosevelt and Churchill were bound to clash, and, in anticipation of that, he said: 'I want to try to get an understanding of Churchill and of the men he sees after midnight.'

Churchill had been informed of Hopkins's devotion to Roosevelt and of his possible suspicion of anyone who might presume to challenge Roosevelt's position of pre-eminence among world statesmen. On the day of Hopkins's arrival the Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon in honour of Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador to the United States, and in the course of his remarks on the long-belaboured subject of Anglo-American amity, he said:

I hail it as a most fortunate occurrence that at this awe-striking climax in world affairs there should stand at the head of the American Republic a famous statesman, long versed and experienced in the work of government and administration, in whose heart there burns the fire of resistance to aggression and oppression, and whose sympathies and nature make him the sincere and undoubted champion of justice and of freedom, and of the victims of wrongdoing wherever they may dwell.

And not less—for I may say it now that the party struggle in the United States is over—do I rejoice that this pre-eminent figure should newly have received the unprecedented honour of being called for the third time to lead the American democracies in days of stress and storm.

When Hopkins learned of this speech from Johnson, who had been present at the luncheon, he began to believe that he and the British Prime Minister might be able to get along with one another.

The next morning, Johnson brought the Military Attaché, General Raymond E. Lee, and the Naval Attaché, Admiral Robert Lee Ghormley, to Claridge's, to give Hopkins the American estimate of the war situation—and it was not an optimistic one—and then Johnson took Hopkins to the Foreign Office for the inevitable courtesy call. Hopkins was not at first favourably impressed with Anthony Eden, though they later became very good friends. Other Americans on first acquaintance with Eden have made the mistake of writing him off as a charming, ornamental, casual young gentleman of Mayfair. Those who jumped to this conclusion had forgotten that Eden had the strength and courage to risk political extinction by refusing to go along with Neville Chamberlain on appeasement.

Hopkins wrote his first reports to Roosevelt in longhand on Claridge's stationery and they were dispatched by courier. He said:

He (Eden) thought Hitler would have a 'go' at England and unsuccessfully—that Turkey would fight if the Germans moved through Bulgaria—that therefore, Hitler would more likely move through Italy to attack the Greeks—that Russia was frightened and would keep out—that there was a real chance of Abyssinia kicking up a rumpus soon—that the British Army in Egypt were using successfully some big tanks over the desert.

That was about all that emerged from that brief meeting, after which Johnson took Hopkins to see Lord Halifax, whom he described thus:

A tall stoop-shouldered aristocrat greeted me in an old office taken over by the ministers of Churchill's Government. I did the talking—or most of it—telling him the people that I thought were important for him to see and know in Washington. When I got beyond the President and Hull I was in deep water and quit. I liked him. I think and hope the President will like him. He has no side—has been about—I presume is a hopeless Tory—that isn't too important now if we can but get on with our business of licking Hitler. I would not like to see him have much to say about a later peace—I should like to have Eden say less. I understand he is off to America on Tuesday next aboard a British cruiser.

Hopkins then returned to Claridge's, made an unsuccessful attempt to neaten up, and then drove down through Berkeley Square and Trafalgar Square to Downing Street for the big moment. He wrote Roosevelt:

Number 10 Downing St. is a bit down at the heels because the Treasury next door has been bombed more than a bit. The Prime Minister is no longer permitted to sleep here and I understands sleeps across the street. He told me they are building a real shelter for him so that he can sleep

in peace near by. Everyone tells me that he works fifteen hours a day and I can well believe it. His man Friday—Brendan Bracken—met me at the door—showed me about the old and delightful house that has been home of Prime Ministers of the Empire for two hundred years. Most of the windows are out—workmen over the place repairing the damage—Churchill told me it wouldn't stand a healthy bomb.

Bracken led me to a little dining-room in the basement—poured me some sherry and left me to wait for the Prime Minister. A rotund—smiling—red-faced gentleman appeared—extended a fat but none the less convincing hand and wished me welcome to England. A short black coat—striped trousers—a clear eye and a mushy voice was the impression of England's leader as he showed me with obvious pride the photographs of his beautiful daughter-in-law and grandchild.

The lunch was simple but good—served by a very plain woman who seemed to be an old family servant. Soup—cold beef—(I didn't take enough jelly to suit the P.M. and he gave me some more)—green salad—cheese and coffee—a light wine and port. He took snuff from a little silver box—he liked it.

I told him the President was anxious to see him in April—he expressed regret that Bermuda would not be the place—the climate was nice—he would bring a small staff—go on a cruiser and by accident meet the President at the appointed place—and discuss our problems at leisure. He talked of remaining as long as two weeks and seemed very anxious to meet the President face to face. We discussed the difficulty of communication with the President at long range—there is no question but that he wants to meet the President—the sooner the better.

I told him there was a feeling in some quarters that he, Churchill, did not like America, Americans or Roosevelt. This set him off on a bitter though fairly constrained attack on Ambassador Kennedy, whom he believes is responsible for this impression. He denied it vigorously—sent for a secretary to show me a telegram which he had sent to the President immediately after his election in which he expressed his warm delight at the President's re-election.

I told of my mission—he seemed pleased—and several times assured me that he would make every detail of information and opinion available to me and hoped that I would not leave England until I was fully satisfied of the exact state of England's need and the urgent necessity of the exact material assistance Britain requires to win the war.

He reviewed with obvious pride his own part in the war to date—he didn't *know* that England could withstand the onslaught after France fell—but he felt sure that it could—it did—and it will withstand the next one—he thinks the invasion will not come, but if they gain a foothold in

England with 100,000 men 'we shall drive them out'—beside its excellent coast defences Britain has twenty-five well-trained and equipped divisions—trained only in offensive warfare which will drive Germany's army into the sea. Germany cannot invade Britain successfully. He thinks Hitler may use poison gas, but if they do England will reply in kind killing man for man—'for we too have the deadliest gases in the world'—but under no circumstances will they be used unless the Germans release gas first. He said he believed Hitler would not strike at Spain now, because the population is starving and Hitler does not want sullen people around his armies—he has enough of that already—but the spring might tell a different story—and left me the impression that Spain would be overrun in the spring.

He thinks Greece is lost—although he is now reinforcing the Greeks—and weakening his African Army—he believes Hitler will permit Mussolini to go only so far downhill—and is now preparing for the attack which must bring its inevitable result. He knows this will be a blow to British prestige and is obviously considering ways and means of preparing the British public for it. He realizes it will have a profound and disappointing effect in America as well. Churchill, too, thinks Turkey will stay put and probably be in the war when Germany moves through Bulgaria. This Churchill thinks will be the route.

This debacle in Greece will be overcome in part by what he considers to be the sure defeat of the Italians in Africa. He feels England can bring great military pressure on Italy—and fully intends to—Britain will control the Mediterranean and the Suez against Germany. He has offered Weygand six divisions—if the former strikes—he is in close touch with Pétain on this point—he spoke with no great assurance about it—but it is clear Churchill intends to hold Africa—clean out the Italians and co-operate with Weygand if the opportunity permits. He expressed the hope that we would not go too far in feeding any of the dominated countries. He feels that tough as it is that one of Hitler's great weaknesses is to be in control of territory inhabited by a dejected and despairing people.

Churchill said that while Germany's bombers were at the ratio of $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 at the present time—that would be soon reduced to $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1—and then he felt they could hold their own in the air—indeed, he looks forward with our help to mastery in the air and then Germany with all her armies will be finished. He believes that this war will never see great forces massed against one another.

He took me up to the Cabinet Room, where there was 'a better fire'—and showed me on the map where the convoys are coming through to Liverpool and Glasgow—and of the route the German bombers are taking from France to Norway to intercept the ships.

The sentence in the foregoing, '*He believes that this war will never see great forces massed against one another*', should be noted as a suggestion of the strategic thinking which later led Churchill into so many arguments over the Second Front.

After that luncheon Hopkins held two Press conferences, one with the British Press and one with American correspondents, and managed in both of them to say nothing. But his presence in London was used to a considerable extent in Britain's propaganda barrage to the continent of Europe, via B.B.C. broadcasts and leaflets dropped by the R.A.F. The gigantic Goebbels machine did not ignore it, either, the principal line being that Hopkins had come for the purpose of taking over the rest of the British Empire (following Bermuda, Trinidad, etc.) in return for some more rusty and obsolete American material.

The following day was Saturday and, war or no war, many of the high officials of His Majesty's Government went off for the week-end. Churchill normally went to Chequers, but the security authorities would not let him use this official and well-known house when there was a full moon. So he went instead to Dytchley, which is near Woodstock, north of Oxford, and one of the most beautiful of all the stately homes of England. Built in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the greatest period of English architecture, it had become the property of Ronald Tree, whose mother was the daughter of the original Marshall Field of Chicago. Tree was Parliamentary Secretary to Brendan Bracken, and he was skilful enough as a host to meet the exacting requirements of Winston Churchill. Three of the handsome rooms on the ground floor were set aside as offices for the Prime Minister and equipped with all the devices by which he could keep in touch with every development of the war at every instant day or night. Week-ends were anything but restful, due to the incessant concern of Churchill with everything that was going on everywhere (Roosevelt could get away from it all now and then, but Churchill never even wanted to try), and due also to the habits of the Axis powers; indeed, Churchill was week-ending when he received the news of the war's most important events in the years when the enemy was making the news—including the attacks on the Soviet Union and Pearl Harbour.

During Hopkins's two days at Dytchley the only news was of the appearance for the first time of German dive-bombers in the Mediterranean; they attacked British naval units and inflicted serious losses. Hopkins was amazed at the calmness with which Churchill and his staff took this bad news. Having had no direct experience of the realities of warfare, he was shocked by the stark immediacy of the information that ships had been sunk and that British sailors had been killed and maimed. But he had to learn that those who make the great decisions in this brutal business can take no time out for

mourning or for penitence; and Winston Churchill, no respecter of his own safety, was a good man from whom to learn it. As it turned out, the presence of the Stuka bombers in the Mediterranean had a significance which was not apparent at the time; the German records eventually showed that this was the week-end selected by Hitler for the capture of Gibraltar.

Hopkins was particularly struck by the extreme difference between Churchill's menage and Roosevelt's. Although hell might be popping all about Roosevelt, it was rarely audible in his immediate presence, where tranquillity prevailed. Churchill, on the other hand, always seemed to be at his command post on the precarious beach-head and the guns were continually blazing in his conversation; wherever he was, there was the battle-front—and he was involved in the battles not only of the current war, but of the whole past, from Cannae to Gallipoli. While it took a Pearl Harbour or a national election or a particularly tense poker game to keep Roosevelt up as late as midnight, Churchill was getting full steam up along about ten o'clock in the evening; often after his harassed staff had struggled to bed at 2 or 3 a.m. they would berouted out an hour or more later with an entirely new project for which a plan must be drawn up immediately. Churchill needed little sleep at night, but took a nap after lunch, whereas it was Roosevelt's custom to work hard all day and sleep soundly all night. Churchill's consumption of alcohol has been widely advertised: it could be described as unique, for it continued at quite regular intervals through most of his waking hours without visible effect on his health or on his mental processes. Anyone who suggests that he became befuddled with drink obviously never had to become involved in an argument with him on some factual problem late at night when everyone else present was drooping with fatigue. He was really Olympian in capacity. His principal *aides*—General Sir Hastings Ismay, Professor F. A. Lindemann, Commander Charles Thompson, Sir Desmond Morton, J. M. Martin, and Bracken—made no attempt to keep up with him in consumption of champagne, whiskey and brandy (he detested cocktails), and they had to summon reserves of energy to be able to keep up with him in work.

Roosevelt engaged in social life no more than was absolutely necessary, and he eliminated it almost entirely when the circumstances of war gave him a good excuse for doing so. Churchill, however, loved to have gay and amusing company at the dinner-table. He had little opportunity for it, of course, during the blitz in London, when he was largely confined during the hours of darkness to the elaborate system of offices and small living-quarters in the air-raid shelters under the Cabinet office building in Great George Street, a few steps from Downing Street. But at week-ends there was usually a peacetime house-party atmosphere surrounding Churchill whenever he wanted some relaxation. In Hopkins's opinion, there was no doubt that the

most charming and entertaining of all the people that he met on these week-ends was Mrs. Churchill.

On Saturday night, in the beautiful library at Dyitchley, he heard Churchill for the first time launch forth into one of the after-dinner war summaries for which, among other things, he was famous. Churchill could talk for an hour or more and hold any audience spellbound, including those who had heard him many times and to whom nothing that he said was news. It might be misleading to say that these Churchill talks were 'impromptu'—for it is doubtful that he was ever unprepared for a speech—but they were always exercises in incredible virtuosity. For Hopkins this was the opening of new horizons. Churchill's eloquence came as no surprise, but his remarkable, encyclopaedic knowledge of the situation in all of its intricate involutions convinced Hopkins that here was one who certainly knew his stuff, who could recite fact and figure and chapter and verse, and in superb English prose.

There is a story which has been often told, and sometimes printed, to the effect that Churchill, having been advised of Hopkins's background as a social worker and rabid New Dealer, attempted to woo him by talking at the outset of all that the British Government was doing for the underprivileged and the forgotten man, and of how his dearest dream for the post-war world was the more abundant life for all . . . whereupon Hopkins rudely interrupted him by saying: 'The President didn't send me here to listen to any of that stuff. All he wants to know is: How do you propose to beat that son of a bitch in Berlin?'

That is a fine story, all right, but in so far as I know it is not true. Churchill subsequently stated that within a few minutes after their first meeting in Downing Street he felt sure that he had at last established 'a definite heart-to-heart contact with the President'. It may be added that the members of Churchill's entourage were mostly men of superior wit—that may have been an important qualification in their selection for these highly confidential posts—and they were adroit in developing anecdotes about their gusty chief. Thus there exists a whole library of Churchill jokes almost as extensive as that fabricated about the legendary figure of Samuel Goldwyn. Some of these stories, of course, are true.

After his return to London, Hopkins paid his respects at Buckingham Palace; this was only a brief meeting, but subsequently Hopkins had a longer visit with the King and Queen, his description of which appears later in this chapter. On January 14 Hopkins cabled Roosevelt:

Having spent the week-end with the Prime Minister I saw the King yesterday. He is well and confident and sends his warm regards to you. Your message to Congress has been well received here. I am urging all

in the Government here not to raise or accentuate differences between us pending passage of the Lend Lease Bill. What is your estimate as to when the Bill will pass? I hope that there will be no major amendments. Can we be informed here from time to time concerning the progress of the Bill? The going here is *pretty rough*. I am seeing everything from bombs to some of your cousins. Letter follows by messenger. Leaving today with Churchill for a tour of naval bases.

The President also received a cable from the Former Naval Person saying: 'I am most grateful to you for sending so remarkable an envoy who enjoys so high a measure of your intimacy and confidence.'

The letter to which Hopkins referred in his cable was written, like the previously quoted report, in longhand on small Claridge stationery and never passed through any diplomatic channels whatsoever:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

These notes are sent by Col. Lee, who is returning with Halifax. Will you save them for me until I get back, when I shall try to put them into readable form.

The people here are amazing from Churchill down, and if courage alone can win—the result will be inevitable. But they need our help desperately, and I am sure you will permit nothing to stand in the way. Some of the ministers and underlings are a bit trying, but no more than some I have seen.

Churchill is the gov't. in every sense of the word—he controls the grand strategy and often the details—labour trusts him—the army, navy, air force are behind him to a man. The politicians and upper crust pretend to like him. I cannot emphasize too strongly that he is the one and only person over here with whom you need to have a full meeting of minds.

Churchill wants to see you—the sooner the better—but I have told him of your problem until the bill is passed. I am convinced this meeting between you and Churchill is essential—and soon—for the battering continues and Hitler does not wait for Congress.

I was with Churchill at 2 a.m. Sunday night when he got word of the loss of the *Southampton*—the serious damage to the new aircraft carrier (*Illustrious*)—a second cruiser knocked about—but he never falters or displays the least despondence—till four o'clock he paced the floor telling me of his offensive and defensive plans.

I cannot believe that it is true that Churchill dislikes either you or America—it just doesn't make sense.

Churchill is prepared for a setback in Greece—the African campaign will proceed favourably—German bombers in the Mediterranean make

the fleet's operation more difficult—convoys must all go around the Cape. An invasion, they feel sure, can be repelled—Churchill thinks it will not come soon, but Beaverbrook and others think it will come and soon.

This island needs our help now, Mr. President, with everything we can give them.

There is no time to be out of London, so I am staying here—the bombs aren't nice and seem to be quite impersonal. I have been offered a so-called bombproof apartment by Churchill—a tin hat and gas mask have been delivered—the best I can say for the hat is that it looks worse than my own and doesn't fit—the gas mask I can't get on—so I am all right.

There is much to tell but it will have to wait—for I must be off to Charing Cross.

HARRY.

The reference to being out of London referred to a suggestion that he stay at a house in the country to avoid the bombing, but that naturally was the last thing he wanted to miss. The train he was to take left from King's Cross, not Charing Cross; but luckily he was guided by an Embassy representative, so he went to the right station.

He travelled with Churchill in his private train to Scotland, where Lord Halifax was about to embark on the new battleship, *King George V*, for his journey to the United States. The final stage of the trip to Scapa Flow had to be made on a destroyer, which was boarded under utmost difficulties, while pitching badly. Churchill was talking rapidly at the time about the African campaign. He scrambled aboard the destroyer easily, but Hopkins, being no old salt (nor even a young one), missed his footing and was narrowly saved from falling into the sea. He was dragged aboard by the scruff of his neck, while Churchill went right on talking. On board the destroyer, off the North Coast of Scotland in January, Hopkins was horribly cold, tired, and generally miserable. He borrowed General Ismay's flying-boots to keep his feet warm and sat down to rest on some object on the deck, but was promptly hauled off it by a Chief Petty Officer, who said apologetically: 'Excuse me, sir—but I don't think you should sit just there, sir—that, sir, is a depth charge.'

When the destroyer came in view of the Home Fleet, at its moorings in Scapa Flow, Churchill or someone else (I do not know who) waved to the impressive sight and said to Hopkins: 'There is our shield! If that should go, we'd be for it. The Germans have attempted some bombing here. If they should intensify it, and had some luck with their hits, our shield would be gone and we should be defenceless.' (Eleven months later Hopkins thought that it was a lucky thing for civilization that the Germans never developed

the carrier-based air power nor the peculiar tactical skill that the Japanese concentrated on Pearl Harbour.)

Hopkins wished good-bye and good luck to Lord Halifax, with whom he was to have close and generally cordial association during the next four years. When Halifax arrived off Annapolis, Maryland, President Roosevelt did him the signal honour of sailing out to meet him. There was considerable quiet mirth in the White House over that episode. We all knew that, of course, the President was glad of the opportunity to welcome the new British Ambassador and thereby to advertise again his support for the British cause; but we all suspected that, as a naval enthusiast, he was also impelled by an irrepressible desire to have a good look at the new battleship.

The career of Lord Halifax as Ambassador was a remarkable one. He started out under many handicaps, being branded as one of the men of Munich. He was photographed indulging in his favourite sport of fox-hunting in Virginia while his countrymen were absorbing fearful punishment, thereby evoking a diatribe from Carl Sandburg, among others. Some months after his arrival in Washington an acidulous and irreverent representative of the British Government in the United States returned to London and when asked how Halifax was getting along, replied: 'Oh, he's doing famously! His popularity has risen from zero to freezing-point.' And yet when, five years later, Halifax completed his mission and left the United States, he took with him a wealth of respect and affection such as could have been given to very few ambassadors anywhere at any time. The size and character of the obstacles that he had been forced to face in the beginning made his ultimate accomplishment all the more admirable.

On the return journey from Scotland, Churchill stopped at various points, always keeping Hopkins with him and always being at pains to explain that this odd-looking, unkempt individual was 'the personal representative of the President of the United States of America', an assurance well calculated to bolster local morale. At Glasgow there was a large inspection by the Prime Minister of anti-air raid personnel. They were formed up in rank after rank. Churchill wanted Hopkins to walk with him the entire distance and to be introduced over and over again. Churchill was tireless, but Hopkins was exhausted, and tried several times to duck out and hide behind the spectators. But every time Churchill noted his absence and summoned him forth.

That night Churchill and Hopkins attended a dinner given by the Lord Provost of Glasgow. Churchill spoke, making graceful references to President Roosevelt, to Hopkins, and to 'the Democracy of the great American Republic' (a phrase calculated to please both sides of the political fence). Hopkins also was called upon for a few words. He quoted the Book of Ruth — 'Whither thou goest, I will go . . . even to the end.' Publication of this

unprepared speech was censored, but word of it spread all over Britain, and it had an effect far greater than Hopkins had dared to intend: it was interpreted as assurance that 'the Americans are with us'. Lord Beaverbrook told me years later that Hopkins's warm-hearted sympathy at this time and his confidence and the conviction that went with it provided more tangible aid for Britain than had all the destroyers and guns and rifles and ammunition that had been sent previously.

It was on this trip, and other trips to Dover, Southampton, and Portsmouth, that Hopkins noted the absolute reverence in which Churchill was held by the British people. They literally wanted to touch the hem of his garments. He had been a famous man in these islands for thirty years before the war, but they did not entrust him with the job of King's First Minister until they were *in extremis*. And as soon as they were out of it they voted overwhelmingly for his opponents. But this was their 'finest hour' and Churchill was their acknowledged leader and spokesman and the living symbol of their will to survive as a free people. The Prime Minister and the President, as Hopkins saw them, were widely different characters, but they both possessed to a superlative degree the ability to provoke loyalty, enthusiasm, devotion, even a kind of adoration—and also the ability merely to provoke.

Returning to London, Hopkins plunged into a schedule of appointments with British and American officials, and those of various governments in exile. One official with whom he established a lasting friendship—after an unpropitious start—was Lord Beaverbrook, the Press Baron and Minister of Aircraft Production. (They first met at luncheon with Herschel Johnson and disliked each other automatically.) Hopkins attended a session of the House of Commons at which Churchill made one of his historic reports on the war situation. In this one he described the composition and functions of his War Cabinet. Coming to Beaverbrook, he said: 'The Minister of Aircraft Production, who was described as an "old sea raider", which is a euphemistic method of describing a pirate, is a man of altogether exceptional force and genius who is at his very best when things are at their very worst.' The relationship of Churchill and Beaverbrook was a matter of considerable interest and often amusement to Hopkins. Here were two determined and inherently powerful men whose very similarities clashed; both were supreme patriots on an imperial scale, both were tireless and tenacious, both extremely worldly, with great zest and capacity for good living, both were superb showmen with an alert ability for spotting and appreciating the main chance; and each of the many disagreements between them seemed utterly irreconcilable until a common contempt for the purely transient issue brought them together again.

Beaverbrook gave a dinner for Hopkins at Claridge's, inviting his col-

leagues and competitors of the London Press. This dinner was off the record, but an account of it has been written by one of the editors present:

We were all tired men, suffering from a succession of long nights during which London had been bombed by explosives and incendiaries, and during which the difficulties of newspaper production had been extreme. But on that midwinter evening in the peak period of the first series of London blitzes we were also intensely curious men—which is the happiest and healthiest state for a journalist in any clime or circumstance. All of us were wondering as our cars advanced cautiously through the blackout toward Claridge's (and they miraculously found it, though its patrician and once-brilliant entrance was as subtly concealed as that of any dubious dive) what Hopkins would have to say to us.

He had said so little since he arrived in London, to the tune of an anti-aircraft bombardment, on January 9. Our reporters, when they met him on arrival, were obliged to record that he 'smiled quizzically' in answer to their questions; and even a full-dress Press conference at the American Embassy two days later had produced nothing more definite from the President's envoy than that he was here 'to discuss matters of mutual interest to our two countries'. Though it must be admitted that he rewarded the zeal of one particularly determined questioner by agreeing: 'Yes, I think you can say *urgent* matters.'

The gathering at Claridge's was one of the biggest of the Beaverbrook wartime occasions. Not only were the editors and some of the leading writers present. Proprietors and managers were there, and the provincial Press, as well as that of London, was represented.

When the waiters had cleared the tables the doors were closed, and Beaverbrook stood up, smiling. He addressed himself not to us, but to Harry Hopkins. For days, he said, Hopkins had been talking to members of the Government. But tonight was a yet more important occasion, for those present were 'the masters of the Government'—the leaders of the British Press. And so he invited Mr. Hopkins to speak to us.

Hopkins rose, looking lean, shy and untidy, grasping the back of his chair, and he continued to look shy throughout his speech.

His words were private, so no notes were taken. But if it had been possible to record the sentences that came quietly and diffidently from the lips of Harry Hopkins they would have compared well for nobility of expression with the splendid oration which Mr. Roosevelt had delivered two days earlier when he was sworn in for the third time as President of the United States.

Not that Hopkins repeated or even echoed the President's speech. He talked in more intimate terms. Where the President had spoken of

America's duty to the world, Hopkins told us how the President and those around him were convinced that America's world duty could be successfully performed only in partnership with Britain. He told us of the anxiety and admiration with which every phase of Britain's lonely struggle was watched from the White House, and of his own emotions as he travelled through our blitzed land. His speech left us with the feeling that although America was not yet in the war, she was marching beside us, and that should we stumble she would see we did not fall. Above all, he convinced us that the President and the men about him blazed with faith in the future of Democracy.

In addition to addressing us as a whole, Hopkins, encouraged by Beaverbrook, went on a slow journey around the table, pulling up a chair alongside the editors and managers of various newspapers and talking to them individually. He astonished us all, Right, Left and Centre, by his grasp of our newspapers' separate policies and problems.

We went away content—Hopkins to bed; Beaverbrook to his desk at the Ministry of Aircraft Production to read the night's reports and prepare orders for his factory managers on the morrow; the rest of us to our offices, to find that production had gone forward well in the evening blessedly free from the crash of bombs or the smell of burning buildings.

Many a tragic and terrible chapter was to be added to our country's history before our prayers were answered and our efforts rewarded. None of us British journalists who had been listening to the man from the White House was in any illusion about the peril which encompassed our island. But we were happy men all; our confidence and our courage had been stimulated by a contact for which Shakespeare, in *Henry V*, had a phrase: 'A little touch of Harry in the night'.

A footnote to this is provided in a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to General Watson for the President's information. It seemed there were F.B.I. men in Claridge's that evening. Hoover wrote:

At the conclusion of the dinner it appeared from facial expressions that all the guests were quite happy as the result of the dinner and discussions. Small groups of them stopped in the coffee-room, where representatives of this Bureau were seated at the moment, and the gist of the conversations related to the very charming manner of Mr. Hopkins, his keen insight into current problems and the very remarkable fact that he combined a very charming but almost shy personality with a very vigorous and dynamic mentality. In no instance was any unfavourable comment made and the entire gist of their conversations relative to Mr. Hopkins was positive and commendatory.

It delighted Roosevelt to know that the G-men were checking up on his personal representative.

Although Hopkins had paid his respects at Buckingham Palace shortly after his arrival, he did not have an opportunity for a real talk with the King and Queen until two weeks later. His description of this meeting follows:

January 30, 1941

I had lunch with Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace today. Sir Alan Lascelles and the Equerry in Waiting greeted me at the door and took me through the long, cold, narrow, windowless passages to the King's office, where apparently he meets all his visitors.

First the King and then the Queen came in. We chatted a moment about inconsequential things and the King then asked me about my trip to Scapa Flow with Halifax, and I told him details of the amusing incidents including the firing of the U.P. gun, and about the bomb landing five feet from me instead of on the enemy. He told me that the Prime Minister had failed to tell him of this incident. I told the King the reason for that was that the Prime Minister didn't think it was funny and I did!

The three of us had lunch together in the next room. We discussed at great length their visit to America a year ago last May, and it was perfectly clear that the President made a great impression on both of them.

I told the King how much the President enjoyed meeting them, how dear his friendship was to him personally, and how great his pleasure was in receiving personal messages from the King. I urged the King, whenever he was of a mind, to send the President appropriate personal notes because I believed that that was one of the ways to keep our two countries closely related during these trying times.

The Queen told me that she found it extremely difficult to find words to express her feeling towards the people of Britain in these days. She thought their actions were magnificent and that victory in the long run was sure, but that the one thing that counted was the morale and determination of the great mass of the British people.

The King discussed the navy and the fleet at some length and showed an intimate knowledge of all the high-ranking officers of the navy, and for that matter, of the army and air force. It was perfectly clear from his remarks that he reads very carefully all the important dispatches and, among other things, was quite familiar with a dispatch which I had sent Sunday night through the Foreign Office.

He thinks very highly of the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces and, as with everybody else, has great confidence in Churchill. He discussed quite freely with me the great difficulties this country would have if anything should happen to Churchill.

If ever two people realized that Britain is fighting for its life it is these two. They realize fully that this conflict is different from the other conflicts in Britain's history and that if Hitler wins they and the British people will be enslaved for years to come.

The Queen told an amusing story about going to Church with Mrs. Roosevelt senior and the President. It appears that the old lady dropped her Prayer Book over and over again and the Queen had to pick it up. This was no sooner done than she would drop her handkerchief. Eventually the Prayer Book went over the bench and there was nothing further that could be done. The Queen had been amused at the fact that the Rector of the Church had urged the parishioners to come to Church even when such distinguished visitors were not present.

The King talked at great length about the President and his obvious deep interest in the defeat of Hitler.

The air-raid alarm had gone off just as we sat down to lunch, and as we reached coffee and port the bell rang in the Palace and the King said, 'That means we have got to go to the air raid shelter', so we immediately walked down two or three flights of stairs, through a dark hallway led by a guard, through several doors and finally landed in a small lighted room with a table and chairs.

We talked in the shelter for an hour longer about Washington and America's relationship to the war. The Queen urged the King to take the time to write to the President as frequently as he could, and said on her part she was going to continue to write to Mrs. Roosevelt.

He asked about Mr. Willkie and his visit, and seemed greatly pleased that I was sure Mr. Willkie and the President would see eye to eye in regard to the President's foreign policy.

He told me the story of Queen Wilhelmina's escape from Holland. It seems she had, after some urging, asked for fighter planes, which could not be sent, but the British Government instead sent a destroyer. She was refusing to leave Holland and took the destroyer in order to get to Flushing. The commander of the destroyer could not get into Flushing and told the Queen there was nothing to do but go to a British port, which she did. She got to Buckingham Palace at five o'clock in the afternoon wearing a tin hat given her by the commander of the destroyer. The Queen said she was a fine courageous woman, and it was perfectly clear from this conversation that she arrived in England entirely by accident and not by intent on her own part.

I told the King the story about the Belgian King, and of Queen Wilhelmina's desire that the President send a message to him. He expressed a good deal of sympathy with the King of the Belgians. It was perfectly clear that he felt that the King had had two responsibilities—

one as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army and the other his job as King, and that he had got the two jobs mixed up. He apparently had little or no criticism of him as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but as King he thought he should have left the country and established his Government elsewhere.

The Queen said she felt Hitler and the German people were a pretty cruel lot and realized they would have no mercy on them; that she liked the fact that the British people did not seem to have much hatred in their hearts but rather determination to resist to the end. She seemed to have a wide acquaintance with British politics and affairs and showed great interest in all I had to tell her about my trips throughout the country particularly my visit to Glasgow. . . .

The King expressed the great hope that somehow the President and Churchill could get together personally in the near future. He believed that it might be arranged.

When I emphasized the President's great determination to defeat Hitler, his deep conviction that Britain and America had a mutuality of interest in this respect, and that they could depend upon aid from America, they were both very deeply moved.

The Queen asked particularly about Diana and told me to be sure to give her her love. She, too, wished to be remembered warmly to Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt. The King on his part told me how greatly he appreciated the President's speeches and said he was sure from the last visit that he knew what was deeply embedded in the President's mind. He told me to tell the President how much beloved he was by the people of Britain and asked that I give to the President his warmest expressions of thanks and appreciation and a personal word of friendship.

I have made some deliberate deletions in the foregoing document relating largely to the British political scene. None of the material deleted was concerned with President Roosevelt or U.S. Government policy or problems. The same applies to the following document, in which I have made one deletion of a passage concerned solely with Norwegian matters:

January 30, 1941

I saw the King of Norway this morning at his house, the Norwegian Embassy, 10 Palace Green, Kensington, W.8. Dr. Benes, the former President of Czechoslovakia, was just coming out. I just had a chance to shake hands with him.

The King told me something of his flight from Norway and mentioned the fact that it was impossible for women and children to follow him, and that is why he ordered the Crown Princess and her two children to leave and go into Sweden. The same thing applied to Mrs. Harriman,

who he was sure could not stand the arduousness of the retreat and he asked that she, too, leave for Sweden. He seemed to have a very warm feeling in his heart for Mrs. Harriman.

The King was a tall man and spoke very vigorously and in perfect English. He deprecated his own part in the whole affair and said that Norway could not have resisted unless the Norwegian people had wished to resist and without their support he could never be carrying on a Government here. He said he tried to impress on the 30,000 sailors of the merchant marine that they were not working for their employers but really working for the rehabilitation of Norway.

He expressed great appreciation of the kindness of the British Government and his very high regard for the spirit of the British people.

He asked me to give the President his warmest thanks not only for his kindness to his family, but for the warm sympathy which America had for Norway.

When Roosevelt had first announced the Hopkins mission at a Press conference he said that the trip would last no more than two weeks. It lasted nearly six weeks. Hopkins wanted to stay on and the President cabled him permission to do so, adding, 'Do get some sleep!' Roosevelt told Hopkins to inform the former naval person that he hoped for action on the Lend Lease Bill some time between February 20 and March 1, but that he had made arrangements to enable nearly all the British orders to go through in the meantime. He said that the general situation in the United States was very encouraging, and wished Hopkins the best of luck. January 30 was Roosevelt's fifty-ninth birthday and Hopkins cabled that he wished he could be with him for the Annual Dinner of the Cuff Links Gang, but that, even though absent, he could be counted on at the proper moment to raise his glass and drink to the long life and good health of the President of the United States.

Hopkins spent three week-ends with Churchill at Chequers and one with Beaverbrook at his place, Cherkley, near Leatherhead. Churchill invited Hopkins for this one, too, but Willkie was also to be there, and Hopkins felt (probably correctly) that Willkie would prefer not to have him present when he was engaging in intimate talks with Churchill. There is record of only one meeting of Hopkins and Willkie in London, reported in a cable to the President:

Last night I saw Wendell Willkie. He told me that he believes the opposition to Lend Lease is going to be vehemently expressed and it should not be under-rated under any circumstances. It is his belief that the main campaign against the Bill will be directed from Chicago and heavily financed. As perhaps he told you it is his opinion that Herbert

Hoover is the real brains behind this opposition. Willkie said he hoped that you would make a radio speech, preferably from Chicago, and thereby take your case right to the people. He said that he himself might make some speeches after he returns home in about two weeks. He said that he approved the Bill with some amendments, but did not specify what they were. He is receiving all the attentions which the British know so well how to provide for distinguished guests. I shall have further observations to make on Willkie's visit here when I see you.

Hopkins had imagined that life in England was fraught with hardship as well as danger during the blitz and he was surprised at the amount of comfort which he at least enjoyed. He discovered, as did thousands of other Americans who were to come to London in the next five years, that living conditions in Claridge's could hardly be described as 'rugged'. Most of the other London hotels had, of necessity, deteriorated in service and conspicuously in the quality of food. But Claridge's had some sort of official status. Being just around the corner from the American Embassy and Grosvenor Square (later known as 'Eisenhowerplatz'), it was usually housing one or more American missions as well as all varieties of royalty in exile and Allied military leaders, and even, now and then, a few fortunate natives. Its service was of pre-war standard and the meals served in the rooms were much more interesting though no more nourishing than the ordinary English fare. Hopkins questioned the waiters about this, asking them to tell him in detail what their families had to eat at home. They were glad to tell him, and they found the former W.P.A. Administrator quick to understand. One of the waiters, Wilfred Harold Hall, told me: 'Mr. Hopkins was very genial—considerate—if I may say so, lovable—quite different from other ambassadors we've had here.' Hopkins awoke at 7.30 a.m., and his standard breakfast order was 'Coffee, toast and whatever you've got in the way of fruit', which generally turned out to be a sour compote of plums. Hopkins received gifts of such rare items as eggs (ordinarily the ration of eggs was one or two a month) from friends who had country places, but he generally gave these away to the staff. He wanted to be scrupulous in avoiding special privileges, but that was obviously impossible.

His room was always a mess, with papers, some of them highly secret, littered about. He had not yet learned the meaning of that awesome word 'Security', and he caused plenty of alarm in the staff of the Embassy and the F.B.I. men, and, no doubt, among the British, who make it a point to watch such things. The hotel valets, when they could persuade him to part with a wrinkled suit for pressing, often found the pockets stuffed with secret papers, as well as his wallet and passport, which he had forgotten. (There was a story in Washington during the war that Hopkins once kept an unopened

cable from Stalin in the pocket of his old bathrobe for three weeks, but that unfortunately is apocryphal.) One Claridge valet, Albert Perry, told me that he always tried to be on hand when Mr. Hopkins was going out, so that he could straighten his collar and tie. Hopkins accepted these ministrations meekly, saying: 'Oh, yes—I've got to remember I'm in London now—I've got to look dignified.' Another valet, James Denyer, learning early in the morning that Hopkins would not be leaving the hotel before lunch-time, swiped his old felt hat and made an unsuccessful attempt to steam it and block it into some semblance of shape.

The only real hardship that Hopkins experienced in living conditions in England was at Chequers, the official country seat of Prime Ministers. Hopkins voted that the coldest house he had ever visited. Although Churchill seemed to thrive there in his siren suit, Hopkins seldom took his overcoat off. His favourite haunt was the downstairs bathroom, the only room where the 'central heating' was detectable. He would go there and sit reading newspapers and dispatches; but he wore his overcoat even there. He was enormously popular with his British hosts, who like Americans best when they are making the least effort to be anything else. Hopkins naturally and easily conformed to the essential Benjamin Franklin tradition of American diplomacy, acting on the conviction that when an American representative approaches his opposite numbers in friendly countries with the standard striped-trousers frigidity, the strict observance of protocol and the amenities, and a studied air of lip-curling suspicion, he is not really representing America—not, at any rate, the America of which Franklin D. Roosevelt was President. Hopkins's approach to Britain in the blitz was fundamentally the same as his approach to Southern Illinois in the great flood or to the Connecticut coast in the hurricane; all he knew was that here were human beings, friends of ours, who were in trouble, and it was his job to find out what they needed and to get it for them. He had the same essential attitude when he went to Moscow in July 1941.

He wrote this record of one week-end at Chequers:

This morning I have awakened on a cold, dreary morning—and the formal garden of this lovely old place seems very unhappy under the onslaughts of wind and snow and cold. I have just finished my breakfast in bed—of kidney and bacon and prunes—the papers have been read telling of Halifax's arrival and the President's personal welcome. This will please the P.M. no end.

I have just read the amazing document given to me last night. It is a war cabinet document of 17 pages printed on light green paper—8 x 14—and contains the principal telegrams relating to operations in the Middle East exchanged between the Prime Minister of the Defence and the

Commander in Chief, Middle East, together with certain telegrams from Secretary of State for War and the Chiefs of Staff. It includes the general directives to Wavell written by the P.M.—laying the Middle East campaign out in detail. When you realize that this directive was written and indeed ordered in September 1940—whilst Britain was fighting for her life—it gives some indication of Churchill's boldness—daring and determination. Italy invades Greece—precious planes must be taken away to bolster the Greeks—and guns too—but the P.M. ever urging Wavell to press on—planes desperately needed in England rushed to Wavell's support by the P.M.'s insistent orders—the P.M. impatient—prodding Wavell—but ever giving him his confident support—but Greece must be supported for political reasons and Wavell grudgingly agrees, for these are explicit orders from the Minister of Defence—but the 'Compass' has been made and the personal though authoritative telegrams show the ever increasing pressure on Italy.

Dec. 18 '40. P.M. to Wavell

'St. Matthew, Chapter 7, Verse 7—the verse reads "Ask, and it shall be given to you; seek, and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you."'

Dec. 19. Wavell to P.M.

'St. James, Chap. 1, Verse 17—first part. More aircraft our immediate need. The verse reads "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."'

A few days later Hopkins filed by cable his full report to the President. It took up some thirty pages of cable forms mostly devoted to details of British requirements. He said:

In the two weeks since my arrival in England I have spent twelve evenings with Mr. Churchill and I have explored every aspect of our mutual problems with him. I have also had extended conferences with all the Cabinet Ministers and most of the Undersecretaries. I have had long and detailed conferences with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, and with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, and with the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, and with the Chiefs of the Fighter and Bomber Commands. I have visited Scapa Flow and the Coast Defences at Dover and various cities and towns and airfields. They have given me complete access to all confidential material which is concerned with my mission here. I believe that insofar as it is possible to get a picture of the situation here in a short time, I have got a reasonably clear perception not only of the physical defences of Britain, but of the

opinions of the men who are directing the forces of this nation. Your 'former Navy person' is not only the Prime Minister, he is the directing force behind the strategy and the conduct of the war in all its essentials. He has an amazing hold on the British people of all classes and groups. He has particular strength both with the military establishments and the working people. The most important single observation I have to make is that most of the Cabinet and all of the military leaders here believe that invasion is imminent. They are straining every effort night and day to meet this. They believe that it may come at any moment, but not later than May 1. They believe that it will certainly be an all-out attack, including the use of poison gas and perhaps some other new weapons that Germany may have developed. The spirit of this people and their determination to resist invasion is beyond praise. No matter how fierce the attack may be you can be sure that they will resist it, and effectively. The Germans will have to do more than kill a few hundred thousand people here before they can defeat Britain. I therefore cannot urge too strongly that any action you may take to meet the immediate needs here must be based on the assumption that invasion will come before May 1. If Germany fails to win this invasion then I believe her sun is set. I am convinced that if we act boldly and promptly on a few major fronts we can get enough material to Britain within the next few weeks to give her the additional strength she needs to turn back Hitler . . . I read in the papers that you are sick in bed with flu. You can be sure there are many people here who hope as I do that you will take good care of yourself.

In the remaining cables Hopkins stated Britain's specific requirements and made his recommendations for meeting them. When Herschel Johnson read these cables as they passed over his desk in the Embassy he was amazed by the accuracy of Hopkins's reports, and even more by his disregard for the taboos of isolationism. Hopkins later drew up the following memorandum for the President, summarizing his recommendations for aid to Britain:

(1) 10 destroyers a month beginning April 1st. Destroyers to be reconditioned in the United States—reconditioning to begin immediately.

(2) The urgent need of more merchant shipping at once. British cannot wait until new ships are built.

(3) 50 PBV planes in addition to the PBVs which the British are receiving on their own account; fully equipped with radio, depth charges, bombs, guns, and ammunition. Adequate operating spares supplies. Urgent need for crews.

(4) There are 29 engineless Lockheed planes in England. They need 58 Wright 1820 engines at once.

(5) There are 100 Curtiss Tomahawks without propellers in England. 764 fifty-calibre and 1,000 thirty-calibre machine-guns required to complete armament. Curtiss Tomahawks already in England.

(6) Consideration to be given immediately to the replacement of fifty-calibre guns manufactured by Colt which are unsatisfactory with the same gun which has already been manufactured by our own arsenals.

(7) 20 million rounds of fifty-calibre ammunition and as many extra fifty-calibre gun barrels as are available urgently needed.

(8) The maximum number of B-17, BS C's or D's in addition to the 20 already agreed upon to be sent to England immediately. Planes should be sent completely ready for immediate operation, including spare parts, bombs, and ammunition. Crews urgently needed.

(9) Transfer to the British 200 North American Harvards or Vultee Valiants trainers in excess of all present deliveries.

(10) At least 5 additional civilian flying training schools completely equipped.

(11) Work out plan to ferry bombers to England. This would release nearly 800 British R.A.F. personnel.

(12) 250,000 Enfield rifles and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition have been sent.

(13) Give priority to tools for the manufacture of point 303 rifles for the British. Same applies to 303 ammunition.

(14) Send 80 trained observers—half from the factories and half from the Army and Navy—to acquaint Britain with the use of our planes.

Hopkins had further talks with Eden concerning German infiltration in the Balkans which led to the attacks later on Yugoslavia and Greece. Eden reported that 'Donovan has been very helpful'. (Colonel, later General, William J. Donovan was then on a confidential mission to the Balkans.) He predicted that 'Winant's appointment will be received here very warmly'. After a meeting with Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Orme Sargent, and Johnson, Hopkins cabled:

Eden told me that he had had a stiff conversation with the Japanese Ambassador here in London yesterday in which he took a very strong line, the main point being that he was asking the Japanese to state what were their real intentions. He informed the Ambassador that the British Government intended to stand for no nonsense in the Far East and British interests there would be protected to the limit if they were attacked. Eden has cabled Halifax about this. He and his colleagues from the foreign office reviewed at length all of the various moves major and minor which they think Japan is making. Eden believes that the Japanese consider the presence of our fleet at Pearl Harbour to be purely a routine matter. He

is very anxious that we find a way to emphasize our determination to prevent Japan from making further encroachments. He believes that if we take a positive line towards Japan we might make them pause before attacking Hong Kong. I want to emphasize to you the British belief that Japan, under the influence of Germany, is considering making a positive move against British territory in the near future. Eden fears that Japan would be able at least for the time being to cut off the transport route around the Cape from their Thailand bases. From the same bases they could also cut off the route from the Eastern Mediterranean to Australia and New Zealand. Eden believes that a recent temporary blocking of the Suez Canal was a German move to impress the Japanese with their ability to close the Canal.

It seems strange that there was apparently little or no discussion of the Soviet Union as a potential factor during the first Hopkins visit to London, although by then the U.S. Government was in possession of intelligence (which it communicated to the British and Russians) indicating strongly that the direction of Hitler's next major drive would be eastward, and Churchill in a broadcast at the time said: 'In order to win the war Hitler must destroy Great Britain. He may carry havoc into the Balkan states; he may tear great provinces out of Russia; he may march to the Caspian; he may march to the gates of India.'

In a note written later Hopkins revealed more of his conversation with Eden than he cared to put in a cable which must necessarily pass through various hands in the Embassy and the State Department before it reached the President:

Eden asked me repeatedly what our country would do if Japan attacked Singapore or the Dutch East Indies, saying it was essential to their policy to know. Of course, it was perfectly clear that neither the President nor Hull could give an adequate answer to the British on that point because the declaration of war is up to Congress, and the isolationists and, indeed, a great part of the American people, would not be interested in a war in the Far East merely because Japan attacked the Dutch.

These urgent questions by the British as to American intentions in the event of further Japanese aggression in the Far East were repeated many times during subsequent months, but they remained unanswered until the day of Pearl Harbour.

At the conclusion of his extended series of cables to Roosevelt, Hopkins summed up as follows:

I believe that I have in no way overstated Britain's need. In fact, the cable provides an altogether inadequate means of expressing the deter-

mination of the British to defend this island and finally to win this war. It has been emphasized more than ever in my mind that Churchill is leading this country magnificently in every respect and that the whole nation is behind him. I hesitate to urge you in matters about which I know you are already convinced, or to presume to advise you since you have seen the needs here far more clearly than anyone else in the United States. But I feel sure that there has been no time in your administration when the actions that you have taken and the words that you have spoken have meant so much to the cause of freedom. Your decisive action now can mean the difference between defeat and victory in this country.

Because of the very nature of his assignment in England, Hopkins's associations were almost entirely on the higher official levels; he had little opportunity to move about freely, as it would have been his natural inclination to do, and talk to the people themselves. (Willkie was notably successful in doing that and received a great deal of publicity which was far more valuable to Britain than to himself.) On at least one occasion Hopkins managed to get out and walk the streets at night during an air raid, and when a German bomb was falling near at hand he was pushed flat on his face in the gutter by an experienced companion.

However, if he did not get to meet the people face to face, he had a very large number of letters which must have reminded him of the type of mail that flowed into W.P.A. headquarters. There were letters asking him whether he was related to the Hopkinses of Somersetshire; letters describing new weapons that would win the war between dawn and dusk; letters complaining that the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was not doing enough to protect dogs and cats during air raids; letters enclosing stamps for President Roosevelt's collection and appeals to Mrs. Roosevelt to send over some warm clothes for the children; there were invitations to visit 'an average English home' and to address this or that local group on the subject of social progress; there was one letter which declared defiantly that England would never be victimized by the bloodstained American dollar, and one from the 93-year-old widow of an American Civil War veteran who complained that her pension checks were being lost at sea through U-boat action and would Mr. Hopkins please look the matter up on his return to Washington? Lady Astor sent him a brisk message, inviting him for a week-end at Cliveden, informing him that he had been making great mistakes in the selection of people that he had seen and assuring him that she could provide much better company than he had picked up thus far. (He had to decline this invitation.)

On Saturday, February 8, Hopkins went to Chequers to say good-bye to the Churchill family. They had received word that day that the House of

Representatives had passed the Lend Lease Bill by a vote of 260 to 165. The Prime Minister was working on a speech which he was to broadcast the following evening to the entire world, but with American public opinion the principal target. This was to be Churchill's contribution to the Lend Lease debate in the Senate and he consulted Hopkins on many of its points. There was by now an intimacy between the two men which developed to such a degree that it is no exaggeration to say that Churchill reposed the same confidence in Hopkins that Roosevelt did. In the lengthy discussions of this important speech Hopkins was fascinated to observe Churchill's methods of speech preparation, which were very different from Roosevelt's. Trained to think on his feet by his forty years of give-and-take debate in the House of Commons, he usually dictated his speeches pacing up and down, acting out his points as though his audience were already there, sometimes keeping at it for hours, occasionally referring to notes that he had been making in preceding days or weeks, but most of the time carrying the material in his head. To Hopkins it was an astonishing performance.

When Hopkins left Chequers late on Saturday night he took a special train to Bournemouth. He was accompanied again by Brendan Bracken and Commander Thompson, representing the Prime Minister, and by a British security officer, Lieutenant Anthony McComas, who travelled all the way to Washington with him to carry and safeguard his voluminous papers. Hopkins had by now learned something of security and wished to take no chances of leaving vital documents lying around a room in the Hotel Aziz in spy-infested Lisbon. For he was going back by no means empty-handed; the British had turned over to him some of their most important technical secrets which were now made available to the U.S. armed forces.

In a cable to Roosevelt, Churchill said that Hopkins had been 'a great comfort and encouragement to everyone he has met. One can easily see why he is so close to you.'

Arriving in Bournemouth on Sunday morning Hopkins found that weather conditions prevented a flight to Lisbon that day. He made use of extra time by visiting two Government officials who lived in the neighbourhood: Colonel J. J. Llewellyn, who was Beaverbrook's Parliamentary Secretary and later his successor as Minister of Aircraft Production, and Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. The Cranbornes told Hopkins that their son, a lieutenant in the Grenadier Guards, was stationed nearby (waiting for the German invasion), so, early the next morning, before his airplane took off, Hopkins went to visit him, and was called upon to make an after-breakfast speech to the Guardsmen.

On Sunday evening, in the lounge of the Branksome Tower Hotel, Hopkins, Bracken, and the rest listened to the broadcast of Churchill's famous 'give us the tools and we'll finish the job' speech which Hopkins had

seen in preparation the day before. In that speech Churchill said: 'It seems now to be certain that the Government and people of the United States intend to supply us with all that is necessary for victory. In the last war the United States sent two million men across the Atlantic. *But this is not a war of vast armies, firing immense masses of shells at one another.* We do not need the gallant armies which are forming throughout the American Union. We do not need them this year, nor next year; nor any year that I can foresee.'

Some suspicious persons considered that statement the ultimate in insincerity. But the sentence which I have italicized represented another expression of Churchill's profound conviction, and he stuck to it in the years that followed Pearl Harbour and throughout the protracted and sometimes bitter arguments over General Marshall's plan to end the war in Europe by a frontal attack against the German armies in the West. It was most certainly no fault of Churchill's that two American Expeditionary Forces went into France, North and South, in the summer of 1944.

Hopkins travelled back by way of the new Clipper route—from Lisbon to Bolama in Portuguese Guinea on the West Coast of Africa and thence to Brazil and north over the Caribbean. This was the first air route linking the four continents; its establishment was the first pioneering move toward exploitation of one of the most vital strategic lines of communication in the Second World War—the route across the South Atlantic at its narrowest, across Africa to the Persian Gulf and thence to the Soviet Union or to India and the Far East, with spur lines via North Africa to the United Kingdom or to points in the Mediterranean basin. This was the network of air lanes that Roosevelt was determined to control before Hitler could, for they were all two-way streets.

When he arrived in New York, Hopkins had a talk with the new Ambassador, John G. Winant, who was about to fly to take up his post in London. Winant did not need to be told that he faced one of the most difficult jobs ever undertaken, involving dangers far worse than those presented incidentally by the German bombs. He approached that job with eager enthusiasm and altruism and the quiet courage which distinguished him to the tragic end of his life.

Back in the White House, Hopkins brought forth among his souvenirs a bottle of pills Churchill had given him with the assurance that he himself took them frequently and found them very bracing. Roosevelt asked what was in them, and when Hopkins said he hadn't the faintest idea, ordered that some of them be given to Dr. McIntire for analysis. The analysis was duly sent to Hopkins from the Naval Medical Centre, and he noted: 'I am told by the Navy that the whole prescription is a conglomeration of everything that couldn't do anybody much harm. It couldn't possibly do them very much good, either.'

Hopkins told Roosevelt that just about the most difficult problem he had to face in England was explaining our Constitutional provision that only Congress can declare war. Churchill understood this—perhaps he had learned it at his mother's knee—but there were others of eminent rank in the British Government who couldn't seem to get it through their heads. 'But surely,' they would say, 'your President understands the situation. He is the leader of Congress. Surely, they will loyally follow him if he says that the time has come for the United States to enter the war.'

Despite all the explanations given by Hopkins—and, after him, by Winant, Harriman, and other Americans—there persisted the belief in London that Roosevelt would have the United States in the war by May 1. This strange misapprehension may have been due in part to the prediction made by Willkie, as part of his 'campaign oratory', that if Roosevelt were re-elected we would be at war in April. It may also have been due to the eternal conviction that history repeats itself: there was the vivid memory of the Democratic party's campaign slogan of 1916, 'He kept us out of war', and of Woodrow Wilson's contradictory action the following April.

Had those who nourished their morale with this wishful thinking been familiar with Roosevelt's real character, they would have known that the last thing he wanted to do was repeat any of the history of the First World War or of the phony peace that followed it.

THE COMMON-LAW ALLIANCE

ALTHOUGH debate over the Lend Lease Bill created considerable uproar for two months—and although so distinguished a citizen as President Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago predicted that with its passage ‘the American people are about to commit suicide’—there was little serious argument over the essential principle of giving aid to Britain, Greece or China. The big sticking-point was over the provision that Lend Lease could be extended to ‘any country whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the United States’. That put the decision entirely in the President’s hands; it meant that, if he so decided (as he eventually did), aid could be rendered to the Soviet Union. That was what the isolationists feared most; even those who grudgingly conceded that perhaps Britain might be deserving of some charity were horrified at the thought that American taxpayers might be called upon to pay for supplies for the Red Army. There was a determined fight on this provision, and some of Roosevelt’s more timid friends urged him to compromise on terms that would exclude the Soviet Union; but he was firm on this point, for it then seemed possible if not probable that Russia would be attacked by Germany or Japan or both and would be desperately in need of American help. The Administration leaders in the Senate, of whom James F. Byrnes was the most vigorous and the shrewdest strategist, waged the battle on the President’s lines, and on Saturday night, March 8, the Bill finally passed the upper house by a vote of sixty to thirty-one. This was an historic victory for Roosevelt. Churchill called it ‘The Third Climacteric’ of the Second World War. (The first two were the fall of France and the Battle of Britain, the fourth was the attack on Russia, and the fifth Pearl Harbour.) When word of the vote was sent from the Capitol to the White House, Hopkins immediately picked up the telephone and put through a call to Chequers. Due to the time difference, it was past even Churchill’s bedtime. Hopkins spoke to one of the Secretaries, who said the Prime Minister was asleep and should he be awakened? Hopkins said never mind—to give him the report of the Senate vote in the morning. When he got it Churchill immediately cabled Hopkins: ‘The strain has been serious, so thank God for your news.’

A few days later Hopkins wrote Churchill:

I seem to have had no opportunity to write letters since I returned, because of a multitude of things that have interfered. This note is just to tell you how greatly I appreciate the many courtesies which you and Mrs. Churchill showed me while in England. I shall ever be grateful to you for your many kindnesses to me.

I am going off with the President on a short trip in the South. I hope by the time we get back the appropriation bill will have been signed. In the meantime, I have worked out a scheme with Purvis last night which will keep your orders moving. I have agreed to take on, in behalf of the President, a responsibility here for the promotion of the whole of our aid to Britain programme and I am trying to avoid getting my mind cluttered up with any other problems. I am sure the country is behind the President and I have great hopes of our ability to be of very genuine help to you.

It looks very much as though we are going to get four million tons of brand-new shipping out of the Maritime Commission, and I have high hopes on other fronts which are a bit premature to discuss now. The President is in good spirits and ever so determined.

I have seen Lord Halifax several times and I am in daily touch with your Purchasing Commission. Under my new responsibilities, all British purchasing requests are now routed through me.

Morgenthau, Stimson and Knox and Hull are a tower of strength and you and your country have innumerable friends here.

I find my thoughts constantly with you in the desperate struggle which I am sure is going to result, in the last analysis, in your victory.

Do remember me ever so cordially to Mrs. Churchill and Mary. I hope to send you some victrola records in a few days and am on the trail of a Stilton cheese.

The day after Roosevelt signed the Lend Lease Bill I had dinner with him and Hopkins and Missy Le Hand off a card table in the Oval Study. As usual, the talk was wildly irrelevant. After dinner Hopkins went to his room to work and Toie Bachelder came in to take dictation for the speech the President was to give at the dinner of the White House Correspondents' Association the following Saturday. He had his speech folder in his lap and he started going through it, searching for clippings that he had saved for this opportunity. He had been enormously cheerful at dinner, but now he seemed to have changed to one of his combative moods. He said to me: 'I'm going to get really tough in this one. There have been so many lies going around about this Aid-for-the-Democracies Bill' (that's what he called it then) 'and so many deliberate attempts to scare the people that they have got the main issue all confused. I couldn't answer all these lies while the Bill was still being debated. But now I'm really going to hand it to them.'

He then started to dictate, referring constantly to the clippings, dragging out one after another of the vicious charges that had been flung about so recklessly in the Congress and in the Press during the past months. It was one of the most scathing, most vindictive speeches I have ever heard. He never mentioned a newspaper or an individual by name—it was always 'a certain

columnist' or 'a certain Senator' or 'certain Republican orators'. After an hour or so he grew weary of it, and I said good night and went to talk to Hopkins, to tell him the nature of the dictated material and to confess that it made me feel very depressed. I thought it was a terrible mistake for the President to take that petulant tone. Now, it seemed to me, in the hour of his great triumph, it would be in character for him to be magnanimous, and reassert his faith in the wisdom and the courage of the people who had accepted the revolutionary doctrine of Lend Lease. Hopkins listened to me and then said sharply: 'You ought to know that is precisely what he will do. He has no intention of using all that irritable stuff you say he dictated. He's just getting it off his chest. It has been rankling all this time and now he's rid of it. He probably feels a lot better for it and he'll have a fine sleep.' Hopkins then spoke in a way that was very unusual for him: 'You and I are for Roosevelt because he's a great spiritual figure, because he's an idealist, like Wilson, and he's got the guts to drive through against any opposition to realize those ideals. Oh—he sometimes tries to appear tough and cynical and flippant, but that's an act he likes to put on, especially at Press conferences. He wants to make the boys think he's hard-boiled. Maybe he fools some of them, now and then—but don't ever let him fool you, or you won't be any use to him. You can see the real Roosevelt when he comes out with something like the Four Freedoms. And don't get the idea that those are any catch phrases. *He believes them!* He believes they can be practically attained. That's what you and I have got to remember in everything we may be able to do for him. Oh—there are a lot of small people in this town who are constantly trying to cut him down to their size, and sometimes they have some influence. But it's your job and it's mine—as long as we're around here—to keep reminding him that he's *unlimited*, and that's the way he's got to talk, because that's the way he's going to act. Maybe we'll make ourselves unpopular now and then—but not in the long run, because he knows what he really is, even if he doesn't like to admit it to you or me or anybody.'

I don't think that the President ever referred again to the draft he had dictated that evening. On the final day of preparation of the speech we were having lunch off trays in the Cabinet Room—it was corned beef hash with poached egg, followed by chocolate pudding—and Hopkins suggested that, since Churchill had made so many respectful references to Roosevelt in his speeches, perhaps the President might care to mention him. So Roosevelt dictated: 'In this historic crisis Britain is blessed with a brilliant leader in Winston Churchill.' He thought that over for a moment, then added: 'Make that "a brilliant and a *great* leader".'

In the speech as finally delivered Roosevelt spoke with an unusual amount of emotion in his voice. He was stirring because he himself seemed deeply stirred. There was no evidence of petty vindictiveness now. He started by

praising the co-operation given him throughout his years in office by his hosts, the Press correspondents. He spoke of the mistakes of the past and said: 'That is water over the dam. Do not let us waste time reviewing the past, or fixing or dodging the blame for it. We, the American people, are writing new history today.' He gave the British people the specific assurance for which they had been waiting, saying: 'The British people and their Grecian allies need ships. From America they will get ships. They need planes. From America they will get planes. They need food. From America they will get food. They need tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds. From America they will get tanks and guns and ammunition and supplies of all kinds.' (In the case of Greece, however, the Nazis got there before any of the American supplies did.)

Roosevelt designated Hopkins to 'advise and assist' him on Lend Lease, never formally gave him the title of Administrator. However, Hopkins performed that function. This was the first official Government post he had held since his resignation as Secretary of Commerce seven months previously. During that time he had actually been a private citizen with no title and no pay, except the *per diem* allowance on his trip to England. When Roosevelt announced that Hopkins was back on the public payroll he said that his role would be merely that of a 'bookkeeper', recording the various transactions and watching the balances, but exerting no authority over the allotment of funds. Roosevelt had said much the same thing about the nature of Hopkins's job when W.P.A. was started, and the analogy was even less accurate now than it had been then. The Lend Lease appointment brought Hopkins out of the shadows in which he had dwelt as a mysterious confidant and made him, in one huge area of authority, the *de facto* Deputy President. The nine billion dollars expended on relief appeared trivial by comparison with the budget for the new and revolutionary programme. Congress first appropriated seven billions for Lend Lease, and by the time Japan surrendered the appropriations had amounted to over sixty billions. Representative John W. Taber, the redoubtable Senior Minority Leader and later Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, roared in the Congress that this appointment was 'the worst blow the President has struck at national defence'. He said that Hopkins's record as Administrator of W.P.A. was 'the grossest record of incompetence of any of the notorious incompetence that this Administration has produced'.

Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner had this to say in their column:

Hopkins is a completely changed man. Before he went to London he was only just beginning to grasp the war picture, and was still an advocate of compromise and slow-motion action. As all major policy must be passed on at the White House, the White House is inevitably the major

bottleneck in the Government. Hopkins, living in the White House, always telling the President to go slow, was a major obstruction in the bottleneck. His only trouble was, however, that he had not come into sufficiently direct contact with the facts.

His trip to Britain was widely represented as political in purpose, and part of a grand international plot between British and American left-wingers. Actually, of his less than a month on British soil, he passed nearly three weeks living in the same house with Winston Churchill, who is hardly a leading left-winger. On many days, he started with Churchill at breakfast, and stayed with him until it was time for a last Churchillian cigar, a nightcap and a final chat about the day's events. Thus he formed an intense admiration for Churchill, the man. Thus also, he acquired a grasp of the war picture far more direct and complete than that of any other man in the President's entourage. Since his return to this country, far from being an obstruction in the White House bottleneck, he has shown a fuller sense of urgency, and has pushed affairs forward faster than most of his co-workers.

Hopkins was not, as Alsop and Kintner stated, a 'completely changed' man. He had been drastically reoriented, to be sure, but his method of attack on the manifold problems at hand was essentially that of the New Deal days. Now, instead of breadlines, droughts, floods or hurricanes, he was confronting the greatest disaster that had ever befallen the human race. Hopkins had to aid Roosevelt in promoting in the American people an entirely new conception of their responsibilities and their capabilities, and this was a job entirely congenial to one of his peculiar temperament. It was at this time that Secretary Stimson noted in his diary his thought that it is 'a Godsend that Harry Hopkins is at the White House'. Other Cabinet members felt differently.

Hopkins's position became more violently controversial than ever, for his activities cut across many lines of authority in Washington. Lend Lease involved not only war weapons, but merchant shipping, vehicles, food, fuel, industrial equipment, innumerable services, and, most importantly, much of the day-to-day business of diplomacy. This was when Hopkins became identified as 'Roosevelt's own personal Foreign Office'. It was obvious that Lend Lease should become the most vital element in the relations between the United States and all the Allied combatant nations and many neutrals as well, with the result that more and more foreign missions in Washington were conducting, or attempting to conduct, their most important business directly with Hopkins, thus bypassing the State Department. This was a development which, quite understandably, did not set well with Cordell Hull. The predicament was best demonstrated by the appointment of W. Averell Harriman as 'Expediter' of Lend Lease, with the rank of Minister, in London.

The Harriman Mission was housed in the Embassy in Grosvenor Square, but it was largely independent of Embassy authority and Harriman was able to report directly to Hopkins through naval communications rather than through the usual State Department channels. Although Winant and Harriman were good friends, neither of whom had become infected with the bureaucrat's occupational disease of jurisdictional jealousy, the situation between them became uncomfortably embarrassing. For, although Winant had the superior rank and the dignity and prestige—as well as the enormous affection of the British people—it was Harriman who had the principal, personal contacts with 10 Downing Street on the one hand and the White House on the other. Churchill left relations with Ambassadors largely to the Foreign Office, but Lend Lease was a matter of wartime life or death and came directly into his department as Minister of Defence. Furthermore, it was evident that Harriman was Hopkins's man, and thus provided an easy, direct and secure pipeline of communication.

There was started at this time correspondence without precedent: an informal, off-the-record but none-the-less official correspondence between the heads of two Governments through a third party, Hopkins, in whose discretion and judgment each had complete confidence. Time and again, when the Prime Minister wanted to sound out the President's views on some new move, he would address a private cable to Hopkins, saying, in effect: 'If you think well of it, perhaps you would ask our great friend for his opinion on the following proposal . . .' Hopkins, having consulted Roosevelt, might decide that he did not 'think well of it', and would reply that this did not seem an opportune moment to submit the proposal. Or, if it were approved, Hopkins would reply, 'It is felt here that you should go ahead with your proposal to . . .'

Since almost every message in this unique correspondence touched in some way on military estimates and plans, the Security authorities required that it must pass through military channels, the State Department codes being considered vulnerable. This applied to many of Winant's messages as well as Harriman's, and the Ambassador himself communicated more and more with Hopkins through Navy or Army or even sometimes British channels. Here again the State Department was bypassed, and it provided inadequate balm to Hull's pride to receive occasional polite notes from Hopkins enclosing copies of cables 'for your information'. It was all irregular, but so was the fundamental situation in which the United States Government found itself at that time.

The Webster's Dictionary definition of 'common-law marriage' is:

An agreement between a man and a woman to enter into the marriage relation without ecclesiastical or civil ceremony, such agreement being

provable by the writings, declarations, or conduct of the parties. In many jurisdictions it is not recognized.

That definition would seem to apply perfectly to the alliance which existed between the United States and Great Britain following the passage of Lend Lease. It was certainly 'not recognized' in such 'jurisdictions' as the Congress, and if the isolationists had known the full extent of it their demands for the impeachment of President Roosevelt would have been a great deal louder. But it was a fact of incalculable importance in the whole process of American preparedness for war. By the spring of 1941, six months before the United States entered the war, the following developments, among others, were in progress:

1. The exchange of scientific information—on all manner of subjects, including atomic energy and radar—had started with Sir Henry Tizard's Mission (approved by Roosevelt) to Washington in September, 1940. During his London trip Hopkins had urged much closer collaboration and fuller exchange in this field, and shortly after his return President James B. Conant of Harvard went to England as representative of Vannevar Bush's Research Council.

2. The pooling of Military Intelligence had started, largely through the efforts of General Marshall and his Assistant Chief of Staff, General George V. Strong. (The U.S. Navy remained for a long time reluctant to pool its own Intelligence with anyone, even with the U.S. Army.)

3. There was established, by Roosevelt's order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close co-operation between J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I. and British security services under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. The purpose of this was the detection and frustration of espionage and sabotage activities in the Western Hemisphere by agents of Germany, Italy and Japan, and also of Vichy France, Franco's Spain and, before Hitler turned eastward, the Soviet Union. It produced some remarkable results which were incalculably valuable, including the thwarting of attempted Nazi putsches in Bolivia, in the heart of South America, and in Panama. Hoover was later decorated by the British and Stephenson by the U.S. Government for exploits which could hardly be advertised at the time.

4. A steady stream of American military and civilian specialists, mostly technical, had started to England, to study British and instruct in American methods, and even to test the performance of American airplanes and other weapons under actual combat conditions. (For instance, the armament of the B-17 Flying Fortress was substantially increased as a result of its first encounters in 1941 with the Luftwaffe.)

5. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet was constantly being strengthened, with some new ships and some transferred from the Pacific, for the purpose of guarding

the sea lanes in the Western Atlantic and thereby relieving the British Navy of a large area of responsibility.

6. Plans were drawn up for the occupation by U.S. Forces of Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, and Martinique. (There were other plans for operations all over creation, but these were the nearest to fruition; in the cases of Greenland and Iceland, of course, they were carried out.)

7. Damaged British warships were repaired in American shipyards.

8. R.A.F. pilots and aircrews were trained in the U.S.

9. Most important of all—the first American-British staff talks had been instituted for the formation of joint Grand Strategy in the event of American entry into the war. These talks started on a purely exploratory basis in mid-August, 1940, when Marshall and Stark sent a mission, headed by Admiral Ghormley, General Delos C. Emmons (of the Air Corps), and General Strong, to London. They arrived in time to occupy front-row seats at the Battle of Britain and the blitz. Their principal function was to gain the fullest possible information as to Britain's strength and prospects, as well as estimates of German strength and intentions, the main purpose being, as Samuel Eliot Morison has pointed out, to avoid the disastrous mistakes made by the King of the Belgians the previous winter and spring, when, due to an overscrupulous regard for neutrality, he refused to conduct any conversations with British and French authorities on plans in the event of a German invasion of Belgium. In the midst of these London talks, on September 27, came the announcement of the signing of the Tripartite Treaty in Berlin, whereby Japan recognized German and Italian leadership in creating the 'New Order' in Europe and Germany and Italy recognized Japan's leadership in organizing the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. That presented so obvious a challenge to the United States that many of Roosevelt's advisers, among them Cordell Hull, urged that the Staff talks assume a more formal and constructive character; but an election was coming up, and charges were being made that Roosevelt was involving the nation in 'secret treaties', and he would not agree to any extension of the nebulous authority granted to the Ghormley-Emmons-Strong mission. Indeed, Roosevelt at that time did not even want to discuss any of the long-range plans for possible operations. He was too busy denying the reports that 'the boys are already on the transports'.

In mid-November Stark prepared a memorandum for Secretary Knox in which he stated as our major national objectives defence of the Western Hemisphere and 'prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies'. He believed that it would ultimately be necessary for America 'to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive'. In these tremendous matters Stark's thinking closely paralleled Marshall's, but it was

by no means typical of the Pacific-minded Navy point of view. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell wrote in a memorandum:

The following are considered the fundamentals of adequate national defence:


- (a) A navy and air force equal to that of any nation or coalition that threatens our security.
- (b) An army adequate to garrison outlying bases and to provide a highly mobile, fully equipped force of about 600,000 men, thoroughly trained in modern warfare. *We should never send an army of millions abroad in any future war.*


The navy and air force must be adequate to carry on offensive war in enemy waters. *The frontier must be the enemy coast.*

I have italicized two sentences in the above because they expressed a theory with which, I believe, Roosevelt agreed at that time—and so, in a way, did Churchill. Both of them thought in terms of the relentless application of superior sea power augmented by ever-increasing air power and both shied away from contemplation of masses of land forces coming into competition beyond the 'frontier' on the enemy coast.

Churchill's reasons for this were obvious: Britain could never hope to meet Germany on equal terms on land, therefore she must rely on (a) superior sea power, (b) comparable air power, (c) longer endurance due to superior moral strength, and (d) sharper wits. Roosevelt, representing a nation which could far outmatch Germany in manpower and resources, still thought in strictly Navy terms, his concept of logistics beginning at the home base and ending at the strip of hostile shoreline secured by the Marines; it was a long time before he could adjust himself to the Army concept, which began at the beach-head base, maintained by a steady, seaborne 'supply train', and from there penetrated tens or hundreds or thousands of miles into enemy territory, ending only with attainment of the ultimate objectives (Berlin and Tokyo) which represented total victory.

The real American-British staff talks began in Washington at the end of January, 1941. The chief American representatives were Admirals Ghormley and Richmond Kelly Turner and Captains A. G. Kirk, C. M. Cooke, and De Witt Ramsey for the Navy, and Generals S. D. Embick, Sherman Miles, and L. T. Gerow, and Colonel J. T. McNarney for the Army. The British representatives were Admirals R. M. Bellairs and V. H. Danckwerts, General E. L. Morris and Air Commodore J. C. Slessor. The opening sessions were addressed by Marshall and Stark, who urged that utmost secrecy surround these conferences, since any publicity might provide ammunition for the opponents of Lend Lease and produce other consequences which 'might well be disastrous'.





Iceland, Between Two Worlds, Holds a Strategic Place in the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic

The map torn from *The National Geographic Magazine*, with the line marked by President Roosevelt to show the limit of American patrols in the Western Atlantic (see page 309).

The members of the British delegation wore civilian clothes and disguised themselves as 'technical advisers to the British Purchasing Commission'. It seemed virtually impossible to keep the conferences entirely hidden from the prying eyes of the Press, especially in view of the fact that where American reporters failed Axis agents were glad to help out with tips dispatched by way of South America to the D.N.B. News Agency in Berlin, or to the Domeii News Agency in Tokyo, and thence broadcast to the world; however, there were no serious leaks.

The staff talks continued until March 29 and produced a plan, known as ABC-I, which suggested the Grand Strategy for the war. The basic point was that in the event of Anglo-American involvement in war with Germany and Japan the concentration of force should be on *Germany first*, while a containing war of attrition was to be waged against Japan, pending Germany's defeat. (This was precisely in line with the conclusions reached by Marshall and Stark months previously.) The primary measures to be taken against Germany were:

1. Blockade.
2. Constantly intensified aerial bombing.
3. Subversive activities and propaganda. (No ground operations planned at this time.)

The conference in Washington also provided for continuing joint Anglo-American military missions as a focus for exchange of information and co-ordination of plans; the British Joint Staff Mission accordingly established in Washington provided the working basis for the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization which came into being a month after Pearl Harbour.

These Staff talks, and the complete interchange of expert opinions as well as facts that they produced, provided the highest degree of *strategic preparedness* that the United States or probably any other non-aggressor nation has ever had before entry into war. This made for far greater efficiency in all planning of Army and Navy organization and training, of production and, most importantly, of administration of Lend Lease. Some system of priorities could now be established for the guidance of Hopkins in his constant negotiations with Robert Patterson and James Forrestal, the procurement authorities of the War and Navy Departments, and with the Office of Production Management and the Maritime Commission. Plenty of confusion remained, of course, because no civilian below the highest level could know on what the system of priorities was based; but, at least, it reduced misunderstanding and discord at the top.

Although the common-law alliance involved the United States in no under-cover commitments, and no violations of the Constitution, the very existence of any American-British joint plans, however tentative, had to be kept utterly secret. It is an ironic fact that in all probability no great damage

would have been done had the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans and the Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the Congress and the Press, American preparation for war might have been wellnigh wrecked and ruined, as, indeed, it came perilously close to being when the House of Representatives voted on the extension of Selective Service.

The American historian, Charles A. Beard, who was at this time one of the more reputable proponents of the isolationist policy, has subsequently written a severe indictment of Roosevelt's dealings ('binding agreements') with Britain before Pearl Harbour and with the Soviet Union at Yalta. He has written: 'If these precedents are to stand unimpeached and to provide sanctions for the continued conduct of American foreign affairs, the Constitution may be nullified by the President, officials, and officers who have taken the oath, and are under moral obligation to uphold it.'

Roosevelt never overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his immediate or eventual impeachment. Having taken the oath of office as President three times, he knew it by heart, and was well aware that he was sworn not only to 'uphold' but to '*defend*' the Constitution of the United States. It was a matter of his own judgment—and the judgment of his advisers whom he was empowered to appoint—as to where that defence should begin. The same independent responsibility has devolved on every Chief Executive in the past—including Abraham Lincoln in 1861—and it will devolve on every Chief Executive in the future unless the Constitution is amended to restrict the present powers and duties of the President.

Roosevelt, before Pearl Harbour, made no 'binding agreements' save those authorized under the Lend Lease law and no secret treaties with Britain nor any other nation which should have been subject to confirmation by the Senate. The plans drawn up at the Staff conferences bound nobody. They could have been altered or renounced at any time 'in the light of subsequent events', and, in fact, the British expected that Roosevelt and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would renounce them when extraordinary developments in the Pacific changed drastically the whole global picture.

Whether Roosevelt's judgment was good or bad is, of course, an entirely different question for historians to ponder in their own good time.

UNLIMITED EMERGENCY

THE Roosevelt-Churchill meeting which Hopkins had discussed when he went to London in January did not take place as planned in the spring. There were far too many and too critical immediate problems to permit time for talks about long-range prospects and projects. The German Blitzkrieg, appearing more devastating and irresistible than ever, burst through the mountain passes of Yugoslavia and then turned into Greece, as Churchill had predicted it would. The British had to face the grim decision either of leaving the Greeks to their unavoidable fate, or of sending in reinforcements which could not possibly be strong enough to render more than token aid. Churchill chose the latter and more honourable but hopeless alternative, and took the consequences. Greece was overrun with terrifying speed, the remnants of the small British Expeditionary Force were evacuated in a minor Dunkirk, and then the Germans launched their remarkable attack by airborne troops on the strategic island of Crete. The defence of Crete meant far more to the British than the mere saving of prestige involved in the attempt to render aid to a brave ally, and the defeat administered by the German paratroopers was one of the most decisive and humiliating of the whole war. Serious injury was done to British morale in general, and, in particular, disagreeable disputes were provoked between the three British services, Navy, Army, and Air Force. Following this disaster, General Rommel, who had taken over command in Africa from the hapless Fascists, launched the first of his disabling campaigns and regained all the ground in Libya (except the fortress of Tobruk) that Wavell had captured the previous winter. The British were thrown back into Egypt and their ability to defend the Suez Canal was in considerable doubt.

In the midst of the Greek fighting Roosevelt and Hopkins read a remarkably prescient memorandum prepared in the Navy Department. It was written by Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was later to become one of the great masters of amphibious warfare in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. He foresaw the ominous possibility that by June the British might have been driven out of the Mediterranean, and if that happened 'The German Army will go by sea to Syria, and the end will then be in sight'. The last two paragraphs of Turner's memorandum were as follows:

Because of the present tragic situation of the British Government, I do not recommend troubling them further at this time by informing them as to our opinion on the seriousness of the situation. They realize it pretty well themselves, even though they are somewhat too optimistic.

Warning them on this score could have only a bad influence on their morale, and could serve no useful purpose.

On the contrary, I believe that a public statement by the President praising the courage and self-sacrificing stand taken by the British in sending troops to Greece would strengthen Mr. Churchill's position, might give some uplift to morale, and might influence neutrals, particularly if coupled with praise of the Greeks themselves. However, I suggest that any such statement not be made until we clearly see the end of the hostilities in Greece.

Harriman wrote from London in a personal letter to Hopkins:

It has been as if living in a nightmare, with some calamity hanging constantly over one's head. I have not expected any war news that would make us happy. . . .

I am with the P.M. at least one day a week and usually the week-end as well. He likes to take me on his trips to the devastated cities—so I can report to the President, but also, I am sure, so the people can see an American around, for the morale. At Portsmouth last week the destruction was fantastic (I think details had best be omitted), but the people are amazing—(five all-night raids out of nine). People who had lost everything they possess, and perhaps a member of the family, all seemed more determined than ever to carry on—and smiling about it. But how long can they last out unless there continues real confidence in victory?

Harriman's extreme despondency was a reflection of the atmosphere prevailing in the upper levels of the British Government at that time—not to mention the mounting anger of the British people as a whole at the new demonstrations of 'too little and too late'. This, it will be remembered, was the psychological moment that had been selected by the British, with no real authority, but with reason-shattering hopefulness, for American entry into the war. Here it was April, the fateful month, and the British listening-posts were tuned to beams from the west, eager to pick up any shouts or even murmurs that 'the Yanks are coming', but there were none; in fact, if the information coming through was accurate, it showed that the American people were farther than ever from any inclination to intervene in Europe. This could hardly be called unreasonable. From the American point of view, there was no Europe left. After the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, there was no part of the Continent that was not physically possessed by Hitler, with such dubious exceptions as Vichy France, Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, in addition to the satellite nations (Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Finland), and the Soviet Union. To the average American, Britain was now a last outpost, seemingly as lonely and as exposed as Guam. The public-opinion polls showed that while public sentiment in favour of

aid to Britain even at a risk of going to war took a marked dip *downward* in the spring of 1941, the public conviction that we would eventually get into the war against Germany zoomed *upward*, being held by more than 80 per cent of the population. This seeming contradiction was, again, not entirely unreasonable, for it suggested that the American people were now sure that the Germans would eventually move against the Western Hemisphere and a defensive war would have to be fought. Nobody with superior strategic knowledge or authority explained to the people the extreme desirability of starting this American defence from bases in the British Isles and Africa; for such action, by the peculiar definition of that befuddled period, would have involved entry into a 'foreign' war, against which so many solemn pledges had been made.

On March 19, shortly after the passage of Lend Lease, Roosevelt and Hopkins had gone on the yacht, *Potomac*, for a cruise in the Bahamas. This, as it happened, was the last of the 'carefree' fishing trips for either of them. There was no pretence of inspecting bases this time, and the yacht never ventured more than a few hours' sail from the Florida coast. Also included in the ship's company on this cruise were Robert H. Jackson, the Attorney-General, Harold Ickes, and Steve Early; oddly enough, the presence of Jackson and Ickes among the guests was cause for considerable satisfaction among the more rabid New Dealers in Washington, who took it as evidence that the President was again paying attention to his social objectives at home and not concentrating on the alien war in Europe—although, be it said, neither Jackson nor Ickes was any more likely than Hopkins was to underrate the German menace.

Since, in an earlier chapter, some reflection has been cast on Hopkins's prowess as a fisherman, it should be recorded in justice to him that on this cruise he not only hooked, but actually landed a 25-lb. kingfish, four feet long. Otherwise, I do not think that he enjoyed this cruise very much; his thoughts were elsewhere. On March 28 a radio message to the *Potomac* informed the President of the *coup d'état* in Yugoslavia by which the pro-German Regency had been overthrown and a new Government, under young King Peter, was put into power to fulfil the people's determination to fight Hitler. The *Potomac* then returned to Port Everglades, Florida.

There was a German ship, the *Arauca*, tied up at Port Everglades. She had been chased in there by a British cruiser in December, 1939, and had remained ever since, flying one of the last Nazi flags visible from American soil. Early in the morning of the last day of Roosevelt's holiday word came to the *Potomac* that the F B I. had uncovered a plan for the wholesale sabotage of Axis ships by their crews, so the President ordered them to be seized immediately. Later that day, Sunday, March 30, coastguardsmen boarded the *Arauca*, removed her crew 'for safe keeping', and hauled down the Nazi flag.

This episode gave Roosevelt and Hopkins considerable pleasure: at least, it was action of a sort.

On returning to Washington, Hopkins plunged into the organization of Lend Lease. It was believed at first that the huge new programme would be under a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and Navy, with Hopkins as a sort of Executive Secretary. But the President thought shy of that. After several weeks' delay, he set up a new agency called Division of Defence Aid Reports of the Office of Emergency Management, which, by its title, suggested a dusty, fusty bookkeeping agency at the end of some blind alley in the bureaucratic labyrinth. Thus, it was an inconvenient target for criticism. (It did not become formally designated as the Lend Lease Administration until seven months later.) Harry Hopkins's name was not even on its rolls. His valued associate, General Burns, was appointed by the President to be Executive Officer of this Division, but there was no Director or Chairman, which meant that Roosevelt kept control in his own hands—or, rather, Hopkins's—and for this, as always, he was severely criticized. The State Department did not like the arrangement which separated an all-important instrument of foreign policy from its control except in so far as Hull or Welles could bring influence to bear on the President personally. Morgenthau did not like it, for it took from his Treasury Department the function it had exercised so long of handling supplies for Britain and China. The Bureau of the Budget, however, supported the President. It stated the problems of Lend Lease in its record, *The United States at War*:

What countries should receive lend-lease aid? On what terms should they receive it? In what quantities should goods be transferred to particular countries? What weight should be given to the immediate necessities of our own military services in comparison with the advantages to be gained by aiding other countries? Only the President could decide these kinds of questions; they were not delegable. Operating authority, however, was freely delegated.

Burns was in a dual capacity, remaining as a member of the Staff of Under Secretary Patterson in the War Department and therefore in immediate touch with the huge procurement problem. Oscar Cox and Philip Young were brought into Lend Lease from the Treasury Department, the former as counsel and general improviser, and the latter as administrator. One General Spalding (Sidney P.) was in charge of the production division and another General Spalding (George R.) was in charge of storage and shipping. The Lend Lease staff grew in the first few months to about a hundred people, a mere handful by Washington wartime standards. They were housed in the Federal Reserve Building.

Because Lend Lease involved matters of utmost secrecy, Hopkins for the first time in his life worried about the imposition of measures of strict security. He wrote sharply to Young:

Be sure and organize a filing system over there that is absolutely secret with locks on all files and a guard who has been carefully investigated by the F.B.I. or the Secret Service as to his reliability. We simply cannot take any chances on anything getting out of the files.

Incidentally, I think all employees over there should be carefully investigated by the Secret Service. I particularly want an inquiry made as to their attitude about the war. I don't want anybody working anywhere about us who by any chance wants Germany to lick Britain.

Be sure and spread the word around that no one in our crowd should give any interviews to newspapermen, privately or publicly. If anybody asks what you are doing simply say that any announcement about it must come from the White House and refer them to Mr. Early. It is very important that we don't get caught off base in regard to this matter.

Most of Hopkins's scanty personal correspondence at this time revealed his extreme impatience. Having received several letters from a Deserving Democratic politician who wanted him to do a favour for another D.D., Hopkins wrote:

I do not know why in the light of things I am doing today I should be burdened by handling a purely personal matter for —. I have repeatedly sent word to — that I am not handling any political matters of any kind or description and I simply think I should not be asked to do it. I am refusing to see other people on similar missions, and there is no more reason for my seeing — than there is for seeing a dozen others.

One former W.P.A. associate of whom Hopkins was particularly fond sent him a letter which he wished to have transmitted to the President. Hopkins returned the letter to him with this curt note:

I think you ought to keep your shirt on about the W.P.A. There is nothing you can do but let the President handle this, and there is just no sense in precipitating any moves. I would not send the attached letter to the President. He would never read it anyway, because it is far too long. Your poker-playing habits are much better than your letter-writing habits!

In a moment of extreme irritability at this time Hopkins said to me: 'I'm getting sick and tired of having to listen to complaints from those goddam New Dealers!' I could hardly believe my ears.

Hopkins had plenty of excuse for impatience, for his responsibilities were far heavier than ever before and his health was miserably bad. He was forced to resume the rigorous treatments involving repeated transfusions and injections of various kinds to keep him alive. He rarely left the White House, but managed to do an enormous amount of business in his bedroom, aided primarily by Isador Lubin, who provided exceptionally acute and accurate pairs of eyes and ears.

Actually, Lend Lease in itself provided no overwhelming difficulties in the beginning. It was, in fact, merely an offshoot of the basic problems of production and transportation. There were seven billion dollars to spend, but the weapons to buy were not coming off the assembly lines fast enough, nor were there enough ships to carry them overseas even when they did. This was a time when one of the most important words in the American language was 'bottleneck', and the most formidable bottleneck of all was created by the ancient principle that you cannot eat your cake and have it: the nation could not meet the reality of wartime demands for production while maintaining the illusion that it was still 'at peace'. There existed an Industrial Mobilization Plan which, in the words of Bernard M. Baruch, its principal author, was designed to enable the country 'to pass from a peace to a war status with a minimum of confusion, waste, and loss'. But—the thinking behind this and all other plans before 1940 was based on the assumption that a nation passed from a peace status to a war status as quickly and as decisively as one passes from one room to another. No provision whatsoever had been made for the maze of corridors, blind alleys, and series of antechambers—labelled 'phony war', 'cash and carry', 'more than mere words', 'Lend Lease', etc.—which the United States was compelled for the first time in its own or any other nation's history to traverse between September 1, 1939, and December 7, 1941. This was particularly confusing for the Army officers charged with responsibility for the supply problem. Although Stimson, Patterson, and Marshall were well aware of the urgency, the Generals and Colonels charged with the implementation of policy were men trained to adhere rigidly to the established Table of Organization and to base all calculations upon that. It was their job to take the number of American soldiers currently authorized by Congress and multiply that by the various items of equipment—rifles, blankets, C-rations, howitzers, toothbrushes, etc. They had been trained to believe that if they asked for more than the irreducible minimum they would find themselves detailed to instruction at some boys' military academy in South Dakota, where promotion is apt to be slow.

The thought that they should sponsor a programme which within a given span of years would enable the United States to exceed the combined production of Germany, Italy, Japan, and all their slave states was too outrageously ridiculous to be worth considering. This understandable hesitancy

represented multiplication of the fears, previously described, which had limited air force officers to an estimate of only nine thousand parachutes as the production target for 1941. The fear was a mark of respect for isolationist suspicion that we were arming not for 'defence', but for war—as though they were two entirely separate and distinct activities. Thus, although every calculation of the staff planners foresaw the vital importance of amphibious warfare, no military authority would dare to ask for heavy appropriations for landing craft, for this would surely suggest a nefarious intention to get into some 'foreign' war. There was even a considerable ruckus among isolationists in Congress when, in 1941, a list of Army requirements from the textile industry included the item '*overseas caps*'. Although it would be hard to imagine a more innocuous implement of offensive warfare, to the isolationists that word '*overseas*' spelled another A.E.F.

A friend of General Marshall's told me at this time that he had been with the Chief of Staff after a grilling of several hours by some Congressional Committee which sought to trap him into admissions which would prove Roosevelt a warmonger. Driving away from Capitol Hill, Marshall closed his eyes and said: 'If I can only keep all personal feelings out of my system, I may be able to get through with this job.'

The reluctance of American industry to convert itself to war production on anything like the necessary scale was also understandable. Of course, some of the industrial leaders, notably Henry Ford, were themselves violent isolationists, and refused (as Ford did) to fill orders involving weapons for the British. But among others there was inevitable doubt that the war with its extraordinary demands would last much longer, particularly in view of the sweeping German victories at that time. Business was booming in consumer goods—indeed, in 1941, the automobile industry reached an all-time high in sales of cars for civilian purposes. The Government could plead and cajole, but it could not compel manufacturers to convert their plants, nor could it fortify contracts with satisfactory long-term guarantees. No one could tell how long the present emergency would last, nor what form the next emergency might take. The wise manufacturer knows that if he expands his production too far beyond the probabilities—estimated on the basis of market analysis and consumer research as well as his own experience—he will end up in bankruptcy. Now he was being asked to provide for the needs of X million men of X nations in a potential war to be fought under every possible condition and circumstance that the great globe itself could present. Small wonder that he quailed at the prospect. His problems were further complicated by serious stoppages through strikes, largely the result of persistent Communist attempts to sabotage war production in every way possible; one of them, in the North American Aviation Plant at Inglewood, California, compelled Roosevelt for the first time in his career to

order armed intervention by the U.S. Army, a decision that was deeply repugnant to him.

Hopkins moved into this situation as the recognized and designated representative of the President in all considerations of production, transportation, raw materials, priorities, allocation, etc. He had no experience whatsoever in handling such problems. He had none of the 'know-how' of a Knudsen or a Batt. But then, he had known nothing of the disease silicosis when he undertook to combat it. He had the amazing ability to find out about things quickly—to talk to people who did know and to determine who was making sense and who wasn't.

Admiral Emory S. Land, head of the Maritime Commission, with whom Hopkins had many tough but friendly tussles, gave him the admiring title, 'Generalissimo of the Needle Brigade'. That was a precise description. Needling was one form of activity in which Hopkins did not lack experience. When some failure was brought to his attention he would pick up the telephone and say: 'Get me General So-and-so'. When the War Department reported that So-and-so was at the moment *en route* to Los Angeles, Hopkins would bark: 'Get him wherever he is!' And the super-efficient White House switchboard operators would have the General hauled off the train or plane at Dodge City, Kansas, and brought to the telephone and compelled to explain: 'Why are there two hundred and eighty P.39's waiting at the Bell Plant for those Pesco pumps? What the hell is going on here, anyway?' Hopkins was making these telephone calls even when undergoing the painful treatments without which he would have starved to death. Because of his addiction to word-of-mouth communication, there are not many copies of outgoing documents among his papers, but the number and variety of those that came to his card-table desk and that littered his four-poster bed on the problems of supply and shipping are staggering to contemplate.

Here are a few scraps of excerpts picked from a bale of documents of this spring of 1941:

From the Greek Minister to Hopkins: As you know, the needs of Greece in aircraft are mentioned in the consolidated list handed to you by me last week, and I should be much obliged to you if you would . . .

From John D. Biggers to Hopkins: You asked me about alloyed steels, such as nickel steel, chrome steel, etc. There are no exact figures available, but the following tabulation indicates the approximate percentages . . .

From Summer Welles to Hopkins: I am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum of my conversation with the Minister of Yugoslavia last night. I am attaching to it a list of the Yugoslav ships which he handed me . . .

From Bernard M. Baruch to Hopkins: The questions you asked and

which I told you I was in no position to answer, and which you asked me to revolve in my mind, have given me the gravest concern. . . . We are improperly organized. It has cost us 20 per cent more in money (which is comparatively unimportant), but also $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent in time which cannot be measured . . . I am sorry I cannot be more encouraging but if my opinion is wanted, no one knows better than you that we must look grim realities in the face . . .

From Hopkins to Mayor La Guardia: I am enclosing photostats of a couple of Communist documents which show the way they are operating on this. It just seems to me that we have got to find a way to beat these people. From my point of view they are just as much a potential enemy as the Germans. I realize that you are not responsible for prosecuting law-breakers, but . . .

From Major G. K. Heiss of the Army and Navy Munitions Board to Hopkins: With reference to your telephonic inquiry relative to information concerning quartz crystals . . .

From Colonel William J. Donovan to Hopkins: You will remember that when we talked last we discussed the danger of Germany striking in through French North Africa and also of coming in through Spain and Portugal. If this should happen . . .

From Arthur B. Purvis to Hopkins: Regarding your note . . . on the new thermal process for producing aluminium . . .

From Robert A. Lovett to Hopkins: I want to confirm the statement made to you on Sunday afternoon regarding the existence at this time of critical shortage of alloy steels. I have checked into the matter and find . . .

From James Forrestal to Hopkins: Shortage of steel for propeller blades due to strikes at Universal Cyclops Steel Corporation has practically halted delivery of propellers for Navy fighters . . .

From Admiral H. L. Vickery to Hopkins: I just want to inform you that I have one shipbuilding way vacant at this time because I can't get steel delivery . . .

From Oscar Cox to Hopkins: You asked me about locating a man who might advise you from time to time on steel. I asked one of my classmates at M.I.T. who is on the staff up there . . .

From General Burns to Hopkins: In regard to your inquiry concerning the amount of small arms ammunition being manufactured for private purposes . . .

From the President—pencilled note: H.H. to put Lauch Currie in as his asst. in China aid & announce? F.D.R.

From Lauchlin Currie to Hopkins: As you may have noticed, the President made no specific commitment re aid to China at his Press

conference today. You left me in a bit of a quandary today as to procedure and status . . .

From Russell W. Davenport to Hopkins: This letter will probably turn out to be long. My head has been crowded with ideas ever since I saw you, and I find we never got around to discussing a lot of things I wanted to discuss. However, I'll stick to one point in this letter, namely, Political Warfare . . .

Again Lovett to Hopkins: The President asked me whether or not our four-engine equipment (such as the B-24's) could carry a spare engine in the North Atlantic hop. I indicated that from the point of view of weight . . .

From the President to Hopkins: Take this up with (Sol) Bloom and Walter George and see if you can get the law amended. The alternative to Congressional action is to send the oil in Government-owned, undocumented ships.

From Sir Arthur Salter to Hopkins: I enclose the best note I can do in answer to your question as to the rate of building needed in the U.S. in order (with British building) to offset losses, on the hypothesis that . . .

From Admiral Land to the President and Hopkins: Vickery and I dined with Sir Arthur Salter last evening. My primary reaction is as follows: If we do not watch our step, we shall find the White House *en route* to England with the Washington Monument as a steering-oar.

From Secretary Frank Knox to the President: I am becoming more and more convinced that the British face imminent defeat unless they are given immediate aid by the United States in the matter of getting an adequate amount of shipping into United Kingdom ports . . .

From James Norman Hall to Hopkins: In the name of old-time Grinnell friendship, I am going to ask a favour of you, and please don't curse me out until you learn what the favour is. The little island of Tahiti, in French Oceania . . . has, for more than three months, been deprived of the right to purchase any gasoline or kerosene from the U.S.A. . . .

From Lieutenant-Colonel Rex Benson of the British Embassy to Hopkins: The Ambassador has asked me to let you know that on the basis of confidential information that was conveyed to Mr. Casey regarding alleged dissatisfaction existing amongst Australian and New Zealand troops in the Middle East . . .

From Representative Albert J. Engel of Michigan to Hopkins: Herewith is sent you a self-explanatory letter . . . with reference to shipment of quantities of tin plate to England . . .

From Isador Lubin to Hopkins: I have had a check made of the situation at the Frankford Arsenal and the report that I get is that the equipment is adequate for greater production on the second and third shifts . .

From Edward Stettinius to Hopkins: The Russian Ambassador cabled to Moscow two days ago again saying he had to have an estimate immediately of the raw copper Russia would need . . .

From Ward Canaday, Chairman of the Board of Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., to Hopkins and Biggers: The following is in summary of our talk last week about Bauxite transfers in the Virgin Islands . . .

From Ambassador Anthony Biddle to Hopkins: It would have done your heart good to see General Sikorski's face when I conveyed your message regarding the decision to include Poland on the 'Lend-Lease' list. . . . He is profoundly grateful and asked me to tell you so immediately—and at the same time to send you his warmest respects . . .

From Oscar R. Ewing to Hopkins: The deeper I get into this aluminium situation, the more obvious it is that the bottleneck is *power*. Something must be done . . .

Again from Stettinius to Hopkins: You asked me on the phone Sunday how much magnesium was going into civilian use. You will find here—with a statement showing . . .

From Philip Young to Hopkins: Attached is the summary of the Netherlands East Indies purchasing situation, which I promised you some time ago . . .

From Harriman to Hopkins: Reference is made to your 2121 . . . The view that aircraft should have the first call on production of this material is shared by the British . . .

From Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister, to Hopkins: Your American requirements of Australian wool, zinc, lead, chrome and probably zircon-bearing sands, and other not unimportant commodities—on the one hand—and our urgent Australian requirements of war materials and machine tools from the United States—these matters are undoubtedly in the minds of your advisers, and we hope very much . . .

Again from Baruch to Hopkins: Any trouble in the Pacific will change our whole defence production. Aluminium is the most outstanding example of incompetency and procrastination, but there are other situations almost as bad.

From Secretary Hull to the President, who referred it to Hopkins: In the attached papers Mr. Moffett states that unless King Ibn Saud receives financial assistance at once there is grave danger that this independent Arab Kingdom cannot survive the present emergency . . .

Again from Lovett to Hopkins: You will observe that in spite of the agreement of the automotive industry to cut down by 20 per cent it is practically meaningless in view of the substantial increase in automobile production . . .

From Isador Lubin to Hopkins: I thought you might be interested in the

following statements, which are the summary of the report of one of my men who attended the recent meeting of the American Management Association . . .

Again from Lovett to Hopkins: British Ferry Service now used for the Blenheim Bombers, Hurricanes, P-40's, and DB-7's, normally uses the following airports for the run from Takoradi to Cairo . . .

Again from Cox to Hopkins: General Arnold delegated to Lieutenant-Colonel Meyers the job of getting the planes delivered as soon as possible. Meyers ran into some Neutrality Act and other legal snarls yesterday and called for help. To avoid bothering you, I have arranged with . . .

Again from Currie to Hopkins: I dropped in on Mr. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply in Ottawa, on Tuesday on the offchance that the Canadians might be able to help out on some items for China on which we are having difficulty. I met with such encouraging response that . . .

From Mrs. Emil Hurja to Hopkins: With wrath and moral indignation and proudly as an American of Scandinavian stock I denounce William Bullitt's insulting attack on Colonel Charles Lindbergh last night, also that of the President. I further am proud to be listed among thousands of (people) who believe in 'America First'. I would be grateful if you draw attention to this to the President.

From Hopkins to Missy Le Hand: They tell me that a picture called 'Citizen Kane', produced by RKO, is excellent. It apparently takes Hearst over the hoops. If you can get it, I think the President would like very much to see it.

From Breckinridge Long to Hopkins: I am responding to your note of yesterday about ———. We have done everything which could have been done and are still attentive to his case. He acted deliberately in the face of warning and was caught by the military authorities. In spite of our many representations he is still held. He also had a history of activity in connection with smuggling refugees across the military line (of Occupied France). His case is not an easy one. Attached is a memorandum of some length which indicates the action we have taken . . .

Again Harriman to Hopkins: Greatly expanded programme for use of incendiary bomb is cause of increase over figures in paragraph three of my 1786. In fact . . . scheduled number of units . . .

Again from Vickery to Hopkins: I am still having a great deal of trouble with steel . . .

From the Former Naval Person to the President and Hopkins: The result which may follow from American and British tank design proceeding for the future on independent lines is something about which I am greatly

concerned. Three types of the M-3 American medium tank are already being produced . . .

From Lord Beaverbrook to Hopkins: May I persuade you to lift up the M3 Medium Tank to the highest place priority. If you would take such a decision, you would help us with our pressing need . . .

From the President to the Former Naval Person: We have had a thorough review of our whole tank situation here during the last few days and I can now give you the following results. We plan to increase our peak production of our medium tank from 600 to 1,000 a month, reaching that goal . . .

Again from Land to the President and Hopkins: Our shipbuilding expansion programme is now far enough along so that we can and should move swiftly to . . .

From Hopkins to James Rowe, Jr.: I know nothing whatever about a row between Pan American and American Export Lines. I have no interest whatever how the decision is reached. I simply cannot be responsible for what Wayne Johnson tells someone else that Juan Trippe has said. If I spent my time running down things like this I would do nothing else, so will you tell anybody who asks you that I have no opinion about this on either side; that he is a damn liar and let it go at that. Incidentally, this might go for anything else you might hear anybody say about me on any such things as these. I trust you will do it effectively.

Hopkins believed that the best way to break bottlenecks was to expose them. Although it was the natural tendency of Government officials to attempt to cover up sore spots and hide them from public view, Hopkins believed that in this case advertisement exerted a healthy effect. When, as indicated in a message from Forrestal, masses of new airplanes were grounded because of a bottleneck in propeller production, Hopkins asked that photographs of these impotent planes be displayed in the Press and in plants responsible for the propeller shortage. He believed that manufacturers and workers could be stimulated by blows to their pride.

Despite Hopkins's annoyance at old friends of his who insisted that the social objectives of the New Deal were of greater importance than the future of the British Empire—and that Hopkins's concern for the latter was making him in effect a 'traitor to his class'—he depended to a very large extent on men with the New Deal point of view in the performance of his job as Generalissimo of the Needle Brigade. Aside from his own *aides*, Cox, Young, and Lubin, there were, conspicuously, Leon Henderson, Director of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, and Sidney Hillman, Robert Nathan, and Stacy May, of O.P.M. They were all aggressive battlers for the principle of unlimited production, impatient with the tendency of the more cautious

industrialists and Army and Navy officers who protested: 'But you can't *do* that!' Which provides a commentary on the oft-repeated accusation that the typical New Dealer was one who believed in a 'satiated economy', who lacked faith in the productive power of America, who was forever advocating the ploughing under of little pigs and big business men. In the 1940 campaign, Wendell Willkie had said: 'The only jobs the New Deal has made are Government jobs. . . . For eight years they have been telling us that America is a land without a future.' But the industrialists who came into constant contact with Hopkins and the zealots of his entourage discovered that these men, far from despairing of American industry, had sublime confidence in its capacity to achieve the utterly impossible; of course, this confidence may have been due largely to deficiency in practical, businesslike, hard common sense, but even so it was certainly not misplaced.

One adviser who remained in the background but who exerted considerable influence was the Frenchman, Jean Monnet. He was no New Dealer. He was, in fact, a coldly calculating business man who had seen his own country suffer terrible defeat and Britain come close to it because of the refusal or the inability of industrialists and soldiers to face the facts of total war. Monnet was the great, single-minded apostle of all-out production, preaching the doctrine that ten thousand tanks too many are far preferable to one tank too few.

Be it said that the business men in Government in Washington were not slow to respond when they realized that this was a game played according to no previous rules and for stakes no smaller than the life or death of the Republic. Production was their game and here was the greatest challenge ever offered. Many of them were ruthless in putting the fear of God (and of public opinion) into the hearts of their old buddies of the Detroit Athletic Club. It was not too easy for private manufacturers to get away with slacking or profiteering under the eyes of men who knew all the tricks of their trade.

Hopkins, who had once appeared to believe that the terms 'big business' and 'entrenched greed' were virtually synonymous, now found himself working on new but common ground with men who had once appeared to fear him as the avowed destroyer of 'the American way of life'.

One of the distinguished industrialists who came into Government service in 1941 was James S. Knowlson, a Chicagoan and Republican, President and Chairman of the Board of the Stewart-Warner Corporation. It was a proud day for Hopkins when years later he read an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* in which Knowlson described his Washington experience:

I lost ten pounds and a lot of personal prejudices. I find to my rather shocked surprise that I once made a memorandum like this: 'I have been talking with Hopkins and I can't escape the conviction that he has the

clearest, coolest mind of anyone I have ever seen here. He factors complicated problems into simple terms, and he has given direction to my thought.' I don't know anything about Mr. Hopkins's social planning or his other ideas, but my one regret is that I did not see more of him in Washington.

The whole production imbroglio before Pearl Harbour and even after it was a story of endless tugging and hauling between the proponents of the total war effort and the protectors of the civilian economy. It was sometimes known as 'The Battle of 7-Up', because of Robert Patterson's vehement complaint that valuable trucks were being used to deliver the soft drink of that name to bobby-soxers when they ought to be delivering ammunition to troops. In this conflict Hopkins was just about 100 per cent anti-civilian. He was enraged chiefly by the gross wastage, as he considered it, of invaluable transport planes in maintaining the schedules of the commercial airlines, and he put in a great deal of time figuring out ways to steal these planes for service across the Atlantic to Britain and Africa or over the Hump to China.

The first measure taken by Hopkins toward aid for China was an attempt to clear up the fearful congestion on the one land communication route, the Burma Road. In consultation with his friend, John M. Hertz, he considered various candidates for this Augean job, and finally settled on Daniel Arnstein, a trucking and taxicab expert who had been with Hopkins that day at the races when Max Gordon engaged in the conversation which was parlayed into 'tax and tax, and spend and spend, and elect and elect'.

Arnstein has told of the beginnings of his remarkable adventure in high-pressure diplomacy in the following way:

In the spring of 1941 I was sunning myself in Florida when Harry called me up and said: 'Dan, I got a tough job to be done and I need your advice. Can you come back to Washington?'

I told him that I would and did. When I saw Harry in Washington he told me that not a god-damn thing was moving over the Burma Road. . . . I had just taken over the Terminal Cab Company of New York the year before and my business needed a lot of attention. I did not want to leave it, but the way Harry put it to me, I agreed to go to China and promised him that he would get some results. So I went to China.

When I got to Rangoon I saw a lot of stuff piled up, but nothing was moving. The reason for this was that the Burmese had put a tax on all goods that went over the Road leading into China. I was boiling mad, so I went to see the Governor-General of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, and told him: 'The American people would give \$70,000,000

away without a murmur if somebody asked for it, but they get sore as hell if someone tries to take ten cents away from them by a fast trick and I'm sore as hell now.'

Arnstein did a good job in Burma and China, but it meant little in the long run. Lend Lease was not extended to China until two months after the Bill passed, and then it was pathetically inadequate, because of the vast distances involved, the demands elsewhere and the policy prevailing at the time of attempting to appease Japan. Soon after Pearl Harbour the Japanese cut the Burma Road.

In the spring of 1941 strategic attention was concentrated on the Atlantic and particularly on Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verdes, and Dakar. Of these, Iceland was of first importance, because of its position on the flank of the direct lifeline from North America to the United Kingdom. Although a fiercely independent republic, Iceland had bonds of union with Denmark which gave Denmark's then master, Adolf Hitler, some claim to control of the island. British forces had therefore moved in there to defend it against sudden German occupation. In December, 1940, the American consul in Reykjavik, Berbel E. Kuniholm, discussed with the Icelandic Prime Minister a proposal to include Iceland in the Monroe Doctrine area, which would enable its defence to be undertaken by the United States. The following month Hull put a damper on further negotiations, but on April 14, 1941, Hopkins and Welles met with Thor Thors, the Icelandic Consul-General in Washington, and opened the extremely secret negotiations which ended with the sending of an invitation by Iceland's Prime Minister and the sending of the First Marine Brigade 'to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces . . . which were needed elsewhere'. There were to be in the first months of the operation, before further American forces could be sent, 4,000 U.S. Marines and 20,000 British troops. Therefore, the British authorities suggested to Admiral Ghormley in London that the normal thing to do would be to have unity of command, and that this command logically should be British, at least until such time as the American forces on the island outnumbered the British. Admiral Stark wrote to Hopkins: 'I know the President has thought this all out, nevertheless he has been so interested in the details and there is so much potential dynamite in this order, that I feel it should have his okay before I sign it. Secretary Knox concurs, so I am sending it over to you, as I don't want it to get in the general mail.' Even in this vital military-diplomatic matter, the Chief of Naval Operations was using Hopkins as a means of rapid access to Roosevelt. Stark enclosed with this letter his orders to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (then Admiral King), and to the Commanding General, First Marine Brigade, for the transportation of the troops and for their organization in Iceland. He said:

'I realize that this is practically an act of war.' He felt it would be going too far to put the American troops under British command, for, in the event of attack on Iceland by the Germans, the British officer would have responsibility for sending Americans into action. Stark, therefore, specified in his orders to the Marine General: 'You will co-ordinate your operations for the defence of Iceland with the defence operations of British forces by the method of mutual co-operation.' There was no doubt in anyone's mind that the Marines would fight in the event of German attack, and while the public announcement of their presence in Iceland provoked new storms of protest from the isolationists, the American people in the main took it calmly, considering it as a perfectly reasonable precaution. Hitler and the Nazi Government were sensible enough not to interpret it as an act of war. The question now arose: 'If the Marines on Iceland were at battle stations ready to repel any German attack, should not the United States Navy be similarly ordered to take action against German raiders (including U-boats) along the sea lanes between the North American continent and Iceland?' This was the most dangerous problem of the time for the President to decide. The chances were remote of a German attempt to seize Iceland. But the risk of naval action was so great that it could be called a virtual certainty. Those sea lanes were full of raiders, not only U-boats, but also possibly the battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* and the cruisers *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen*.

On April 2 Roosevelt had talked about a plan for providing U.S. naval escort for the Atlantic convoys. He gave orders for the Navy to draw up what was called Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 1; this made definite provision for aggressive action by American warships against German U-boats and surface raiders in the Western Atlantic. On April 13, however, the news of the neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union raised such alarms concerning the situation in the Pacific that Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2 was drawn up and was made effective by Presidential directive on April 24. This revised plan provided that American ships were merely to report movements of German vessels west of Iceland as they observed or detected them. There was to be no shooting unless shot at.

The responsibility for the active protection of convoys passing was still entirely with the British. In a statement on the limits of this patrol which Roosevelt and Hopkins drafted in longhand, the President wrote: 'All navigable waters in the North and South Atlantic lying west of longitude 25°. This line is determined by taking a point half-way between the land mass of the American hemisphere and the land mass of Europe, Africa, in other words half-way between Brazil and the West Coast of Africa.' It may be noted that the 25th parallel runs just west of Iceland, but the line was later bent to include that island. Roosevelt and Hopkins drafted a cable to Churchill on this:

Before taking unilateral action I want to tell you of steps that we propose to take for the security of the Western Hemisphere and favourably to affect your shipping. The United States Government proposes to extend the security zone and patrol area utilizing naval vessels and aircraft working from Newfoundland, Greenland, Nova Scotia, the West Indies, Bermuda and the United States with possible later extension to Brazil if this can be arranged. We will want to be notified by you in great secrecy of movements of convoys so that our patrol units can seek out the ship of an aggressor nation operating west of the new line of the security zone. We propose to have our ships refuelled at sea when advisable. We suggest that your long shipping hauls move to the greatest possible extent west of the new line up to the latitude of the north-western approaches. As soon as you clear out the Red Sea we propose to declare it no longer a zone of combat. We propose to send all types of goods in unarmed American flagships via the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf to Egypt or any other non-belligerent port. We think we can work out a plan for sending wheat and other transferable goods to Greenland and Iceland in American ships through the next six months. We expect very soon to make use of Danish ships and in about two months Italian ships. We hope to make available for the direct haul to England a large amount of our shipping which is now being utilized for other purposes.

In all these developments Hopkins was continually urging bold action and Roosevelt was taking the more moderate, temperate, cautious course. One has only to read Henry Stimson's record of his own profound dissatisfaction in this spring of 1941 to know how sorely Roosevelt tried the tempers of those trusted advisers who were urging him that the time had passed when 'all aid short of war' was enough.

A Roosevelt speech was scheduled for May 14, which was Pan-American Day, one of the State Department's favourite occasions, and the Department had prepared a draft, emphasizing hemispheric solidarity. The mere announcement of this speech provoked widespread speculation at home and abroad, for it was the President's first important address since the enactment of Lend Lease. Would this be the long-expected request for a Declaration of War? The Nazi and Communist anti-Roosevelt propaganda was greatly intensified, and Lindbergh came alarmingly close to an outright demand for open revolt against the Administration. At the same time the extreme interventionists, now led by the Fight for Freedom Committee, were matching the isolationists in the stridency of their demands. It was a period of loud noise in the nation.

Roosevelt was very disturbed by all the speculation about his speech,

largely because he was so far from clear in his own mind as to just what he could say. It was obviously impossible for him to refer to his plans for Iceland and patrols—nor to the possibility of an American occupation of the Azores—nor to the fact that part of the Pacific fleet was at that moment moving into the Atlantic. Speaking on behalf of the President, Steve Early had cautioned the newspapermen not to attach any special importance to the speech—an intended tip-off that it would be merely a routine performance. This suggestion from Early, who always chose his words carefully, in itself created reverberations in the anti-isolationist Press, in England and other countries. The tension was heightened by a number of public utterances by high officers of the Government, notably Stimson and Knox, which seemed to place the United States on the very brink of war. Roosevelt had read these speeches before they were delivered. It was generally assumed that he approved the position taken—as indeed he did. But that did not mean that he was willing or ready to go so far himself.

Then, suddenly, Roosevelt postponed his speech on the grounds of ill health. When it was later announced that the speech was to be given on May 27 newspapermen asked Early if he cared to repeat his admonition not to attach special importance to it, and he declined to do so. So the anticipation was intensified.

During those days in mid-May Roosevelt spent a great deal of time in bed and rarely went to his office. He said that this was one of the most persistent colds he had ever had. One day, after a long talk with him in his bedroom, I came out and said to Missy Le Hand: 'The President seems in fine shape to me. He didn't cough or sneeze or even blow his nose the whole time I was in there and he looked wonderfully well. What is really the matter with him?' Missy smiled and said: 'What he's suffering from most of all is a case of sheer exasperation.' Indeed, he seemed at the time to be exasperated with practically everyone—the isolationists on one side, who were demanding in effect that he resign; and on the other side the extreme interventionists, who were demanding that he immediately send expeditionary forces to England, the Azores, Dakar, the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore, the Aleutian Islands, and other points of interest.

Very few people were allowed to see the President during those days. There were a lot of very nervous men in high places in Washington wondering what was the reason for this inaccessibility and, when the President should finally emerge from it, which way he would jump. Those of us who were in the White House at the time were subjected to an exceptionally large amount of flattering attention by officials who hoped that we could get some message through to him or call his attention to some memorandum that was presumably reposing in his baskets. I reported to Hopkins what seemed to

me to be the most important of the requests that came even to me and in every case he told me to 'forget it'.

On May 10 came the amazing news of Rudolf Hess's sudden landing by parachute on the Duke of Hamilton's estate in Scotland. This happened on a Saturday evening, and Churchill was at Dytchley. He was, in fact, watching a Marx Brothers movie—at least, that was the story as Hopkins was told it. The Duke of Hamilton telephoned from Scotland. Churchill wouldn't leave the movie; he told a secretary to inform His Grace that the Prime Minister was otherwise engaged. But the Duke insisted that this was an urgent matter of Cabinet importance. So Churchill sent Bracken to take the message while he concentrated on Groucho, Harpo, and Chico. Bracken returned to announce that Rudolf Hess had arrived in Britain.

Churchill snorted. 'Will you kindly instruct the Duke of Hamilton,' he growled, 'to tell that to the Marx Brothers?' (I am not vouching for the veracity of the above—merely hoping that it is somewhere near correct.)

Subsequently Ivone Kirkpatrick was dispatched to the Hamilton place to identify Hess. Kirkpatrick had been in the British Embassy in Berlin for years before the war and therefore knew Hess well, and disliked him cordially. When he verified the identification, curt announcement was made, and then the British Government covered the whole affair with a thick pall of secrecy. Practically everybody in the world who could read a newspaper or listen to a radio was in a fever of anxiety to know what was really behind this strange story. There was no limit to the rumours and speculations. Like everyone else, I was consumed with curiosity, but I knew I was not supposed to ask questions around the White House that were not directly connected with the performance of my own duties.

One evening about ten days after Hess landed I was at dinner with the President, Hopkins, and Sumner Welles. Suddenly, in the midst of a conversation about something else, Roosevelt turned to Welles and said: 'Sumner, you must have met Hess when you were in Europe last year.' Welles said that he had. I was excited, for I thought that now I was going to hear the inexplicable explained.

'What's he like?' Roosevelt asked.

Welles gave a thoughtful description of his impressions of Hess—fanatical, mystical devotion to his Fuehrer, apparently brutish stupidity, etc. Roosevelt was silent for a moment, then: 'I wonder what is *really* behind this story?' Welles said he did not know.

So all I learned was that the President was asking precisely the same question that was being asked at thousands if not millions of other American supper tables. Months later, when Lord Beaverbrook was in Moscow, Stalin asked him what was the real truth about Hess, as will appear in a later chapter. Everybody was mystified.

On May 24 the monster German battleship *Bismarck*, which had emerged from its hide-out at Bergen, Norway, attended by the cruiser *Prinz Eugen*, was intercepted between Iceland and Greenland by the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Hood*. In an engagement that lasted only a few minutes the *Prince of Wales* was slightly damaged and the *Hood* was sunk. The German ships got away. When last seen the *Bismarck* was on a south-westerly course, heading right into the convoy routes toward Newfoundland and the U.S. East Coast. For nearly two days after that the whereabouts of the *Bismarck* was unknown. There was all sorts of speculation as to her intended destination. Among the guesses were:

She would shell Halifax, New York, Norfolk, and various other targets.

She would go to Rio de Janeiro to make a big propaganda display for South Americans.

She would go around Cape Horn and all the way across the Pacific to Japan. (There were several theories as to how she would refuel.)

Certainly, after the Hess episode, it seemed that no possibility was too absurd to be considered improbable.

Roosevelt thought it not unlikely that the *Bismarck* would go into the Caribbean to Martinique and perhaps take possession of that strategic outpost. He said: 'Suppose she does show up in the Caribbean. We have some submarines down there. Suppose we ordered them to attack her and attempt to sink her. Do you think the people would demand to have me impeached?'

Roosevelt was speaking in such a detached, even casual manner that one might have thought he was playing with some time-machine fantasy, such as: 'Suppose you suddenly found yourself living in the middle of the thirteenth century . . .' Yet here was the reality of one murderous ship, off on some wild, unpredictable career, guided by the will of one man who might be a maniac or a genius or both, capable of converting one inexplicable impulse into a turning-point of history. And here was the President of the United States, sitting in the White House in an atmosphere of oppressive calm, wondering what the next naval dispatch would tell him, wondering what he would be able to do about it. He was behind his desk in the Oval Study, and he had his coat off. It was a very hot day. He had air-conditioning apparatus in the Study and his bedroom and office, but he hated it and never, to my knowledge, turned it on. The windows were open. Outside the one to the south-west was a big magnolia tree which, they said, had been planted by Andrew Jackson. It was now covered with big white blooms and their lemony scent drifted into the Study. You could look from these windows across to Virginia, which when Lincoln lived in this house was enemy territory. But Roosevelt was wondering whether he'd be impeached.

It was the opinion of those of us who were there, sitting about the desk, that if the U.S. Navy did a thorough job on the *Bismarck* off Martinique, or

anywhere else in Western waters, the American people would applaud the action vigorously. The demand for impeachment would come only if it appeared that the Navy had fired and missed.

However, the big German ship turned eastward, heading apparently for a French port. Two days later, on May 26, the flash came that she had been spotted by a Catalina PBY, one of the naval patrol bombers which Hopkins had helped to turn over to the British R.A.F. Coastal Command. The next day the Royal Navy closed in on the *Bismarck* and sank her. This was the day of Roosevelt's speech, and Hitler had helped greatly to give it a melodramatic background. I do not know just what Hitler had in mind in sending the *Bismarck* toward the Western Hemisphere at this time, thereby risking the greatest ship in his navy and perhaps in the world. The only logical explanation at the time was that he hoped to sink one or more entire convoys and thereby intimidate the United States and discredit anything that Roosevelt might say in his widely advertised speech. This seems likely, for, at the same time—although it was not known until later—the Germans for the first time in the war sunk an American merchant ship, the *Robin Moor*.

There were further alarming indications of the next probable trends of German aggression. Following their fierce, quick conquests of Yugoslavia and Greece, it seemed logical for the Germans to attempt to complete the process of driving the British from the Mediterranean. Roosevelt had been advised by Admiral Leahy in Vichy that Marshal Pétain 'expects an early advance of German troops through Spain with the purpose of either taking Gibraltar or occupying some place on the coast from which the Straits can be controlled by gunfire and from which troops can be sent to Spanish Morocco'—and there will undoubtedly always be plenty of room for speculation (and for gratitude) as to why Hitler failed to do just that.

Darlan went to Berchtesgaden for a conference with Hitler, and Churchill sent intelligence from London confirming Leahy's reports of the dangers of North Africa by way of Spain. Indeed, Churchill's messages at this time were grimly pessimistic and with lamentably ample reason. Roosevelt, who was always interested in North Africa as a theatre of operations, was deeply concerned with the effect of these possible developments on the Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic, and ordered that plans be drawn up for American occupation of the Azores.

On the day when the first news of the *Bismarck* reached the White House, Hopkins said to Rosenman and me that he believed the President had decided to end the speech with a proclamation of Unlimited National Emergency (up to then, since September, 1939, the emergency had been 'limited'), and told us to try drafting such a proclamation. Somewhat awe-struck, we went down to the Cabinet Room and wrote a proclamation consisting of one sentence. Later, when the new draft of the speech had been typed by Grace Tully (no

one else was permitted to do it, for reasons of secrecy), Sumner Welles and Adolph Berle came over from the State Department to go through it. When they came to the proclamation Welles asked: 'Who drafted this?' We confessed that we had. Welles asked if the President had seen it. We had to confess: 'Not yet.' Welles and Berle could hardly be blamed for feeling that these were pretty strange goings on. The four of us then went upstairs to dinner with Roosevelt and Hopkins, and afterwards the President sat down at his desk to read through the latest draft. He read it aloud, as he often did, to see how it sounded and to detect any tongue-twisting phrases that would be difficult on the radio. Just before he came to the final crucial paragraph Hopkins had to leave the room to take some medicine. Rosenman and I were appalled at being left to face it out alone. Roosevelt read: 'I hereby proclaim that an unlimited national emergency exists . . . what's *this*?' He looked up from the typescript with the expression of artless innocence that he frequently put on, and asked very politely: 'Hasn't somebody been taking some liberties?'

I managed to explain, in a strangled tone, that Harry had told us that the President wanted something along these general lines. I am sure that Welles and Berle expected that our heads—Rosenman's and mine—were about to come off. But there was not another word about the proclamation; it remained in the speech.

There were two important prohibitions in this speech. The President would not mention Japan and he would not mention the Soviet Union. He would not even use the word 'dictatorships', which he had used often to describe all the Nazi-Fascist-Communist States. It was official policy then to avoid provoking Japan so as to keep her out of the war and to avoid provoking Russia in case Germany forced her into it. Thus, the only blanket term that could be used in a sense of opprobrium was 'Axis'. As an example of how this proposition worked: in the speech there was a review of the events of the war since September, 1939, with the line: 'In the subsequent months the shadows deepened and lengthened. And the night spread over Poland, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France.' But before the speech was delivered, and after considerable consideration, the word 'Finland' was omitted.

The occasion for the delivery of this speech was a curiously inappropriate one. It was still in observance of Pan-American Day, and the guests were the Ambassadors and Ministers from the twenty Latin-American republics, with their families. Roosevelt insisted on including the Canadian Minister, his old friend, Leighton McCarthy, although Canada was not particularly enthusiastic about Pan-Americanism. It was a black-tie affair, the guests seated during the speech on the little gilded chairs in the East Room, and then moving out on to the South Lawn for a sort of garden-party, with refresh-

ments and Japanese lanterns. (Sam Rosenman said to me: 'We've got to be careful and call them Axis lanterns.')

It was very hot in the East Room while the President was speaking. All around the edges of the room were the news-reel and still camera-men, but they didn't put their lights on during the speech. The movies were taken after the guests had gone out, Roosevelt repeating selected portions.

The speech evoked few signs of enthusiasm from its audience and was followed by merely polite applause. Those who could understand English seemed disturbed and even alarmed by what he said. It was certainly not the standard Pan-American, hemisphere-solidarity oration. Indeed, after the opening paragraph of courteous reference to those present, Roosevelt seemed to forget that there *was* anyone present. He was talking to the far-away radio audience all over the United States and the world. This was his strongest utterance:

From the point of view of strict naval and military necessity, we shall give every possible assistance to Britain and to all who, with Britain, are resisting Hitlerism or its equivalent with force of arms. Our patrols are helping now to insure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain. *All additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken. Any and all further methods or combination of methods, which can or should be utilized, are being devised . . .*

Those italicized words could certainly be taken as a guarantee of American action in the North Atlantic against German attempts to break the supply line, but months passed before the orders for action were given.

Irving Berlin was with me at the speech, and afterward we went upstairs to Harry Hopkins's room. Hopkins was lying there in his old bathrobe. He always preferred to listen to speeches over the radio. After the diplomatic guests had departed, Mrs. Roosevelt came in to invite us into the Monroe Room, where the President was sitting with a few friends and relatives. He was delighted to see Berlin, and begged him to go to the piano and play and sing 'Alexander's Ragtime Band' and many other songs.

Later I went into the President's bedroom to say good night. He was in bed, surrounded with telegrams. There must have been a thousand or more of them. He had looked at them all.

'They're 95 per cent favourable!' he said. 'And I figured I'd be lucky to get an even break on this speech.'

The response of the Press and, in so far as one could judge, of the people was indeed overwhelmingly favourable. Roosevelt's words were taken as a solemn commitment; the entry of the United States into the war against Germany was now considered inevitable and even imminent. Yet the very day after the speech Roosevelt at a Press Conference vitiated most of his own effect. He dismissed airily any suggestion that he contemplated using the

U.S. Navy for convoy duty or asking Congress for any changes in the Neutrality Law. Hopkins, who thought he knew Roosevelt's mind, was totally unable to account for this sudden reversal from a position of strength to one of apparently insouciant weakness. The fact of Roosevelt's unaccountability was a lesson to be learned over and over again. In the awful crisis produced by blitzkrieg in the West, and Dunkirk, and the fall of France, he had been almost alone in his own Administration in making bold, even desperate decisions. Now, exactly a year later, with Britain's fortunes again at terribly low ebb, he was again almost alone—but now alone in reluctance to take decision and action. It can be said that the isolationists' long and savage campaign against the President—emphasizing such phrases as 'ploughing under every fourth American boy'—had failed to blind American public opinion to the huge accumulation of events, but it certainly had exerted an important effect on Roosevelt himself: whatever the peril, he was not going to lead the country into war—he was going to wait to be pushed in.

When news of the torpedoing of the *Robin Moor* reached the White House, Hopkins wrote the following memorandum for the President:

The sinking of the *Robin Moor* violated international law at sea; it violates your policy of freedom of the seas.

The present observation patrol of the Navy for observing and reporting the movement of ships that are potential aggressors could be changed to a security patrol charged with the duty of providing security for all American flag ships travelling on the seas outside of the danger zone.

It occurred to me that your instructions to the Navy Department could be that the United States Atlantic patrol forces, to be specific, are to, in effect, establish the freedom of the seas, leaving it to the judgment of the Navy as to what measures of security are required to achieve that objective.

But Roosevelt refused to issue any such instructions.

On June 2 Hitler and Mussolini staged one of their portentous conferences at the Brenner Pass, and the world wondered what new terrors were being hatched. But there were no invasion signs on the Northern French or Belgian coasts, whereas there were indisguisable evidences of German concentrations on the Eastern Front in conquered Poland. And Laurence Steinhardt, the American Ambassador in Moscow, was cabling that nearly all of the wives of the high German and Italian diplomats there were leaving for their homes, giving reasons for this exodus which sounded highly unconvincing, and the Counsellor of the German Embassy had even sent his pet dog, from which he was inseparable, by special plane to Berlin.

These scraps of information were only the final bits of evidence which had been accumulating for months in the State Department, and all of which

had been passed on to the British, who added to it other evidence of their own, and also to the Soviet Government. I do not know just how much real credence the Russians attached to it; their expressed attitude was that it was merely Anglo-American propaganda fabricated to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany, to break up the Ribbentrop-Molotov mutual non-aggression pact.

Certainly, Roosevelt attached so much importance to it that he was determined to wait to see what these indications forebode. He soon found out.

RETURN TO LONDON

EARLY in June, 1941, Ambassador Winant returned to Washington to report and Averell Harriman started off from London on a flight to the Middle East to study supply problems at first hand. It was a brief period of suspension between crises when these harassed men could leave their posts. Hopkins was interested in an appreciation of the situation, brought to him by Winant, written by an American Army observer in London:

The Imperial situation, as a whole, seems to be deteriorating. The forces which Germany can exert are too enormous to be halted at once. At the same time, like lava, I am confident that as they spread further from the volcano's mouth, they will cool and slow down. It would be unfortunate if the Middle East fell, but if it absorbs the German effort all summer it will be worth while.

I still believe the British can resist invasion. It will be a hard, bloody business, but what has occurred so far in Crete does not alter my opinion. By some error of judgment or lack of imagination, the R.A.F. withdrew all its planes. Even a few fighters would have wrought havoc amongst the German troops carriers at the outset and would have been well expended. There is likely to be serious criticism of this decision and technical reasons will not serve to quell it.

At the same time I have never believed and cannot see how the British Empire can defeat Germany without the help of God or Uncle Sam. Perhaps it will take both. God has undoubtedly been on the side of the big battalions so far, but may change sides. The equation at present is too unbalanced: 80,000,000 Germans in one lump + the labour of *n* slaves + 8 years of intense rearming and organization + frenzied fanaticism *versus* 70,000,000 British in 4 continents + zero slaves + only 3 years of real rearmament and no industrial mobilization + dogged determination.

It is another example of the old prize ring rule: 'A good big man will beat a good little man every time.'

What our position and policy is at home, it is difficult to discern at this range. From here our steps in aid of Britain appear to follow along well behind the development of events. The lag is great and may prove too much. It seems already to have had its effects in the slow and discouraged crumbling of France. There was some chance that this might have been much slower otherwise. As it is, there seems to be no more sense of resistance among the French than there is in a wet dish rag.

At any rate, should we find ourselves at war, I hope that it won't be a piecemeal affair. Total war requires throwing everything available at once, military, naval, air, economic, moral—including the kitchen stove, and following this up with everything else as soon as it can be got to working.

One may question now, a year later, whether the decision to try and defend the whole Empire was a practical one. Nevertheless, any other decision at that time (after the French collapse) would have been unthinkable militarily, as well as directly opposed to the British character and tradition.

Hopkins approved particularly the 'lava' analogy, that being the one optimistic note in an otherwise dismal picture. Hopkins often appeared on the surface a sour sceptic who made a profession of looking on the dark side of everything; but in his heart he was an incorrigible optimist, as his father had been before him, and as he himself proved by innumerable \$2 bets on hopeless long shots. He was confirmed in this by close association with Roosevelt and with Churchill, two of the really Olympian optimists of all time. One could not be with either of them for long without seeing the glow and feeling the warmth of the fires of confidence that burned so strongly and so steadily in both of them. (A point for historians to consider is that had these Allied leaders not been optimists in the blackest hours, the Germans and the Japanese would undoubtedly have won the war; it was the pessimists, like Pétain, Darlan, and Weygand, who went down to quick defeat.) The 'lava' analogy proved to be an apt one, not only as applied to Germany, but even more to Japan.

During the week of June 16 Hopkins had many conferences with James Forrestal, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, and others in connection with the Iceland expedition. He saw Arthur Purvis, Jean Monnet, Sir Clive Baillieu (Australian), Air Marshal Harris, and Major Victor Cazalet, M.P., of the British Delegation. He saw Princess Juliana of the Netherlands, and her husband, Prince Bernhardt. (In fact, at 8.30 one morning, he had as breakfast guests in his room in the White House, Prince Bernhardt and Mayor La Guardia, which must have provided an entertaining mixture with the orange juice.) He saw the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, Postmaster-General Frank C. Walker, Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones, Marriner S. Eccles, William S. Paley, General S. D. Embick, and a great many other people.

On Saturday, Hopkins took a happy day off and went to the races. That night, June 21, a short-wave listening-post picked up a report that Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union. Hopkins's first thought when he heard this news was: 'The President's policy of support for Britain has really paid off!

Hitler has turned to the left.' But if Hopkins had a moment of relief it was no more than a moment; for he was compelled instantly to face the new and gigantic problems of aid for Russia.

The immediate response of the isolationists to this news was one of exultation. They had been profoundly embarrassed by the Communist alignment with the Nazis—and Roosevelt had been strengthened by it in the eyes of the American people—but now they were free to go berserk with the original Nazi party line that Hitler represented the only bulwark against Bolshevism.

There was a curious and revelatory episode in which I happened to be involved on the Sunday when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. I was scheduled to attend a Fight for Freedom rally in the Golden Gate Ballroom in Harlem. It was an insufferably hot day and there was no pretence at air-conditioning in the ballroom. When we went in there was a picket line outside (obviously a Communist one), with placards condemning the Fight for Freedom warmongers as tools of British and Wall Street Imperialism. Pamphlets were being handed out urging a Negro March on Washington to demand Equality and Peace! The Communists were very active among the Negro population in those days and since. We went through the picket line and conducted the meeting, the principal speakers being Herbert Agar and Dorothy Parker, and when we left the Golden Gate Ballroom, an hour and a half later, we found that the picket line had disappeared and the March on Washington had been cancelled. Within that short space of time the Communist party line had reached all the way from Moscow to Harlem and had completely reversed itself (or, rather, had been completely reversed by Hitler.) The next day the *Daily Worker* was pro-British, pro-Lend Lease, pro-interventionist and, for the first time in two years, pro-Roosevelt.

Among the first high officers of the Administration to put himself on record about this startling new development was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. He wrote to the President:

For the past thirty hours I have done little but reflect upon the German-Russian war and its effect upon our immediate policy. To clarify my own views I have spent today in conference with the Chief of Staff and the men in the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I am glad to say that I find substantial unanimity upon the fundamental policy which they think should be followed by us. I am even more relieved that their views coincide so entirely with my own.

First: Here is their estimate of controlling facts:

1. Germany will be thoroughly occupied in beating Russia for a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months.
2. During this period Germany must give up or slack up on

- a. Any invasion of the British Isles.
- b. Any attempt to attack herself or prevent us from occupying Iceland.
- c. Her pressure on West Africa, Dakar and South America.
- d. Any attempt to envelop the British right flank in Egypt by way of Iraq, Syria or Persia.
- e. Probably her pressure in Libya and the Mediterranean.

Second: They were unanimously of the belief that this precious and unforeseen period of respite should be used to push with the utmost vigour our movements in the Atlantic theatre of operations. They were unanimously of the feeling that such pressure on our part was the right way to help Britain, to discourage Germany, and to strengthen our own position of defence against our most imminent danger.

As you know, Marshall and I have been troubled by the fear lest we be prematurely dragged into two major operations in the Atlantic, one in the northeast and the other in Brazil, with an insufficiency of Atlantic Naval and shipping strength and an insufficient demonstrated superiority of American seapower to hold politics steady in South America. By getting into this war with Russia, Germany has much relieved our anxiety, provided we act promptly and get the initial dangers over before Germany gets her legs disentangled from the Russian mire.

To me in my knowledge of your programme which we discussed last week of going to Congress with a report and a request for ratification and authority as soon as the Iceland project is public, Germany's action seems like an almost providential occurrence. By this final demonstration of Nazi ambition and perfidy, the door is opened wide for you to lead directly towards the winning of the battle of the North Atlantic and the protection of our hemisphere in the South Atlantic, while at the same time your leadership is assured of success as fully as any future programme can well be made.

My discussions with my Staff have covered much broader grounds, embracing the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, but nothing has been developed to throw any doubt upon our views of the imperative importance of seizing at once the abovementioned opportunity for action and following it through to its logical and effective conclusion.

In its estimate of 'a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months' for the Russian campaign the War Department thinking was not far removed from that of the British military authorities, although the latter were careful to cover themselves in the event of miracles. Their appreciation of the situation reached Hopkins a week after the invasion started. They said: 'It is possible that the first phase, involving the occupation

of Ukraine and Moscow might take as little as three, or as long as six weeks, *or more.*' (The italics are mine.) The British authorities also stated:

An attempted invasion of the United Kingdom may now be considered to be temporarily postponed, since so much of the German Air Force and so many essential German Army formations are engaged in the East. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that this is only temporary. If the German campaign in Russia is a lightning one, say from three to four weeks' duration, the regrouping of the German formations in the West might be expected to take from four to six weeks after the conclusion of the campaign in Russia. If the campaign were of longer duration, it might take from six to eight weeks.

(Ribbentrop's estimate, according to Ciano, was that '*the Russia of Stalin will be erased from the map within eight weeks*'.)

Regardless of predictions, Churchill made instant response to Hitler's move into Russia. He received the news early Sunday morning, and he was, of course, in the country. He conferred that day principally with Beaverbrook and with Sir Stafford Cripps, then British Ambassador to Moscow, who had come home to report the dismal failure of all his efforts to exert any influence on Russian policy. Although one would hardly have expected it of him, Beaverbrook was a vehement supporter of immediate and unstinted aid for the Soviet Union, and was subsequently an ardent, persistent and sometimes (to Churchill) embarrassing proponent of the Second Front. At the urging of these two men as well as of his own inclinations, and after hasty consultation by telephone with other War Cabinet Ministers, Churchill went on the air that same Sunday with one of his most powerful speeches.

He said: 'No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding.' Referring in characteristic terms to Hitler, he said:

This bloodthirsty guttersnipe must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage, and devastation. Poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen, and soldiers, he must steal from them their daily bread; he must devour their harvests; he must rob them of the oil which drives their ploughs; and thus produce a famine without example in human history. And even the carnage and ruin which his victory, should he gain it—he has not gained it yet—will bring upon the Russian people, will itself be only a stepping-stone to the attempt to plunge the four or five hundred millions who live in China, and the three hundred and fifty millions who live in India, into that bottomless pit of human degradation over which the diabolic emblem of the Swastika flaunts itself. It is not

too much to say here this summer evening that the lives and happiness of a thousand million additional people are now menaced with brutal Nazi violence.

Churchill declared the decision of His Majesty's Government to give all possible help to Russia and the Russian people. I do not know for sure whether he communicated with Roosevelt by telephone or cable during the day before he made this speech, but it is my impression that he did. Following the speech, Roosevelt was urged to step up and do likewise. All manner of suggestions came into the White House as to what the President should say to the American people. The most intelligent of these were summarized in a Memorandum to Hopkins from Herbert Bayard Swope:

We are opposed to the Communists' formula and we are opposed to the Nazi formula.

In the twenty-seven years since Russia became Communistic, our national interests and our way of life never have been seriously threatened by the Soviets. But in the two years of Hitler's mad drive for world enslavement, our very existence, as a free people, has been gravely endangered.

Attempts to divide us have been made by would-be Quislings, acting within our borders. They have tried to create racial and religious differences; they have promised peace and quiet through Nazi appeasement.

Now we see what a grim tragedy a Nazi peace treaty is. Now we see again the fate that has overtaken fifteen nations which, relying upon Nazi promises, were destroyed, one by one.

We are not for Communism, but we are against all that Hitler stands for. He and his Godless Nazis are the pressing threats to a world of peace and justice and security. In his defeat lies our safety.

At this time, as ever, we must keep in mind that our greatest strength is in unity; our greatest danger in discord.

Joseph E. Davies wrote the following memorandum to Hopkins when the war in Russia had been going for two weeks:

The resistance of the Russian Army has been more effective than was generally expected. In all probability the result will depend upon air power. If Hitler dominates the air, it is likely that the same thing will occur in White Russia and in the Ukraine that occurred in Flanders and in France, namely, the inability of land forces, without air protection, to resist the combined attack by air, mechanized forces and infantry.

In such an event, Hitler will take White Russia, Moscow and the Ukraine, which will provide him with 60 per cent of the agricultural resources and 60 per cent of the industrial production of Russia.

When I was in Russia and for several years theretofore, and I am sure now, a very substantial part of the Red Army was guarding the East against Japan. I was told by competent Russian authorities in 1938 that this Army was completely self-sufficient and was provided with supplies and resources adequate for an independent campaign of two years, even though cut off from Western Russia.

In addition thereto there was the so-called Volga Army also in the interior, which consisted of 400,000 to 500,000 regulars which might be held as reserves to fall back on.

At that time there had also been built enormous steel and aircraft plants in the interior of Siberia about 1,000 miles east of Moscow. If Stalin is compelled to fall back to the East he will probably have these armed forces for such an emergency. The Ural and Caucasus mountains afford a very strong natural barrier to a mechanized attack.

If Hitler occupies White Russia and the Ukraine, as he may, and Stalin falls back into the interior, Hitler will be confronted with three major problems:

1. Guerrilla warfare and attack;
2. Sabotage by the population who resent that 'Holy Mother Russia' has been attacked; and
3. The necessity of policing conquered territory and making it produce.

In 1918 under similar circumstances in the Ukraine, the Germans found that they did not get but 80 per cent of the agricultural and other products which they had reasonably believed they could get.

Obviously, under such circumstances, it would be to Hitler's interest to put on a peace drive to induce Stalin to consent to an arrangement based on the then *status quo*, leaving Stalin to find his outlet to the South and East to China, possibly India.

Even though Hitler takes the Ukraine and White Russia, in all probability Stalin can maintain himself back of the Urals for a considerable time.

There are two contingencies which might prevent such resistance. They are:

1. An internal revolution which would overthrow Stalin and by a *coup d'état* put a Trotskyite Pro-German in power, who would make a Hitler peace.

The possibility of that is lessened because of the tendency of the people to rally around the Government in power in the face of an attack on their homes and 'Holy Mother Russia'.

2. The possibility of Stalin himself making a Hitler peace.

Stalin is oriental, coldly realistic and getting along in years. It is not impossible that he might again even 'fall' for Hitler's peace as the lesser of two evils. He believes that Russia is surrounded by capitalistic enemies. In '38 and '39 he had no confidence in the good faith of either Britain or France or the capacity of the democracies to be effective against Hitler. He hated and feared Hitler then just as he does now. He was induced to make a pact of non-aggression with Hitler as the best hope he had for preserving peace for Russia, not so much on ideological grounds as on practical grounds to save his own government.

It is, therefore, of vital importance that Stalin be impressed with the fact that he is not 'pulling the chestnuts out of the fire' for allies who have no use for him or who will be hostile to him after the war and who will be no less enemies, in the event of an allied peace, than the Germans in the event of their victory. Churchill and Eden, profiting by their previous mistake, apparently recognized this and have promised 'all out' support to Russia.

I do not overlook the fact that in this country there are large classes of people who abhor the Soviets to the extent that they hope for a Hitler victory in Russia. Hitler played on that string in Europe for the past six years to his enormous advantage and to the disruption of 'collective security'. He will play upon it again here if he can and will use it once again and to the utmost in any overtures for a new peace with Stalin. That should be offset, if possible. It could measurably be thwarted if Stalin could find some assurance that regardless of ideological differences the Administration is disinterestedly and without prejudice desirous of aiding them to defeat Hitler.

As a matter of fact, without condoning the many evil things and methods of communism in Russia, much good can be said of the Soviet Government, particularly in its relation to peace.

From my observation and contacts, since 1936, I believe that outside of the President of the United States alone no Government in the world saw more clearly the menace of Hitler to peace and the necessity for collective security and alliances among non-aggressive nations than did the Soviet Government . . .

Throughout their participation in the League of Nations, the Soviet Government led the fight for the protection of little nations vigorously and boldly. This was the fact in the case of Ethiopia and Spain.

No Government saw more clearly or stated with greater accuracy what Hitler was doing and would do and what ought to be done to preserve peace and prevent the projection of a war by Hitler than did the

Soviets. That is a fact regardless of whether their motive was ideological, or whether it was for the safety of their own people.

I found among the leading Soviets a real friendliness to the United States possibly based on the fact that there was nothing that they had that we wanted, and that we had nothing that they could take; so there was a natural basis for a policy of 'live and let live' between our two peoples. They bitterly resented the attitude of Britain and France to look down their noses at the Soviets, and this intensified their distrust and ultimately drove them into the Hitler camp.

Vis-à-vis with Japan, it is obviously to our advantage to have a friendly Russia at Japan's rear. It is my opinion that it is not their intent to seek to project communism in the United States, nor would it be within the realm of possibility after this war or for many years thereafter for the Soviets to project communism if they wished in the United States or even in Europe.

Specifically, I fear that if they get the impression that the United States is only using them, and if sentiment grows and finds expression that the United States is equally a capitalistic enemy, it would be playing directly into the hands of Hitler and he can be counted upon to use this in his efforts to project either an armistice or peace on the Russian front after he takes the Ukraine and White Russia. Word ought to be gotten to Stalin direct that our attitude is 'all out' to beat Hitler and that our historic policy of friendliness to Russia still exists.

Roosevelt, at this point, believed in the policy of making haste slowly. Churchill had spoken and there can be no doubt that Roosevelt backed him up. But before he took public action on aid for Russia he wanted to know, first, what were their needs and, second, how could the goods be delivered? (It will be remembered that, at that particular moment, American forces were *en route* to Iceland.)

The more serious aspect of the situation was that the supplying of Russia involved considerable extension of the convoy routes—and the route from Britain to Murmansk was by all odds the most terrible of the whole war, subject as it was to attack not only by U-boats, but by surface raiders darting from Norwegian fiords and bombing planes from Norwegian air bases. The British Navy, stretched tenuously over all the lifelines of the North and South Atlantic and the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, could not possibly take on this new and expensive assignment unless they were relieved of some of their responsibilities elsewhere. The moment had come when Roosevelt must consider taking 'all additional measures necessary to deliver the goods'.

On Friday evening, July 11, Hopkins had a long talk with Roosevelt in the Study, and the President drew a line on a small map of the Atlantic

Ocean, which he had torn from the *National Geographic Magazine*. Roosevelt scribbled a cable: 'To Winant from Roosevelt—Secret: Please tell former naval person to expect Hopkins very soon.' The next morning Hopkins had an engagement for breakfast with Sidney Hillman on production problems, and at 11.30 he was due to go for a week-end with the President on the *Potomac*, but that was cancelled. He had lunch with Sumner Welles and in the afternoon conferred with Commander Vickery on shipping and with General Burns on supplies. He had dinner with Lord Halifax. Early Sunday morning he flew to Montreal, thence to Gander, Newfoundland, and from there in one of the Lend Lease B-24 bombers to Prestwick, Scotland. He was very ill when he arrived, but he went immediately to Churchill to discuss the entirely new situation which had developed since their last meeting.

Hopkins noted many changes in Britain: it was summer, and he did not have to wear his overcoat indoors in Chequers; there had been no substantial air raids for two months and Britain was no longer fighting alone, which marked the faces of the people in the streets with an expression of almost incredulous relief. Yet mixed with the relief was a new kind of undefined anxiety. It was as though the British people had become so adjusted to the bombing that they had come to depend on it as a reliable morale builder. Now, without it, they seemed to be puzzled as to just what was expected of them in the waging of the war. They were thrilled by every scrap of news concerning Russian resistance to the Germans, but they could not avoid the fear that this development was no more than a temporary respite for themselves, and that once Hitler had mopped up in the East their case would be worse than ever. They were beginning to suspect that the long-sustained hope of armed aid from America was a delusion.

They were not aware—nor were the American people—of the extent to which the American invasion of the United Kingdom had really started, but it was this phenomenon which interested Hopkins most, for his previous visit had been responsible for so much of it. Grosvenor Square was now beginning to assume the character which it attained when it came to be known as Eisenhowerplatz, and some of which, as the site of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial, it will retain for ever. So many military, naval, and air *attachés* and *aides* were being attached to the U.S. Embassy that it was becoming a sizeable force in itself. These were classified as 'observers', which was no misnomer, for they were certainly observing, and profiting thereby. For instance, the B-17 Flying Fortresses had already been used by the R.A.F. in bombing raids and had belied their name, proving extremely vulnerable. Study of this combat experience was enabling U.S. Air Force officers to recommend the changes in armament which made the B-17 the tough, murderous aircraft that it became when later it was flown in action by American crews.

In addition to the American military representatives there were in London all manner of missions dealing with Lend Lease, scientific research, food, shipping, aircraft and ordnance production, and every other subject of war-time importance. The American Embassy was bursting at the seams with personnel and overflowing into other buildings in Grosvenor Square and environs.

When Hopkins saw Churchill the war in Russia was in its fourth week. Thus it had already passed the minimum set by the British authorities, and it was evident that it would pass the minimum set in Washington. There was beginning to be the faintest glimmering of hope that perhaps the Russians might hold out until winter set in, and Churchill was never one to overlook a glimmer. His principal concern was that so many German infantry divisions were now getting combat experience—or learning to be ‘battle-worthy’, in the term he loved to use—which would make them all the harder to handle later on. Hopkins gathered that Stalin had not been tremendously impressed by Britain’s offer of aid, but had been concerned, from the very beginning, with the political aspects of the enforced alliance. Even with its very life in peril the Soviet Government appeared to be more anxious to discuss future frontiers and spheres of influence than to negotiate for military supplies. The British Government was reluctant to negotiate any purely political treaty at that time. But a few days before Hopkins arrived in London the two powers had signed an ‘agreement for joint action’ which contained two provisions:

(1) An undertaking on the part of the two Governments to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite Germany, and (2) A mutual undertaking that during this war neither party would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. It was understood between the two Governments that this agreement might be supplemented by more detailed political and military agreements at a later date.

Hopkins showed Churchill the map from the *National Geographic Magazine* which Roosevelt had marked. The pencilled line followed longitude 26° north from the South Atlantic, missing the Cape Verde Islands, but cutting through the Azores. About two hundred miles south-west of Iceland it turned sharp right (eastward) and then curved around Iceland, at a radius of roughly two hundred miles, which was to be the area of U.S. air and sea patrol. The sea lanes west of this line would be—subject to further discussion—the area for the policing of which the U.S. Navy would assume responsibility, thereby freeing British escort ships for service elsewhere, particularly the Murmansk route.

In Hopkins's notes of his final talks with the President were three brief items:

'Economic or territorial deals—NO.'

'Harriman not policy.'

'No talk about war.'

The first of these speaks for itself; the last was an indication of Roosevelt's determination that, at his forthcoming meeting with Churchill, no questions were to be asked as to when the United States would enter the war. The reference to Harriman was the result of the awkward situation between him and Winant which has been mentioned previously. Hopkins was instructed to inform Churchill that Harriman, as expediter of Lend Lease, was an instrument not a maker of policy—that Winant was still Ambassador and, therefore, the President's personal representative to the King. (It is doubtful that this explanation had any appreciable effect on the situation.)

At the time of Hopkins's arrival in London, Harriman returned from his trip to the Middle East and over the new African air lanes, from the Gold Coast to the Persian Gulf. He had been given the same opportunities for inspection that he would have commanded if he were a member of the British War Cabinet. Indeed, he was accompanied by a directive from Churchill to General Wavell which said, in part: 'Mr. Harriman enjoys my complete confidence and is in the most intimate relations with the President and with Mr. Harry Hopkins. No one can do more for you. . . . I commend Mr. Harriman to your most attentive consideration. He will report both to his own Government and to me as Minister of Defence.' Which provides an indication of the extent to which the common-law alliance was in actual operation.

Harriman's report was clear and candid, but too long and detailed to reproduce here in full. He was not sparing in criticism of some of the organization in the Middle East—particularly the eternal problem of division of command as between the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In the Middle East, as in the United Kingdom, he had heard the persistent demand for American technicians—radio mechanics, ordnance artificers, boiler-makers, coppersmiths, welders, machine-tool setters, even carpenters and bricklayers. Hopkins conferred on this endless subject with Lord Hankey, the Paymaster-General, with Ernest Bevin, then Minister of Labour, with Generals, Admirals, Air Marshals. His records show that he was still trying to find ways to meet Britain's need for technicians right up to the day before Pearl Harbour. He also discussed innumerable problems of production and supply with which he had familiarized himself despite his total lack of military and industrial experience. He surveyed the tank and ordnance situation with Beaverbrook, now Minister of Supply, the aircraft situation with Sir Archibald Sinclair, the food situation with Lord Woolton.

Hopkins and Winant had the disagreeable task of going into most careful investigation of the disposition of certain Lend Lease items. The ugly charge had been made in the United States, and taken up joyfully by isolationists who were fighting Lend Lease appropriations in Congress, that the British were using Lend Lease raw materials and even some finished products not for war purposes, but to revive their export trade, particularly in South America. This was a recurrent accusation, which came to plague Winant time and again, and files of the State Department must be filled with the detailed explanations that the harassed Ambassador obtained from Sir John Anderson, President of the Privy Council, Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and other dignitaries of His Majesty's Government. There was hardly a time in the whole war when there wasn't some dangerous rumour to be investigated and refuted.

Most of Hopkins's conversations with Churchill on the forthcoming Atlantic Conference and the proposed American naval activities between the U.S. and Iceland were conducted in private and Hopkins kept no record of them. The results of them, however, are a matter of historic record. He did keep a full account of an interesting meeting at No. 10 Downing Street in which he participated with the Prime Minister, Harriman, the British Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir John Dill, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, General Sir Hastings Ismay) and the three ranking American officers in London, Admiral Ghormley, General James E. Chaney, and General Raymond E. Lee.

In the background of this meeting was serious disagreement, albeit at long range, between the American and British Chiefs of Staff as to the defensibility of Britain itself and the wisdom of continuing to attempt to hold the Middle East. Although the R.A.F. was much stronger than it had been in 1940, when it won the Battle of Britain, and thereby made German invasion at the time impossible, it was the American opinion that the Germans had profited by the lessons learned, and had demonstrated in the battle of Crete that they now knew how to immobilize the R.A.F. It was felt that the British airfields were particularly vulnerable to attack by airborne forces, and Hitler now had 60,000 trained parachutists which he evidently did not plan to use on the Russian Front. Therefore, it was questionable whether the British should be diverting substantial numbers of men and quantities of supplies to the Middle East, when all of them might be needed for the desperate defence of the United Kingdom. Similarly, naval forces and merchant shipping now traversing the long sea lanes to Suez would be better employed in the Battle of the Atlantic and the carrying of supplies to Britain.

After the Prime Minister had opened the meeting at No. 10 Downing Street with his customary parliamentary courtesy and grace, Hopkins

immediately got down to the root of the matter. He stated the American attitude bluntly, saying:

In so far as I am concerned, I am absolutely convinced that if it is decided to continue the campaign in the Middle East, the United States has got to send supplies there. Up to now, this supply problem has been handled on a day-to-day hit-or-miss basis. If it is to be continued, it will have to be done systematically and on a regular schedule, using maybe 100 ships or even more to carry regular, carefully planned cargoes or airplanes, tanks, ammunition, etc.

Our Chiefs of Staff—the men who make the big decisions on all matters relating to defence—believe that the British Empire is making too many sacrifices in trying to maintain an indefensible position in the Middle East. At any moment the Germans might take Gibraltar and seal up the Western Mediterranean. They might block the Suez Canal. They might concentrate enough air and armoured forces to overwhelm the British Armies in the Middle East. Our Chiefs of Staff believe that the Battle of the Atlantic is the final, decisive battle of the war and everything has got to be concentrated on winning it. Now, the President has a somewhat different attitude. He shares the belief that British chances in the Middle East are not too good. But he realizes that the British have got to fight the enemy wherever they find him. He is, therefore, more inclined to support continuing the campaign in the Middle East.

I know perfectly well that all of you here in Britain are determined to go on fighting to hold the Middle East at all costs and that it's difficult for you to understand the American attitude. But—you have got to remember that we in the United States just simply do not understand your problems in the Middle East, and the interests of the Moslem world, and the inter-relationship of your problems in Egypt and India. That is largely due to the fact that we have insufficient information on these subjects. The President himself has never been given a comprehensive explanation of the broad strategy of the Middle East campaign. The whole thing has been dealt with on a piecemeal basis, with attention being focused on Ethiopia, or Libya, or Syria or whatever happened to be the scene of local operations at the moment. I think that everyone in the United States appreciated why you had to go in and try to help Greece, and why you had to try to defend Crete. But there are now grave doubts as to whether it is wise for you to go any further in that region. I don't want to overstate the case, but it is vitally important that we come to an understanding on this whole matter so that the people in authority in Washington will really know why we must get supplies to the Middle East and then develop and carry through a programme to that end.

The next speaker was General Chaney, who stated that, in the American military view, the order of priority was as follows:

(1) The defence of the United Kingdom and of the Atlantic sea lanes.
(2) The defence of Singapore and the sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand.

(3) The defence of the ocean trade routes in general.

(4) The defence of the Middle East.

Chaney dwelt on the difficulties that the Germans would face in conducting successful land operations in the Middle East and also in the invasion of Britain. He said that their ability to overcome these difficulties would depend upon how soon the Russians collapsed. (Every calculation seemed to be based on the assumption that the Russians would collapse.) He said that if the Russians could hold out until the end of September, then the invasion peril would recede until the following spring, which would give time for the building up of defences both in the United Kingdom and the Middle East. But he urged that the British divert to the Middle East only the minimum necessary for defence and that they should not send any armoured forces for offensive purposes.

General Lee echoed these sentiments, and said that the American authorities were anxious to know whether the British would contemplate offensive operations in the Middle East and, if so, where would the necessary troops come from and what would be the general strategy?

Admiral Ghormley said that U.S. policy was concerned primarily with the defence of the Western Hemisphere and the provision of supplies for the defence of the United Kingdom. He said that the defence of the Middle East was important to this policy in that while the British held it they were providing indirect protection to the bases on the West African Coast, particularly Dakar. He spoke of the increasingly critical situation in the Far East, which might require the diversion of formidable units of the British Navy. He said that whatever the advantages of maintaining the position in the Middle East, it was questionable whether they were great enough to justify the enormous amount of shipping and naval escorts which were certainly needed in the Battle of the Atlantic and which might be needed in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Hopkins said: 'As far as I know, we have no plans to provide naval escorts for our ships going to the Middle East. They will have to take their own chances of getting through.'

Admiral Ghormley said that this was true, but if there were many more sinkings like the *Robin Moor* the U.S. Navy would be compelled to divert escort vessels from the North Atlantic for the protection of the South Atlantic routes.

Churchill then said that the British Chiefs of Staff would comment on all

of these interesting questions in detail, but that he would like first to comment on general aspects. He felt that conditions were improving in the Battle of the Atlantic, and would improve still further in view of the increased activities of the U.S. Navy as they had been outlined to him by Hopkins. In so far as invasion of Britain was concerned, he was confident that they had this situation well in hand. However, the Prime Minister was much less sure of his ground when he talked of possibilities in the Far East. He was convinced that the Japanese would not enter the war until they were certain that the British Empire was beaten. He was convinced that the Japanese did not want to fight the United States and the British Empire together. (This conviction, shared by Roosevelt, was of enormous importance in the formulation of policy prior to Pearl Harbour.) Churchill said that, in the event of a Japanese attack on British possessions in the Far East, Singapore, of course, would hold out, but the Japanese Navy would constitute a very grave threat to the whole traffic along the Eastern trade routes and might well offer serious threats to Australia and New Zealand. In that case, it would obviously be necessary to send naval forces, including battle-ships, from the Mediterranean to the Far East. Needless to say, the situation would be entirely different if the United States were to enter the war in the Pacific after Japan had attacked Britain . . . and, since it was needless to say it, Churchill did not pursue that dynamite-laden subject any further. He summed up by saying that, in the meantime, and awaiting all contingencies—and in spite of all objections from transatlantic friends—it would be British policy to go ahead with the reinforcement of the Middle East. The Prime Minister revealed that during the past eight months nearly half of Britain's war production had been sent to that theatre.

Admiral Pound, Air Marshal Portal, and General Dill then spoke for the Navy, Air Force, and Army. It was obvious that the German production of tank-carrying barges pointed to plans for an invasion, but it was believed that the British would be able to tell three weeks in advance if any trans-Channel operation by the Germans was imminent. Churchill said that all the lessons of Crete had been taken to heart. He again confronted the possibility that the Germans would use gas, but if they did so the British were ready for retaliation on a large scale. Dill emphasized the disastrous moral effect of withdrawal from the Middle East, particularly in its effect on the Moslem world all the way from West Africa through North Africa and the Arab States on into India.

Churchill then brought up a point which impressed Hopkins and which he duly communicated to Roosevelt when they met again at the Atlantic Conference. It was the ever-present possibility of the Germans smashing down through Spain and past Gibraltar into North and West Africa to Dakar. He said that in the event that the United States were drawn into the

war against Germany and Italy, North and West Africa might well prove to be areas favourable for the operations of American forces. Churchill also mentioned the possibilities of operations in Norway—a country, he said, 'where there was a great people burning to be liberated'—and this was a project that he never dropped until the war in Europe was nearly over.

As a result of this meeting Hopkins decided to urge the President to bring Marshall and Arnold along with him to the Conference. Presumably, before then the only military matters that were contemplated for discussion had to do with the Battle of the Atlantic, but Hopkins felt it would be useful for Marshall to learn something of the British point of view. He also suggested that Harriman fly back immediately to Washington to give Roosevelt a report on all the matters that had been discussed.

Hopkins realized all too clearly that in one vitally important respect the discussions at the Atlantic Conference would be held in a vacuum without some real knowledge of the situation and the prospects on the Russian Front. It was obvious that all the prevailing estimates, both British and American, were based on inadequate information and speculation. There was a British military mission in Moscow, but it was gathering no more information than was vouchsafed by Molotov's Foreign Office to the Embassies, which was to say none at all. Since all deliberation on all phases of the war at that time, including American production and Lend Lease, depended on the question of how long Russia could hold out, Hopkins decided that he should make a quick trip to Moscow and try to get an answer to that question from Stalin himself. He asked Churchill whether it would be possible to fly to Moscow and return within a week. Churchill informed him that the R.A.F. Coastal Command had recently opened up a new air route for PBV (Catalina) flying boats from Invergordon in Scotland around the North Cape of Norway to Archangel; a few flights had already been made on this extremely difficult route. Churchill agreed that it would be valuable to learn the truth about the Eastern Front, and he felt that Stalin might agree to disclose some part of it to the personal representative of the President of the United States, but he was not enthusiastic about the idea of Hopkins taking so long and hazardous a trip. However, Hopkins was excited at the thought of it, and on Friday evening, July 25, he and Winant drafted the following cable to Roosevelt.

For the President only:

When I was in Canada the Government officials stated they hoped that you could go to Ottawa on the seventh of August. I wanted to phone you from Gander but there were no communications there. I am going to remain here a day or two longer for conference with Commander Middle East. His visit here very secret. I am wondering whether you

would think it important and useful for me to go to Moscow. Air transportation good and can reach there in twenty-four hours. I have a feeling that everything possible should be done to make certain the Russians maintain a permanent front even though they be defeated in this immediate battle. If Stalin could in any way be influenced at a critical time I think it would be worth doing by a direct communication from you through a personal envoy. I think the stakes are so great that it should be done. Stalin would then know in an unmistakable way that we mean business on a long-term supply job. I of course have made no moves in regard to this and will await your advice. If you think Moscow trip inadvisable I will leave here not later than Wednesday. Am spending week-end with Prime Minister but message through Navy will reach me quickly. There is no news here about Russia or Japan that you do not already have. Prime Minister does not believe Japan wants war. Russian Ambassador told me this morning he did not believe Japan would attack Russia immediately. Long conference last night with military chiefs and our military representatives on the strategic position of the British in the Middle East. They are determined to fight it out in that sector and it seems to me they gave very convincing reasons to all of us for that determination. I do hope you are well and am sorry my mission has taken longer than I anticipated. We had news this morning that the *Scharnhorst* is out. British making very powerful air attacks but bomber losses substantial. Everybody here in good spirits but realize that the Russian business gives them only a temporary breather. Everyone here asks about you and are delighted to know that you are in good health.

HARRY.

It is remotely possible, though unlikely, that Roosevelt had discussed the possibility of a trip to Moscow before Hopkins left Washington. If so, there is no mention of it in any of the notes that Hopkins took with him to London, and it was the recollection of Churchill, Winant and Harriman that Hopkins himself conceived the idea for the trip very suddenly and acted on it immediately. Hopkins was at Chequers, late on Saturday evening, when he received Roosevelt's reply:

Welles and I highly approve Moscow trip and assume you would go in a few days. Possibly you could get back to North America by August eighth. I will send you tonight a message for Stalin.

All well here. Tell Former Naval Person our concurrent action in regard to Japan is, I think, bearing fruit. I hear their Government much upset and no conclusive future policy has been determined on. Tell him also in great confidence that I have suggested to Nomura that Indo-China

be neutralized by Britain, Dutch, Chinese, Japan and ourselves, placing Indo-China somewhat in status of Switzerland. Japan to get rice and fertilizer but all on condition that Japan withdraw armed forces from Indo-China *in toto*. I have had no answer yet. When it comes it will probably be unfavourable but we have at least made one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific.

The first short paragraph in that cable provided Presidential authorization for one of the most extraordinarily important and valuable missions of the whole war. Within twenty-four hours of its arrival at Chequers, Hopkins was on his way. Early on Sunday morning Hopkins went into Churchill's bedroom. The Prime Minister always did a great deal of his business while still in bed and often carried it on while he was in his bath; it was his inexorable habit to have two very hot baths each day and he did not permit these to interrupt the transaction of the business of his high office. On this occasion Churchill picked up the telephone and put through the orders for transporting his guest to Archangel on the White Sea. Hopkins would have to leave by train that night for Invergordon on the East Coast of Scotland, where the PBY Catalina would be ready for him. In the meantime Winant was busily engaged locating the Russian Ambassador, M. Maisky, in order to get a Soviet visa on Hopkins's passport. This was no easy matter, as Maisky had gone sufficiently native in England to be away in the country himself for the week-end, but Winant finally tracked him down.

That Sunday at Chequers must have been an interesting one, with few evidences of peace or quiet. Quentin Reynolds was there on Saturday working with Hopkins on a speech which he was to broadcast on Sunday from Churchill's personal microphone. Churchill himself was preparing an enormous speech, which would last more than two hours, reporting to the House of Commons on the whole intricate production situation. Professor Lindemann, now Lord Cherwell, was helping in the marshalling of facts, some of which represented proud boasts and some apologies. Winant came out on Sunday for a hurried conference. In the late afternoon Averell Harriman and his daughter Kathleen arrived. There was the usual complement of week-end guests who were supposed to provide relaxation for the harried Prime Minister. In addition to all this, that indefatigable fighter for freedom, Dorothy Thompson, came to Chequers for Sunday lunch in the course of a whirlwind tour of embattled Britain. Of course, none of those present, except Churchill and his personal staff and Winant and Harriman, knew that Hopkins was leaving that night for a visit to Joseph Stalin.

Miss Thompson recalls that at lunch that day there was some discussion of the Russian situation, and it was largely expressions of pessimism, which Churchill and Hopkins seemed to share. 'In fact,' she has said, 'from what I

recall of my London visit in the summer of 1941, the only person I met who was confident about the power of the Russians to hold the Germans was Eduard Benes (the exiled President of Czechoslovakia).'

Reynolds has provided me with the following description of his participation in that week-end at Chequers:

I was invited by Mrs. Churchill, but at the instigation of Hopkins who wanted me to help him write the B.B.C. speech. Harry felt I'd know how to word things so that the British people would know what he was trying to say. He had been working very long hours—attending British Cabinet meetings—and he showed it. He was dog-tired and had a touch of 'grippe'. At least, that is what he told Mrs. Churchill. I am sure it was his old ailment bothering him, but he always sloughed that off by saying a casual: 'Got a little cold during the trip over.'

Mrs. Churchill was very concerned over Harry's health. She knew Harry so well that she could tell when he was in pain by looking at him, I think. Around eleven o'clock in the evening she would start trying to persuade him to go to bed, saying: 'You have a long day tomorrow and you can have a nice talk with Winston in the morning. I've fixed your bed and put a hot-water bottle in it.' I am sure Harry never got such a mothering in his life, except maybe from Mrs. Roosevelt.

When Harry talked to me about his speech he said he wanted to give the British public hope that big things were on the way; that substantial help was coming under Lend Lease. But he couldn't be too specific. Security was involved (submarines were very active; at home the isolationists were screaming bloody murder). Harry said: 'Anything I say will be construed as a direct message from F.D.R. People know I'm only the President's messenger-boy.' (I heard Harry say that quite often.) 'Funny thing, but a lot o' politicians at home who hate the Administration credit me with a Svengali-like influence over the Prez.' Harry always laughed at that. 'If they only knew I just deliver messages.' (I don't know if Harry actually felt that way. But that's the line he always took with me when I'd meet him in London.)

After they had talked out the speech at length—while Hopkins played with the Churchills' cat, which was named Nelson and was very ill natured—Reynolds sat down at a typewriter that had been provided in Hopkins's bedroom, and Hopkins lay down on the bed and slept. When the speech was finished Hopkins read it through and exclaimed: 'Hell, Quent, you've got me declaring war on Germany.' Said Reynolds: 'We should have done that long ago.' Hopkins then proceeded to tone it down.

Hopkins broadcast the speech from Chequers at 9.15 on Sunday evening,

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Merchant ships go -
all the time -
Convoy can join
up with American
flag or Icelandic flag
ships. Must be an
American ship if
captured.

No talk about war

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

is threatened - No
Communist attack -

America not policy

Patrol

1. We run 26 north
from F.P.C. - Manning
Cape Verde but nearest
Agnes. Into S. E. of
Greenland & S.W. of
Iceland. Swings
eastward. around
Iceland to reach
destination as necessary
Would about 200 miles
+ all W. Galat

Notes jotted down by Harry Hopkins during his final conference with President Roosevelt in July, 1942, before leaving for the United Kingdom (see page 312).



July 27. From the point of view of the B.B.C. audience in Britain and on the Continent, far and away the most important statement that he made was: 'I did not come from America alone. I came in a bomber plane, and with me were twenty other bombers made in America.' That statement, accurate in itself, gave people who were hungry for hope a highly inaccurate picture of a steady swarm of bombers flying from the United States to Britain, and from British bases to their devastating missions over Europe.

After the speech, Hopkins and Churchill walked out on the lawn at Chequers. It was still daylight. Churchill told Hopkins in minutest detail of the efforts that Britain was making and planned to make to bring aid to Russia. He talked with his usual vigour and eloquence of the importance of Russia in the battle against Hitler. Hopkins asked if he could repeat any of this to Stalin.

'Tell him, tell him,' Churchill said. 'Tell him that Britain has but one ambition today, but one desire—to crush Hitler. Tell him that he can depend upon us. . . . Good-bye—God bless you, Harry.'

Hopkins then drove with Harriman and his daughter Kathleen to Euston Station, where he was to take the train for Invergordon. He had no time to go back to Claridge's. Dorsey Fisher, of the U.S. Embassy, had been there to collect Hopkins's sparse luggage, which he delivered at the station. (Hopkins did not pay his hotel bill until six weeks later.) As the train was pulling out Winant ran up and, through the car window, handed Hopkins his passport, containing Maisky's handwritten visa—which proved to be a total waste of time and effort, since no one in Russia ever looked at the passport.

As the special train left the gloomy, smoky, faintly lit station, Winant and Harriman felt that they had said good-bye to someone who was about to step into a rocket bound for interstellar space, for Russia then seemed immeasurably far away.

The only authority that Hopkins carried with him on this strange, sudden journey, aside from the passport, was a cable which had arrived that day from Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State:

The President asks that when you first see Mr. Stalin you will give him the following message in the President's name: 'Mr. Hopkins is in Moscow at my request for discussions with you personally and with such other officials as you may designate on the vitally important question of how we can most expeditiously and effectively make available the assistance the United States can render to your country in its magnificent resistance to the treacherous aggression by Hitlerite Germany. I have already informed your Ambassador, Mr. Oumansky, that all possible aid will be given by the United States Government in obtaining munitions,

armaments and other supplies needed to meet your most urgent requirements and which can be made available for actual use in the coming two months in your country. We shall promptly settle the details of these questions with the missions headed by General Golivkov which is now in Washington. The visit now being made by Mr. Hopkins to Moscow will, I feel, be invaluable by clarifying for us here in the United States your most urgent requirements so that we can reach the most practicable decisions to simplify the mechanics of delivery and speed them up. We shall be able to complete during the next winter a great amount of material which your Government wishes to obtain in this country. I therefore think that the immediate concern of both Governments should be to concentrate on the material which can reach Russia within the next three months.

I ask you to treat Mr. Hopkins with the identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me. He will communicate directly to me the views that you express to him and will tell me what you consider are the most pressing individual problems on which we could be of aid.

'May I express, in conclusion, the great admiration all of us in the United States feel for the superb bravery displayed by the Russian people in the defence of their liberty and in their fight for the independence of Russia. The success of your people and all other peoples in opposing Hitler aggression and his plans for world conquest has been heartening to the American people.'

Hopkins at this time again became an important figure in the psychological warfare which, apart from the endless battle of the Atlantic, was about the only form of combat between the British and the Germans. The B.B.C. European services advertised Hopkins's peregrinations constantly in broadcasts to all of the occupied countries of Europe, as well as to Germany and Italy. His own radio speech was translated and broadcast in many different languages and printed in leaflets distributed by the thousands and millions by the R.A.F. Bomber Command. It took a good deal of ingenuity on the part of the British propaganda experts to explain just who Hopkins was, but they managed to convey the implication that he represented the vanguard of an enormous American Expeditionary Force. The Germans used Hopkins plentifully in their propaganda to the United States, announcing that he was committing his country to intervention in the war to defend British Imperialism and Russian Communism—and this charge was, of course, loudly echoed by the isolationists. However, Dr. Goebbels could not use this same line in his propaganda to Britain—or to France, Norway, Poland or other occupied countries—since American intervention was the one development

for which they were praying. In his propaganda to these countries, about the best that Goebbels could do was represent Hopkins as the instrument of Western barbarism, intent upon the enslavement of Europe by Wall Street and the reduction of Europe's ancient culture to the levels of Hollywood. The amount of attention that the Nazi propagandists gave to Hopkins served greatly to increase the warmth of his welcome in Moscow.

THE KREMLIN

ON Sunday, July 26, the PBY Catalina W.6416 of the R.A.F. Coastal Command was resting on the calm waters of Loch Lomond after weeks of rough work patrolling the north-west approaches between Scotland and Iceland. The members of its crew were enjoying swimming, picnicking, and the Highland scenery in the summer sunshine. It was the general practice to fly these planes periodically from their salt-water base to a lake to wash them down in fresh water, and the crews always converted these trips into little holidays. On this day, however, the relaxation was cut short. At four o'clock in the afternoon a reconnaissance plane came over and flashed light signals to the Catalina's captain, Flight Lieutenant D. C. McKinley, D.F.C. He was ordered to return immediately to Base, which was at Oban on the West Coast of Scotland.

When he had reported there McKinley was informed that he was to proceed next day to Invergordon, a naval and air base on the East Coast, for a highly important mission; he had a good idea what this meant, for Invergordon was the base from which other Catalinas had been opening up the new air route to Northern Russia. The next day, Monday, they flew to Invergordon, and there McKinley was briefed on his flight and told that his passengers were Americans—Mr. Harry Hopkins, General Joseph T. McNarney, and Lieutenant John R. Alison of the U.S. Army Air Corps. Weather conditions were bad and the flight was delayed. Hopkins was taken for a drive over the Scottish moors, and stopped for tea at a shop run by a Mrs. Simpson, where he had delicious bread and butter, heather honey, and other delicacies which were usually unobtainable even in Claridge's. After this tour, Hopkins went to a cocktail-party at a small hotel, and was going on from there to dinner with R.A.F. officers and a group of Americans who were secretly in training, but a message came from London that the aircraft was ordered to ignore the weather and take off at once. When Hopkins came down to the waterfront and saw the PBY out in the harbour, he felt a sort of pride of possession in it; he had fought harder for PBY's for the British than for any other type of aircraft, as the U.S. Navy quite naturally objected to giving up any of these valuable patrol bombers.

In a report on this mission McKinley wrote:

The names of (passengers) or broad nature of the mission were not transmitted to the remainder of the crew prior to departure, on the wishes of the Station Commander. Owing to the shortage of time following the arrival of Mr. Hopkins's party at Invergordon and the

intended time of departure for Archangel, little time was available for properly kitting the party with flying clothing. This factor was doubtless a contributory one in the subsequent discomfort of the party. Although each person was finally issued with a full list of items, the fact that many were ill fitting detracted from their usefulness. An additional factor that was seriously overlooked was that of briefing the crew as to Mr. Hopkins's state of health. Twenty-four-hour flights in the very stern austerity furnishings of a warplane and living on hard tack rations are not ideal conditions for a man in a critical state of health.

In view of the general crowding and the forecasted length of flight, with the resulting increase in fuel load, we were forced to reduce the crew to five. This in turn was to place an additional strain on the passengers, since we could not spare flight personnel from flight duties to prepare meals and attend to the needs of our passengers.

About an hour after the take-off, McKinley told Pilot Officer C. M. Owen to go aft and 'see how Mr. Hopkins is—he's the very thin one in a grey hat'.

'And who is Mr. Hopkins?' asked Owen.

'He's a very important person. That's all we need to know.'

The hat that Hopkins was now wearing was a dignified, well-blocked grey Homburg which bore inside the initials W.S.C. He had lost his old, misshapen 'benny' on a trip out of London (or perhaps someone had deliberately mislaid it for him) and the Prime Minister had given him one of his own. Hopkins sat most of the time on this flight on a machine-gunner's pivoted stool in the 'blister' near the tail, watching for signs of the enemy. The plane followed a course about a hundred miles from the Norwegian coast, but it flew at comparatively low altitude and slow speed, and if a scouting German plane or destroyer had spotted it, it could have been shot down easily. Furthermore, visibility was uncomfortably good, for on the entire flight out and back through those far northern latitudes there was virtually no night. In the event of attack by enemy aircraft Hopkins might have been called on to man a machine-gun, and this possibility naturally interested him very much. But, fortunately, he was not subjected to this test; he served occasionally as cook and steward in the absence of the sixth crew member.

Because of the secrecy as well as the haste which surrounded the preparations for this trip there was no opportunity to provide anything in the way of comfort for the passengers. The aircraft was in its ordinary operational status and anyone who has flown a long distance in a PBY knows that it provides 'very stern austerity' indeed. Since these planes sometimes were out as long as thirty hours on patrol, there were canvas stretchers to be used as bunks for crew members to snatch intervals of rest. Hopkins tried to get

some sleep on one of these, but in the last third of the flight he suffered severely from the sub-Arctic cold.

The PBY was to make its first landfall at Kanin Point at the north-east tip of the White Sea. But here the only error was made by the navigator, a gallant young officer who was later killed in action. The plane was somewhat to the north of its intended course and, missing Kanin Point, they continued on until they sighted Kolzuev Island, some 150 miles to the eastward. They then turned south into Cheshskaya Bay, thinking it was the White Sea. Lacking adequate charts of that remote coast, they might have become completely lost had they not picked up the faint signal of the Archangel radio, and they 'homed' on that beam. McKinley's report described the arrival:

On arrival at Archangel the Mission was met by representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces, and a very cordial welcome extended to all, including the flight crew. Mr. Hopkins and his staff were hurriedly transferred to a waiting aircraft for the onward flight to Moscow. At this stage Mr. Hopkins was looking very tired, although he was most convincing that he had passed a pleasant journey. Such a statement was in itself mildly untrue, because little could be further from an accurate description. . . . This was an early indication of his determination to totally disregard personal comfort.

Owen, the first pilot, added to this that during the days they remained at Archangel, waiting for Hopkins to return from Moscow, they were confined to their quarters on a houseboat on the Dvina River. A woman interpreter was assigned to them, and they continually asked her if they couldn't go ashore and see something of the people and the town, but the reply was always flatly negative. However, there was another R.A.F. Catalina crew there who had landed a few days previously and, said Owen, 'we were treated with so much more deference than they were and got such better food that we finally realized Mr. Hopkins must be very important indeed'.

At Archangel, Hopkins was met by representatives of the American and British Embassies, Russian Army, Navy and Air Force officers, local commissars, and the inevitable secret police. He noted later that 'the latter looked neither more nor less obvious than the American plain-clothes man'. He was introduced to his interpreter, an attractive-looking Russian woman, and informed through her that unfortunately it would be impossible to fly him to Moscow that night, but that they hoped to be able to get him off at 4 a.m. the following day. He made no objection to this, for he was glad of a chance to get some sleep after his long flight, but the Admiral who was in command there invited him and the American officers to dinner aboard his yacht. This was Hopkins's first experience of the hospitality shown by

Soviet officials to visiting dignitaries. He later wrote a description of this dinner:

It was monumental.

It lasted almost four hours. There was an Iowa flavour to it, what with the fresh vegetables, the butter, cream, greens. For some reason the cucumbers and radishes surprised me. They were grown on the farms that hem in the city. Anyway, the dinner was enormous, course after course. There was the inescapable cold fish, caviar, and vodka. Vodka has authority. It is nothing for the amateur to trifle with. Drink it as an American or an Englishman takes whiskey neat and it will tear you apart. The thing to do is to spread a chunk of bread (and good bread it was) with caviar, and, while you are swallowing that bolt your vodka. Don't play with the stuff. Eat while you're drinking it—something that will act as a shock absorber for it.

Due to the length of this dinner, Hopkins had only two hours to sleep before being taken to the airport. The plane, flown by Russians, was an American Douglas Transport with very comfortable appointments.

On the take-off Hopkins was given his first taste of the 'special salutes' which the Russians give to distinguished visitors: the plane buzzes the field, dips first one wing then the other, and then, as he wrote, 'seems to spring vertically upward, then bounce'. This is a mark of signal honour, but it tends to scare the hell out of the recipient.

The flight to Moscow took four hours, and during it Hopkins began to be reassured as to the future of the Soviet Union. He looked down upon the hundreds of miles of solid forest, and he thought that Hitler with all the Panzer Divisions in the Wehrmacht could never hope to break through country like this.

At the airport in Moscow, Hopkins was met by the American Ambassador, Laurence A. Steinhardt, and another large reception committee. He wrote: 'In Russia I shook hands as I have never shaken hands before. Several times I grinned at myself, asking myself whether I were running for office. However, I kissed no babies.' Steinhardt took him to the American Embassy, Spasso House, and put him to bed, but he was too excited at being in Moscow to be able to sleep very long. He did not want to waste a moment during his brief stay in the Soviet capital—he wanted to spend all the time that he possibly could observing, listening, absorbing. He was now at the other end of the cables upon which the United States and British Governments had depended for information about the vast mystery which was Russia.

He had a long talk with Steinhardt in which he said that the main purpose of his visit was to determine whether the situation was as disastrous as it was

pictured in the War Department—and particularly as indicated in the cables from the Military Attaché, Major Ivan Yeaton.

Steinhardt said that anyone who knew anything of Russian history could hardly jump to the conclusion that the Germans would achieve easy conquest. Russian soldiers might appear inept when engaged in offensive operations—they had done so in the Napoleonic wars and again in Finland. But when they were called upon to defend their homeland they were superb fighters—and there were certainly a great many of them. But, Steinhardt emphasized, it was supremely difficult for any outsider in Moscow to get a clear picture of what was really going on. He and other diplomats in Moscow had been continually frustrated in their attempted dealings with the Soviet authorities, because of the prevailing attitude of suspicion toward all foreigners and consequent secretiveness. Hopkins said he was determined somehow or other to break through this wall of suspicion.

He had a rest and then drove about Moscow with Steinhardt on a sight-seeing tour. At 6.30 p.m. Steinhardt took him to the Kremlin to meet Stalin. Hopkins's report to the President of that first meeting follows, in full:

I told Mr. Stalin that I came as personal representative of the President. The President considered Hitler the enemy of mankind and that he therefore wished to aid the Soviet Union in its fight against Germany.

I told him that my mission was not a diplomatic one in the sense that I did not propose any formal understanding of any kind or character.

I expressed to him the President's belief that the most important thing to be done in the world today was to defeat Hitler and Hitlerism. I impressed upon him the determination of the President and our Government to extend all possible aid to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible time.

I told Mr. Stalin that I had certain personal messages from the President and explained my relationship to the Administration in Washington. I told him further that I just left Mr. Churchill in London, who wished me to convey to him the sentiments which I had already expressed from the President.

Mr. Stalin said he welcomed me to the Soviet Union; that he had already been informed of my visit.

Describing Hitler and Germany, Mr. Stalin spoke of the necessity of there being a minimum moral standard between all nations and without such a minimum moral standard nations could not co-exist. He stated that the present leaders of Germany knew no such minimum moral standard and that, therefore, they represented an anti-social force in the present world. The Germans were a people, he said, who without a second's thought would sign a treaty today, break it tomorrow and sign

a second one the following day. Nations must fulfil their treaty obligations, he said, or international society could not exist.

When he completed his general summary of the Soviet Union's attitude toward Germany he said 'therefore our views coincide'.

I told Mr. Stalin that the question of aid to the Soviet Union was divided into two parts. First, what would Russia most require that the United States could deliver immediately and, second, what would be Russia's requirements on the basis of a long war:

Stalin listed in the first category the immediate need of, first, anti-aircraft guns of medium calibre, of from 20 to 37 mm., together with ammunition. He stated that he needed such medium-calibre guns because of the rapidity of their fire and their mobility. He stated that altogether he needed approximately 20,000 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, large and small. He believed that if he could acquire such a quantity it would immediately release nearly 2,000 pursuit ships which are today required for the protection of military objectives behind the Soviet lines, and such planes, if released, could be used as attacking forces against the enemy.

Second, he asked for large-size machine-guns for the defence of his cities.

Third, he said he heard there were many rifles available in the United States and he believed their calibre corresponded to the calibre used in his Army. He stated that he needed one million or more such rifles. I asked Mr. Stalin if he needed ammunition for these rifles and he replied that if the calibre was the same as the one used by the Red Army 'we have plenty'.

In the second category, namely, the supplies needed for a long-range war, he mentioned, first, high-octane aviation gasoline, second, aluminium for the construction of airplanes and, third, the other items already mentioned in the list presented to our Government in Washington.

At this point in the conversation Mr. Stalin suddenly made the remark: 'Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminium and we can fight for three or four years.'

I referred to the 200 Curtiss P-40's which are being delivered to the Soviet Union and, in reply to a question from Mr. Stalin, I confirmed the fact that 140 were being delivered by way of England and 60 from the United States.

In connection with the delivery of these planes I referred to Lt. Alison's presence in Moscow and said he was an outstanding expert in the operation of this type of plane. I asked if he would care to have Lt. Alison stationed in Archangel in an advisory capacity, to which Mr. Stalin replied affirmatively.

Mr. Stalin stated that he would be glad if we would send any techni-

cians that we could do the Soviet Union to help train his own airmen in the use of these planes. He stated that his own airmen would show us everything about the Russian equipment, which he stated we would find very interesting.

He described at some length, but not in great detail as he did in the conference the next day, the planes which he had available. Mr. Stalin said the plane he needed particularly was the short-range bomber, capable of operating in a radius of 600 to 1,100 kilometres, or with a total range of 1,200 to 2,200 kilometres.

I asked Mr. Stalin what he thought was the best route to ship supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. Mr. Stalin stated that the Persian Gulf-Iranian route was not good, because of the limited capacity of the Iranian railways and highways. He stated, 'furthermore we do not yet know the view of the Iranian Government on this subject'.

Mr. Stalin stated that the Vladivostok route was not a favourable one. I emphasized the danger of its being cut off by the Japanese and Mr. Stalin in turn emphasized the great distance from the scene of battle.

Mr. Stalin believed that the Archangel route was probably the most practicable. Both Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov stated that the Archangel harbour could be kept open in the winter by the aid of ice breakers. Mr. Stalin pointed out that the only two absolutely ice-free ports in the north were Murmansk and Kalgalaksha.

I told Mr. Stalin that my stay in Moscow must be brief. I wished to accomplish as much as possible in the short time which I had at my disposal. I asked Mr. Stalin whether he wished to carry on the conversations personally or would prefer that I would discuss some of the details with other representatives of the Soviet Government. I said that, of course, I would prefer to confer directly with him, but I realized he had a great many responsibilities at the moment. I told him that I had some personal messages from the President which I wanted to deliver at an appropriate time.

Mr. Stalin replied: 'You are our guest; you have but to command.' He told me he would be at my disposal every day from six to seven. It was then agreed that I confer with representatives of the Red Army at ten o'clock that night.

I reiterated to Mr. Stalin the appreciation of the people of the United States of the splendid resistance of the Soviet Army and of the President's determination to do everything to assist the Soviet Union in its valiant struggle against the German invader.

Mr. Stalin replied with an expression of gratitude of the Soviet Government.

I told Mr. Stalin that I expected to interview the representatives of the

Anglo-American Press following my meeting and asked whether Mr. Stalin had any wishes in connection with what I should say or whether he would prefer that no interview be held at all. I told him that under any circumstances the correspondents' stories would be subject to the control of his censorship.

To this Mr. Stalin replied that anything I might have to say would require no censorship by his Government.

I expressed to Mr. Molotov my desire to call upon him and it was arranged that I should see Mr. Molotov at three the next day.

Later that evening Hopkins engaged in technical discussions with General Yakovlev, an artilleryman of the Red Army, General McNarney, and Major Yeaton. Most of the discussion was of the items previously mentioned by Stalin—anti-aircraft guns, aluminium, rifles, etc. When that list was exhausted Hopkins went on to suggest that a Russian technical mission be sent to Washington and kept there permanently to discuss new problems as they came up day by day. Yakovlev refused to comment on this suggestion, saying it should be taken up with Stalin. This was Hopkins's first real encounter with the limitations imposed on the lower levels (which meant any level below the very top) of the Soviet system; they did not dare to utter a word on any topic beyond the prescribed agenda. Hopkins asked Yakovlev if he couldn't think of other items that the Army might need, and Yakovlev—doubtless with the utmost reluctance—said that he could think of nothing else, that the most important items had been covered. In the minutes of this meeting appears the following revealing passage:

Mr. Hopkins stated that he was surprised that General Yakovlev did not mention tanks and anti-tank guns. General Yakovlev replied, I think we have enough. Mr. Hopkins remarked that many tanks were necessary when fighting this particular enemy. General Yakovlev agreed. When asked the weight of Russia's heaviest tank, General Yakovlev replied, it is a good tank.

General Yakovlev was asked if Russian artillery had been able to stop the German tanks. He replied, our artillery shoots any tank—conditions vary. After further discussion of the tank question General Yakovlev stated that the Russians could use extra tanks and anti-tank guns and said America could provide Russia with them. He went on further to say, I am not empowered to say whether we do or do not need tanks or anti-tank guns.

Hopkins was greatly impressed with the black-out in Moscow which was even more impenetrable than London's. He was also impressed by the tremendous concentration of anti-aircraft fire when German bombers came

over on a raid. A bomb shelter had been placed at his disposal, and he and Steinhardt went there. Hopkins was amazed at the champagne, caviar, chocolates, and cigarettes with which the bomb shelter had been equipped and, according to Steinhardt: 'He laughed heartily when I told him that no bomb shelter had ever been placed at *my* disposal and I owed this night's protection to his presence.'

On Hopkins's second day in Moscow, July 31, he met Sir Stafford Cripps, who had returned in haste from England after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. They discussed principally the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill conference in its relation to Russia. They agreed that the President and Prime Minister should send a joint message to Stalin at the end of the conference and discussed the wording of this message. Cripps wrote a draft of the message based on their discussions and Hopkins took this draft with him to the Atlantic Conference. Although some of this was cut out, the wording was essentially the same in the cable that was sent to Stalin from Argentina two weeks later—including the opening sentence: 'We have taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration of the report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defence that you are putting up against the Nazi attack.' (The only change there was that 'making' was substituted for 'putting up'.)

That afternoon Hopkins and Steinhardt called upon Molotov in the Kremlin as arranged. The main topic was the situation in the Far East and the growing menace of Japan. In his report to the President on this conversation Hopkins did not record what he himself said in introducing the subject, since this would have no news value for Roosevelt. However, Steinhardt summarized it in a cable to the State Department, the first part of which follows:

At an interview with Molotov this afternoon at which I was present Harry Hopkins presented to him the point of view of the President and the American people with respect to Japan and China in their relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. He made it clear that in the event of continued Japanese aggression the temper of the American public and the disposition of the President is to make no threat which would not be followed by action if necessary. He stressed the fact that the longstanding amicable relations between the United States and Russia, which the American public has come to accept as assuring stability in the North Pacific, would be jeopardized by a Japanese venture in Siberia and said that the United States could not look with complacency on the occupation of any part of that area by Japan. In this connection he stated that he had reason to believe that the Japanese Government is

awaiting the outcome of the great battle now in progress on the Soviet western frontier and that it might take action against the Soviet Union should the outcome of this battle be unfavourable to the Soviet Union. Molotov stated that he understood and appreciated the President's point of view.

At this point Steinhardt's message joins up with Hopkins's report, which was as follows:

Mr. Molotov stated that while the Soviet-Japanese relations presumably had been fixed by, first, the conversations with Matsuoka and, secondly, the neutrality pact signed between the two countries, nevertheless, the attitude of the new Japanese Government toward the Soviet Union is uncertain and, since the Soviet Government is by no means clear as to the policy which the Japanese Government intends to pursue, it is watching the situation with the utmost care.

He stated that the one thing he thought would keep Japan from making an aggressive move would be for the President to find some appropriate means of giving Japan what Mr. Molotov described as a 'warning'.

While Mr. Molotov did not use the exact words, it was perfectly clear that the implication of his statement was that the warning would include a statement that the United States would come to the assistance of the Soviet Union in the event of its being attacked by Japan.

Mr. Molotov did not express any immediate concern that Japan was going to attack Russia, and on Russia's part Mr. Molotov stated repeatedly that Russia did not wish any difficulties with Japan.

He left me with the impression, however, that it was a matter of very considerable concern to him, and that he felt the Japanese would not hesitate to strike if a propitious time occurred. Hence his great interest in the attitude of the United States toward Japan.

I told Mr. Molotov that the Government of the United States was disturbed at the encroachments which Japan was making in the Far East, and I was sure the American people would not look with any favour on Japan gaining a further hold in Siberia; that our long period of friendly relations between Russia and the United States, with our two countries only fifty miles apart, should be some indication of our interest in seeing stability in the Far East, including Siberia.

I told him that our Government was watching developments in the Far Eastern situation with great care and looked with misgivings and concern at the threatening attitude of Japan, both to the South and to the North. I told him, however, that our attitude towards Japan was a

reasonable one and that we had no desire to be provocative in our relations with Japan.

I told him I would give the President his message regarding his, Molotov's, anxiety about Siberia and his desire to have the President indicate to Japan that further encroachments would not be tolerated.

I asked Mr. Molotov what their relationships with China were in the light of new developments and whether or not they could continue rendering the substantial material assistance they had been giving to Chiang Kai-shek or whether the Soviet Union's requirements in its own war with Germany would preclude their continuing to supply China.

Mr. Molotov replied that, of course, the Soviet Union's requirements for war material must of necessity adversely affect delivery to China; that while they do not wish to cut them off entirely and would continue to give everything they could, the necessities of their own situation required them to divert the Chinese supplies to their own battle line. Molotov expressed the hope that the United States would increase its own deliveries to make good the deficiency caused by Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.

I told Mr. Molotov that the American people were impressed by the gallant defence of the Soviet Army and assured him of the desire of the President to render every possible aid in the terms of materials to the Soviet Union as speedily as possible.

Mr. Molotov asked me to convey the Soviet Government's thanks to the President for sending his personal representative on this mission to Moscow.

It is interesting to note that Molotov expressed much the same point of view that Churchill had expressed previously and expressed again at the Atlantic Conference: that the United States should adopt a tough attitude toward Japan as a means of preventing further extension of the war in Asia.

When Hopkins returned to the Kremlin at six-thirty that evening for a three-hour meeting with Stalin he was unaccompanied by Steinhardt or anyone else. The interpreter was Maxim Litvinoff, who had been the Soviet Foreign Commissar in the days of Geneva and 'collective security', and then had disappeared into the vast silences after the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939. Now, Hopkins said later, he seemed like a morning coat which had been laid away in moth-balls when Russia retreated into isolation from the West, but which had now been brought out, dusted off, and aired as a symbol of completely changed conditions.

Hopkins divided his report of this long meeting with Stalin into three parts. The first two, in full, were as follows:

PART I

I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have his—Stalin's—appreciation and analysis of the war between Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as follows:

He stated that in his opinion the German Army had 175 divisions on Russia's western front at the outbreak of the war, and that since the outbreak of the war this has been increased to 232 divisions; he believes that Germany can mobilize 300 divisions.

He stated that Russia had 180 divisions at the outbreak of the war, but many of these were well back of the line of combat, and could not be quickly mobilized, so that when the Germans struck it was impossible to offer adequate resistance. The line which is now held is a far more propitious one than the more advanced line which they might have taken up had their divisions been prepared. Since war began, however, divisions have been placed in their appropriate positions, and at the present time he believes that Russia has a few more divisions than Germany, and places the number of Russian divisions at 240 in the front, with 20 in reserve. Stalin said that about one third of these divisions had not as yet been under fire.

Mr. Stalin stated that he can mobilize 350 divisions and will have that many divisions under arms by the time the spring campaign begins in May 1942.

He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air. Stalin said that 'nothing in warfare can take the place of actual combat', and he wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great campaign which will come next spring. He stated that the German troops seemed to be tired, and the officers and men that they had captured had indicated they are 'sick of war'.

The German reserves are as much as 400 kilometres back of the front, and the communications between the reserves and the front line are extremely difficult. These supply lines require many thousands of German troops to guard and protect them from Russian raids.

He said that in the battle now in progress, very many Russian and German troops are fighting far forward from their respective lines, because of the advances made by both sides with their mechanized forces. Stalin said that his soldiers did not consider the battle lost merely because the Germans at one point and another broke through with their mechanized forces. The Russian mechanized forces would attack at another point, often moving many miles behind the German line. Merely because

German forces pierce the Russian line does not mean the Russians are lost. They fight behind the Germans, are adept at the use of cover and fight their way out in the night. He said: 'Even the German tanks run out of petrol.' This is merely a phase of modern warfare, and accounts for the fact that there have been no mass surrenders of troops on either side. The Russians therefore have many 'insurgent' troops which operate behind Germany's so-called front line. They constantly attack German aerodromes and lines of communications. The Russians are more familiar with the terrain and know how to use the natural cover which nature has provided better than the Germans. These 'insurgent' troops are proving a great menace to the German offensive.

He believes that Germany underestimated the strength of the Russian Army, and have not now enough troops on the whole front to carry on a successful offensive war and at the same time guard their extended lines of communications. He repeatedly emphasized the large number of men Germany was forced to use for this purpose, and believes that the Germans will have to go on the defensive themselves. There is considerable evidence that they are already doing this. They are burying many of their large tanks in the ground for defensive purposes. The Russians have already found fifty such defensive positions.

Mr. Stalin stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has too many men on the Russian front, which may account for their preparing some defensive positions so that some of their divisions might be returned to the German western areas of actual or potential operation.

He thinks the Germans have now on his front about 70 tank and motorized divisions. He also states that the Russo-German war has already changed the character of divisional organization; that the Germans had broken up their large armoured divisions and dispersed this equipment through what Stalin called their tank and motorized divisions. Stalin stated that the war has already shown that infantry divisions must include a larger number of mechanized units. While Russia had a large number of tank and motorized divisions—none of them were a match for the German 'Panzer' division, but were far stronger than other German divisions. Hence the great pressure on the German infantry divisions which caused the diversion of German armoured equipment all along the line.

Stalin believes that Germany had 30,000 tanks at the outbreak of the Russian war. Russia herself had 24,000 tanks and 60 tank divisions with about 350 to 400 tanks in each division. They have always had about 50 tanks in each infantry division. Stalin believes that the large divisions are being broken up by the German Staff, and as the war progresses the number of men in the divisions will be decreased in both armies.

He stated that the pressure on his army in the last ten days had become considerably less, and the only reason he could give for it was that he thought Germany had been unable to supply their mechanized divisions and air forces with adequate fuel. He stressed the great difficulty the German armies had encountered in moving vast quantities of fuel to the front, and believes these difficulties are going to increase. He does not think this is because Germany has any lack of fuel, but rather because of transportation difficulties, the lack of good roads and more particularly the effective interference of the Russians with the German communications.

Stalin says that even though the war has been going on only six weeks, his troops are meeting brand-new divisions at the front, and some of the original divisions seem to have been withdrawn. He believes that the morale of his own troops is extremely high, and realizes that this is partly due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that 'moving mechanized forces through Russia was very different than moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France.'

Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a surprise attack; he himself believed that Hitler would not strike, but he took all precautions possible to mobilize his army. Hitler made no demands on Russia hence they were forced to organize a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians were counter-attacking at many points.

He said the Russian Army had met few of the 70-ton German tanks, but that this was probably due to the inability of the Russian bridges to hold the tanks. He believes the terrain too difficult to manoeuvre these giant tanks. Where the 70-ton tanks were encountered, they were pierced by the Russian 75-mm. guns. He does not think that the very large German tank will play an important part in the war in Russia, although there are parts of the southern front where these tanks can manoeuvre. The roads are very bad for the big tanks to operate over.

He believes that his largest tanks are better than the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown their superiority in the war to date. He stated that the two largest Russian tanks were of 48 to 52 tons respectively, with 75-mm. armour and 85-mm. guns. They have approximately 4,000 of these tanks at present. The Russian medium tank of just over 30 tons has 45-mm. armour and 75-mm. guns. The infantry tank is 13 tons and has 37-mm. armour and 45-mm. guns. They have approximately 8,000 medium (30-ton) tanks at present and 12,000 light (13-ton) tanks. He stated their present production of tanks was 1,000 per month. He stated that his production was equally divided between medium and heavy tanks on the one hand, and light tanks on the other. He stated they

would be short of steel for tank manufacture and urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. He later said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the United States. He also wished to purchase as many of our tanks as possible to be ready for the spring campaign. Stalin said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter—the tank losses on both sides were very great, but that Germany could produce more tanks per month this winter than Russia. Hence the aid of the United States in supplying steel and tanks is essential. He would like to send a tank expert to the United States. He stated that he would give the United States his tank designs.

He emphasized the fact that Germany has a strong and powerful air force, and that their present production of planes was probably 2,500 fighters and bombers per month, but not more than 3,000 a month. Germany has more planes than the Russians at the front at this time but the quality of many of the German planes is not first-class—they are rough, plain machines, in which pilots fly without a long training. Some pilots they have captured indicated that their training was short and consisted of only a 'practical course'. He realizes that Germany moved to the Russian front a great many aircraft which types are no longer being built in German factories. He thinks that Germany underrated the ability of the Russian Air Force and thought that these second-rate planes could operate successfully against them. The Russians have experienced no trouble in destroying these planes. The Heinkel plane was faster than the new Messerschmitt. On the whole the most useful plane the Germans have against the Russians is the Junkers 88, which is as good or better than anything of that type that the Russians have.

He stated that the Germans are putting 20-mm. cannon in their fighters; some have 12-mm. machine guns. Stalin said that all fighters must have cannon in modern warfare. He has equipped all his fighters with cannon or heavy-calibre machine-guns, and he stated the Russians proposed to have no fighters without cannon or the heaviest-calibre machine-guns.

The Russians put their old fighter planes on the front, and these have a speed of only 440 kilometres per hour, but they have been very useful and successful against many of the planes that the Germans put on Russia's western front. They have seven to eight thousand of these older type fighters.

The new fighters are of three types. They have approximately 2,000 of these at the front, and are producing 1,200 a month. The speediest of these newer one-motor fighters is the M.I.G.3, with heavy armour and cannon, and a speed of 650 kilometres per hour. The second fighter is the L.A.G.3, which carries a cannon, has heavy machine-guns and a speed of 590 k.p.h.

The third is the J.K.1; this carries a cannon, and has a speed of 590 k.p.h.

Stalin said the Russians have three new medium bomber types. First a single-motor bomber, flying at 510 k.p.h., for close-range bombing. Second, the 2-motor dive-bomber, flying at 540 k.p.h. with a flying range of 800 kilometres. The third bomber, which is only just being produced in quantity, is a 2-motor dive-bomber with a range of 2,200 kilometres and a speed of 610 k.p.h., and carries one ton of bombs on its full flight range, but double that amount of bombs on more than half range. It has 7 heavy machine guns. Stalin spoke of it as 'a very good bomber'.

He said he has three types of long-range bomber. One, a 2-motor bomber which is quite slow, doing 440 k.p.h. with a range of 3,000 kilometres. Second, a 2-motor bomber, just in production, with a Diesel engine; range 5,000 kilometres, carrying one ton bomb load, 2 tons at 4,000 kilometres range; speed 500 k.p.h. Third, a 4-engine bomber, just now getting into production; range 3,500 kilometres, carrying 3 tons of bombs. He said they had at present about 600 heavy long-range bombers.

He said that his total production of planes at present was 1,800 per month; by January 1, this would increase to 2,500 per month. 60 per cent of these would be fighter planes, and 40 per cent bombers. This was exclusive of training planes, now being produced at 15 per day. The Russians have approximately 3,500 training planes. Stalin said the training course for pilots was 8 months.

He expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America and left me the impression there would soon be a shortage of pilots. Stalin said the German claims of Russian air losses were absurd. The Russians lost more planes than the Germans at first, but he thinks the advantage is the other way now. He would not indicate the number of losses other than there were a 'good many on both sides'.

He stated there had been some damage to aircraft factories, but that there had been considerable disbursal of the machinery before the destruction took place. (I saw two factories, which I was told by our Ambassador were aircraft factories, just outside Moscow completely destroyed.)

I asked Mr. Stalin about the location of his munitions plants. He did not reply to this in detail, but indicated that about 75 per cent of the sum total of his munitions plants, the percentage varying depending on the type of plant, were in the general areas of which Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev were the centres.

I gained the impression from him that if the German Army could move some 150 miles east of each of these centres, they would destroy almost 75 per cent of Russia's industrial capacity.

Stalin said they had dispersed a good many of their larger factories and were moving many machine tools eastward to escape the bombing attacks.

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. He stated that their organization was of the very best and that he believed that they had large reserves of food, men, supplies, and fuel. He thinks that we may be underestimating Germany's oil supplies, and he bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He thought one weakness the British had was under-rating their enemy; he did not propose to do this. He, therefore, thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, the German Army is capable of taking part in a winter campaign in Russia. He thinks, however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after the first of September, when the heavy rains will begin, and after October 1 the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the winter months would be in front of Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad—probably not more than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at the moment is that the Germans 'are tired' and have no stomach for an offensive. He realizes that Germany can still bring up about 40 divisions, making 275 divisions in all at the Russian front, but these divisions probably cannot get there before the hard weather sets in.

He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was light anti-aircraft guns, 20-mm., 25-mm., 37-mm., and 50-mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to give protection to their lines of communications against low-flying planes.

His second great need was aluminium needed in the construction of airplanes.

The third was machine-guns of approximately 50 calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the defence of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter the spring campaign with adequate equipment, particularly in aircraft, tanks, and anti-aircraft guns.

He expressed an urgent desire that the British send large planes as soon as possible to bomb the Rumanian oilfields, and made a point of urging that pilots and crews be sent with the planes.

He told me one of the great problems was to determine the ports of entry which were to be used for supplies; and that Archangel was difficult, but not impossible; he was sure his ice-breakers could keep the

port free all winter. He stated that Vladivostok was dangerous, because it could be cut off by Japan at any time, and he feared the railroads and roads in Persia were inadequate. But all would have to be used for the present.

Mr. Stalin expressed repeatedly his confidence that the Russian lines would hold within 200 kilometres of their present position.

No information given above was confirmed by any other source.

It was during this conversation that Stalin wrote down in pencil on a small pad the four basic Russian requirements and handed the sheet to Hopkins. There was another passage, not recorded in the above report, which Hopkins noted later:

I asked Mr. Stalin whether he had seen any of the Italian divisions on his front, or Franco's volunteers, which had been announced in the papers.

Stalin laughed at this, and said there was nothing his men would like better than to see either the Italians or the Spaniards on their front.

He said that the Soviet Army discounted all divisions other than the Germans. Neither the Finns, Rumanians, Italians nor Spaniards count, and he was quite sure that neither the Italians nor the Franco troops would ever appear on his front. He stated that he thought Hitler had even more contempt for them than he had.

The Hopkins report continued:

PART II

I told Mr. Stalin at this conference that our Government and the British Government (Churchill having authorized me to say this) were willing to do everything that they possibly could during the succeeding weeks to send material to Russia. This material, however, must obviously be already manufactured and that he—Stalin—must understand that even this material could in all probability not reach his battle lines before the bad weather closes in.

I told him that we believed that plans should be made for a long war; that so far as the United States was concerned we had large supply commitments in relation to our own Army, Navy, and Merchant Marine, as well as very substantial responsibilities for supplies to England, China, and the Republics of South America.

I told him that the decisions relating to the long-range supply problem could only be resolved if our Government had complete knowledge, not only of the military situation in Russia, but of type, number, and quality of their military weapons, as well as full knowledge of raw materials and factory capacity.

I told him that I knew that our Government, and I believed the British Government, would be unwilling to send any heavy munitions, such as tanks, aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns, to the Russian front unless and until a conference had been held between our three Governments, at which the relative strategic interests of each front, as well as the interests of our several countries, was fully and jointly explored.

I suggested that, in as much as he was so fully engaged with the immediate prosecution of the battle now in hand, he could not give the time and attention to such a conference until after this battle is over.

Stalin had previously indicated that the front would be solidified not later than October 1.

I was mindful of the importance that no conference be held in Moscow until we knew the outcome of the battle now in progress. I felt it very unwise to hold a conference while this battle was in the balance. Hence my suggestion to him to hold a conference at as late a date as was possible. Then we would know whether or not there was to be a front and approximately the location of the front during the coming winter months.

Stalin said he would welcome such a conference and said that of course it would be impossible for him to go to a conference anywhere other than in Moscow; that he would be glad to make available to our Government all information which was required and he offered to give us the Soviet designs of their airplanes, tanks, and guns.

I told him that I was not authorized to make this suggestion of a conference to him officially.

Stalin then stated that in case our Government wished to have such a conference he would receive such a proposal sympathetically and would give the conference his personal attention.

Stalin has not given hitherto any information of any kind to any of the Embassies or to any of the Military Attachés of foreign governments. The British Naval Attaché has been given information confined to the Russian Navy because of certain joint operations.

There is literally no one in the whole Government who is willing to give any important information other than Mr. Stalin himself. Therefore, it is essential that such a conference be held with Mr. Stalin personally.

I believe he would give this conference his personal attention.

My suggestion is that the conference be not held prior to October 1, but not later than October 15.

Copies of these Parts I and II of the Hopkins report were sent to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. There followed a Part III which Hopkins marked "FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY". He made only one copy of this

part and recommended to the President that it should not be let out of his office, but suggested that its contents might be communicated verbally to Secretary Hull. The reason for this secrecy was that Stalin spoke bluntly of the desirability of U.S. entry into the war against Germany. The full text of Part III follows:

After Stalin had completed his review of the military situation, he expressed to me his great thanks to the President for the interest he was showing in their fight against Hitler. He stated that he wanted to give the President the following personal message; that he had considered putting the message in writing, but believed it would be more desirable to have the message delivered to the President by me.

Stalin said Hitler's greatest weakness was found in the vast numbers of oppressed people who hated Hitler and the immoral ways of his Government. He believed these people and countless other millions in nations still unconquered could receive the kind of encouragement and moral strength they needed to resist Hitler from only one source, and that was the United States. He stated that the world influence of the President and the Government of the United States was enormous.

Contrariwise, he believed that the morale of the German Army and the German people, which he thinks is already pretty low, would be demoralized by an announcement that the United States is going to join in the war against Hitler.

Stalin said that he believed it was inevitable that we should finally come to grips with Hitler on some battlefield. The might of Germany was so great that, even though Russia might defend herself, it would be very difficult for Britain and Russia combined to crush the German military machine. He said that the one thing that could defeat Hitler, and perhaps without ever firing a shot, would be the announcement that the United States was going to war with Germany.

Stalin said that he believed, however, that the war would be bitter and perhaps long; that if we did get in the war he believed the American people would insist on their armies coming to grips with German soldiers; and he wanted me to tell the President that he would welcome the American troops on any part of the Russian front under the complete command of the American Army.

I told Stalin that my mission related entirely to matters of supply and that the matter of our joining in the war would be decided largely by Hitler himself and his encroachment upon our fundamental interests. I told him that I doubted that our Government, in event of war, would want an American army in Russia, but that I would give his message to the President.

He repeatedly said that the President and the United States had more influence with the common people of the world today than any other force.

Finally, he asked me to tell the President that, while he was confident that the Russian Army could withstand the German Army, the problem of supply by next spring would be a serious one and that he needed our help.

This was Hopkins's last meeting with Stalin on that brief trip. In two days he had gained far more information about Russia's strength and prospects than had ever been vouchsafed to any outsider. Stalin had certainly taken Roosevelt's request to heart and had reposed great confidence in Hopkins, and Hopkins for his part left the Kremlin with the profound conviction that Stalin was not talking through his or anyone else's hat. This was indeed the turning-point in the wartime relations of Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union. No longer would all Anglo-American calculations be based on the probability of early Russian collapse—after this, the whole approach to the problem was changed. Hopkins later wrote of Stalin in the *American Magazine*:

Not once did he repeat himself. He talked as he knew his troops were shooting—straight and hard. He welcomed me with a few, swift Russian words. He shook my hand briefly, firmly, courteously. He smiled warmly. There was no waste of word, gesture, nor mannerism. It was like talking to a perfectly co-ordinated machine, an intelligent machine. Joseph Stalin knew what he wanted, knew what Russia wanted, and he assumed that you knew. We talked for almost four hours on this second visit. The questions he asked were clear, concise, direct. Tired as I was, I found myself replying as tersely. His answers were ready, unequivocal, spoken as if the man had had them on his tongue for years.

Only once while we talked did his telephone ring. He apologized for the interruption, telling me he was making plans for his supper at 12.30 that night. Not once did a secretary enter with dispatches or memoranda. And when we said good-by we shook hands again with the same finality. He said good-by once, just as only once he said hello. And that was that. Perhaps I merely imagined that his smile was more friendly, a bit warmer. Perhaps it was so because, to his word of farewell, he had added his respects to the President of the United States.

No man could forget the picture of the dictator of Russia as he stood watching me leave—an austere, rugged, determined figure in boots that shone like mirrors, stout baggy trousers, and snug-fitting blouse. He wore no ornament, military or civilian. He's built close to the ground, like a football coach's dream of a tackle. He's about five feet six, about a

hundred and ninety pounds. His hands are huge, as hard as his mind. His voice is harsh, but ever under control. What he says is all the accent and inflection his words need. . . .

If he is always as I heard him, he never wastes a syllable. If he wants to soften an abrupt answer or a sudden question he does it with that quick, managed smile—a smile that can be cold but friendly, austere but warm. He curries no favour with you. He seems to have no doubts. He assures you that Russia will stand against the onslaughts of the German Army. He takes it for granted that you have no doubts, either. . . .

He offered me one of his cigarettes and he took one of mine. He's a chain smoker, probably accounting for the harshness of his carefully controlled voice. He laughs often enough, but it's a short laugh, somewhat sardonic, perhaps. There is no small talk in him. His humour is keen, penetrating. He speaks no English, but as he shot rapid Russian at me he ignored the interpreter, looking straight into my eyes as though I understood every word that he uttered.

I said there were no interruptions in our interview. There were—two or three. But not by the telephone nor an unbidden secretary. Two or three times I asked him questions which, after a split second of consideration, he couldn't answer to his own satisfaction. He touched a button. Instantly, as if he'd been standing alertly at the door, a secretary appeared, stood at attention. Stalin repeated my question. The answer came like a shot. The secretary disappeared just like that.

In the States and in London such missions as mine might be stretched out into what the State Department and Foreign Office call conversations. I had no conversations in Moscow—just six hours of conversation. After that there was no more to be said. It was all cleaned up at two sittings.

Of course, Hopkins saw nothing of the actual battlefield in Russia. Even if he had, he would hardly have been able to understand what was going on. He gained his confidence in Russian powers of resistance mainly from the very nature of Stalin's requests, which proved that he was viewing the war on a long-range basis. A man who feared immediate defeat would not have put aluminium so high on the list of priorities. As a result of this, Hopkins later expressed extreme irritation with the military observers in Moscow when they cabled darkly pessimistic reports that could be based on nothing but mere guesswork coloured by prejudice.

Hopkins was elated by his meeting with Stalin, but he was also depressed—for he had been given a glimpse of something that he had never seen before, the true nature of the totalitarian State. He wrote: 'Before my three days in Moscow ended, the difference between democracy and dictatorship were clearer to me than any words a philosopher, historian or journalist could

make it.' He had seen the awful fear which was a part of the respect with which any subordinate, even a high-ranking officer, like General Yakovlev, regarded his superiors. Through the years that followed Hopkins was a sincere and even aggressive friend of Russia and an intense admirer of Russia's gigantic contribution to the winning of the war. He had nothing but contempt for those jittery Americans who were forever looking for Communists under the bed. But he could never reconcile himself to a system which seemingly concentrated such absolute power in one mortal man. His whole concept of government was based on the American system of checks and balances, and he had seen at first hand the continuous and direct responsibility of the British Prime Minister to Parliament. Later on, as the record will show, when evidences of discrepancy began to appear in the application of Soviet policy, Hopkins suspected that if he had ever been permitted to attend meetings of the Politburo, as he had attended Cabinet Meetings in Washington and London, he might have learned that Stalin's power was not so absolute as he had at first imagined. But he never gained any clear idea as to how the Politburo really operated, and neither did Roosevelt. As time went on, as and the tide of battle turned, they became more and more aware of it as an unseen, incomprehensible but potent influence on Stalin and thus on all Allied long-term policy.

There was not much excitement in the U.S. Press over the Hopkins trip to Moscow, because, despite Stalin's assurance that nothing he said would be censored, Hopkins in a Press conference in Moscow played it safe by saying little of any particular interest. Editorial comment was largely favourable, but tepid. The *Wall Street Journal* disapproved of the trip, saying that to render aid to Russia was 'to fly in the face of morals'. The *Knoxville, Tenn., Journal* disapproved of Hopkins, saying:

He has always been such a generous man with other people's money. The great heart of him has always been so easily touched. Sometimes we think it might have been better if Mr. Roosevelt could have chosen a less free-hearted ambassador to send to Europe. Because a man as susceptible to leaf-raking projects as Harry always was, is likely, in the face of real need in Britain and Russia, to give away more than we've got. . . . We shall be glad when Harry comes home!

The *Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union* was similarly worried that Hopkins would promise too much because 'he told the Britons that the United States would, in 1942, put in service 6 million tons of new merchant shipping. That figure, everyone must admit who keeps at all in touch with what is going on in American shipping, is way off. . . . Mr. Hopkins has just about doubled the figures that can be expected.' (NOTE: American merchant ship produc-

tion in 1942 was over 8 million tons.) But the *Sioux City, Iowa, Journal* said:

Isolationists will attempt to make capital of the Hopkins flight to Moscow . . . there no doubt will be revived the 'crawling into bed with Stalin' cry . . . but majority public opinion in the United States may be depended upon to express its outright approval of what has been done. The thing to keep for ever in mind is that Hitlerism must and shall be destroyed.

Hopkins was particularly grateful for this broad-minded expression from the supposedly isolationist corn-belt, for Sioux City was his birthplace and the *Journal* was the paper for which his father had worked as delivery boy.

His plane left Moscow on August 1. After his departure, the Chinese Ambassador called at the American Embassy and delivered the following message which had been cabled from Chungking: 'To Mr. Harry Hopkins. On behalf of the Chinese Government we send you hearty greetings and a cordial invitation to visit Chungking on your way back to the United States. We hope that you may find it possible to do so. Chiang Kai-shek, H. H. Kung.' Hopkins never did get to Chungking, but throughout the war he had close association with the Generalissimo's and Kung's brother-in-law, T. V. Soong. He and the President met Chiang Kai-shek only once—at Cairo in November, 1943—but Hopkins formed a warm friendship with Mme Chiang during her visit to the United States in 1942.

Steinhardt cabled the State Department his résumé of the Hopkins visit:

The reception accorded Harry Hopkins by the Soviet Government and the unusual attention which has been devoted to him by the Soviet Press clearly indicate that extreme importance has been attached to his visit by this Government. He was met at the port of entry by a number of high-ranking Army and Navy officials and by the Acting Chief of Protocol, who flew with him to Moscow, where an unusually large delegation headed by Lozovski had been assembled to await his arrival. He was received promptly by Stalin, who granted him very extended interviews and discussed with a frankness unparalleled in my knowledge in recent Soviet history the subject of his mission and the Soviet position. All Soviet newspapers have put photographs and items concerning his visit on their front pages—a position of much greater significance here than in any other country.

I am certain that the visit has been extremely gratifying to the Soviet Government and that it will prove to have exercised a most beneficial effect upon Soviet American relations in general and in particular to have greatly encouraged the Soviet war effort.

When the plane carrying Hopkins from Moscow arrived at Archangel, McKinley and his crew, watching from their houseboat, could see its peculiar manoeuvres as it buzzed the air-strip. They thought it must be in serious trouble and that Hopkins was probably a goner, but this was only the final 'special salute'. When Hopkins got aboard the PBY, which was now loaded with a cargo of platinum (Russia's most concentrated export), McKinley informed him that they had been unable to get adequate information on the weather prospects ahead, but, from what he had observed on the flight out, they were pretty sure to encounter severe headwinds and it might be rather rough going. Hopkins said: 'Whatever it is, it will seem easy after what I've been doing the last couple of days.' McKinley said further that from what they had been able to learn 'landing conditions in the northern reaches of the U.K. were most unfavourable'. He considered it prudent to delay the flight until they could be surer of their chances of completing it. But Hopkins was urgent. He knew, although he could not say so, that if they delayed another day he might miss the battleship *Prince of Wales*, which was to carry Churchill to the Atlantic Conference.

Hopkins carried his essential medicines—without which he could not live—in a small satchel. Through some unaccountable error, this had been left behind in Moscow. He was desperately ill on the return flight, which, as McKinley had predicted, was very rough because of headwinds, and for the same reason the plane's speed was so reduced that it took twenty-four hours to reach Scapa Flow. Hopkins was so exhausted that, despite the discomfort, he slept for seven of these hours. At one time he was awakened and told that the aircraft was being fired on by an unidentified destroyer off the Murman Coast. McKinley flashed the Russian call signal repeatedly, but the only response was more flak. Hopkins did not see any of the bursts, but was told that some were close enough to shake the aircraft.

McKinley's instructions for landing at Scapa Flow were so indefinite that he did not know where he was supposed to come down for delivery of Hopkins. He therefore picked the spot which looked most sheltered and least cluttered with ships. On landing, he managed to establish contact by blinker signal with an armed trawler and was told this was the wrong place. The sea was too rough to taxi several miles to the right place, so he took off again and finally spotted the Admiral's launch which was to take Hopkins off. When they landed in a narrow and turbulent lane between ships the tail of the PBY was slapped up and down by the waves and Hopkins was being slapped with it. The plane and the launch manoeuvred about until the launch got her bow close enough to the blister for Hopkins to jump. A sailor with a boathook hauled him, sprawling, across the slippery deck to safety. His luggage was then tossed after him, including the priceless papers which set forth the Soviet position in detail.

McKinley's report of this mission concluded:

As he waved us farewell we could not help feeling that very few persons could have taken what he had endured since we met at Invergordon on July 28. Circling overhead prior to our return flight to Oban we saw a launch wallowing heavily across the harbour and we wondered if there was to be any rest for a man so obviously ill and yet showing unbelievable courage, determination, and appreciation for the services of others. His was a noteworthy example of unparalleled devotion to duty.

This was August 2, just a week after Hopkins had asked for permission to go to Moscow and a week before he rejoined President Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference.

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

WHEN the launch delivered Hopkins to Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, at Scapa Flow, it was feared that President Roosevelt's personal representative might not live long enough to make his report from the Kremlin. Hopkins seemed to be not only at the end of his rope, but at the end of the last filament of the spider's web by which he was hanging on to life. Winant had come from London to Scapa Flow, and Hopkins managed to stay up for dinner with the Ambassador and the Admiral, but then he started to wilt, and Tovey ordered him to bed, having summoned all the medical skill that was available to drug him into the sleep that he so desperately needed. Hopkins asked Winant to 'wait until I've had a little rest'. Winant went to Hopkins's cabin in the morning and sat by his bed for an hour, but when Hopkins awakened the following afternoon Winant had gone back to London. (Harriman had already arrived in Washington, having left England the day Hopkins took off for Moscow.)

Churchill arrived aboard the *Prince of Wales*, bringing with him his Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Pound and General Dill. Air Marshal Portal could not go along, for some reason, so the R.A.F. was represented by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman. Churchill left General Ismay behind 'to keep the shop open', but brought with him Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Cherwell (the 'Prof'), Colonel L. C. Hollis (Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet), Commander Thompson, and J. M. Martin, Principal Private Secretary, as well as various staff officers of the three services.

Hopkins was given the Admiral's cabin on the *Prince of Wales*, but later asked to be moved from it, saying that 'the ship's propellers are a bit too close to my eardrums'. During the trip across the North Atlantic, through the U-boats' happy hunting-ground, Hopkins worked on the preparation of the reports from Moscow which are published in the previous chapter. He told Churchill all the points from his talks with Stalin which touched on Russia's military situation and her needs, and the Prime Minister, as he listened, understood all the better why Hopkins was of such value to the President, for he had never before heard harshly objective and salty reporting quite like this. They discussed the phraseology of the Atlantic Charter which the Prime Minister was to present to the President, and Churchill again emphasized the necessity of a firm warning to Japan. There was also a considerable amount of relaxation. Hopkins noted:

During the trip back on the *Prince of Wales* I played backgammon with the Prime Minister several times for a shilling a game. The enclosed Canadian money was handed me by the Prime Minister on the last day of the Conference, August 11, 1941.

The Prime Minister's backgammon game is not of the best. He likes to play what is known to all backgammon addicts as a 'back game'. As a matter of fact, he won two or three very exciting games from me by these tactics. He approaches the game with great zest, doubling and redoubling freely.

Attached to this memorandum was \$32.00 in Canadian bills and about a dollar's worth of small change—all of which was saved to go into the Hopkins estate along with the \$2.00 from President Roosevelt mentioned in the first chapter of this book.

Hopkins wanted to teach Churchill the insidious, two-handed game of Gin Rummy, which was then a mounting mania in the United States, but the Prime Minister would have none of it—although, on a visit to Miami Beach years later, he succumbed to the game and became a demon at it.

Before leaving London, Churchill had notified all the Dominion Prime Ministers that he was going to meet the President of the United States, who had extended an invitation to him through Harry Hopkins. This notification was not only a matter of routine courtesy. Churchill hoped that from the meeting some momentous agreement might be reached which would require ratification by the Dominions, and it was therefore a matter of prudence as well as respect to make them privy to the secret in advance. The agreement that Churchill hoped for was definitely not the Atlantic Charter: it was the establishment of a common policy of resistance to further Japanese aggression. Churchill informed the Prime Ministers that through the war years he had had intimate correspondence with Roosevelt and had talked to him on the telephone, but had never met him. This, by the way, was a somewhat sore point with Roosevelt; when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the First World War he had gone to London and had met Churchill at a banquet. Churchill, already an eminent statesman, had apparently failed to take much notice of the young American official, and had promptly forgotten this encounter, but Roosevelt remembered it clearly.

There was no question about Churchill's attitude toward Roosevelt now. Hopkins later told friends: 'You'd have thought Winston was being carried up into the heavens to meet God!' Roosevelt had become an almost legendary figure in Britain. He was known simply but warmly to the man in the rubble-strewn street as 'the best friend we ever had'. Churchill, who knew and understood America far better than most of his compatriots, was all the more impressed by Roosevelt's achievements in overcoming isolationism

and in breaking the sacred Third-Term Tradition. In the many meetings that were to follow, from Argentia to Yalta, Churchill's respect for Roosevelt may have wavered at times, but it never ceased. Nor did Churchill ever lose sight of the fact that Roosevelt was his superior in rank—the President being the Head of State, on the level with the King, whereas the Prime Minister is Head of Government. To the average American this may seem a rather academic distinction, but it was of great importance in the relationship of the two men.

As the *Prince of Wales* approached the Western Hemisphere Hopkins managed to write a few letters in which, as usual, he said little:

To Herbert Morrison, then Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security:

I have your tin hat for La Guardia and shall give it to him with your warmest greetings. I much regretted not seeing you and having a discussion over a highball. We shall do that yet.

To Ambassador Winant:

I ran off without paying my bill at Claridge's. . . . Won't you also arrange to tip the valet and my waiter a couple of pounds apiece, because I forgot to do that. . . . I do hope you take care of yourself. It seems to me you all work too hard. That is very absurd advice coming from me; hence, I withdraw it.

To General Ismay:

I should so much have liked to tell you about the trip to Moscow. At least I was not airsick, although the caviar and smoked salmon were almost too much. . . . The Prime Minister failed to work yesterday for the first time in his life. The trip will be a great rest for him. So far, we have seen nothing worse than fog. Pound, Dill, and Freeman get on as gentlemen should, and there is never a cross word between any of the Services. They knew better than to discuss Crete in mixed company.

To Air Chief Marshal Portal:

I want particularly to thank you for the arrangements for my flight to Archangel. It could not have been better. If you get a chance, will you tell Captain McKinley and his crew how fine and patient I thought they were. There wasn't a hitch in the whole performance.

To Admiral Tovey:

Our trip has been uneventful so far, although we have moved out of our way a bit to miss a submarine. The bad weather for the first day out washed away the destroyers, but Canadian ones are alongside now.

To Brendan Bracken:

I would have liked so much to tell you about my visit to Uncle Joe, which I think went off fairly well, but only events can tell.



The President and the Prime Minister photographed with their Chiefs of Staffs at the Atlantic Conference. Harry Hopkins is at the back, left, standing next to Averell Harriman. Immediately behind the two leaders are, from left to right: Admiral King, General Marshall, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Admiral Stark and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound (*see page 354*).



To his daughter, Diana:

I presume by this time you are as brown as a berry, and that is as it should be when one is 8 years old. It is nearly 4 weeks ago now that I telephoned you at Betsy's (Mrs. James Roosevelt). Since then I have been far away, to what is said to be one of the coldest countries in the world, Russia. Strange to say I found little boys and girls swimming in the White Sea.

In another far-off country I have been to there is war, and bombs and guns going off in the night. Some day that will all be over and Mr. Hitler will be defeated. Then I shall bring you to England, and we will roam over the green hills and eat in what you will think to be very queer little restaurants. The strange part of it is, little English boys and girls think that our houses and hotels and beaches are just as queer.

I shall see you very soon now, and want you to know that I love you very much.

PS.—Tell Betsy I will call up as soon as I get back, but I am afraid my telephone call will come before this letter reaches you.

On Saturday, August 9, the great British battleship (which was to perish in Malayan waters four months later) arrived at the Newfoundland rendezvous. There had been endless rehearsals of the expected ceremonials on board and a sort of eve-of-battle tension prevailed. Hopkins went out on the bridge in his bathrobe for a look at Newfoundland, from which he had flown in a bomber less than four weeks before, but visibility was obliterated by the white summer mist. The sun was struggling to get through to the surface of the sea. Then out of the mist appeared the shapes of impressive new American destroyers—not at all like the old four-stackers that had been turned over in return for bases—and then the cruiser *Augusta* herself. When Hopkins saw that he rushed to his cabin and started to pack. The orderly, or batman, or whatever the term is in the Royal Navy, who had been assigned to him wanted to do this packing for him, but Hopkins figured that if he didn't throw the things in himself (including his papers) he'd never know where to find them.

A U.S. destroyer came alongside the *Prince of Wales* and Hopkins was transferred to the *Augusta*. Captain John R. Beardall, the President's Naval Aide, went aboard the *Prince of Wales* to communicate the President's wishes as regards arrangements for meetings, social engagements, etc. The President was to entertain the Prime Minister and his party at dinner that evening, and Hopkins wrote to Churchill from the *Augusta*:

I have just talked to the President, and he is very anxious, after dinner tonight, to invite in the balance of the staff and wants to ask you to talk very informally to them about your general appreciation of the war, and

indeed to say anything that you would be disposed to say to a group as large as will be present. I imagine there will be twenty-five people altogether. The President, of course, does not want anything formal about it.

Hopkins had suggested this, for he wanted the President and his party to hear one of Churchill's after-dinner analyses of the war situation.

Present at that dinner were, on the American side, Roosevelt, Welles, Stark, Marshall, King, Arnold, Hopkins, and Harriman. On the British side, Churchill, Cadogan, Pound, Dill, Freeman, and Cherwell. The menu: Vegetable soup, broiled chicken, spinach omelet, lettuce and tomato salad, chocolate ice cream, and a lot of side dishes. During dinner, Roosevelt, Churchill, Welles, and Cadogan got down to business. There were two main topics of conversation: the growing menace of Japanese aggression, about which the British were primarily concerned, and the five-point proposed joint declaration which was to become the eight-point Atlantic Charter. Of course, there was a great deal of interest in what Hopkins had to say about Russia, but even this brought the subject back to the Far East. For, although Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union had so far been an authentic blessing in the war against Germany, it had tended to decrease the threats to Japan's flank in Manchuria and thus increased the danger of further Japanese moves in other directions.

The next morning, Sunday, Roosevelt went across to the *Prince of Wales* for the church service under the big guns. The Lesson was from the first chapter of Joshua: 'There shall not any man be able to stand before thee all the days of thy life: as I was with Moses, so will I be with thee: I will not fail thee, nor forsake thee. Be strong and of good courage. . . .' The Prayers were, first for the President of the United States, then for the King and his Ministers and his Admirals, Generals, and Air Marshals, then Prayers for the invaded countries, the sick and wounded, the prisoners, the exiled and homeless, the anxious and bereaved—and a prayer that 'we may be preserved from hatred, bitterness, and all spirit of revenge'.

After the service, Roosevelt was introduced to members of the *Prince of Wales* crew and saw as much of the ship as was possible from his wheelchair. He was having a fine time, and so was the Former Naval Person. Here, on the decks of a mighty battleship, these two old-fashioned seafaring men were on common ground. However, in another part of the ship Welles and Cadogan were in conference over documents which the British Government had drafted of 'Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government'. One message to Tokyo was to come from Washington:

Declaration by the United States Government that:

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-Western Pacific

would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter-measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

The one from London was to read:

Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-Western Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter-measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter-measures or of their support of them, His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power.

There was a third proposed Declaration from the Netherlands Government. This was the same as the British except that it referred to 'Her' instead of 'His' Majesty.

In the official records of the Conference, Welles wrote:

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands, and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.

This is as clear a statement as could be made of the British point of view,

which, as has been shown in the previous chapter, was essentially the same as the Russian. Both Churchill and Stalin, engaged as they were in a veritable death grapple with Germany in the West, considered it would be calamitous for their countries to become involved in war with Japan in the Far East.

It was this Asiatic phase of the discussions at the Atlantic Conference which occupied a vast amount of attention during the exhaustive Pearl Harbour investigation, because of the repeated isolationist charges that there had been 'secret commitments'. (As one of the British officials present at this meeting said to me, 'We wished to God there *had* been!') All American records of the Conference were brought forth and the testimony of living American participants was added to the voluminous evidence. In the preparation of this book I have been given access to the British records of the Conference. I have found that all of the records put together not only fail to provide suggestion of skulduggery but, in so far as discussion of military matters is concerned, fail even to provide much of interest. The agreements for which the British had hoped did not come near to realization, either in the Roosevelt-Churchill talks or in the Chiefs of Staff conferences which went on concurrently. Therefore, only a general summary of the military discussions need be given:

Churchill talked, as he had to Hopkins in London, of the prospect of a German eruption into Spain and Portugal—and North Africa—which would mean the end of Gibraltar as a British base. He said that 'the situation in Spain is going from bad to worse' and that the British were prepared to launch, in a month's time (about September 15), a powerful expedition for the seizure of the Canary Islands to provide an alternative base to Gibraltar for operations in the South Atlantic, although nothing, of course, could replace Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt said that he had been putting out feelers with a view to obtaining an invitation from the Portuguese Government, similar to that extended by the Icelandic Government, for the dispatch of American forces to the Azores for the defence of these crucial islands. He was hopeful that something might come of this. Churchill said that if the United States should send troops to the Azores, the British would cover the approaches between these vital islands and the European mainland to forestall any German attempt to send an expeditionary force to prevent the occupation by American forces with Portuguese consent.

All of these arrangements came to nothing, as Hitler never did move forcibly into the Iberian Peninsula, and the Portuguese Government extended no invitation to the Azores until two years later, when the tide of the war had unmistakably turned.

Following this discussion, Churchill took up the question of the 'Parallel Communications' to Tokyo. Roosevelt showed him copies of the statements handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura five days previously. These presented the Japanese occupation of Indo-China as a *fait accompli*

which, the Japanese said, 'was of entirely peaceful character and for self-defence', and offered proposals looking toward 'a speedy settlement of the China Incident'. There was no doubt, as Roosevelt and Churchill agreed, that the Japanese proposals could be acceptable only if the United States were prepared to sell China down the river. Roosevelt said that he felt 'very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan'. But—the question eternally was: Would a tough line, a medium line, or a soft line best suit that purpose? Roosevelt was well aware of the importance of 'face' to the Japanese. Therefore, the adoption of a line which would not give them some kind of 'face-saving out' would be practically a guarantee of war. On the other hand, the only kind of appeasement which the Japanese would consider satisfactory would seal the doom of China and would be humiliating and mortifying to the American people and calculated to depress the morale of all who were opposed to the Axis powers everywhere in the world. Roosevelt believed that any warnings to Japan should not be limited to the South-Western Pacific area, but should be broad enough to encompass the possibility of new Japanese aggression against any friendly power in Asia—specifically, the Soviet Union, this being the result of Hopkins's talk with Molotov. As Sumner Welles expressed it, 'the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands'. The only definite promise that Roosevelt gave was that he would see the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura, on his return to Washington, and he sent a radio to Hull to arrange this meeting. Following was the conclusion and crux of the warning given to Nomura on August 17, while Churchill was still at sea on the way home:

This Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or programme of military domination by force or threat of force of neighbouring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward ensuring the safety and security of the United States.

Which meant absolutely nothing except that the United States was electing to reassert its status as a sovereign power which would look out for its own interests. Churchill undoubtedly hoped for something much stronger than that, and Sumner Welles's notes indicate that for a time Roosevelt considered taking a firmer position; but the fact remains that he quickly com-

promised on what seemed to be a safe middle course between the tough line and the soft one. The proposed Anglo-American-Dutch parallel warnings to Japan were never made, and from then on Churchill took the position that Britain would follow America's lead when and if Japan took further violent action and Roosevelt made known his policy.

There was plenty of backing for the tough policy in the American Press and among Roosevelt's official family. After the first Cabinet Meeting following Roosevelt's return to Washington, Vice-President Wallace wrote him:

When you mentioned Japan at Cabinet Meeting this afternoon I had a strong desire to express myself, but reached the conclusion it might be better to do so to you privately.

I do so hope that in the current conversations you take an exceedingly firm stand. It seems to me that the appeasing stand or partially appeasing stand is certain to bring bad results, not only with regard to Japan, in the long run, but with regard also to the situation in Europe. If we take a strong stand, the entire Axis will be impressed and the psychology of the American people will be strengthened.

I do hope, Mr. President, you will go to the absolute limit in your firmness in dealing with Japan. I am as confident as anyone can be in a matter of this sort that such a policy will bear rich dividends, and that any sign of weakness, concession or appeasement will be misunderstood by Japan and the Axis and will cost us, directly or indirectly, many millions of hours of man labour and much suffering.

However, all of the considerations of policy which seemed so momentous at the time proved of no avail in the light of subsequent developments and revelations. Matsuoka had told Hitler four months previously that 'sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable . . .' In his opinion this conflict would happen sooner rather than later. And Hitler had promised the Japanese that 'Germany would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe . . . that no American could land in Europe . . . that the German soldier naturally ranks high above the American'. It may be argued that if a really tough line had been taken the Pearl Harbour attack would have occurred a month or so earlier; in that case—it could also be argued—so would the ultimate victory.

The Chiefs of Staff discussions at the Atlantic Conference produced little of importance. No agenda had been prepared; there had been no previous cabled exchange of views. The British Chiefs sat down at the conference table hoping that major problems of strategy would be discussed. The Americans, however, had no authority from the President to go beyond the tentative agreements already made; their main interest was in the subject of Lend

Lease priorities and production schedules as affected by the developments on the Russian front.

The Navy men settled various details of the patrol and convoy problem, as a result of which more than fifty British destroyers and corvettes were released from service in the Western Atlantic; but the major decisions in respect to this had already been taken. On the Army and Air Force side, Generals Marshall and Arnold were more concerned with the debate then raging in the Congress over extension of the Selective Service Law than in the reinforcing of the Middle East or the bombing of Germany. The U.S. Chiefs placed repeated emphasis on the fact that their job was the defence of the Western Hemisphere, and they were reluctant to discuss anything farther away from that than the Azores, Canaries, and Cape Verde Islands, Dakar, French Morocco, and Spanish Morocco (in the last of which Roosevelt was particularly interested.) So far as the records show, there was little discussion of strategic considerations in the Pacific, although there was some contemplation of the possible extension of Japanese naval power into the Indian Ocean and even of a Japanese attempt to seize Madagascar.

The British Chiefs proposed that American-British-Dutch-Australian staff talks be held in Singapore to plan joint defence of the South-West Pacific area. No agreement was reached on this. The British did, however, acquaint the Americans with their own plans for the immediate and far-distant future, and among the latter was an extremely tentative and remote plan for an operation to be known as 'Roundup', an invasion of the continent of Europe. For this, 'there would not be needed vast armies on the Continent such as were required in World War I. Small forces, chiefly armoured, with their power of hard hitting, would be able quickly to win a decisive victory'. It is interesting to note that the chief planner of 'Roundup' was General Sir Frederick Morgan, who later became the chief planner of its fulfilment, 'Overlord'.

The only development of really lasting importance in these military talks at Argentia was the beginning of the friendship between Marshall and Dill which was to be a vital element in the functioning of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

At one point in the Roosevelt-Churchill talks the Prime Minister pointed out that there were 150,000 men now guarding Britain's vital airfields who were armed only with 'pikes, maces, and grenades'. Roosevelt promised to furnish rifles for these men. In a memorandum to Hopkins, delivered from the *Prince of Wales* to the *Augusta*, Churchill wrote:

We hope . . . that the most rapid delivery possible of 150,000 rifles will be made, as the invasion season is fully operative after September 15. In the event of our reporting to the President that great and active pre-

parations are being made by the enemy in the Dutch, Belgian, and French ports for invasion, of which there is no sign at present, we would ask as a matter of emergency that a further consignment of 300 ammunition could be rushed across, this being recovered later from our monthly quotas of production.

In this memorandum Churchill also urged strongly that a conference be held in Moscow, for the re-equipment of the Russian armies, along the lines that Hopkins had discussed with Stalin. He said that he would name Lord Beaverbrook as the British representative at this conference 'with power to act for all British departments'. It was then assumed that Hopkins would be the American representative, but Roosevelt later decided that Hopkins could not stand another long journey so soon, and Harriman was named in his stead.

Beaverbrook arrived at Argentina on Monday, August 11. His principal concern was aid for Russia, a topic on which there was now virtually no argument as a result of Hopkins's encouraging reports. But when Beaverbrook learned of the proposal to issue a document known as the Atlantic Charter, and read the text of it, his deep-banked devotion to the economic solidarity of the British Empire flared up, and he became difficult.

Welles has told of the drafting of the Atlantic Charter in his admirable survey of Roosevelt's foreign policy, *Where Are We Heading?* and his description agrees with the British records in point of fact if not precisely in terms of interpretation. But there are one or two points to be added, chiefly in relation to the establishment of an international organization, which was the first planted seed for the United Nations. In the original draft of the Joint Statement which Churchill presented at Argentina and in the second draft prepared by Welles were the words: 'They (the U.S. and Britain) seek a peace which will not only cast down for ever the Nazi tyranny, but *by effective international organization* will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security, etc.' The italicized words were struck out by Roosevelt. Churchill pled that they be restored, but, as Welles has written:

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this, because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favour of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had passed and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express to the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but

that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favour of it and shared the President's view.

From which it was seen that Roosevelt was again being haunted by the ghost of Woodrow Wilson. The extreme internationalists, he felt, were lacking in 'realism', which meant they did not take into account the power of isolationist sentiment. He was afraid that even an implication of another League of Nations would fill the American people with memories of the First World War—another A.E.F., another false 'peace', another age of disillusionment, of boom and bust, another opportunity for another Hitler. However, if Churchill expressed himself as sharing 'wholeheartedly' the President's point of view as this meeting broke up, within an hour or two thereafter he had not only reversed himself but persuaded Roosevelt in a large measure to do likewise. In this he was aided materially by Hopkins, who urged upon Roosevelt his belief that the American people would be in favour of a strong organization for world peace—indeed, that they would settle for nothing less. He said that they would consider it idle to talk of disarmament, as in Point Seven, until there was an international organization strongly functioning. Roosevelt would not yield so far as to include the term 'international organization', but he agreed to include the phrase 'the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security', which was generally accepted as meaning exactly the same thing.

On another point Hopkins felt compelled to oppose Welles for reasons of expediency. That was the inclusion of the niggling qualification, demanded by the British, 'with due respect for their existing obligations', which was widely and justifiably criticized in the United States at the time. This was where Beaverbrook came in. He assumed that Point Four—'to further the enjoyment of all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world'—meant the cancellation of the Ottawa Agreements for 'Imperial Preference', and Welles conceded that indeed it did. Beaverbrook had fought for those agreements in the first place and he was now prepared to wade in and fight for them again. It was he who insisted that the qualifying line be included. Churchill made it clear that he 'had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa Agreements', but Beaverbrook convinced him that he had no authority to approve Point Four of the Declaration as then drafted, without consulting all the Dominion Governments and gaining their consent to this abrogation of the Ottawa Agreements. This complicated process would require too much time, and Hopkins felt strongly that publication of the Charter must coincide with announcement of the meeting itself. He did not

like the hedging phrase any better than Welles did, but he was less aware of its consequences, and he so persuaded the President. Of course, Welles was right on principle, and Hopkins was wrong.

There was also loud criticism of the Atlantic Charter among the isolationists on the ground that while it provided for three of the Four Freedoms, it made no mention of Freedom of Religion; this, it was said, provided proof of the subservience of the cynical Roosevelt and Churchill to the godless Soviet Union. Actually, this omission was an oversight. I have seen no record, either British or American, indicating that the inclusion of Freedom of Religion was ever in any way considered. So severe was the criticism, however, that when the Atlantic Charter was incorporated in the first Proclamation of the United Nations on January 1, 1942, Roosevelt was careful to see to it that Freedom of Religion was included (and with Russian agreement).

The Atlantic Conference gave Hopkins an opportunity to observe more clearly than ever the differences between the American and British systems of democracy. This was the first time he had seen both the President and Prime Minister in operation away from their own home bases. He remarked on the fact that whereas Roosevelt was completely on his own, subject only to the advice of his immediate and self-selected entourage, which advice he could accept or reject, Churchill was constantly reporting to and consulting the War Cabinet in London, addressing his communications to the Lord Privy Seal, who was then Clement Attlee. During three days more than thirty communications passed between the *Prince of Wales* and Whitehall, and the speed of communication and of action thereon was astonishing to the Americans. For example, on Monday, August 11, at 1.50 p.m. (Argentina time), Churchill filed a cable to London containing the agreed text of the Atlantic Charter, which was then seven points, and describing in detail all the changes suggested and the reasons therefor. Due to the time necessary for coding and decoding, and the difference in time between Newfoundland and the U.K., this message did not reach Attlee until shortly after midnight. However, the War Cabinet was ready to go into session at that late hour. At 4.10 a.m. (London time) it cabled its approval of the document word by word and suggested the addition of an eighth point, which Roosevelt heartily approved (it was in line with Freedom from Want) and which was incorporated as Number Five in the Charter.

Churchill's final report to his Government stated that, whatever the failures of the Atlantic Conference to achieve some hoped-for objective—specifically, the mailed-fist threat to Japan—the big news was that he had established 'warm and deep personal relations with our great friend'.

The public announcement of the Atlantic Conference, made simultaneously from London and Washington, came as little surprise to anyone

who had been reading the newspapers or listening to radio commentators. A Churchill-Roosevelt meeting had long been considered an obvious development—so much so that even while the President was *en route* to Argentina the Japanese were suggesting that he meet Prince Konoye somewhere in the Pacific. When the Press started to discuss the mystery of the whereabouts of both the President and Prime Minister, as well as of the Chiefs of Staff, there could be little doubt that the cigarette-in-holder and the long cigar were at last being lit from the same match.

When the story was released, unsupported or embellished by any reports from on-the-spot Press correspondents, it proved to be something of an anti-climax, particularly in Britain. The isolationists in the U.S. managed to make the Conference seem more interesting than it actually was with their charges that there was far more in this meeting than met the eye—that when the truth were finally known Roosevelt would be proven a blacker traitor than Benedict Arnold. Thus, for Americans, there was created about the event a certain atmosphere of fascinating intrigue leading to the provocative 'If we only knew what *really* went on . . .' In Britain, however, there had been the expectancy of tremendous action resulting from the meeting—of vast American armadas sweeping across the seas—and all that came out of it was a grouping of pious words. The British people were, of course, glad to know that Roosevelt and Churchill were determined to see to it that in the post-war world there would be liberty, justice, prosperity, and security for all, but they were far more concerned with the question of when the black-out and rationing would end.

The Atlantic Charter, however, turned out to be incalculably more powerful an instrument than the officers of the British Government intended it to be when they first proposed it. They never regarded it as a formal State Paper; it was, to them, not much more than a publicity hand-out. Roosevelt, who took it more seriously, was compelled to foster this belief by insisting that it could not be considered as in any way a 'treaty'; if it had been, he would have had to submit it to the Senate for ratification, and he was taking no chances on that. Therefore, it was never inscribed on parchment and signed, sealed, and taped. It was merely mimeographed and released. Nevertheless, its effect was cosmic and historic. The British learned that when you state a moral principle you are stuck with it, no matter how many fingers you may have kept crossed at the moment. It was not long before the people of India, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia were beginning to ask if the Atlantic Charter extended also to the Pacific and to Asia in general. So acute and embarrassing did the questions become that Churchill was later compelled to take cognizance of them in the House of Commons. He said:

At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of

the sovereignty, self-government, and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any alterations in their territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions, and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.

However, the Atlantic Charter stated, in Point Three: 'They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live' (that clause, incidentally, was taken intact from the first draft prepared by Churchill himself). Point Four referred to 'all States, great or small', Point Five to 'all nations', Point Six to 'all nations' and also to 'all the men in all the lands', Point Seven to 'all men', Point Eight to 'all of the nations of the world'. Indeed, it may be said that that one small word, 'all', came to be regarded as the veritable cornerstone of the whole structure of the United Nations. Even the qualifying phrase about 'existing obligations' became inconsequential under the superior weight of the new responsibilities firmly if not formally assumed.

On the last day of the Atlantic Conference, with all points of the Charter and the joint cable to Stalin straightened out, the President had the Prime Minister, Beaverbrook, and Hopkins to lunch, and this, from Hopkins's point of view, was the most satisfactory session of all. There was no business to be transacted. Both Roosevelt and Churchill were relaxed and amusing and amused. This was Hopkins's ambition as a 'catalyst' or 'marriage broker': to prove to Roosevelt that it was possible to be utterly at ease with Churchill, and vice versa. Beaverbrook, whom Roosevelt had known of old, helped considerably in this process.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Roosevelt and Churchill became chums at this conference or at any subsequent time. They established an easy intimacy, a joking informality and a moratorium on pomposity and cant—and also a degree of frankness in intercourse which, if not quite complete, was remarkably close to it. But neither of them ever forgot for one instant what he was and represented or what the other was and represented. Actually, their relationship was maintained to the end on the highest professional level. They were two men in the same line of business—politico-military leadership on a global scale—and theirs was a very limited field, and the few who achieve it seldom have opportunities for getting together with fellow craftsmen in the same trade to compare notes and talk shop. They appraised each other through the practised eyes of professionals, and from this appraisal resulted a degree of admiration and sympathetic understanding of each other's professional problems that lesser craftsmen could not have achieved. Thus, when Churchill was being particularly unyielding on some point

during the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt could say to Hopkins: 'We've got to remember that Winston has an election coming up.' And, as the record proves, there were many occasions when the Prime Minister yielded on major points in deference to the domestic political problems which were forever besetting the President.

It is a matter of sacred tradition that when an American statesman and a British statesman meet the former will be plain, blunt, down-to-earth, ingenuous to a fault, while the latter will be sly, subtle, devious, and eventually triumphant. In the cases of Roosevelt and Churchill this formula became somewhat confused. If either of them could be called a student of Machiavelli, it was Roosevelt; if either was a bull in a china shop, it was Churchill. The Prime Minister quickly learned that he confronted in the President a man of infinite subtlety and obscurity—an artful dodger who could not readily be pinned down on specific points, nor hustled or wheedled into definite commitments against his judgment or his will or his instinct. And Roosevelt soon learned how pertinacious the Prime Minister could be in pursuance of a purpose. Churchill's admirers could call him 'tenacious, indomitable', and his detractors could describe him as 'obstinate, obdurate, dogged, mulish, pigheaded'. Probably both factions could agree on the word 'stubborn', which may be flattering or derogatory. In any case, it was this quality which at times made him extremely tiresome to deal with and at other times—and especially times of most awful adversity—made him great.

Roosevelt and Churchill certainly had the capacity to annoy each other, but the record of their tremendous association with one another contains a minimum of evidences of waspishness or indeed of anything less than the most amiable and most courteous consideration. For they had a large and wonderful capacity to stimulate and refresh each other. In one of the darkest hours of the war Roosevelt concluded a long, serious cable to Churchill with the words: 'It is fun to be in the same decade with you.'

When Churchill left Argentia on the *Prince of Wales*, his ship was escorted as far as Iceland—where he stopped for a brief inspection tour—by American destroyers, in one of which Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., was serving as an Ensign. Churchill later broadcast a speech in which he said:

And so we came back across the ocean waves, uplifted in spirit, fortified in resolve. Some American destroyers which were carrying mail to the United States Marines in Iceland happened to be going the same way, too, so we made a goodly company at sea together.

That jocosely little glimpse that Churchill gave of U.S. destroyers 'going our way' meant a lot more than it seemed: it meant that our Atlantic Fleet, under that grim realist, Admiral King, was operating and training twenty-four hours a day under battle conditions, no lights at night, the responsible officers

watching with suspicion every uncharted speck on the radar screen, the crews constantly ready for the sounding of GQ; whereas, in the Pacific the Fleet, relatively paralysed with the obsession of neutrality, was being meticulously careful to avoid all semblance of awareness of tension, its officers trying to act and even to think in terms of peacetime routine as usual, movies on the hangar deck as usual, Saturday nights as usual at the Royal Hawaiian, the officers' clubs, the Manila Hotel.

Back in England, Churchill seemed so bursting with confidence—he gave the new 'V for Victory' sign with such exuberant assurance—the British people delightedly assumed, like the American isolationists, that perhaps there *had* been some secret agreements at the Conference, the results of which would become apparent in due course. It is improbable that Churchill did much to discourage this hopeful assumption.

SHOOT ON SIGHT

THE battle in Congress over extension of Selective Service was disagreeably synchronized with the Atlantic Conference. It proved to be one of the narrowest escapes of Roosevelt's wartime career. He had almost let it go by default. The Selective Service Law provided that the Army could draft no more than 900,000 men in any one year, and only for one year of 'training and service unless Congress declares that the national security is imperilled, when such service may then be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interest of national defence'. The President's proclamation of a state of unlimited national emergency did not in any way bind Congress to concede that the national security was imperilled. Indeed, leaders in Congress had informed Roosevelt that they could never muster votes enough to extend Selective Service. The emotional appeal of families who wanted their 'boys' back was overwhelming. Even more important was the shocking morale of the men themselves: they didn't know why they were in the Army; they were muttering and shouting about promises made to them of only one year of this useless subjection to the brass hats; and, worst of all, great numbers of them were training with broomsticks for guns and with trucks masquerading as tanks, which made the whole process seem a ridiculous waste of time. The war seemed more remote than ever from American soil, with the Japanese apparently bogged down in China and Hitler getting himself more and more involved in Russia. The initials 'O.H.I.O.' gained alarming currency, being scrawled on walls in training camps all over the country; these stood not for the State, but for 'over the hill in October', which meant that, when the first year of Selective Service had ended, if the drafted men were not released and sent home according to the letter of the law under which they had registered, they would desert. (Many of the same men who had once truculently chalked up 'O.H.I.O.' later marked walls all over the world with the prideful 'Kilroy was here'.) The situation in this summer of 1941 was so ugly that Roosevelt concluded it would be better not to bring the issue up in Congress. He was again afraid of fear itself. But Secretary Stimson and General Marshall felt otherwise. They knew that this would mean, in Marshall's words, 'disintegration of the Army'. It would mean starting all over again—and, in the light of subsequent developments, it is appalling to contemplate the probable results. Hopkins saw eye to eye with Stimson and Marshall on this, but was of little help to them in the most critical days because of his extended journeys overseas. Marshall, by dint of five days of concentrated work, produced his first Biennial Report, in which he courageously recommended the removal of

'legal restrictions' which tended to 'hamstring the development of the Army into a force immediately available for whatever defensive measures may be necessary'. Marshall's presentation of the case was so dignified, so statesman-like, and so incontrovertible that, while the isolationists, as usual, railed at it and tried to damn its author as a militaristic warmonger, the reputable Press and the less timid elements on Capitol Hill supported it. Roosevelt himself was persuaded to agree to risk the fight, and it is no exaggeration to describe this as one of the decisive battles of the war; it was certainly one that Americans, for their own good, should never forget. The fight was won, in the House of Representatives, by the perilous margin of one vote. This was on August 12, the day when the Atlantic Conference ended. The news of it dropped like enemy bombs on the decks of the *Augusta* and the *Prince of Wales*.

A few days later an American radio commentator in London quoted a typical reaction of the British man in the street: 'The Americans are curious people. I can't make them out. One day they're announcing they'll guarantee freedom and fair play for everybody everywhere in the world. The next day they're deciding by only one vote that they'll go on having an Army.'

Senator Burton K. Wheeler made a statement which carried considerable weight in foreign countries, both friendly and hostile:

This vote clearly indicates that the Administration could not get a resolution through the Congress for a declaration of war. It is notice to the War Department that the Congress does not approve of their breaking faith with the draftees. It is also notice that the Congress does not take seriously the cry of the Administration that the so-called emergency is greater now than it was a year ago.

The *New York Times* said editorially:

The record shows that every one of these four measures (indicated below) was adopted solely because the President received the support of a large majority of his own party. Not one of them would be law today if the decision had been left to the Republicans in Congress. The tally of Republican votes runs as follows:

On repeal of the Arms Embargo:

Senate: 8 in favour, 15 against.

House: 21 in favour, 143 against.

On the passage of the Lend Lease Bill:

Senate: 10 in favour, 17 against.

House: 24 in favour, 135 against.

On the adoption of Selective Service:

Senate: 7 in favour, 10 against.

House: 46 in favour, 88 against.

On the extension of the period of training:

Senate: 7 in favour, 13 against.

House: 21 in favour, 133 against.

The Republicans in Congress have achieved, in short, a perfect record of opposition to the measures recommended by the President, the Secretary of State, and by the Army's Chief of Staff. . . . It is impossible to dismiss the element of plain party politics from the votes so heavily one-sided as these.

Crisis or no crisis, the Republicans in Congress are still 'fighting Roosevelt', still jockeying for position, still trying to write a record which they can turn to profit if and when there occurs that long-delayed 'reaction' on which they have built their political hopes.

To the British, with their Parliamentary way of thinking, the ominous thing was not the Republican vote in Congress, but the extent to which members of Roosevelt's own majority party went against him in so critical a test. A division like this in the House of Commons would have been indicative of 'No confidence' and could well have resulted in the fall of a Government.

When Beaverbrook left Argentina he travelled with Harriman to Washington to arrange for the Moscow Conference, and Churchill instructed him to make some soundings of American public opinion on the side. Beaverbrook did so, and his reports were discouraging to his colleagues in London. He stated, and truthfully, that there wasn't the slightest chance of the U.S. entering the war until compelled to do so by a direct attack on its own territory, and it seemed that this could not happen until Britain and Russia had been defeated. The words of Senator Wheeler were given ominous weight, and Roosevelt's enormous prestige with the combatant allies began to ebb. There was increasing shrillness in the demands to know when the United States would abandon the role of sideline cheerleader and get into the game. Churchill, taking cognizance of this temper, said in an international broadcast:

The question has been asked: How near is the United States to war? There is certainly one man who knows the answer to that question. If Hitler has not yet declared war upon the United States, it is surely not out of his love for American institutions; it is certainly not because he could not find a pretext. He has murdered half a dozen countries for far less.

There again Churchill, like virtually everyone else in authority at the time, assumed that it was the powerful Hitler who would decide when the time had come to attack the United States. The possibility that this act of incredible folly would be committed by the Japanese, the saving of whose 'face' had been the object of so much solicitude in Washington, was hardly worth considering.

It happened that at that time, near the end of August, I had to go to England to study the British political warfare (i.e. propaganda) organization. Before I left, I had dinner with the President and Hopkins, and was told: 'You couldn't have picked a better time for getting a cool reception.' While I was there Churchill sent a lengthy cable to Hopkins about various matters, and toward the end he said: 'Today I saw Mr. Sherwood', which was my one and only appearance in that historic correspondence. This meeting was purely a courtesy one on Churchill's part—he had received a cable from the White House asking him to give me a few minutes (I was given fifteen to be exact). He told me that he did not believe the Germans would get to Moscow before the Russian winter set in. He paid glowing tribute to Harry Hopkins, speaking of 'the great heart that is within that frail frame'. His eyes welled over with tears when he said this. Churchill, who was so completely English, and who therefore, according to the rules, should have been coldly phlegmatic in demeanour, was one of the most unashamedly emotional of men. Whereas Roosevelt, a sentimental American, always kept his emotions so far from the surface that one could only guess as to their nature or even their very existence.

On Labour Day, September 1, Roosevelt made a short but vigorous speech, of which the *New York Times* said, editorially:

We have not yet declared or taken a direct part in a shooting war. But we have taken a position which must force us ultimately to take such a direct part if our present policy does not prove sufficient to defeat Hitler. It is a position from which we cannot now retreat. It is a position from which the overwhelming majority of Americans have no wish to retreat.

Hopkins wrote of the preparation of the Labour Day speech:

The President indicated that he wanted to make a very straightforward speech about Hitler. It seemed to me that the drafts prepared were not taking the line which the President had in mind.

The President himself developed the paragraph on page 2 relative to the Navy, but he toned down a similar paragraph which he had written about the Army. The President believes very strongly that as far as naval strength is concerned, that as long as the British fleet is afloat that fleet joined with ours can command the seas, but if the British fleet were defeated our fleet alone could not handle the job.

The President also worked considerably on the paragraph beginning 'I give solemn warning'.

The paragraph referred to read:

I give solemn warning to those who think that Hitler has been blocked and halted, that they are making a very dangerous assumption. When in any war your enemy seems to be making slower progress than he did the year before, that is the very moment to strike with redoubled force—to throw more energy into the job of defeating him—to end for all time the menace of world conquest and thereby end all talk or thought of any peace founded on a compromise with evil itself.

Here again was evidence of Roosevelt's perpetual concern about agitation for a negotiated peace. Three days after this speech a German submarine attacked with two torpedoes, but did not hit, the U.S. Destroyer *Greer* south-east of Greenland, and a week later Roosevelt made another broadcast, announcing the orders to the Navy to 'shoot on sight'. Hopkins wrote a description of the preparation of this speech as follows:

The genesis of this speech began as far back as the first of July after the President had initiated his first patrol of the North Atlantic, which was merely a patrol of notification in event a submarine or raider were discovered in the waters between North America and Iceland.

The President determined upon a far more important patrol before I went to England late in July, namely one in which all ships flying all flags would be protected. At that time Secretary Stimson was urging the President to tell the people about the nature of the new patrol. The President agreed that this should be done.

At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in August the President reiterated that he was going to speak early in September on the implications of his new policy. He felt that the speech, however, should not be made until the patrol was fully effective and all merchant ships were in the protective custody of our naval ships and the permanent plan for the patrol worked out.

He had not set a date for the speech, although he had discussed it with me from time to time after our return from the conference. But with the attack on the *Greer*, he determined to make his speech at once.

He had Cordell Hull and me to lunch on September 5 and outlined his proposal and planned the speech for the following Monday night.

Hull then elaborated at some length on our general position and in very aggressive and stern language laid out the policy of the United States Government and the reason for this patrol. The President liked the statement Hull was making verbally and asked him to dictate what

he had just said and send it to the White House late that afternoon. Because the President was then preparing to go to Hyde Park, he asked Hull to send him a copy of the memorandum by telegraph and to give me the other copy.

I was ill and tired and decided to remain in Washington. The draft from Hull arrived, and instead of being the vigorous, determined memorandum that had been represented in his verbal talk with the President, it was a pretty weak document, although it built up a fairly strong case for the necessity for some action. But there was no recommendation of any action.

Judge Rosenman and I worked on the speech, and I dictated the paragraphs which were proposed to the President for the end of the speech, which put the action that the circumstances required into the speech.

Beginning on page 5 of the mimeographed copy of the speech, with the paragraph 'When you see a rattlesnake', was the substance of the language that I prepared for the President.

The President wrote the paragraphs specifically referred to 'Do not let us split hairs' and all the historical references and the paragraph about 'But let this warning be clear' on the last page.

I talked to the President about this on the phone during the week-end. (This was the week-end the President's mother died.) The President, of course, said at once that Hull's draft was totally inadequate and left the speech entirely in thin air.

I told him that Sam and I were working on an end for the speech with a wallop to it and he asked us to meet him in New York after the funeral and to ride down with him Wednesday afternoon, when the speech would be put in final form. He himself had dictated a few memoranda which had been sent down, but which would not include an end for the speech.

I went to New York and met the train at 138th Street and worked all that afternoon on the speech.

Judge Rosenman and I had a draft of our own which we presented to the President and he dictated a few new paragraphs. We made another draft on the train and that night at 8.45 the President called in Hull, Stimson, and Knox and myself and read us a draft of the speech.

All of them liked it very much. Knox urged that there be nothing facetious in the speech and that it have a very serious tone. Each of them made some very minor corrections, but it was clear that all of them approved of it heartily.

The speech was to be given the next day. That night I told Judge Rosenman of the amendments which had been suggested, the most

important of which was the clarification of the fact that we were going to protect foreign ships.

Judge Rosenman then worked up a new draft of the speech on the basis of the conference.

The next morning the Judge and I took it in the President's bedroom, and he corrected a new draft in order to read it to the Congressional leaders at ten o'clock.

He later told me that the Congressional leaders had little comment to make on it and all of them thought it was good except Joe Martin, a Republican isolationist.

I had an appointment Thursday morning with the President, with Hull and the Soviet Ambassador on another matter and after that conference was over Hull remained behind, he having just before the conference with the Ambassador told me that the speech was too strong and that all reference to shooting first, or shooting of any kind, should be taken out of the speech.

This was a great surprise to me, because Hull had fully agreed before.

On many previous occasions, however, in the last six months Hull has talked pretty strong in private conversation, but when it comes down to putting it in writing he has tended to want to dilute everything. He has in recent months given me the impression that he isn't prepared for the implications of a tough row with Hitler.

I later learned from the President that Hull made a very strong argument urging the President to take out of the speech the real guts of it. The speech itself indicates that this was not done.

I have said elsewhere in this book that Hopkins knew nothing of what went on in the mysteries of the Politburo in Moscow. It may be added that he was often almost as ignorant of and puzzled by the processes of policy interpretation in the innermost recesses of the State Department.

Early in September, Hopkins wrote to Brendan Bracken, who had been appointed Minister of Information in the British Cabinet, complaining about 'the concerted attack in the British Press on two fronts, one, that we won't fight and the other that our supplies are very slow. These editorials don't sit well over here, but I presume there is some good reason for the outburst.' Hopkins had learned enough about the procedures in wartime London to know that when the British Press was 'concerted' on any angle it generally had been given some sort of off-the-record 'guidance' from the Government. He went on to say,

We are having some difficulty with our public opinion with regard to Russia. The American people don't take aid to Russia easily. The whole Catholic population is opposed to it, all the Nazis, all the Italians, and a

lot of people who sincerely believe that Stalin is a great menace to the world. Still, I think it will come out all right in the end. . . . The exhibition of the Russian Army has certainly made all of our military people look a little ill. Anglo-Saxons have a hard time believing that anyone can fight except themselves.

A very serious blow to Anglo-American negotiations, and particularly to Hopkins's large share in them, was the death of Arthur Purvis in a tragically unnecessary airplane accident on the R.A.F. Ferry Command run between Scotland and Newfoundland. As representative in Washington of the British Supply Council, Purvis, a Canadian, had gained such a thorough grasp of the complex situation, and so much experience in Hopkins's abrupt methods of doing business, that he and Hopkins could in a few words settle problems which would ordinarily have required hours of tiresome diplomatic dickerings. Hopkins recommended to British friends that Purvis be given some high decoration posthumously, but I do not know whether this was ever done.

Only a few days after Churchill made his broadcast saying that only Hitler knew the date of U.S. entry into the war Hopkins received one of the gloomiest messages that ever came to the White House from the normally confident, ebullient Prime Minister. He mentioned the concern of the British Cabinet over Roosevelt's repeated assurances (in answer to isolationist charges) that the Atlantic Conference had brought the U.S. 'no closer to war', that there were no 'secret commitments', etc. Each of these statements provided deflation of the confidence that Churchill had inspired on his return from Argentina. The propaganda effect of the Atlantic Conference was beginning to fizzle out. Churchill said that the Cabinet's concern would inevitably extend itself to Parliament, and then to the people as a whole, and he added: 'I don't know what will happen if England is fighting alone when 1942 comes.' He pointed out that there were at that moment thirty U-boats on the line from northern Ireland to Iceland and that the British had lost 50,000 tons of shipping in the past two days. He said that Hitler was keeping clear of the 26th Meridian, which constituted Roosevelt's frontier of the Western Hemisphere (this was before the attacks on the destroyers), so there was little prospect of an 'incident' serious enough to bring the United States into the war. He asked Hopkins if he felt inclined to express any hope for the future. If Hopkins replied directly to this, I can find no copy of it in his papers. But he made the following note which he attached to the Churchill message:

I talked to the President about this cablegram and the only thing we can make out of it is that Churchill is pretty depressed and takes it out on us in this fashion.

I told the President, however, that not only Churchill but all the members of the Cabinet and all the British people I talked to believed that ultimately we will get into the war on some basis or other and if they ever reached the conclusion that this was not to be the case, that would be a very critical moment in the war and the British appeasers might have some influence on Churchill.

Both Roosevelt and Hopkins well knew that despite Churchill's enormous popularity and hold on the emotions of the British people, the sentiment for appeasement which had existed in Baldwin's time and Chamberlain's was still alive in a small but potentially powerful minority. The appeals to 'reason' that had been made and were still being made by Rudolf Hess might well have found sympathetic listeners, particularly in the House of Lords. What Hess was continually offering, and with confidence that he spoke for Hitler, was a peace which would recognize and guarantee the power and prestige of the British Empire *in toto* while giving Germany control of the continent of Europe and a free hand against the 'Bolsheviks'. Hess repeated over and over again that the hopes for effective American intervention were illusory, that Russia was doomed, that England's case was hopeless, and that, therefore, the British Government was insane if it failed to accept Hitler's proffer of friendship while there was yet time to save the ageing lion's skin. Here are a few quotations from Hess's interminable monologue: 'I am convinced that in any event—whether an Eastern Front persists or not—Germany and her allies are in a position to carry on the war until England collapses from lack of tonnage. . . . The convoy system, which, in the (first) world war—but at the last minute—settled the U-boat war in favour of England, has in this war misfired. It could not prevent the big-scale sinking figures which must finally be fatal. . . . (If Germany must reluctantly conquer Britain) an occupation of the whole island does not come into question—for Germany would be burdened with the feeding of the population. In the long run, only the most important airfields would be kept in occupation. All these would be hermetically sealed over a wide area from the population, so that the troops of occupation would not be affected by the misery of their starvation. . . . I am conscious that in the above I have partly given away military secrets. But I believe I can answer to my conscience and to my people, for I believe that frankness makes possible the ending of a senseless war.'

There was nothing that Roosevelt could do in response to Churchill's plea for more tangible evidences of American determination except to attempt to increase the rendering of aid 'by all means short of war' (and, when one looks back on those days, one cannot escape the conclusion that never was the word 'short' given a more liberal interpretation). Churchill's depression, as it turned out, was shortlived, for within two days of the foregoing cable to

Hopkins came one from the Former Naval Person to the President, giving glowing reports of favourable developments in Persia, which provided opportunities for increased contacts with Russia in that part of the world, and asking for help in transporting two more British divisions, aggregating 40,000 men, to the Middle East. This involved the loan of the largest transports then in the U.S. service, including such converted liners as the *Manhattan*, *Washington*, and *America* (renamed, in wartime, U.S.S. *Wakefield*, *Mount Vernon*, and *West Point*). Churchill said in his cable: 'It is quite true that the loan of these liners would hamper any large dispatch of United States forces to Europe or Africa, but, as you know, I have never asked for this in any period we can reasonably foresee in the near future.' Hopkins went to work on this immediately, referring Churchill's message to Admirals Stark and Land. On September 6, Hopkins noted:

The President had a conference yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock between Admiral Stark; Admiral King, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet; Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Land and me.

It was agreed at this conference that we should provide troop transports for 20,000 men and that Admiral Stark was to consult with Admiral Little and Admiral Land with Sir Arthur Salter about the details.

The Admirals seemed quite willing to acquiesce in this programme.

One of the important decisions made was that these troopships were to fly the American flag and be manned by the Navy crews which are now on them.

It was decided it was unwise, however, for American destroyers to accompany these ships, which would be filled with British troops.

The arrangements went forward, but in early October Roosevelt was again involved with Congress for legislation which would further amend the Neutrality Act to permit the arming of American merchant ships.

Roosevelt thereupon cabled Churchill that, to his deep regret, he felt compelled to reopen the question of using American ships to transport British troops to the Middle East. He said, 'I have utmost confidence that you will sympathetically consider the problem and my frank statement of it.' He said that he had discussed with Congressional leaders his request for new legislation which would permit the arming of American merchant ships and the entry of these ships into British ports, and had reached the conclusion that no chances must be taken of any incidents occurring in the Atlantic while this legislation was being considered. Therefore, the President suggested two alternatives to the Prime Minister:

First—that the British Navy furnish enough officers and men to man the six American transports, which could then be loaned to Britain (under the Lend Lease law) and sail from Canadian ports under the British flag.

The second alternative—that the British troops be sent to Halifax where the six transports (manned by American crews) would pick them up and then sail through Western Hemisphere waters to the South Atlantic and thence around the Cape, keeping out of range of the main zones of danger from U-boats.

Roosevelt said that he preferred the first of these alternatives.

Churchill replied that he fully understood the President's position, but that he definitely preferred the second alternative, whereby the British troops would be delivered to Halifax and then transhipped to the American transports—and this was done. After Pearl Harbour, these transports were diverted from the Middle East to the carrying of troops across the Indian Ocean for the reinforcement of Singapore. The ships themselves got away from that doomed stronghold in time, but the troops they carried were delivered into the hands of the Japanese.

Hopkins's health was failing again in the autumn of 1941. There was now a vast increase in the details of Lend Lease Administration details. The two-headed (Knudsen-Hillman) Office of Production Management had come to an unlamented end and been replaced by the Supply Priorities Allocation Board, a stopgap organization under the chairmanship of Vice-President Wallace, with Donald Nelson as Executive Director and Hopkins one of the members of the Board. He determined to turn the job of Lend Lease Administrator over to someone else, and Edward R. Stettinius, jun., was selected. Stettinius has described how he was summoned to the White House and found Hopkins in bed with the usual mess of papers littered over the blankets and stuffed under the pillows. The conversation was brief:

HOPKINS: 'Ed, the President wants you to take over administration of the Lend Lease Programme. He thinks there is nothing more important now for the country than getting this Lend Lease show moving at top speed. We stayed up late last night talking over the whole situation, and he feels you are the man to do it.'

STETTINIUS: 'I'm here in Washington to serve wherever the President feels I can be most useful and if he wants me to run the Lend Lease show, I'll take it on and do my best.'

There was then some discussion of organization problems and policies and finally Stettinius asked: 'Is there anything more to consider about this thing? Does the President want to talk it over with me first?'

HOPKINS: 'Not unless you have something you particularly want to talk over with him. So far as the President is concerned you're elected, Ed.'

That bit of the record provides a pretty good example of the unique nature of Hopkins's position in the annals of Government. Here he was

calmly relinquishing an imposing title and a job of vast importance—and this in the city of Washington, where men in top positions not only fought and bled to hold on to their own jobs, but sat up nights figuring ways to take powers and functions away from others of equal eminence. However, Hopkins knew that the policy governing Lend Lease would still be made in the White House, and that the President would continue to delegate most of the responsibility for this to him. Stettinius was his friend and they could work well together—and that was that.

Even when relieved of the major part of the work of Lend Lease, he still was overburdened with responsibilities and worries, and his temper became shorter and shorter. He read a public statement by a General on the unpreparedness of the Army and sent it to the President with a note:

I think statements like this are beginning to do us a good deal of harm. I think many people hesitate to go all the way with you because they feel the Army is not ready to fight.

I can't see any useful purpose in Army officers continuing to make statements like this.

To prove his impartiality as between the services he sent the President the following note attached to a clipping concerning a statement made by an Admiral:

I am not so sick but that reading a speech like this doesn't make me a little sicker.

As a matter of fact I think Yarnell has made serious misstatements of fact in relation to Crete and has done a great injustice to the Royal Air Force.

It seems to me that if our naval officers would spend more time getting our own Navy ready to do its job and less on criticizing the British we would be better off.

Roosevelt did not take either of these squawks very seriously. His temper was far evened than Hopkins's. If it had not been, he could not possibly have lived as long as he did.

Roosevelt could find apparently complete relaxation in talking about the past or the future—particularly, in both cases, his own. He could engage in hours of reminiscence about his Hyde Park and Campobello days before the First World War; or he could go into endless detail about his plans for retirement, which covered a wide range of activities—such as, starting an entirely new kind of country newspaper, a new kind of college, and even a new kind of roadside hot-dog stand. In the midst of the uncertainty and

hair-trigger danger of the months before Pearl Harbour, Roosevelt expended a great deal of time on a project for a fishing retreat for Hopkins and himself. He had the place all picked out. He wrote a note for Hopkins to obtain a 'Large Scale Chart of Long Key, Fla., and Channel Key about 3 miles S.W. of it and just off North Side of Viaduct. This is about half-way from Key West to the mainland along the Trestle.' Hopkins noted that 'we had been talking a good deal about getting a fishing-camp in the deep south for use after the President leaves the White House. He has had his eye on Channel Key for a good many years. It was offered to him back in 1924 for \$15,000 and the President thinks since the hurricane it probably could be bought very cheaply.' Roosevelt designed a hurricane-proof house. It was to be lashed by cables to concrete anchors in the ground.

Hopkins got in touch with a friend, Julius F. Stone, jun., a lawyer in Key West who had been a W.P.A. official in Florida, specializing in hurricane relief. Stone investigated Channel Key and found it could be bought for \$3,500, but that the island had been so beaten by the 1935 hurricane that most of it was underwater at high tide. The approximate cost of bulkheading and filling the island would be \$18,000. Stone recommended that property on the mainland would be preferable. He wrote:

As you know, there are some windy periods down in this part of the country quite aside from hurricanes, during which one is likely to get good and wet in any small boat going between the island and the mainland. The cost of building a small home on the mainland would be less than transporting everything on an island, and likewise the cost and nuisance of maintenance would be considerably less.

However, Roosevelt was not to be talked out of it that easily. After reading Stone's letter, he wrote to Hopkins:

This is another interesting letter. I still think that property directly off the main highway on a larger Key would be a mistake and the Channel Key is the best bet. Unless the storm washed a lot of it away, I would not think of bulkheading or filling the whole of the island.

The real answer to it is that somebody has to look at the thing personally. The price of Channel Key is not out of the way. The chief question is whether, since the hurricane, there is enough water for a fishing-launch to get to the Island from the highway and from the Island out to the fishing-grounds.

Perhaps if we can go to Warm Springs within a week, you could run down and stay with Stone in Key West for a week and look it over. That we can decide later.

Roosevelt and Hopkins went on talking about Channel Key right up to the Japanese attack, nor was it forgotten thereafter. I feel sure that to the moment of his death Roosevelt was determined to build that house and then pray for a hurricane to come along and prove it practicable.

In a previous chapter I have mentioned the astonishment I always felt that there were so few interruptions, dispatches or telephone calls when the President was in his Study, either working or relaxed. This was due to the superlatively good staff work in the White House by Grace Tully and other secretaries, by Louise Hackmeister and Russell McMullin, who ran the telephone switchboard day and night, and by the three ushers. There were always during the war years plenty of triple priority, super-urgent messages or calls coming into the White House from important officials who considered that the continued existence of the Republic and of freedom itself depended on immediate action by the President on whatever it was they were worrying about at the moment. Yet, somehow or other, the staff knew how to sort these out and divert the 99 per cent that were not nearly so crucial as the senders imagined, so that the President would not be disturbed when he wanted to sit around quietly telling lengthy anecdotes, or pasting stamps in albums.

I do not believe there was ever a time when he was being more steadily assailed morning, noon, and night than in those tense weeks in the autumn of 1941. He was constantly being goaded in one direction by those who favoured bold action, of whom Stimson and Morgenthau were the most vigorous proponents; and he was being hauled in another direction by others who were convinced that our only salvation lay in a policy of extreme caution; in addition to which, Churchill was augmenting his voluminous cables with telephone calls from the little booth in the bomb-proof quarters to which he had been consigned under Great George Street. (In that telephone-booth were two clocks, one set at London time and the other at Washington time.)

At the end of September, Roosevelt had to make up his mind as to whether or not he should again put an issue up to Congress and run the risk of an unfavourable verdict. He was besieged with advice as to the dreadful perils that he faced in taking either one course or the other. The attitude of the War Department was obviously in favour of the frontal attack against the isolationists. The attitude of the Navy was less clear. Hull asked Admiral Stark to state his opinions on this matter, and the resultant memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations was highly refreshing to the President. It was a complete statement of Stark's estimate of the possible advantages and disadvantages and need not be quoted in full. The most important parts of it were as follows:

A declaration of war by the United States against Germany, unless Germany had previously declared war against the United States, might bring Japan into the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided disadvantage, because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities on two fronts; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression. . . .

It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted. . . .

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have often stated that the sooner we get in the better. . . .

PS.—I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.

He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to.

He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to invade the countries he has.

When he is ready, he will strike, and not before.

On October 9, Roosevelt sent to the Congress his request for further amendments to the Neutrality Law which would permit the arming of American merchant ships and restoration of the right of these ships to carry trade into the war zones. This provoked another bitter debate on Capitol Hill; indeed, the President's position there was actually weaker than it had been when the Lend Lease Bill was introduced the previous January. During this debate the Germans were driving against Moscow along a 375-mile front, and in Tokyo the so-called 'moderate' Konoye Cabinet resigned, to be replaced by the undisguisedly militaristic Cabinet of General Tojo. In addition to these portentous developments, the Germans drew the first American blood in the battle of the Atlantic: on October 17, about 350 miles south-west of Iceland, a U-boat torpedo hit the U.S. Destroyer

Kearny, and eleven of her crew were killed. The ship herself managed to limp into the harbour of Reykjavik.

Even this 'incident' was taken pretty much as a matter of course by the American people, who always have considered the men in their regular armed forces—Navy, Army and, most of all, Marine Corps—as rugged mercenaries who signed up voluntarily, as do policemen and firemen, for hazardous service; it was, of course, tough luck when any of them were killed in line of duty in a Central American revolution, or on an accidentally sunk submarine or on a deliberately sunk gunboat, like the *Panay*, but it was still all in the day's work. There was little or no self-identification of the normal American civilian with the professional American soldier or sailor. In the case of the drafted men, however, the attitude was entirely different. They were 'our boys', who must be kept out of harm's way at all costs. Since there were no drafted men in the Navy at that time, there was no great popular indignation against Hitler for the attacks on the destroyers; but what is most important is that neither was there any serious popular indignation against Roosevelt for his responsibility in thus exposing our ships. The American people were merely waiting, in a seemingly apathetic state, comparable to that of the British people during the Phony War period—waiting for the Dunkirk which would impel them to positive action. The very fact that the British people remembered how dangerously complacent they themselves had been before the fall of France made it all the more difficult for them to understand the American confidence that 'the war can never touch us'.

Following is a quotation of a news story in the *Washington Times Herald* which gives some suggestion of the depths touched in those days:

Government officials were at a loss last night for a legal means of combating a unique form of antiwar propaganda which has come to light since the torpedoing of the destroyer *Kearny*, with the loss of most of her officers and crew.

This new method of assailing the Administration's foreign policy has taken the form of taunting messages to the families and relatives of the men who died when the *Kearny* went down in the Atlantic.

A cartoon depicting Uncle Sam being crucified on 'The Cross of Gold' with Justice and Liberty hanging from crosses on either side and pencilled messages were received by the family of George Alexander Calvert, jr., a fireman on the *Kearny*, who was reported missing.

The taunting messages, which included the statement that 'your dear son was sent to his death by the murdering imbecile head of our Government', were received by the Calvert family shortly after the newspapers

reported the collapse of the mother when she learned that her son was lost.

Among the messages was an engraved dodger depicting the hanging of Uncle Sam, with figures labelled 'F.D.R.' and 'Me, too, W.W.', pulling on the rope. Other figures in the cartoon were labelled Carter Glass, Bernard Baruch, Dotty Tom Tom, Frank Knox, Harry Hopkins, La Guardia, Pepper, Henry L. Stimson and others.

The Calvert family, living near Gillespie, Ill., sent the messages to officials here, asking that the persons who sent them be hunted down so 'they will not torture any more families whose boys are lost'.

A few days after the attack on the *Kearny* General Robert E. Wood of the America First Committee issued a public appeal to the President to go before the Congress and ask for a definitive vote as to whether the United States should or should not enter the war. This was precisely the demand for bold, decisive action that had been urged on Roosevelt by Stimson and many other advisers in and out of the Government for the past six months. The very fact that such a demand now came from an important spokesman for isolationism provided Roosevelt with sufficient confirmation of his conviction that, were he to do this, he would meet with certain and disastrous defeat.

On October 27 Roosevelt gave his annual Navy Day Speech in the Grand Ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. It was by far the strongest speech he had yet given. He said:

The shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot. . . .

I say that we do not propose to take this lying down. . . .

Today, in the face of this newest and greatest challenge of them all, we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations. We stand ready in the defence of our nation and the faith of our fathers to do what God has given us the power to see as our full duty.

Brave words—but they did not change the situation in the slightest degree. They may well have been greeted with derisive laughter by the war lords in Berlin and Tokyo. Three days after Roosevelt spoke, another U.S. destroyer, the *Reuben James*, was torpedoed and sunk. One hundred and fifteen members of the ship's company, including all the officers, were lost. The bereaved families mourned, but among the general public there seemed to be more interest in the Army-Notre Dame football game. There was a sort of tacit understanding among Americans that nobody was to get excited if

ships were sunk by U-boats, because that's what got us into war the other time. It has been said that in 1914 the French were prepared for the war of 1870, and in 1939 they were prepared for the war of 1914. It could be said with equal truth that in 1941 the Americans were fully prepared to keep out of the war of 1917.

On November 7, the Senate agreed to amend the Neutrality Act by the close vote of fifty to thirty-seven, and a week later the House passed the amendments by the much closer vote of 212 to 194.

The truth was that as the world situation became more desperately critical, and as the limitless peril came closer and closer to the United States, isolationist sentiment became ever more strident in expression and aggressive in action, and Roosevelt was relatively powerless to combat it. He had said everything 'short of war' that could be said. He had no more tricks left. The hat from which he had pulled so many rabbits was empty. The President of the United States was now the creature of circumstance which must be shaped not by his own will or his own ingenuity but by the unpredictable determination of his enemies. It is small wonder that he attempted in his spare time to find surcease by figuring out means of anchoring a holiday cottage against West Indian hurricanes.

On October 31, Roosevelt and Hopkins went to Hyde Park for five days, after which Hopkins went to the Navy Hospital, where he remained for four weeks. The Hospital was then on 24th and E Streets, only a short distance from the White House, and Hopkins drove over occasionally for dinner with the President. He was always in touch with Stettinius and General Burns at Lend Lease and was kept constantly informed on the general situation.

He always took more interest in his family affairs when he was ill, and while in hospital he made elaborate preparations for a birthday-party for his daughter Diana at the White House on November 15. On November 24 he wrote to his son Stephen at Hill School:

I didn't hear how the football team came out in its last game, but I hope you managed to get into it.

I have your report card indicating that you are failing in two of your four subjects. Some way, some how it seems to me you have to buckle down to your school work and forget about athletics for the balance of this year. Surely you are not so backward that you can't do reasonably good work, but you have got to learn really to study.

It is far more important that you make good marks than that you make the football team. There is little chance of your ever getting to college with these kind of marks.

I don't want you to think I underrate having a good time, but the world being the way it is these days each one of us has got to learn to

take care of himself, and you are getting, it seems to me, a very special opportunity now that hardly one boy in a thousand in the United States has and I want you to take full advantage of it.

Stephen was his youngest son, who was killed in action with the Marines two years later.

Hopkins left the hospital four days before Pearl Harbour and returned to his bedroom-office in the White House. He never managed to follow the advice that he gave his son—'each of us has got to learn to take care of himself'.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

AS a measure for coping with the serious Catholic opposition to aid for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt decided to send Myron C. Taylor, his special Ambassador to Pope Pius XII, on another mission to Rome. Even this move raised difficult religious issues, for there were many Protestants, including some important Church leaders, who were deeply alarmed by any signs of collusion between the White House and the Vatican, as they had proved when Alfred E. Smith was a candidate for the Presidency in 1928. But Taylor was an ideal choice for this delicate mission. He was an eminent Protestant. He was also a former Chairman of the Board and continuing Director of the U.S. Steel Corporation, and Director of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, the First National Bank of New York, the New York Central Railroad, etc.—so that he could hardly be accused of subservience to Stalin.

In the handling of the supremely delicate problem presented by the antipathy of the Church toward Communism, Roosevelt received invaluable aid from such eminent Catholic laymen as Associate Justice Frank Murphy of the Supreme Court, Postmaster-General Frank Walker, and Philip Murray, who had succeeded John L. Lewis as President of the C.I.O. There were some impatient people who thought that the President exaggerated the strength of Catholic sentiment, but it was his way to tread with extreme wariness wherever religious sensibilities were involved; he knew a lot more than his advisers did about these sensibilities.

The preparations for the departure of the Harriman Mission to Moscow were immensely complicated, involving exhaustive negotiations and some heated arguments with the Army and Navy, the production and shipping authorities, and British representatives in Washington, over the long lists of items which might be pledged to the Soviet Union. Both Churchill and Beaverbrook telephoned Hopkins from London begging that these preparations be concluded with all possible haste, as the Russians, so hard pressed themselves, were pressing the British Government to advance the date of the Moscow talks.

In the midst of this the elder Mrs. James Roosevelt died, and the President had to leave the final work on the schedule entirely in Hopkins's hands.

Those who were closest to Franklin Roosevelt could not presume to guess at the quality of sorrow caused him by his mother's death; one needed only a small realization of the tenacity with which he clung to every surviving link with the lovely world of his childhood—a world fantastically different from the one in which he now lived and fought—to know that his

sorrow was very deep indeed. He kept it to himself. He permitted no sign of it to appear on the surface. He wanted no evidences of awareness of it from anyone else.

On September 9, before leaving for New York to attend Mrs. Roosevelt's funeral, Hopkins sent a long cable to Churchill saying that the President had requested the Secretaries of War and Navy to draw up immediately (in fact, by the following day) a programme to cover allocation of material to Great Britain and the Soviet Union up to June 30, 1942. 'With this information available,' Hopkins wrote, 'the President proposes that there be a conference about September 15 in London between high British and American officials'—this to be followed at the earliest possible date by a conference with the Russians in Moscow. Churchill replied that he and Beaverbrook were in complete agreement with the proposals and were making all necessary preparations for the conferences. He said that the entire American and British delegations would be transported to Russia in ships of the Royal Navy. As it happened, Harriman travelled with Beaverbrook and his mission in a British cruiser, but the rest of the American mission travelled from London to Moscow in the same B-24's which had brought them from Washington. These two bombers, piloted by Major A. L. Harvey and Lieutenant L. T. Reichers, made a remarkable flight at very high altitude over much the same route that Hopkins had flown in a PBY, this being the first mission of the U.S. Army Air Corps over areas controlled by the Luftwaffe. Quentin Reynolds, a close friend of Harriman's, managed to hitchhike a ride on one of these bombers, and later cabled Hopkins recommending that Harvey and Reichers be awarded Distinguished Flying Crosses for an 'amazing flight under terrific conditions'. He added that the 'Russian Air Force thinks it greatest flight ever made'.

The American Mission included: William L. Batt, Admiral William H. Standley, General Burns, General Chaney, and Colonel Philip R. Faymonville; and the British Mission: Harold Balfour, Sir Archibald Rowlands, Sir Charles Wilson, General G. N. Macready, and General Ismay.

As he sailed from the U.K., Beaverbrook cabled Hopkins:

We finished our work this evening in the big room of the War Cabinet and now with gratitude and affection I send you my personal thanks for your efforts in making this conference possible. The faith that you have had in our people has sustained our courage through dark hours and terrible attacks. We all recognize the influence you have exerted in our country and we shall continue to look to you for guidance and leadership.

Which sounds a little as if Beaverbrook contemplated the possibility that these might be his last words. Neither he nor any other senior members of the mission could forget, as they started their journey aboard H.M.S.

London, that Lord Kitchener had met his death on a torpedoed British cruiser *en route* to Archangel in the first year of the first World War.

Roosevelt wrote a letter of introduction for dispatch to Harriman in London, as follows:

My Dear Mr. Stalin:

This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.

Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defence of the Soviet armies.

I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own.

I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

This letter arrived after Harriman had left London, and the extra-careful intelligence officers burned it rather than forward it in an airplane which might be shot down over territory held by the Germans. Roosevelt therefore transmitted its text by cable through the State Department to the American Embassy in Moscow, and Steinhardt duly delivered it to Stalin. Evidently the Germans intercepted this cable, for they released a version of Roosevelt's letter, deliberately garbled, through the DNB News Service to North and South America. This German version quoted the President as starting the letter with the salutation 'My Dear Friend Stalin', and ending it 'In cordial friendship', instead of 'Yours very sincerely'.

Hopkins sent a memorandum to Stettinius shortly before the Moscow Conferences started:

I would like to be in direct touch with Harriman and the Mission in Moscow and any replies to Harriman's telegrams I would like to have sent through me and signed by me.

Will you please notify everybody over there about this, so there will be no possible hitch about it.

Harriman and Beaverbrook had three evening meetings with Stalin—Sunday, September 28, Monday the 29, and Tuesday the 30, for a total of some nine hours. During the same days there were repeated meetings of the

sub-committees on Army, Navy, Air Force, Raw Materials, Transportation and Medical Supplies. These committee meetings were described at first as 'protracted exercises in utter frustration', for the British and American officials and officers could seem to get little or no comment from their Russian opposite numbers on the various proposals for a programme of supplies. As usual, nothing of any real importance could be accomplished below the topmost level.

At the first meeting with Stalin cordiality prevailed. Stalin gave a candid review of the military situation, as he had done with Hopkins, saying that Germany's superiority to Russia was, in air power, in a ratio of three to two—in tanks, a ratio of three or four to one—in divisions, 320 to 280. However, Stalin said, the preponderance in tanks was absolutely essential to the Germans, for without it the German infantry was weak as compared with the Russian infantry. He said that, of Germany's satellites, the best fighters were the Finns, next the Italians, third the Rumanians, and last of all the Hungarians. He estimated that there were at the time ten Italian divisions in the Eastern Theatre of Operations. (This indicates a certain change of opinion since his talks with Hopkins two months previously.) Stalin went into considerable detail as to required items, ending up with the statement that his greatest need was tanks, and after that anti-tank guns, medium bombers, anti-aircraft guns, armour plate, fighter and reconnaissance planes and, high on the list, barbed wire.

Stalin had a great deal to say to Beaverbrook about the question of active British military co-operation with Russia. Even at that early stage of Russia's participation in the war, the desirability of opening a Second Front in the west had already become a lively issue and was providing the persistent theme-song of Russian propaganda in Britain and the United States. However, Stalin does not appear to have pressed particularly for the Second Front at this Conference. He did feel that the British might send forces to join the Russians in the Ukraine. Beaverbrook pointed out that British divisions were being built up in Persia and that these might be moved into the Caucasus. (The British obviously were interested in reinforcing the Caucasus to prevent a possible German break-through into the Middle East.) Stalin dismissed this with the brusque statement: 'There is no war in the Caucasus, but there is in the Ukraine.' Beaverbrook suggested that the Soviet and British Staffs might engage in strategic discussions, but this suggestion met with no welcome whatsoever.

Harriman took up the matter of the Siberian airports and the possibility of the delivery of American aircraft to the Soviet Union by the Alaskan route. Stalin agreed that information about the airports in Siberia should be made available, but when Harriman suggested that delivery of the planes might be made by American crews Stalin demurred that it was 'too dangerous

a route'. Harriman gathered that Stalin did not wish to take any chances of provoking Japan.

Stalin asked about peace objectives. When Beaverbrook mentioned the eight points of the Atlantic Charter, Stalin asked: 'What about getting the Germans to pay for the damage?' Beaverbrook evaded that question with some generality about 'We must win the war first.' Harriman mentioned President Roosevelt's concern about the state of American public opinion, particularly on the religious issue. Stalin said that he did not know much about American public opinion towards Russia and did not seem to attach much importance to it. As it was getting late, Harriman did not press the matter, but promised to give Stalin a memorandum on it.

At the end of this first session Harriman noted: 'Beaverbrook and I considered the meeting had been extremely friendly and were more than pleased with our reception. The meeting lasted over three hours.'

At the second meeting, the following evening, the atmosphere was entirely different. In his report Harriman noted:

The evening was very hard sledding. Stalin seemed discourteous and at times not interested, and rode us pretty hard. For example, he turned to me once and said: 'Why is it that the United States can only give me 1,000 tons of armour plate steel for tanks—a country with a production of over 50,000,000 tons?' When I tried to explain the length of time required in increasing capacity of this type of steel he brushed it aside by saying: 'One only has to add alloys.'

At this meeting, which lasted two hours, Lord Beaverbrook noted that 'Stalin was very restless, walking about and smoking continuously, and appeared to both of us to be under an intense strain'. Beaverbrook handed him a letter from Churchill, which Stalin opened and merely glanced at, then left it laying on the table unread throughout the meeting. As Beaverbrook and Harriman were preparing to leave, Molotov reminded Stalin of the Churchill letter. Stalin thrust it back in the envelope and handed it to a clerk.

During the meeting Stalin made three telephone calls, each time dialling the number himself. Neither Beaverbrook nor Harriman could account for Stalin's mood at this meeting, but their likeliest guess was that he had just received some alarming news about the imminent German drive on Moscow. In all the lengthy review of all the items of arms, munitions, raw materials, etc., that was painstakingly made Stalin betrayed evidence of enthusiasm only once, and that was when Harriman mentioned an American offer of 5,000 jeeps to Russia. Stalin asked if he could have some more. But when Harriman asked if he would like to have some ordinary armoured cars for his troops Stalin said that armoured cars were death traps and he did not want any.

Beaverbrook and Harriman had hoped to conclude their business with Stalin at this meeting, but when it broke up they were still so far from settlement on so many points that they asked for a third meeting the following evening. Stalin readily agreed to this—the only real agreement achieved at this session, except on the question of the merit of the jeep.

The next day the German propagandists were blasting to the world the news that the Conferences in Moscow had bogged down—that bitter quarrels had developed—that the British and Americans could never find common ground with the 'Bolshevists'. It seemed to the members of the British and American missions that this time, for once, Goebbels might be uncomfortably close to the truth. But when Beaverbrook and Harriman met Stalin in the Kremlin at six o'clock that evening they found that the atmosphere had again changed completely. Stalin mentioned the Nazi propaganda with some amusement and indicated that it was for the three of them to prove Goebbels a liar.

Beaverbrook went through a memorandum listing everything that the Russians had asked for, stating those items on which the Americans and British could not meet the demands immediately, and then a long list of items which could be met in full with even some extras thrown in. Beaverbrook asked Stalin if he was pleased with this list. Stalin replied that he had received the list with enthusiasm. Then, Beaverbrook noted:

The interpreter, Litvinov, bounded out of his seat and cried with passion, 'Now we shall win the war.'

When we had completed the recital of the list the atmosphere developed to the highest degree of satisfaction and pleasure on both sides. The assembly took on the form of closer and even intimate relations. . . . It was sunshine after rain.

In his records of this Conference, Beaverbrook has given an interesting glimpse of Stalin's 'doodling' habits: While Litvinov was translating the Russian words into English, 'Stalin occupied himself by drawing numberless pictures of wolves on paper and filling in the background with red pencil'.

During this meeting Stalin again emphasized the need for the greatest possible number of jeeps and also for American three-ton trucks. He said that the war depended on the gasoline engine—that the country with the biggest output in engines would be the ultimate victor. He also talked again about post-war aims and politics in general. Beaverbrook notes that at one point in the meeting Stalin 'sent for tea and food. This was the first time food had been produced at our conferences. It was obviously the result of his pleased excitement.'

In Harriman's notes is the following:

Stalin asked about Hess and seemed much interested in Beaverbrook's amusing description of his talk with Hess and his size-up of the situation. Stalin indicated that he thought Hess had gone not at the request of Hitler, but with the knowledge of Hitler, to which Beaverbrook agreed.

The net of Beaverbrook's statement was that Hess had come thinking that with a small group of British aristocrats a counter-Churchill government could be set up to make peace with Germany which would be welcomed by the majority of the British. Germany with British aid would then attack Russia. Stalin relished the amusing and detailed comments by Beaverbrook who was in his best form as a raconteur.

In his notes on this part of the conversation, Beaverbrook wrote that Stalin said the German Ambassador (who was still in Moscow at the time of the Hess flight) had told him that Hess was crazy—but Beaverbrook expressed the view that Hess was not.

Harriman expressed to Stalin the hope that he would feel free to cable President Roosevelt directly on any matters that he considered of importance. Harriman assured him that Roosevelt would welcome such messages—as he did similar messages from Churchill. Stalin said he was glad to hear this, as he had previously felt he should not presume to address the President directly. Beaverbrook suggested to Stalin that it would be highly desirable for him to meet with Churchill face to face. According to Harriman's notes, Stalin expressed to Beaverbrook his belief that the present military alliance and agreement of no separate peace should be extended to a treaty, an alliance not only for war, but for post-war as well. Beaverbrook answered that he personally favoured it and believed that it was an opportune time to take it up.

Harriman made repeated attempts to break through the continued discussion of European matters in order to obtain Stalin's views on the Far East. Stalin expressed the belief that Japan might be split from its Axis alliance with Germany. He said it was his impression 'that Japan was not Italy and is not willing to be a serf to Germany and therefore could be won away'.

Beaverbrook noted of Stalin: 'We had got to like him; a kindly man, with a habit, when agitated, of walking about the floor with his hands behind his back. He smoked a great deal and practically never shows any impatience at all.' Beaverbrook was somewhat disturbed because, during the second and third meetings, the door leading from the conference-room to the outer office was left open, which indicated the possibility that somebody was checking on Litvinov's translations. Harriman did not feel that the open door had any significance whatever.

At the conclusion of this final meeting Molotov exchanged a few sentences

with Stalin, who then expressed the hope that Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Harriman would have dinner with him the next evening. The invitation was accepted. Harriman wrote:

The meeting broke up in the most friendly fashion possible. Stalin made no effort to conceal his enthusiasm. It was my impression that he was completely satisfied that Great Britain and America meant business. In spite of my lack of knowledge of the language he had indicated by his manner throughout the three nights of conferences (totalling about nine hours) very clearly his reactions to everything we said, either favourable or unfavourable or that he was not interested.

I left feeling that he had been frank with us and if we came through as had been promised and if personal relations were retained with Stalin, the suspicion that has existed between the Soviet Government and our two Governments might well be eradicated.

There can be no doubt that Stalin is the only man to deal with in foreign affairs. Dealing with others without previous instruction from Stalin about the matters under discussion was almost a waste of time.

Beaverbrook has been a great salesman. His personal sincerity was convincing. His genius never worked more effectively.

Harriman later wrote a memorandum on religion in the U.S.S.R.:

Throughout the week in Russia I took every occasion (and I believe covered most of the members of the Soviet delegation, including, of course, Stalin and Molotov) of explaining the American political situation and public opinion regarding Russia, particularly in relation to the religious subject, and urged that both statements and action be taken to indicate to America that the Soviets were willing to allow freedom of worship not only in letter but in fact.

Everyone at least nodded 'Yes'. In explaining the subject to Stalin, he nodded his head and indicated what I understood to mean a willingness to see that something was done.

Oumansky was the most expansive and assured me that the Soviets did allow religious worship and would reduce restrictions and would have the necessary publicity. He promised the last time I saw him, at the American Embassy, Friday, October 3, categorically without qualification that the President's public statement on religion would be responded to by a high Soviet official in a manner to obtain maximum publicity in the United States.

In spite of all comments and assurances, I leave with the impression that all the Soviets intend to do is to give lip-service and to create certain instances which would give an impression of relaxation without really changing their present practices. At the dinner given for the Delegates in

the Kremlin (October 1) Molotov expressed to me with great sincerity the high regard that he and the others had for the President, both in his motives and the fundamental wisdom of his conceptions. At one point in discussing the President, he asked me whether the President, being such an intelligent man, really was as religious as he appeared, or whether his professions were for political purposes. They look upon a man who believes in a religious doctrine or faith as we do a fundamentalist.

They do appear, however, to be much less afraid of religion than they were some years ago. For example, Stalin's remarks in toasting the President's aims for the creation of a proper peace (as translated by Oumansky) ended with the old Russian colloquial phrase 'May God help him'. (I questioned Oumansky about this and he assured me that his translation was exact, but as one of the Embassy men said he had not heard Stalin say it, I checked later with another member of the Embassy staff, who told me Stalin had used the phrase. There is no doubt that Oumansky did not translate all the toasts accurately. Stalin even commented on this to Litvinov in Beaverbrook's hearing.)

The Polish refugees and army are going to be allowed some priests. Two have been released from confinement so far—more to follow. I discussed this subject with Sikorski in London before leaving for Moscow. I asked him to advise Washington what had been done, explaining why it was of interest. I understand subsequently this was done and the information released by the State Department.

I got conflicting reports regarding the amount of worship, the percentage of churches in the villages that were open, and the attendance. All, however, agreed on the following:

- (1) That worship was engaged in by older people; practically nobody under thirty.
- (2) That they were chiefly women.
- (3) That there were, of course, no Communists.

Religion to the Communists is superstition and against the Communist philosophy, and in its organized form dangerous in developing anti-Communist political groups. It is, of course, a grave offence for anyone to teach the youth under sixteen religious philosophy.

Unless Stalin is ready to compromise the entire political philosophy of the Party, namely allowing no minority political parties to develop, freedom (including free balloting, etc.), religious worship will be tolerated only under closest G.P.U. scrutiny, with a view to keeping it under careful control, like a fire which can be stamped out at any time rather than allowed to burn freely with the dangers of uncontrolled conflagration.

The Communists will unquestionably continue anti-religious education of the youth up to sixteen years without allowing religious education. Religious worshippers will be restricted in economic or political advancement even if they are no longer persecuted. Priests or clergymen will be closely watched, as will everybody with whom they have intimate contact.

The type of concession that will be made is indicated by the following statements on religion, which are considered revolutionary, that appeared in the official Communist Party paper, *Pravda*.

- (1) 'We hold sacred the religious sentiments of our women.' (So translated to me by Oumansky.)
- (2) The phrase 'independently of race, wealth, creed or political opinion'.

Aside from the members of the American and British Embassies the only foreigner I talked to was Father Braun, the only American Catholic priest in Russia, whose sentiments are described in the attached letter to Myron Taylor.

In the letter referred to, Father Braun reviewed at length the improvements that he had observed in the Russian tolerance of religion. He attributed this largely to the influence of President Roosevelt.

Harriman also made note of certain evidences of friction between Beaverbrook and the military members of the British Mission. Beaverbrook had by then become, as he was to continue, a vociferous advocate of the Second Front in the west. He was for ever opposing any diversions from this fixed purpose. Following is his own original statement of the matter, a copy of which he sent to Hopkins:

On my return from Russia in about the middle of October 1941 I stated a case for a Second Front to help the Russians.

I claimed that our military leaders had shown themselves consistently averse to taking any offensive action.

Our advance into Persia was a purely minor and preventive operation in which we employed less than one quarter of the troops used by the Russians. And the only other operations we have undertaken have been the bombing of Western Germany and fighter sweeps over France which have done nothing to help Russia or hinder Germany in the present crisis and in which we have lost many of our finest airmen.

Our strategy is still based on a long-term view of the war which is blind to the urgencies and opportunities of the moment. There has been no attempt to take into account the new factor introduced by Russian resistance.

There is today only one military problem—how to help Russia. Yet on that issue the Chiefs of Staff content themselves with saying that nothing can be done. They point out the difficulties, but make no suggestions for overcoming them.

It is nonsense to say that we can do nothing for Russia. We can, as soon as we decide to sacrifice long-term projects and a general view of the war which, though still cherished, became completely obsolete on the day when Russia was attacked.

Russian resistance has given us new opportunities. It has probably denuded Western Europe of German troops and prevented for the time being offensive action by the Axis in other theatres of possible operations. It has created a quasi-revolutionary situation in every occupied country and opened 2,000 miles of coastline to a descent by British forces.

But the Germans can move their divisions with impunity to the East. For the Continent is still considered by our generals to be out of bounds to British troops. And Rebellion is regarded as premature and even deplored when it occurs, because we are not ready for it.

The Chiefs of Staff would have us wait until the last button has been sewn on the last gaiter before we launch an attack. They ignore the present opportunity.

But they forget that the attack on Russia has brought us a new peril as well as a new opportunity. If we do not help them now the Russians may collapse. And, freed at last from anxiety about the East, Hitler will concentrate all his forces against us in the West.

The Germans will not wait then till we are ready. And it is folly for us to wait now. We must strike before it is too late.

On Wednesday afternoon, October 1, the first 'Confidential Protocol' between the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. was signed and sealed by Harriman, Beaverbrook, and Molotov. It contained over seventy main items and more than eighty items of medical supplies—from tanks, planes and destroyers down to Army boots (of which the Russians asked for 400,000 pairs monthly) and shellac (300 tons monthly).

Hopkins wrote to Churchill:

I think the all-important thing now is to increase our monthly production during the coming months. We are bending every effort in that direction here and, as the President wired you the other day, we are going to very substantially increase our sights on the total output on all weapons.

At times I get terribly discouraged about getting the material fast enough but then I think of your own overwhelming problems and I am tempted to try again.

I have heard from Averell in Moscow and as long as that Mission is

there I am spending all my time on their interests in Washington. There is still an amazing number of people here who do not want to help Russia and who don't seem to be able to pound into their thick heads the strategic importance of that front.

Roosevelt cabled Harriman: 'I want to express to you and your associates the great satisfaction I have with the successful culmination of your mission in Moscow. I think that you all did a magnificent job.'

Harriman did not realize it at the time, but he was to learn on several later occasions that this first experience of a major conference in Moscow set a pattern which was to be followed time and again: extreme cordiality at the start of the conference, changing to disagreeable and even surly hostility at the second meeting—and then harmonious agreement and a jubilantly triumphant banquet with innumerable toasts to Allied co-operation, at the finish.

Before Harriman left Moscow the military situation on the Eastern Front was becoming exceedingly grave. It was then that Hitler called in his Press Chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich, and ordered him to inform the universe that the Red Army had been crushed and the war in Russia was over.

At Hopkins's request, Harriman left Colonel Faymonville in Moscow to act as representative there for Lend Lease. This appointment led to a great deal of controversy between Hopkins and the War Department, for Faymonville was one regular Army officer who was sympathetic to the Russians and confident of their ability to hold out against the powerful German forces. The protests against Faymonville began to be heard in Washington as soon as it was known that Hopkins was reposing so much confidence in him. General Marshall received a comment from an undisclosed source and referred it to Hopkins:

I don't know him (Faymonville) well, but I do know that competent men who have served with him, such as ex-Ambassador Bullitt and Mr. Henderson of the Russian Division of the State Department, have serious doubts as to his judgment and his impartiality wherever the Soviets are concerned.

The remarkable disparity between the points of view of Faymonville and Major Yeaton, still the Military Attaché in Moscow, and the conflicting nature of the intelligence that they provided, can be demonstrated by two cables sent on successive days. On October 10 Yeaton reported that he considered it possible that the 'end of Russian resistance is not far away'. He reported that 'commuters reaching Moscow from the suburbs today are speaking of being misled by their government and are saying that the Red Army's defence is not as effective as it should be'. Yeaton added the grim

thought that American shipments via Archangel might be destroyed or lost or seized by the Germans. On October 11, Faymonville reported the view of the Soviet General Staff that adequate reserves could prevent the encirclement of Moscow, that the military situation in the extreme south was serious but not hopeless, and that planned shipments of ammunition, small arms, machine-guns, airplanes and tanks be exceeded wherever possible.

When, as so often happens, intelligence reports on the same subject come from observers who disagree with one another, the superiors in the home office to whom the reports are addressed are inclined to believe the one that fits in best with their own previously formed conceptions. That is why governments with even the most extensive intelligence organizations in foreign countries so often make such incomprehensible mistakes—and that, as will be seen, was particularly true of the Soviet Union itself.

When Hopkins read the Yeaton cable, he wrote the following letter to Secretary Stimson:

There has been sent to us a copy of a report by our Military Attaché in Moscow dated October 10. This report in my opinion should be accepted with the greatest reserve.

When I was in Moscow, Yeaton was outspoken in his criticism of the Russians and was insisting at that time—over ten to twelve weeks ago—that Moscow was going to fall at any time.

From my short observation in Moscow I can not see how any Military Attaché could get any reasonable expression of opinion from commuters or the general public which would be worth while.

On October 30 Roosevelt cabled Stalin that he had approved all the items of material agreed to in the Protocol of the Moscow conference and had ordered that deliveries be expedited. He had directed that shipments up to the value of one billion dollars be financed under Lend Lease, that 'no interest be charged on the indebtedness resulting from these shipments' and that payments by the Soviet Government should 'begin five years after the war and continue over a period of ten years thereafter'—these arrangements, of course, being subject to agreement with the Russians. Roosevelt said he hoped that Stalin would make special efforts to facilitate American purchase in the U.S.S.R. of such raw materials and commodities as were available and of which the United States might be in desperate need. He closed with an expression of appreciation for the manner in which the conference in Moscow was handled, and said he hoped Stalin would 'not hesitate to communicate directly with me' whenever he felt that circumstances demanded it.

Hopkins wrote the following note on this cable:

It seemed to me after my conference in Russia with Stalin that the President should personally deal with Stalin. . . .

This telegram is the second wire the President has sent Stalin since I returned. The first one was on October 13, when the President wanted to let him know about some supply items.

This telegram represents the President's decision to put the Russians under Lend Lease. There has been an endless amount of discussion about that for some weeks and it has become more and more clear that this is the only technique to finance their purchases. Yesterday I consulted both Morgenthau and Hull about it and they were agreeable to the contents of the wire, which I drafted this morning, and the President has since cabled it.

The President met with the Russian Mission and went over their work in some detail this morning.

I lunched with General Burns and spent the afternoon with Stimson and Marshall in the former's office.

Stimson is obviously unhappy because he is not consulted about the strategy of the war and I think he feels that I could be more helpful in relating him and Marshall to the President.

Stimson wanted me to be sure that I knew the War Department's full strategic plans and he and Marshall delivered them at great length, including the techniques to keep Japan out of the war and the various theatres in which we might operate in the event of our getting into the war.

Both Stimson and Marshall feel that we can't win without getting into the war, but they have no idea how that is going to be accomplished.

Following is Stalin's reply, dated November 4, to Roosevelt's cable:

The American Ambassador, Mr. Steinhardt, through Mr. Vyshinski, presented to me on November 2, 1941, an *aide-mémoire* containing the contents of your message, the exact text of which I have not yet received.

First of all I would like to express my sincere thanks for your appreciative remarks regarding the expeditious manner in which the conference was handled. Your assurances that the decisions of the conference will be carried out to the limit is deeply appreciated by the Soviet Government.

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant to the Soviet Union a loan in the amount of one billion dollars subject to no interest charges and for the purpose of paying for armaments and raw materials for the Soviet Union is accepted with sincere gratitude by the Soviet Government as unusually substantial aid in its difficult and great struggle against our common enemy, bloodthirsty Hitlerism.

I agree completely, on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union,

with the conditions which you outlined for this loan to the Soviet Union, namely that payments on the loan shall begin five years after the end of the war and shall be completed during the following ten-year period.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. stands ready to expedite in every possible way the supplying of available raw materials and goods required by the United States.

I am heartily in accord with your proposal, Mr. President, that we establish direct personal contact whenever circumstances warrant.

It is an indication of Roosevelt's concern for public opinion that he did not formally include the Soviet Union among the recipients of Lend Lease until November 7. At that time the Germans were some thirty miles from Moscow, and it seemed that they must soon take the ancient capital; but the heroic fight that the Russian armies had put up had gone far toward convincing the world that the occupation of Moscow would do Hitler no more good than it had done Napoleon, and the overwhelming sentiment in the United States was that the Russians richly deserved and would know how to use every scrap of help that we could give them.

Shortly thereafter, with Moscow in a state of siege, Roosevelt and Hopkins discussed the possibility of expediting the delivery of fighter planes to Russia by sending an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, thereby delivering the planes in a state of readiness for immediate action. Roosevelt was in favour of this and instructed Hopkins to investigate the matter with the Navy Department. The suggestion did not receive a cordial response. Hopkins thereupon wrote a memorandum to the President:

I gather that what is really behind this is that in the light of the whole strategic situation as it is in the world today the Navy feels it would be unwise to send a carrier. Hence, unless you decide otherwise, we are going to move these planes at once by merchant ship, although as I have told you, the Maritime Commission is having a good deal of difficulty getting enough ships.

Roosevelt returned this to Hopkins with the following pencilled notation:

H.L.H.:

O.K., but say to them from me: Hurry, hurry, hurry!

F.D.R.

In view of the date of this memorandum it can be seen that the Navy had some reason for feeling that 'the whole strategic situation made it unwise to send a carrier' all the way round Africa to the Persian Gulf. The date was November 25, 1941, twelve days before Pearl Harbour.

Myron Taylor's mission to Rome was completed at the time when Harriman's to Moscow was starting. Taylor was one who really deserved

the somewhat archaic title of 'Ambassador Extraordinary'. (The same might well be said of Hopkins, although both of them were designated only 'Personal Representative of the President'.) He made a supremely tactful and legitimate presentation of the President's case at the Vatican, where he met with a most sympathetic reception. While the results of this mission were given no great amount of publicity, they were reflected in the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, and no serious issue was raised over the more than eleven billion dollars of Lend Lease materials which went to the Soviet Union.

While on the way back from Rome, Taylor stopped off in Lisbon for an interview with Dr. Salazar, the 'benevolent dictator' of Portugal. Roosevelt was naturally intensely interested to hear Taylor's report of this interview, because of his preoccupation with the strategic importance of the Azores. The report was not encouraging. Salazar apparently hoped that the United States would not enter the war, as this would prolong it indefinitely; he seemed to believe that Britain and America together might destroy Hitler personally, although even that would be no easy task, but that they could not destroy Naziism, which was the new social, political, and economic evolution in Europe. Indeed, Roosevelt gained the impression that, in Salazar's opinion, the best interests of European evolution would be served by Britain agreeing to the incorporation of the Ukraine into Germany as part of her vital 'living-space', and that without the Ukraine Russia could not continue to provide much of a military threat. It must be added that Roosevelt could not find it in his heart to blame Salazar for playing an extremely cautious game, for this was the time when German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula appeared to competent observers as an almost day-to-day probability, and Salazar was fully aware that the British were powerless to stop it, even with such aid as the Americans could give them.

It must also be added that it was not only the Catholics in the United States who made difficult the problem of aid for the Soviet Union. There was always a faction, and it was strongly represented in the State Department, which was sure that the Russians would make a separate peace with Germany as they had done at Brest-Litovsk in 1917, and again in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Mutual Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The repeated warnings of possible Russian perfidy that Roosevelt received in 1941 and throughout the years that followed only served to make him increase his efforts to convince the Russians of America's incontestable good faith. A year after the United States entered the war Hopkins attended a meeting of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee. The point was raised that, before we extended further aid to the Russians, we should demand that they provide us with full information concerning their military situation as the British had consistently done. According to the minutes of this meeting:

On the whole, Mr. Hopkins felt that there were certain unsatisfactory aspects to the programme. The Russians are at times difficult and hard to understand. The United States is doing things which it would not do for other United Nations without full information from them. This decision to act without full information was made with some misgivings, but after due deliberation. Mr. Hopkins said that there was no reservation about the policy at the present time, but that the policy was constantly being brought up by various persons for rediscussion. He proposed that no further consideration be given to these requests for rediscussion.


Although Hopkins attempted thus summarily to dismiss the question, it remained to plague the relations between the two countries.

Indeed, evidence of strain had begun to appear even before the United States entered the war. As the ferocious German drive against Moscow spent itself, and Hitler's supermen began to confront the awful realities of the Russian winter for which they were so ill prepared, the Red Army demonstrated a reserve strength and resilience that few in the outside world had dared to hope for and even fewer had expected; counter-attacks were launched and the Russians recaptured Rostov—the first point of importance that anyone had taken back from the Germans since Nazi expansion had started. With this reversal of fortune—which still seemed merely a temporary one, however heartening—the Soviet Government immediately started pressing for agreements, looking toward political settlements in the post-war world. Stalin was not content to drop the embarrassing subjects that he had raised with Beaverbrook. He apparently felt that the time had come to fix the borders between the Soviet Union and Finland, Poland and Rumania, and the status of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and even to reach agreement on such far-flung subjects as the future of the Rhineland, Bavaria, and East Prussia, the restoration of the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, and numerous territorial adjustments affecting Greece and Turkey. All of these were matters for negotiation primarily between Moscow and London, but the British were careful to keep Washington constantly informed. With the recapture of Rostov, the situation became so tense that it was decided that Anthony Eden should travel to Moscow in an attempt 'to smooth out relations in general, to explore the possibility of some kind of political agreement, and to discuss certain post-war problems'. Eden was to leave the United Kingdom on December 7.

On December 5 a vitally important cable was dispatched to Winant; it was signed by Hull and okayed by Roosevelt. Winant was instructed to read the cable to Eden, but not to hand a copy of it formally to the British authorities. This cable stated that 'the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfil the commitments our

representatives made in Moscow'—referring, of course, to the commitments for material aid made by the Beaverbrook-Harriman missions. The cable then went on to say that the post-war policies of the United States government had been 'delineated in the Atlantic Charter which today represents the attitude of Great Britain and the Soviet Union as well. . . . In our considered opinion it would be unfortunate for any of the three governments . . . to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post-war settlement . . . *Above all, there must be no secret accords . . . the constitutional limitations to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind*'. (The italics are mine.)

Winant communicated the contents of that cable to Eden on Saturday morning, December 6, and that night the British Foreign Secretary left London for Invergordon and embattled Russia; at that moment the United States was still a non-belligerent.



PART III
THE UNITED STATES AT WAR



PEARL HARBOUR

ON July 7, 1941, when major attention in Washington was inevitably concentrated on urgent problems of aid for Britain and Russia, Sumner Welles wrote the following prescient letter to Hopkins:

I know that you are keenly interested in seeing that the assistance we are rendering China under authorization of the Lease and Lend Act of March 11, 1941, shall be as prompt and effective as possible. It is also clear that numerous causes over which you can have no control, including imperative needs in other parts of the world, are constantly operating to obstruct the shipment of supplies to China.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Far East is causing us anxiety, and I venture to suggest that if anything further can be done to increase the speed and the volume of munitions and supplies going to China it would appear highly advisable to make additional effort to that end.

The fact is that the German invasion of Russia may very possibly serve to cause Japan to take some further aggressive action. Among the obvious possibilities are: (1) invasion of Siberia; (2) expansion to the southward; and (3) intensification of Japanese military operations in China.

It seems to me that German successes against Russia and the opportunity which Japan may consider is afforded her by those successes to take further aggressive action constitute a factor which increases the importance of this country's rendering effective aid to China in the shortest possible time. It is essential that this country take all practicable steps to avert a possible serious weakening of the morale of the Chinese Government. The surest means of averting such a possible development is to do all we can to make available to China urgently needed supplies and to see that those supplies reach China promptly.

I am sending copies of this letter to General Marshall and to Admiral Stark, and I am sure that all of you will do your utmost in reference to this very important aspect of our self-defensive effort.

(It will be noted that Welles's list of 'obvious possibilities' of further Japanese aggressive action did not include an attack on the United States.)

The Japanese soon started to prove Welles correct in assuming that they might capitalize on the German invasion of Russia by making new moves of their own: on July 23 they compelled the feeble Vichy Government to yield them bases in Indo-China from which they could launch attacks against the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies or Malaya. Thus, the situation in the Far East became acutely serious. Roosevelt placed General MacArthur and the Philippine armed forces under U.S. Army command.

Welles's concern for China was certainly shared by Hopkins, but there was little he could do about it at the time because of his journeys to London, Moscow, and Argentina. When he returned to Washington he read a cable which Owen Lattimore had sent to Lauchlin Currie, the Presidential assistant who was especially concerned with Far Eastern affairs. Lattimore, one of the wisest of Americans in matters relating to Asia, was serving at the time in Chungking as Political Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. He reported:

Recent propaganda by the Japanese and their puppets has been insinuating that China is being used by the Western democracies not as an ally but as a tool and will be victimized in the peace terms. This is exploiting a situation about which the Generalissimo is gravely concerned, for the Chinese feel politically isolated and there is growing apprehension that after the war they will not be given equal status and fair treatment. The Generalissimo feels that only President Roosevelt is in a position now to take the initiative and suggest to Britain and Russia that either they should form an alliance with China, or at least include China in their Pacific defence conferences. . . . Either of these measures, if initiated by the President, would serve to safeguard China's equal status among the anti-Axis powers and remove the stigma of discrimination . . . and thereby strengthen Chinese morale.

Shortly thereafter, Hopkins received the first detailed report from Daniel Arnstein, whom he had recommended for the Burma Road job. It was a long report, and a candid one. The first two paragraphs will convey the general idea:

The main reason that practically no tonnage is moving the full length of the Burma Road, is due to an entire lack of knowledge of the fundamentals of motor transportation by the men now in charge at the various headquarters along the road. The present Governmental agencies that are trying to operate trucks on the road are overloaded with executives and office personnel. No one gets right down into the actual operating end of the business. No effort is made to see that the trucks are maintained, dispatched early in the morning so as to get a full day's run, properly loaded or many other things that require the personal attention and observations of the operating head at each station. Each and every executive has three or four assistants and several secretaries, and actually does not observe what is going on from the transportation standpoint.

At the moment, there are sixteen Governmental agencies operating over the Burma Road, each and every one of them overstaffed with incompetent executives, and none moving anywhere near the tonnage that could be moved with co-ordinated effort. Naturally, each one of

these agencies tries to move only the particular requirements of their respective departments. This situation will not improve until motor transportation is taken out of the hands of all these Government departments and co-ordinated, and placed in the hands of someone competent, with authority to correct this impossible situation. It will be necessary for whomever this person may be, that he have full and complete authority to select his own operating personnel, and be able to employ or discharge without fear or favour anyone in the organization who does not function. No employee's position in this organization should be determined by his connections, but must be based solely on his knowledge, ability and desire to work himself, and not through a number of assistants. All motor transportation facilities now being maintained by these various organizations should be placed under his direction.

This, so far as I know, was the first of a long series of depressing documents which brought home to Hopkins some plain truths about the situation in China. Both Roosevelt and Hopkins, like so many other Americans, were naturally and strongly pro-Chinese. On this they were often at variance with Churchill, who felt that any policy based on confidence in China was a 'great illusion'—and, on this subject, Churchill and Stalin were agreed. As will be seen in later pages of this book, there were bitter and dangerously confusing differences of opinion between responsible Americans on the same subject; indeed, General Marshall told me that the Stilwell-Chennault controversy over our Chinese policy provoked the only serious disagreement he ever had with Hopkins. There were ardent friends of China in the U.S. who did not help to promote realistic thinking about a situation massive in its obscurity. Their wholehearted devotion to the cause of the Chinese people impelled them to paint pictures of Kuomintang China which were misleading, to say the least, and which resulted in angry disillusionment for many Americans who went to China on wartime missions as soldiers or civilians.

Major McHugh, a Marine Corps Attaché at the American Embassy in Chungking, informed Currie that the Generalissimo was pleased with the Arnstein Report.

It provides him with a reference work which is almost a dictionary of the various ills of motor transportation. I believe it has the added value in his eyes of being a completely unbiased document. He has heard of many of these things before, but never from anyone in whom he had real confidence. The fact that Arnstein & Co. came without pay, gave their opinions without reservation and are going home gives the report a status which cannot be attacked. The record is there; it remains for the Chinese to correct the defects which it points out.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek wrote to Currie: 'When you next meet Mr. Harry Hopkins please thank him for us for his assistance to China under the Lend Lease Act. I understand that through you he has been taking great interest in supplies to China and is eager to see that China gets her quota.' However, the measure of this 'assistance' is indicated in a letter sent by T. V. Soong to Col. William J. Donovan:

This is to summarize the conversation I had with you yesterday afternoon.

The concurrence of certain events has made it desperately necessary that help of aircraft to China be immediate, so immediate that the delivery will have to be effected by diversion from the nearest available sources of supply, such as the Philippines, Singapore or the Dutch East Indies.

A. The first of the events is a new type of continuous all-day bombing—twenty-two hours out of twenty-four—by relays of bombers in units varying from large squadrons to flights of a few planes to which Chungking has been continuously subjected since the Anglo-American protest about Japanese moves to the south. Without planes to fight off the bombers over the city and to bomb back at the bases from which the raiders come, there is no possibility of defence or retribution.

It is perfectly clear that the purpose of this bombing is to finish the 'China Incident' before Japan moves in other directions—by demonstrating to the people of China the difference between reality and the hopes of the last fourteen months that American assistance would be effective.

This awful demonstration of the difference between reality and promises is underlined for the Chinese by two other events.

B. The second event is the swiftness with which it is announced that deliveries of aircraft are being made to the Soviet Union, after repeated earlier promises of delivery to the Chinese have been excused as non-performable because the aircraft simply does not exist.

C. The third event *and you must understand this not in the light of true justification, but in the light in which it appears to the Chinese under bombardment of twenty-two hours a day—is the recent frank disclosure* of the American policy of appeasing Japan with materials of war—the very material and gasoline that are presently bombing Chungking—in order to keep Japan from attacking certain American supply routes to the south.

Adding these three events and their implication together, Chinese who are weary of Chiang Kai-shek's policy of resistance in the general democratic cause are saying, 'Our resistance is just a pawn in the calculations of other democratic powers. Japan is being furnished the materials with

which to destroy us in order to relieve the British from attack in the south and maybe even the Russians from attack in the north. Although we are being given polite non-offensive aid like road materials and trucks, nothing which would really offend Japan or give us striking power of retribution against Japan is being allowed to actually get here—even though this supposedly non-existent offensive material is available immediately for our friends the Russians.

Please do not think that any of us in the Chinese Government think that way or do not understand the American problem. . . .

I have now been in the United States over fourteen months pleading for the help of planes.

In response, the President, after pointing out the dangers of non-resistance to aggression, promised to call upon his advisers to give all practical assistance to us.

I then and there stressed the urgent necessity of providing us with aircraft to defend the main routes of supply, the key urban areas, and to enable strategic operations on the part of our land forces.

In the fourteen months which have followed not a single plane sufficiently supplied with armament and ammunition so that it could actually be used to fire has reached China.

Through the exertions of the President 100 Curtiss P-40's were released by the British last fall and eventually reached China, but the necessary spare parts and ammunition without which these craft are not fighting ships but only training ships are just being arranged for now.

Last fall and winter we were offered a few bombers capable of raiding Japan. The offer was accepted but it did not materialize.

A special American air mission under General Claggett visited China following Mr. Currie's visit and after an intensive study of our airfields, air force, and facilities on the spot, favourably reported on our plans for an air force of 350 pursuits and 150 bombers. No action has materialized.

At the end of July an allotment of 66 bombers and 269 fighters was definitely ratified by the Joint Strategy Board on the President's authority and Chiang Kai-shek was assured of immediate delivery of 24 bombers. General Chiang was never happier than when Lauchlin Currie cabled back that assurance to Chungking.

Today I am told that deliveries cannot start before October and then on a scale that will extend into spring, 1942.

Meanwhile Chungking is bombed incessantly day and night and China goes on the second month of her fifth year of war while the promises I cabled over for encouragement one by one fail. . . .

You will excuse me for having been so frank. But the Russian situation and the failure to mention China in all the new joint strategic plans that

are being publicized has really precipitated a problem of Chinese morale about the immediacy of aircraft help to China.

I am sure you will understand.

Remember, Colonel, that we have proved that we can fight longer than any other people who are fighting on the democratic side—that given the arms we can really finish the job.

We have stuck for five years. Please help us stick now.

Of the sixty-six medium bombers mentioned by Soong as having been promised on Presidential authority in July, not one had been delivered by the end of October. This appears in a memorandum from Soong to Roosevelt on which the latter wrote in pencil, 'H.H.—Speed up! F.D.R.' After this, Hopkins and Soong started to work together and continued to do so, becoming very warm friends.

Shortly thereafter, when Hopkins was in the Navy Hospital, he had a letter from Soong:

I am indeed sorry to learn that you are indisposed, and I feel reluctant to disturb your convalescence. You will recall that I saw the President and yourself on the 31st of October, conveying General Chiang Kai-shek's urgent request for acceleration of delivery of planes and ordnance materials in view of imminent Japanese attack on the Burma Road through Burma and Yunnan. The President was good enough to direct that the deliveries should be 'hurried up', and you very kindly took steps immediately to implement his wishes. However, I wish to report that so far I have not been able to get any concrete results.

You were kind enough to promise to see me again after you returned from Hyde Park, which your illness no doubt prevented. In the meantime I am hard put to reply to General Chiang, and I shall appreciate it if you will advise me what I should tell him in answer to his repeated anxious inquiries.

One of Hopkins's first acts on the day of Pearl Harbour was to request a check on all the ships and airplanes in the Pacific that were carrying supplies to China. There were pitifully few of them. The aid was only a trickle and stopped altogether for a time when the Japanese cut off access to China by land and sea.

There was, indeed, a shocking shortage of most weapons and material when one considered the mounting demands of Britain, Russia, China as well as the U.S. armed forces. For one instance: during the month of July, when Hopkins was visiting London and Moscow and learning so much of the importance of bombing Germany, the production of four-engined bombers in the U.S. achieved a total of two. The total hopefully scheduled

for the final five months of 1941 was only 213. In view of the needs of the U.S. Army Air Corps for aircraft for training bomber crews, as well as the incessant and always urgent requirements of the British and Russians, the number left for the far-away Chinese was a minus quantity.

On November 13, Hopkins wrote his friend James Norman Hall, co-author of *Mutiny on the Bounty*, who was living in Tahiti:

We are really getting on with our production programme here, now. Airplanes, tanks, ammunition and guns are moving rapidly and I think they are going to play an important part in the next few months. I, however, don't believe we can ever lick Hitler with a Lend Lease programme. It, unfortunately, is going to take, I believe, much more than that.

That was obviously not a complete statement of Hopkins's feelings. For he knew that we could not have even an adequate production programme until the automobile and other industries could be converted from a peacetime basis to meet the requirements of total war—until the American people as a whole realized that production was not merely a matter of 'aid' to foreigners, however deserving they might be, but a matter of life or death for their own sons.

It will be noted in the Hopkins letter to Hall that he again spoke of beating Hitler, with no reference to Japan. His advocacy of all possible aid for China (which meant very little) was based on moral rather than on practical grounds. It was a mere token payment—or one might call it 'conscience money'—which could be of value in the distant future, but not of primary importance in the winning of the present war.

One of the most important documents of the pre-Pearl Harbour period is called the 'Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements'. This was a purely military estimate of the situation, requested by the President as a basis for the production programme. It was dated September 11, 1941, and signed by the Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It is, in my opinion, one of the most remarkable documents of American history. Its first section, of three paragraphs, cited the reasons for the estimate. Section II, starting with Paragraph 4, was headed 'Major Military Policy':

4. Germany, and all German-occupied countries whose military forces co-operate with Germany; Japan and Manchukuo; Italy; Vichy France; and possibly Spain and Portugal, are assumed potential enemies. Countries considered as friends or potential associates in war are the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, China, Russia, Free France, peoples in German-occupied territory who may oppose Germany, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

5. Those major national objectives of the United States which are related to military policy may broadly be stated as: preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favourable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

6. Since the paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere, it is fundamental that the United States must provide armed forces appropriately disposed, which in all eventualities, and operating in co-operation with the forces of other American Powers, can successfully prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or military power, even though the British Commonwealth had collapsed.

7. Attainment of this objective alone will not lead to the success of all of the national policies mentioned in paragraph 6. *These national policies can be effectuated in their entirety only through military victories outside this hemisphere, either by the armed forces of the United States, by the armed forces of friendly Powers, or by both.*

The italics in that last paragraph are mine. They underline one of the most vital points in our approach to the entire strategy of the Second World War—that the decisive battles must be fought outside of the Western Hemisphere, and not, as the isolationists persisted in believing, in our own front or back yard. The Estimate continues:

8. Should Germany be successful in conquering all of Europe, she might then wish to establish peace with the United States for several years, for the purpose of organizing her gains, restoring her economic situation, and increasing her military establishment, with a view to the eventual conquest of South America and the military defeat of the United States. During such a period of 'peace', it seems likely that Germany would seek to undermine the economic and political stability of the countries of South America, and to set up puppet regimes favourable to the establishment on that continent of German military power. In such circumstances, Germany would have better chances to defeat the United States. This concept can not be accepted as certain, because it is conceivable that Germany might at once seek to gain footholds in the Western Hemisphere.

9. Were Japan to defeat China and Russia, and obtain control of Siam, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, it is probable that she likewise would endeavour to establish peace for the purpose of organizing the 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. Almost inevitably the Philippine Islands would ultimately pass under Japanese hegemony.

Here again is the assumption that Japan will attack northward into Russia, westward into China and southward into Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, leaving the Philippines (with the Mandated Islands to the eastward) completely surrounded. Following are the next five paragraphs on Major Military Policy:

10. It is believed that the overthrow of the Nazi regime by action of the people of Germany is unlikely in the near future, and will not occur until Germany is upon the point of military defeat. Even were a new regime to be established, it is not at all certain that such a regime would agree to peace terms acceptable to the United States.

11. Assuming the truth of the views expressed in the preceding paragraph, it is the opinion of the Joint Board that Germany and her European satellites can not be defeated by the European Powers now fighting against her. Therefore, if our European enemies are to be defeated, it will be necessary for the United States to enter the war, and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in the Eastern Atlantic and in Europe or Africa.

12. The Joint Board also holds the view that, if, under present circumstances, Japan should advance against the British in Malaya and against the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, British and Dutch forces probably could not successfully withstand such an advance in the absence of active military assistance by the United States. The result of an attack by Japan on the Eastern Siberian Soviet Republic cannot now be predicted.

13. In view of the preceding considerations, the Joint Board recommends that the overall production and material objective of the United States be designed to meet United States needs while engaged simultaneously in war against Germany and Japan, under either of the following sets of circumstances:

- a. While associated as a belligerent with the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, Russia, and China.
- b. While associated as a belligerent with Canada and some of the Latin American countries, other belligerent Powers having been defeated by Germany and Japan.

14. Due to inadequate industrial capacity and material resources, friendly Powers must look to the United States for a large part of the

munitions and other materials which they will require for success. The munitions and other materials which may be produced or controlled by the United States should be divided between itself and friendly Powers in such a manner as to effectuate the success of the military strategy adopted by the United States as best calculated to defeat our common enemies.

The next Section III is headed 'Probable Character of the Enemy's Major Strategy: (A) German Strategy':

15. For Germany, the objective of the current phase of the war is the complete military and political domination of Europe, and probably of North and West Africa. If Germany is successful she may then seek a period of peaceful refreshment, during which she can reorganize Europe and prepare for further adventures. However, the possibility can not be dismissed that Germany might seek at once to continue into India, South Africa, or South America.

16. Germany's present major strategic objectives, and the means by which she seeks to attain them, seem to be some or all of the following:

- a. The conquest of European Russia, the destruction of the Russian Armies, and the overthrow of the Soviet regime. This is a task for the German Army and air forces, and will doubtless absorb most of the energy available to these contingents for some months to come. Final success in this aim is still in the balance.
- b. The destruction of the power of resistance of the United Kingdom, through accelerated attrition of shipping, and continued bombing of British facilities. The forces employed will be surface raiders, submarines, and aircraft in the northwestern approaches and down through the Middle Atlantic, operating from bases in Norway, France, Portugal, and French West Africa; and merchant-type raiders distributed throughout all oceans. Invasion of England may possibly not be attempted unless these other measures fail.
- c. The conquest of Egypt, Syria, Irak, and Iran. This may be the region in which the next major German offensive will be undertaken. Large land and air forces must be employed, both German and Italian, aided by Italian naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Success may depend upon whether or not a large concentration of British and Russian defensive forces are available, and upon the continued military capacity of Italy, now an uncertain quantity.
- d. The occupation of Spain, Portugal, Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Atlantic Islands, for the purpose of strengthening the German offensive against British shipping, and for denying these positions to Germany's enemies. Considerable land, air, and naval

forces will be required for this offensive, though not so great as would be required for conquest of the lands to the eastward of the Mediterranean.

17. In and near her own home territory, Germany can exert her full effort. As her forces move away from the home base, the effort that can be exerted at the point of military contact becomes reduced in proportion to the length and security of the lines of communication, and to the difficulties of transportation. Germany is experiencing these difficulties in Russia; she would experience them in an even greater degree in an offensive in the regions in the east of the Mediterranean; while the problem of the support of strong forces in Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Azores would be very great indeed. In the eastern part of European Russia, in Egypt, Irak, Iran, and North and West Africa, the effort that German military forces can exert is only a fraction of what they have been able to put forth in France, the Balkans, and Poland. Severe German defeats in these regions might readily affect the stability of the Nazi regime. This significant possibility should be taken into account in the development of the strategy of the Associated Powers.

That final paragraph is particularly interesting in that it foresees the Allied strategy which a little more than a year later resulted in the battle of El Alamein and the landings in Algeria and French Morocco. The second part of Section III (B) discusses Japanese strategy.

18. The Japanese objective is the establishment of the 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. It is Japan's ambition ultimately to include within this Sphere Eastern Siberia, Eastern China, Indo-China, Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and possibly Burma. The accomplishment of this objective is a heavy task for Japan's strength, a fact well realized by the Japanese.

19. Dependent upon results in Europe, Japan's strategic moves might be as follows:

- a. Building up and maintaining an effective screen in the Japanese Mandate Islands by the employment of minor naval forces and considerable air forces, supported by the *Combined Fleet*. This activity would include submarine and raider action against United States naval forces and United States and British lines of communication in the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean.
- b. The conquest of Eastern Siberia by means of land and air operations covered by the *Combined Fleet* operating to the eastward of Japan.
- c. The conquest of Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. Success will require strong air forces, a considerable

strength of light naval forces, and rather large land forces. It is unlikely that Japan will simultaneously attempt a major effort to the northward and to the southward, because of her lack of equipment and raw materials.

- d. An offensive from Northern Indo-China against Yunnan for the purpose of cutting the Burma Road and eliminating further resistance of the Chinese Nationalist army. This move might be supplemented by an attack on Burma. Considerable land and air forces would be required, as well as a large amount of shipping to provide the necessary support.

20. All of these prospective Japanese moves would be made at great distances from Japan. If Japan encounters stubborn and protracted resistance, her ability to continue offensives at these distances is problematical, owing to a lack of adequate resources and industrial facilities. Marked weakness or lack of cohesion on the part of her opponents might permit Japan to accomplish any one of these objectives within the next few months.

Sub-head (a.) of paragraph 19 might be said to have included the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbour, but in speaking of 'submarine and raider action against United States naval forces and United States and British lines of communication in the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean' it indicated sniping action against ships in transit rather than concerted attacks against bases.

Section IV of the Estimate discussed 'Major Strategy of the United States and its Associates':

21. The Joint Board is convinced that the first major objective of the United States and its Associates ought to be the complete military defeat of Germany. If Germany were defeated, her entire European system would collapse, and it is probable that Japan could be forced to give up much of her territorial gains, unless she had already firmly established herself in such strength that the United States and its Associates could not afford the energy to continue the war against her.

22. An inconclusive peace between Germany and her present active military enemies would be likely to give Germany an opportunity to reorganize continental Europe and to replenish her strength. Even though the British Commonwealth and Russia were completely defeated, there would be important reasons for the United States to continue the war against Germany, in spite of the greatly increased difficulty of attaining final victory. From this it follows that *the principal strategic method employed by the United States in the immediate future should be the material*

support of present military operations against Germany, and their reinforcement by active participation in the war by the United States while holding Japan in check pending future developments. Necessarily, only small Army contingents are now sufficiently equipped and trained for immediate participation in offensive operations.

(The italics in the foregoing are General Marshall's and Admiral Stark's.)

23. Except in the case of Russia, the principal strength of the Associated Powers is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may greatly contribute to victory. By themselves, however, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land armies can finally win wars.

24. It is out of the question to expect the United States and its Associates to undertake in the near future a sustained and successful land offensive against the centre of the German power. It being obvious that the Associated Powers can not defeat Germany by defensive operations, effective strategic offensive methods other than an early land offensive in Europe must be employed. These methods may be found in a continuation of the economic blockade; the prosecution of land offensives in distant regions where German troops can exert only a fraction of their total strength; air and sea offensives against German military, economic and industrial resources; and the support of subversive activities in the conquered territories. Strategic methods to be employed against Japan (assuming her in the war) should be a strong defence of Siberia and Malaysia; an economic offensive through blockade; a reduction of Japanese military power by raids; and Chinese offensives against the Japanese forces of occupation.

25. The major strategic objectives which it is believed the United States and the Associated Powers should adopt are indicated below, as well as the means for attaining them. The material assistance to be supplied friendly Powers (where mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs) should be consistent with the needs of the United States.

- a. *The security of the Western Hemisphere* against the extension into it of European or Asiatic political or military power is an essential of United States strategy. To provide this security under all eventualities, the United States must have naval, land, and air forces in such positions that they can be made promptly available in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans in strengths adequate for preventing invasion should the British Isles and Russia collapse. In this connection, an important question is whether or not Northwestern Africa and the Atlantic

Islands are in German or friendly hands. Similarly, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Islands of the South Pacific Ocean have an important relation to the security of the Eastern Pacific. United States naval strength, built up in accordance with the approved programme, should be adequate for defensive needs until 1944. However, if Germany is successful in Europe, and Japan is successful in the Far East, naval strength for defensive purposes must be increased, even in excess of the present approved naval programme. United States land and air forces may be required for the defence of the Western Hemisphere within the next few years, and it is necessary for Latin American countries to be provided with munitions and manufactured articles.

- b. *The security of the United Kingdom* is essential to the prosecution in the Eastern Hemisphere of military operations against Germany and Japan. Its safety is also highly important to the defence of the Western Hemisphere. The security of the United Kingdom depends on an effective defence by sea, land, and air forces. In turn, this defence depends upon the safety of sea communications. The sea communications can continue to support the United Kingdom only if the damage now being inflicted upon them is greatly reduced through increases in the strength of the protective sea and air forces based in the British Islands, Iceland, and positions in the central and eastern Atlantic. Unless the losses of British merchant ships are greatly reduced, or unless there is an internal collapse of Germany, it is the opinion of the Joint Board that the resistance of the United Kingdom can not continue indefinitely, no matter what industrial effort is put forth by the United States. Therefore, the immediate and strong reinforcement of British forces in the Atlantic by United States naval and air contingents, supplemented by a large additional shipping tonnage, will be required if the United Kingdom is to remain in the war. These contingents must be manned by Americans, since the reserves of British manpower for employment in Europe are practically exhausted. To maintain present British strength, the United States must also continue to supplement the British blockade, and the naval building and repair potential; and to provide considerable numbers of aircraft.
- c. *Safety of the sea communications of the Associated Powers* throughout the world is essential to the continuance of their war effort. Naval and air forces employed in and near Europe should, so far as practicable, be strong enough to prevent the escape of surface raiders to the open sea, and to defeat submarine and air raiders. In addition, a widespread distribution of naval and air forces for direct protection of shipping foci and shipping routes will be required.
- d. *The enforcement of economic blockade* is, for the time being, likely to be

the most effective offensive method for use against Germany and Japan. Naval and air forces must be maintained to close all avenues of sea approach to Germany. The continued existence of hostile land fronts in Russia and in the Middle East is necessary if this blockade is to be maintained. In addition, diplomatic, economic, and financial measures should be employed for increasing the effectiveness of the military blockade.

- e. *The retention by the British of the control of the Red Sea, Irak, and Iran* is necessary for preserving opportunities for decisive land action against Germany. Of great importance are effective land and air forces of all categories; large numbers of merchant vessels for their support; and adequate naval forces for the protection of communications leading to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. These forces can not be fully supported by the material means available to Britain. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and raw materials required by these troops, and should supply much of the merchant shipping for their transport.
- f. *The maintenance of an active front in Russia* offers by far the best opportunity for a successful land offensive against Germany, because only Russia possesses adequate manpower, situated in favourable proximity to the centre of German military power. For Russia, ground and aviation forces are most important. Predictions as to the result of the present conflict in Russia are premature. However, were the Soviet forces to be driven even beyond the Ural Mountains, and were they there to continue an organized resistance, there would always remain the hope of a final and complete defeat of Germany by land operations. The effective arming of Russian forces, both by the supply of munitions from the outside and by providing industrial capacity in the Volga Basin, or to the east of the Ural Mountains, would be one of the most important moves that could be made by the Associated Powers.
- g. *Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands* is very important, not only as a contribution to the defence of the Western Hemisphere, but also as security to British sea communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States. Because the British Commonwealth has but few troops available and because of the unfriendly relations between the British and the Weygand regime, it seems clear that a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this region necessarily must be United States troops.

- h. *Retention by the United States and its Associates of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australasia, Burma, and China* would have far-reaching effects. The armed forces of the United States can not be greatly increased in the Far East if they are to discharge their heavy tasks in other regions, but the operations of the Pacific Fleet will have an important influence on events. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and aircraft to China and the Netherlands East Indies. A large part of this material must be transported in United States bottoms.
- i. *Retention of Eastern Siberia by Russia* is necessary if Japan is to be checked. Only material assistance can be provided by the United States to Siberia. No materials can be sent to Siberia by water when Japan is at war with Russia, but deliveries of aircraft could continue by air.

26. The following principles have been taken into consideration in arriving at recommendations concerning the strengths of the armed forces which the United States should undertake to raise or support, in whole or in part:

- a. The Navy considers that, since the principal strength of the Associated Powers is at present in naval and air categories, the strategy which they should adopt should be based on the effective employment of these forces, and the employment of land forces in regions where Germany can not exert the full power of her land armies. The Army believes that the foregoing strategy may not accomplish the defeat of Germany and that it may be necessary to come to grips with the German armies on the continent of Europe. Consequently, the Army feels that the equipment of land armies necessary to meet this contingency should be provided as a part of the overall production requirements.
- b. Past experience of the United States and other Powers should condition estimates of the capability of the United States to support a war effort, with due regard to differences in overall industrial capacity; differences in availability of materials; and an appropriate balance between the manpower to be employed in the armed forces, and the manpower to be employed in industry and essential civilian services. Because of the present high degree of mechanization, a greater proportion of manpower must be allocated to industry for the manufacture of equipment and munitions than was the case in former wars.
- c. The sound use of diplomatic, economic, financial, and propaganda weapons will serve to reduce the magnitude of the direct military effort.
- d. The burdens of the war effort, even though continued by the United

States over a long period of time, should be so adjusted as to maintain the morale and the will to fight of the civilian population.

Thus, in this document, was charted the policy to be followed by the United States throughout the remaining years of a global war in which she was still legally 'neutral'. It must be remembered that this Joint Board Estimate was the result of two years of wartime deliberation by Marshall, Stark and their staffs and the year of exchanges of information and opinion by the British and American staffs working together in secret and unofficial but highly effective co-operation.

On October 17 General Tojo ousted Konoye as Premier and the militarist extremists in Tokyo came into power in name as well as in fact. On that same day Captain R. E. Schuirmann of Admiral Stark's staff wrote a memorandum a copy of which was sent to Hopkins:

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what Cabinet is in power or on diplomatic manœuvring, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military, not that it has opposed Japan's programme of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favourable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down, depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the 'moderates' in order to enable them to cope with the 'extremists', has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack

Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what Cabinet is in power.

Captain Schuirmann's Appreciation was supported by Lieut.-Col. Harry I. T. Creswell, Military Attaché in Tokyo, who reported, on October 20:

Since the make-up of the new Cabinet appears to be essentially conservative in character, the resignation of the old Cabinet is not regarded as indicating any drastic change in Japan's policy in the immediate future, at least. . . . While General Tojo is first of all a thorough-going Japanese, with the national ambitions and welfare inherent in his make-up, he is believed to have a breadth of vision which would seem to preclude the possibility of his taking extreme radical actions.

On November 9 General Lee cabled from London:

The British Ambassador in Tokyo has reported the opinion that the Netherlands East Indies provide the most likely spot at which the Japanese will strike next. Since Japan already has control of all that she needs of the resources of Indo-China and Thailand she is unlikely to strike in this area. Attacks against British Malaya or a drive toward the Burma Road are considered too difficult, involving too great effort. Secret attacks against the N.E.I. could be launched from the Mandated Islands and this would give Japan access to the needed oil. The source of this information reverses a view he held previously: he now doubts that Japan will be deterred by a desire to avoid war with the United States, but is now ready to present this contemplated operation as an accomplished fact to the British and Americans.

On the same day, Harold Balfour, the British Under-secretary of State for Air, wrote a memorandum and gave a copy of it to Harry Hopkins. Balfour at the time was pressing for more and more heavy bombers for the R.A.F. to use against Germany. His account of his interview with the President on this subject gives some indication of Roosevelt's attitude toward the Far Eastern situation four weeks to the day before Pearl Harbour. The memorandum in full was as follows:

I saw President today on heavy bomber question. The Lord Privy Seal was also present.

2. The President did not wish to speak in specific terms of numbers or dates when we might expect a better allocation than at present proposed.

3. President said that he felt that we should have a substantially greater allocation than the round hundred proposed in addition to current British

orders, but that until the Far Eastern position developed one way or the other he felt unable to take definite steps to this end.

4. His present Japanese policy is one of stalling and holding off. If during the next few weeks this policy looks likely to succeed for some months ahead, or alternatively, if the President can sign up for peace with Japan so as to ensure no sudden hostilities, then he will feel able at once to direct a further diversion of heavy bombers to U.K.

5. On the other hand, the Japanese situation may blow up in the very near future, in which case U.S.A. and U.K. Joint Staffs will have to get together and decide in the light of combined war strategy where such equipment as becomes available can best be used.

6. I asked the President for guidance as to how great can be our expectations in the event of no war with Japan and he said that he hoped before the end of March to be able to direct a diversion and that it might be more than half the available heavy bomber production.

7. The President was most sympathetic to our urgent need of more heavy bombers on the Western Front. He asked that we should continue to use all pressure. He remarked: 'Keep on pushing us—the more we are urged the better'. The President said that as soon as he feels Far Eastern situation allows him to come to a decision in numbers and dates he will communicate with Prime Minister.

On November 21, Lieut.-Col. S. A. Greenwell dispatched from London a copy of the 'Report by Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, War Cabinet, on Probable Japanese Intentions'. This was a lengthy British estimate of the situation, of which the conclusions were as follows:

- (i) Japan will make a last effort to obtain a general agreement with the U.S.A. If she fails she will be faced with the necessity of deciding whether or not to take aggressive action involving risk of war with one or more major Powers.
- (ii) Such action would be likely in the first instance to be against Thailand, which Japan might think would involve the least risk of a major conflict. Occupation of bases in Thailand including the Kra Isthmus would be a sound strategic preliminary to subsequent operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Recent military moves tend to support the opinion that Thailand is the next objective.
- (iii) Action against Russia is likely to be deferred until there is a serious weakening of Russia's position in the Far East.
- (iv) In the absence of a general agreement with America operations against China will continue.

- (v) In view of the latest evidence of diversion of forces southwards from Northern Indo-China and Canton, we do not believe that the former concentrations in those areas imply an early attack on the Burma Road.

On November 20 the Japanese delivered a note to the United States Government and this was followed, on November 22, by a secret message from Foreign Minister Togo to Nomura which was intercepted and decoded by the special process known as 'Magic'. In this message Togo said the note was a Japanese 'ultimatum', it was their 'absolute final proposal', and 'a last effort to prevent something happening'. The time limit on the ultimatum was given as November 29, and Togo informed Nomura, 'this time we mean it, the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen'. The American reply to the November 20 note was handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26. This reply, entitled 'Outline of Proposed Agreement Between the United States and Japan', has been described as an 'ultimatum' by a few American isolationists who have seemed anxious to absolve the Japanese of all guilt for the war in the Pacific and to fix the guilt on their own President and Secretaries of State, War and Navy. In this connection it should be noted that the Japanese task force sailed for Pearl Harbour on November 25, the day before the Hull Outline was delivered in Washington and four days before the absolute 'deadline' designated in the Togo message to Nomura. The dogs of war had been unleashed while the solemn and futile diplomatic exchanges continued.

On November 26 Nomura and Kurusu cabled to their Government in Tokyo:

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable.

Which indicates that the two Japanese Ambassadors—or at least one of them—were also ignorant of the real war plans and were assuming that the first clash would come in the South-West Pacific with the British and Americans taking the initiative.

On the following day, November 27, there was a conference in the White House of Roosevelt, Hull, Kurusu, and Nomura. In Hull's memorandum of this meeting he states:

I made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and talk and

move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in certain areas, are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social, and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course.

Hull also quotes Roosevelt as having said in effect to the Ambassadors:

We remain convinced that Japan's own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

The report of the Commission which was headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts states that on November 27:

The Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks.

The foregoing message from Stark was one of the few documents in those weeks that considered the likelihood that the first attacks might be against the Philippines.

On December 6, the day before Pearl Harbour, the British reported heavy Japanese forces moving along the Indo-Chinese Coast toward objectives in Thailand or possibly in Malaya. Ambassador Winant in London sent a cable marked 'Triple Priority' and 'Most Urgent' and 'Personal and Secret to the President and Secretary':

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a.m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers. . . .

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.

On that same day, Saturday, Harriman cabled to Hopkins:

The President should be informed of Churchill's belief that in the event of aggression by the Japanese it would be the policy of the British to postpone taking any action—even though this delay might involve some military sacrifice—until the President has taken such action as, under the circumstances, he considers best. Then Churchill will act 'not within the hour, but within the minute'. I am seeing him again tomorrow (Sunday, December 7th). Let me know if there is anything special you want me to ask.

The reference in this to postponing 'any action even at some military sacrifice' referred primarily to possible British naval or air action from Singapore against the Japanese landings. Churchill had recently sent substantial reinforcements to Singapore, particularly the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse*. But it seemed that he was not going to use force until he had been advised of Roosevelt's intentions after the Japanese moves had actually been made. In London, as in Washington, on the eve of Pearl Harbour, the best-informed thinking was that further Japanese aggression was imminent and that it would come in the South-West Pacific, its probable objective being the Kra Isthmus, which joined the mainland of Thailand and Burma with the Malay Peninsula, six thousand miles from Pearl Harbour. Nowhere, in any of the official military intelligence reports, appraisals or estimates that came into the White House during the weeks preceding December 7 have I found one mention of the possibility that the Hawaiian Islands might be the first object of attack. And what of the best-informed thinking in Pearl Harbour itself?

Here are two paragraphs from the Roberts report:

General Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3 concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view.

At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war-plans officer, Captain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability

of a surprise attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and, according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese would never so attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian defence to be adopted in the light of the messages.

On and after November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, independently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the existing situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively.

(The War Plans Officer mentioned, Captain C. H. McMorris, later became one of the finest fighting Admirals in the Pacific.)

On December 7 the Navy Department gave the location of all the major warships in the Pacific—U.S., British, Japanese, Dutch, and Russian—and the Congressional Joint Committee stated, of this report:

The bulk of the Japanese Navy was listed as in the two major Japanese naval stations at Kure and Sasebo on the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Included among the Japanese ships listed by name as in those two Japanese naval stations that morning were all of the ships which, it is now known, were at that very moment less than 300 miles north of the Hawaiian Islands.

On the afternoon of Saturday, December 6, the Australian Minister in Washington reported to his Government:

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.
2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening,
 - (a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,
 - (b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i.e. after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington.

This, of course, indicated an expectation that nothing would happen for three days at least. The 'warning' referred to was presumably one drafted by Churchill for issuance by the United Kingdom and the Dominions; the text of this was delivered to Roosevelt the following day, December 7 itself. It ended with the words: 'If Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should

hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan.' It is not known whether Roosevelt even had time to read this before the blow came. Nor is it known whether he would have joined Churchill in such a strong threat or whether, as after the Atlantic Conference, he would have sent another inconclusive warning.

On Saturday evening a long cable from the Japanese Government to Nomura was intercepted and decoded by 'Magic'. It was delivered to the President at 9.30 p.m. by Commander L. R. Schulz, then assistant to Captain Beardall, the Naval Aide. This cable was in thirteen parts with a fourteenth part to follow. Hopkins was with Roosevelt in the Study when it was delivered. Schulz described this scene under cross-examination by Seth W. Richardson, the General Counsel for the Joint Committee on the Investigation. Following is his testimony:

MR. RICHARDSON: Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: Yes, sir, I remained in the room.

MR. RICHARDSON: What happened?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: The President read the papers, which took perhaps ten minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

MR. RICHARDSON: How far away from the President was Mr. Hopkins sitting?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: He was standing up, pacing back and forth slowly, not more than ten feet away.

MR. RICHARDSON: Did the President read out loud when he was reading the papers?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: I do not recall that he did.

MR. RICHARDSON: All right. Now go ahead and give us in detail just what occurred there, if you please, Commander.

COMMANDER SCHULZ: Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned towards Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance: 'This means war.' Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then for perhaps five minutes the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and —

MR. RICHARDSON: Can you recall what either of them said?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that—I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first—that since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them —

THE CHAIRMAN: When all was what?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: When all was most opportune for that. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indo-China in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications for where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indo-China, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded, and then said, in effect: 'No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people.' Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said: 'But we have a good record.'

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record; we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbour. The only geographic name I recall was Indo-China. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

MR. RICHARDSON: Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

COMMANDER SCHULTZ: There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion, about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined—I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theatre.

MR. RICHARDSON: Now, that was from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

COMMANDER SCHULZ: Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theatre was mentioned in my presence and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the theatre, where I believe the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned, and that if he had left suddenly he would surely

have been seen because of the position which he held, and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen, because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case.

These statements by Schulz sound unassailably authentic, and when he made them many people regretted that he had not remained longer in the Oval Study to hear the rest of the Roosevelt-Hopkins conversation. I cannot pretend to guess what was said, and see no reason even to try. One thing is all too clear: Roosevelt at that moment faced the most grievous dilemma of his entire career.

After the Roberts report came out, some six weeks after Pearl Harbour, Hopkins wrote the following:

I dined with the President alone tonight and he discussed at some length the implications of the Roberts report on Pearl Harbour and the negotiations with Japan in the Far East prior to December 7.

The President told me about several talks with Hull relative to the loopholes in our foreign policy in the Far East in so far as that concerned the circumstances on which the United States would go to war with Japan in event of certain eventualities. All of Hull's negotiations, while in general terms indicating that we wished to protect our rights in the Far East, would never envisage the tough answer to the problem that would have to be faced if Japan attacked, for instance, either Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. The President felt it was a weakness in our policy that we could not be specific on that point. The President told me that he felt that an attack on the Netherlands East Indies should result in war with Japan and he told me that Hull always ducked that question.

I remember when I was in England in February, 1941, Eden, the Foreign Minister, asked me repeatedly what our country would do if Japan attacked Singapore or the Dutch, saying it was essential to their policy to know.

Of course, it was perfectly clear that neither the President nor Hull could give an adequate answer to the British on that point, because the declaration of war is up to Congress and the isolationists and, indeed, a great part of the American people, would not be interested in a war in the Far East merely because Japan attacked the Dutch.

(NOTE: The two preceding paragraphs have already been quoted.)

I recall talking to the President many times in the past year, and it always disturbed him because he really thought that the tactics of the Japanese would be to avoid a conflict with us; that they would not attack either the Philippines or Hawaii, but would move on Thailand, French Indo-China, make further inroads on China itself and possibly attack the Malay Straits. He also thought they would attack Russia at an

opportune moment. This would have left the President with the very difficult problem of protecting our interests.

He always realized that Japan would jump on us at an opportune moment and they would merely use the 'one by one' technique of Germany. Hence his great relief at the method that Japan used. In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbour and the blitz-warfare with the Japanese during the first few weeks, it completely solidified the American people and made the war upon Japan inevitable.

Apropos of the Roberts report, which indicates that the State Department had given up all hope of coming to an agreement with Japan, it seems to me that hardly squares with the facts. It is true that Hull told the Secretaries of War and Navy that he believed Japan might attack at any moment. On the other hand, up to the very last day he undoubtedly had hopes that something could be worked out at the last moment. Hull had always been willing to work out a deal with Japan. To be sure, it was the kind of a deal that Japan probably would not have accepted but, on the other hand, it was also the type of a deal which would have made us very unpopular in the Far East.

Hull wanted peace above everything, because he had set his heart on making an adjustment with the Japanese and had worked on it night and day for weeks. There was no question that up until the last ten days prior to the outbreak of war he was in hopes that some adjustment could be worked out.

The ten days referred to in the last paragraph go back to November 27, when the Chief of Naval Operations sent to Admiral Kimmel the message directing 'defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks'. During these ten days a sort of paralysis set in, at Oahu and in the Philippines (where the unreadiness for attack at Clark Field still remains a mystery) and perhaps worst of all in Washington. Here was presented the awful picture of a great nation which had surrendered all powers of initiative and therefore must wait in a state of flabby impotence for its potential enemies to decide where, when, and how action would be taken.

This, then, was Roosevelt's dilemma:

The Japanese were about to strike at British or Dutch possessions or both—and what could he do about it? The British and the Dutch were hopelessly unable to defend themselves, and so were the exposed Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Singapore might hold out for a while, but it and Manila would be rendered inoperative as bases with the Japanese in control of the air above them and the seas around them. Without formidable American intervention, the Japanese would be able to conquer and exploit an empire, rich in resources, stretching from the Aleutian Islands to India or

even to the Middle East; and it was idle to assume, and Roosevelt knew it better than anyone else, that there could be no formidable American intervention without the full, final, irrevocable plunging of the entire nation into war. And what were the chances of that when the Japanese landed on the Kra Peninsula? What would the President have to say to the Congress in that event? It was the same Congress which only a month before had barely agreed to extend permission for the arming of American merchant ships. It was afflicted with the same myopia which had led the previous Congress to refuse to appropriate funds sufficient for the fortification of Guam.

In 1939, with a traditional enemy in armed force on the very frontier of France, the French isolationists—most of whom had later become collaborationists—had raised the scornful cry: 'Why should we die for Danzig?' Why, then, should Americans die for Thailand, or for such outposts of British imperialism as Singapore or Hong Kong, or of Dutch imperialism in the East Indies, or for Communism in Vladivostok?

Even if Roosevelt, through diligent use of the Democratic party whip, could compel the Congress to vote for war by a narrow margin after weeks or months of demoralizing debate (during which the Japanese would sweep ahead), what degree of unity or of fighting spirit could the American people achieve for the long and prodigious and bloody effort that must be demanded of them?

Roosevelt had been telling the people for a year and more that the real enemy was Hitler's Germany. His Administration had been rendering all possible aid to Hitler's enemies in Europe and, at the same time, often seeming to go out of its way to appease Japan. The people had supported his policy as long as it carried with it the assurance that this was the best way to keep out of war: Churchill had provided too convenient a slogan, and Americans felt too secure in the thought that 'All we have to do is give the British (or Russians, or Chinese) the tools and let them finish the job.' Even the killing of American sailors by Germans in the North Atlantic had apparently failed to set off any sparks of belligerence in the American soul. How much will to battle would be stimulated by the news that the Japanese were establishing a beach-head at Khota Baru on the Gulf of Siam?

And if the Congress and the people should refuse to go to war on this provocation, as it seemed inevitable that they would refuse, what would be the effect on the British, the Russians, the Chinese—as well as on the Germans, Italians, and Japanese?

The plain fact was that the moment was imminent when the United States would be forced at gun-point either to put up or for ever shut up.

While Commander Schultz was still in the Oval Study with Roosevelt and Hopkins there was some speculation as to where the Japanese blow would come; the only geographical point mentioned was Indo-China, that

being the obvious base from which strong forces would be further deployed. After he left the room the conversation may have turned to all sorts of eventualities—but they could not have included the inconceivable possibility that, before launching their major attacks against British and Dutch possessions, the Japanese would first take the precaution of forcing the United States into the war.

There was just one thing that they could do to get Roosevelt completely off the horns of the dilemma, and that is precisely what they did, at one stroke, in a manner so challenging, so insulting and enraging, that the divided and confused American people were instantly rendered unanimous and certain.

Before he went to bed on the night of December 7 Hopkins took the time to write down the events of that day in the White House:

I lunched with the President today at his desk in the Oval Room. We were talking about things far removed from war when at about 1.40 Secretary Knox called and said that they had picked up a radio from Honolulu from the Commander-in-Chief of our forces there advising all our stations that an air raid attack was on and that it was 'no drill'.

I expressed the belief that there must be some mistake and that surely Japan would not attack in Honolulu.

The President discussed at some length his efforts to keep the country out of the war and his earnest desire to complete his administration without war, but that if this action of Japan's were true it would take the matter entirely out of his own hands, because the Japanese had made the decision for him.

The President thought the report was probably true and thought it was just the kind of unexpected thing the Japanese would do, and that at the very time they were discussing peace in the Pacific they were plotting to overthrow it.

At five minutes after two he called Hull and told Hull of the report and advised Hull to receive Nomura and Kurusu, who had an appointment with him, and not to mention that he, Hull, had the news but to receive their reply formally and coolly and bow them out.

I heard Hull later report to the President about the interview, and I gather he used some pretty strong Tennessee mountain language to the two Japanese emissaries. The burden of his remarks being that he didn't believe a word in the reply to his note and that it was false from beginning to end.

At 2.28 Admiral Stark called the President and confirmed the attack, stating that it was a very severe attack and that some damage had already been done to the fleet and that there was some loss of life. He discussed

with the President briefly the next step and the President wanted him to execute the agreed orders to the Army and Navy in event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific.

At 2.30 the President called Steve (Early) and dictated a news release which Steve was to release at once to the Press. Steve came in half an hour later and the President dictated a further statement which the President promptly ordered Steve to release.

The President called a conference of Secretary Stimson, Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and General Marshall at three o'clock.

The conference met in not too tense an atmosphere, because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity. Everybody, however, agreed on the seriousness of the war and that it would be a long, hard struggle. During the conference the news kept coming in, indicating more and more damage to the fleet. The President handled the calls personally on the telephone with whoever was giving the dispatches. Most of them came through the Navy.

It was at this conference that Hull reviewed his interview with the Japanese.

It was agreed that some type of censorship had to be set up at once.

Churchill called from England. The President told him that we were all in the same boat now and that he was going to Congress tomorrow. Churchill apparently told him that the Malay Straits had been attacked and that he, too, was going to the House of Commons in the morning and would ask for declaration of war.

The President discussed at length with Marshall the disposition of the troops and particularly the air force, and with Hull the urgent necessity of keeping all of the South American Republics not only informed, but to keep them in line with us. Marshall was clearly impatient to get away. He said he had ordered General MacArthur to execute 'all the necessary movement required in event of an outbreak of hostilities with Japan'.

The President ordered the Japanese Embassy and all the consulates in the United States to be protected and ordered all Japanese citizens to be picked up and placed under careful surveillance. It was agreed that this should be done by the Department of Justice.

The President also ordered Stimson and Knox to order that careful guards be placed not only on our own arsenals, but on all private munitions factories and all bridges. Marshall announced that the military would guard the War Department from now on. The President refused to have a military guard around the White House.

Many of the moves required the President to sign an executive order.

The President instructed the person to whom he talked to go ahead and execute the order and he would sign it later.

There was some discussion about the President's message to Congress, for by this time the President had decided to go to Congress Monday. The President expressed himself very strongly that he was going to submit a precise message and had in mind submitting a longer message later. Hull urged very strongly that the President review the whole history of the Japanese relations in a strong document that might take half an hour to read. The President objected. I thought at the time the President had in mind going on the radio to the American people and would at that time develop his case at length and that he proposed now to keep the case centred on the attack at Hawaii.

I told the President I thought he should have two conferences before the day was out, one with the Cabinet, and he ordered Steve to call it for 8.30, and one with the legislative leaders. We discussed between us a list of the members and he finally decided to have only a few of the leaders. Later he added Hiram Johnson. He refused to have the chairman leaders, because the ranking member of the House Committee is Ham Fish and the President will not have him in the White House.

It was finally agreed that the conference should include Vice President Wallace; Speaker Rayburn; John McCormack, Majority Floor Leader; Joseph Martin, Minority Floor Leader; Sol Bloom, Foreign Affairs Chairman; Tom Connally, Foreign Relations Committee; Charles Eaton, Foreign Affairs Committee; Warren Austin, Military Affairs Committee; and Charles McNary.

In the meantime various Cabinet members were calling the President and all of them out of the city were urged to take planes at once to return for the conference.

The conference adjourned about 4.30 and the President then dictated to Grace (Tully) the first draft of his message to Congress. This was ready when the President, Grace and I had dinner together in the Oval Room.

Again the phone was ringing constantly. Jimmy called up. The Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury also called. Stark continued to get further and always more dismal news about the attack on Hawaii. We went over the speech again briefly and the President made a few corrections and decided to read it to the Cabinet.

The Cabinet met promptly at 8.30. All members were present. They formed a ring completely around the President, who sat at his desk. The President was in a very solemn mood and told the group this was the most serious Cabinet session since Lincoln met with the Cabinet at the outbreak of the Civil War.

The President reviewed the news with the Cabinet and they were all shocked by the damage wrought by the Japanese aircraft. He told them of his plan to go to Congress at noon tomorrow and read them the proposed message. Hull again argued strongly that the message was inadequate. The President, however, stuck to his guns, determined to make his statement to Congress what is in effect an understatement and nothing too explosive.

At this time we did not know whether or not Japan had actually declared war on us.

Even at this time the President had decided not to tell the Congressional leaders who were waiting outside precisely what was going to be in the message. They came in at approximately 9.30. Those present were Vice President Wallace, Senator Alben Barkley, Senator Charles McNary, Senator Connally, Senator Warren Austin, Senator Hiram Johnson, Speaker Rayburn, Congressman Sol Bloom, and Congressman Charles Eaton.

The President outlined at some length the situation, reviewing the negotiations with Japan and giving them as much news as he could relative to the Japanese attack on Hawaii. Everybody realized that the implication of the conference was that a declaration of war would be made tomorrow.

The President asked the legislative leaders when they would be ready to receive him and it was agreed he would appear personally at 12.30 tomorrow. They asked him whether he wanted a declaration of war and what was going to be in the message and he said he had not as yet decided. As a matter of fact, the President, of course, knew that he was going to ask for a declaration of war, but he also knew that if he stated it to the conference that it would be all over town in five minutes, because it is perfectly footless ever to ask a large group of Congressmen to keep a secret. The legislative leaders left.

Welles had a draft of a war message which the President did not like, although Hull pressed very strongly that he use it. Hull's message was a long-winded dissertation on the history of Japanese relations leading up to the blow this morning. The President was very patient with them and I think in order to get them out of the room perhaps led them to believe he would give serious consideration to their draft.

Waiters brought in beer and sandwiches, and at 12.30 the President cleared everybody out and said he was going to bed.

The orders that the President told Admiral Stark to execute on confirmation of the news from Honolulu were based on every conceivable eventuality listed in the Joint Staff Estimate quoted previously. I doubt that any of them

encompassed the circumstance of seven U.S. capital ships being put out of commission within the first hour of hostilities. Millions of words have been recorded by at least eight official investigating bodies, and one may read through all of them without arriving at an adequate explanation of why, with war so obviously ready to break out *somewhere* in the Pacific, our principal Pacific base was in a condition of peacetime Sunday-morning somnolence instead of in Condition Red.

When General Marshall appeared before the Joint Congressional Committee he was asked why he sent a telegram to alert General Short in Honolulu on Sunday morning (the telegram arrived after the attack), when he could have spoken to him instantly over the scrambler telephone which was on his desk. The Committee report stated:

General Marshall testified that among the possible factors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act. (He said:) 'The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part.'

Marshall's hesitancy was precisely the same as that of Roosevelt when he decided not to call Admiral Stark away from a performance of *The Student Prince* because 'undue alarm might be caused'. Marshall and Roosevelt were far more afraid of the isolationists at home—the 'portions of our public that doubted our integrity'—than they were of the enemies abroad. They were afraid of being called 'alarmists', a word which was then interchangeable with 'warmongers'. Therefore, neither one of them, nor Stark, ever reached out to push the button which rang the General Alarm, for that precautionary measure might have been construed as the overt act.

Marshall could not forget the occasion, previously mentioned in these pages, when in that same year of 1941 a Congressional Committee raised a fearful rumpus because of its discovery that the Army was ordering 'overseas caps' for American troops!

'The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.'

In addition to which is the equally inescapable fact that none of them believed it possible that Japan could commit an act of such seemingly suicidal folly as an attack on Pearl Harbour. Churchill referred to it repeatedly as 'this irrational act'—it being particularly incomprehensible in view of the long-established reputation of the Japanese for diabolical cleverness.

It may well be said that those in high authority in both the United States and Britain made two original errors of calculation: they greatly underrated Japanese military strength and daring, and they greatly overrated Japanese political astuteness.

However, all possible explanations and recitals of extenuating circumstances cannot wipe out the responsibility of all concerned, including the Commander-in-Chief, for the appalling unreadiness. As an officer of the Japanese Naval Ministry said four years later: 'We had expected a much greater defence at so important a base. We were amazed.'

Hopkins made a valid comment on this question of responsibility, although not in relation to Pearl Harbour. Later, when the French liner *Normandie* burned and capsized at a pier in New York City while it was being converted for use as a troop transport, Secretary Knox produced a file of correspondence to prove that many months previously he had attempted to obtain funds from the Congress for the protection of naval vessels from sabotage while in port. Failing to obtain these funds, Knox had written the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee:

In reviewing the foregoing facts, I cannot but come to the conclusion that, as Secretary of the Navy responsible for the protection of its Shore Establishments from external and internal danger, I have done all in my power to meet this grave responsibility. In my efforts to crystallize a measure to meet this serious problem, I have at all times considered and accepted the constructive objections of the Members of Congress. I cannot but feel that the responsibility for any catastrophe which might occur in a Shore Establishment of the Navy because of subversive activities no longer rests with me.

When Hopkins read this he wrote expressing the opinion that Knox should not have made such a statement, because 'no matter what Congress fails to do the Secretary of the Navy still has responsibility'.

The news of the shocking extent of the casualties and the damage to capital ships spread rapidly throughout Washington. Many newspaper men knew the details, but refrained from publishing them even before the Government had time to put censorship into operation. The jittery conduct of some of the most eminent of our Government officials was downright disgraceful. They were telephoning the White House, shouting that the President must tell the people the full extent of this unmitigated disaster—that our nation had gone back to Valley Forge—that our West Coast was now indefensible and we must prepare to establish our battle lines in the Rocky Mountains or on the left bank of the Mississippi or God knows where. In going about Washington in those first days it sometimes seemed that maybe the Nazi and Fascist propagandists were right, that maybe our democracy had become decadent and soft, that we could talk big, but that there were too many of us who simply did not know how to stand up under punishment. But the atmosphere inside the White House was very different; here, one felt, was the United States of America. Telegrams and messages flowed by the hun-

dreds and thousands from people all over the country. I read all of them that were received in the first few days, and if I had been misled by any doubts, these messages to the President put me right. The spirit that they expressed welled up in the Press and over the radio, and gave an inspiring and valid promise of the manner in which this country was to handle its gigantic job.

The same was true of Roosevelt himself. When he went before the Congress on the morning of December 8 he was taking his stand before the bar of history, and he knew it. As an evidence of his historical sense, he had asked that Mrs. Roosevelt be accompanied at this Joint Session by Mrs. Woodrow Wilson. The brief speech that he then gave represented Roosevelt at his simplest and most direct. Every word of this was Roosevelt's own except for the next to last sentence, which was largely suggested by Hopkins, and which is the most platitudinous line in the speech. Roosevelt's only literary flourish was his phrase 'a date which will live in infamy'. Although he gave no details of the results of the attack—many of these details being still unknown—he certainly made no attempt to gloss over the essential, ugly truth or to put a good face on a bad situation. He listed the extraordinary events of the past twenty-four hours:

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation. . . .

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

There was none of Churchill's eloquent defiance in this speech. There was certainly no trace of Hitler's hysterical bombast. And there was no doubt in the minds of the American people of Roosevelt's confidence. I do not think there was another occasion in his life when he was so completely representative of the whole people. If, as Hopkins wrote, Roosevelt felt a sense of relief

that the Japanese had chosen this method of settling the issue of war or peace, so with remarkably few exceptions did the people themselves. They recognized Pearl Harbour as a tragedy and a disgrace—and that recognition provided a boost to national pride which expressed itself in tremendous accomplishment. On Tuesday night after Pearl Harbour, Roosevelt spoke over the radio and said:

We may acknowledge that our enemies have performed a brilliant feat of deception, perfectly timed and executed with great skill. It was a thoroughly dishonourable deed, but we must face the fact that modern warfare as conducted in the Nazi manner is a dirty business. We don't like it—we didn't want to get in it—but we are in it, and we're going to fight it with everything we've got.

The American people, notoriously nondocile, accepted the unquestionable accuracy of that statement and acted accordingly. They cast off isolationism, readily, rapidly, even gratefully—though perhaps not permanently. The inveterate isolationists remained inveterate, ready to carry out guerrilla raids against the Administration whenever a line of communication to the rear appeared to be exposed. As Elmer Davis said, broadcasting for C.B.S. shortly after Pearl Harbour: 'There are some patriotic citizens who sincerely hope that America will win the war—but they also hope that Russia will lose it; and there are some who hope that America will win the war, but that England will lose it; and there are some who hope that America will win the war, but that Roosevelt will lose it!'

Nevertheless, the historic fact remains that throughout the forty-four months of war that followed the American nation achieved its most massive effort: the fighting qualities of the individual men of the armed forces were at least equal to the most hallowed and possibly exaggerated traditions of our past, and so was the quality of military leadership; the mass production of arms, food, raw materials, and everything else that was necessary was far beyond anything that had previously been imagined possible, and so was the expenditure of money; the scientific development was immeasurable. The overall record could not have been approximated had the nation failed to attain and sustain an unprecedented degree of unity with its Allies and within itself. Strangely enough, in so far as the people as a whole were concerned, the element known as 'morale' did not become a vital consideration. Morale was never particularly good nor alarmingly bad. There was a minimum of flag-waving and parades. It was the first war in American history in which the general disillusionment preceded the firing of the first shot. It has been called, from the American point of view, 'the most unpopular war in history'; but that could be taken as proof that the people for once were not misled as to the terrible nature and extent of the task that confronted them.

THE UNITED NATIONS

BOTH Winant and Harriman were at dinner with Churchill at Chequers on Sunday evening, December 7, 1941. The \$15 American radio that Hopkins had given the Prime Minister was on the dining-table, and from it came the measured, emotionless tones of the B.B.C. news reader announcing that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbour. Winant has told how Churchill was immediately on his feet, about to call the Foreign Office to give instructions that a declaration of war on Japan should be put through at once—'within the minute', as he had promised. He was talked out of this on the ground that one could not declare war on the strength of a news broadcast, even from the B.B.C. Winant suggested that perhaps the Prime Minister should telephone the White House for confirmation. (This was the call mentioned in the notes that Hopkins wrote on the night of December 7.) Roosevelt immediately agreed that Churchill should come to Washington with his Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. Churchill then put through a call to Anthony Eden, who was at Invergordon, about to board a cruiser for his mission to Moscow.

When Eden heard of Pearl Harbour and Churchill's imminent trip to Washington he felt that his own trip should be cancelled: the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should not be away from the United Kingdom at the same time. Actually, Churchill could not order Eden to go or stay, as a President could order a Secretary of State, for Eden had his own direct responsibility to the King; but Churchill convinced him that now that the United States was a belligerent his hand would be greatly strengthened in his talks with Stalin and Molotov, particularly in view of the cable from Hull which Winant had communicated the day before. So Eden went.

One of the immediate effects of United States entry into the war was an order by the War Department placing a stoppage on all Lend Lease shipments then loaded at American ports. This meant that shipments of vital material allocated to the Middle East were tied up, presumably for diversion to the Pacific. The British were afraid that now there might be a drastic reorientation of American strategic thinking—that the formerly accepted strategy of 'Germany first' might be abandoned and the whole weight of American power concentrated on Japan.

On December 11 Harriman cabled Hopkins that Beaverbrook would telephone him about five o'clock that afternoon to discuss the alarming fact that thirty ships which had been scheduled to sail shortly for the Middle East were now held up by this order. Harriman begged that Hopkins would

be sympathetic to the plea that Beaverbrook was to make for the release of the ships.

The subsequent conversation is one of the few of Hopkins's many transatlantic telephone talks which were transcribed. It is not particularly important, but it does show Hopkins's directness and the extent to which both Beaverbrook and Harriman accepted his terse assurances as absolute guarantees that their fears for the Lend Lease shipments were baseless. Following is the complete dialogue:

BEAVERBROOK: Is that you, Harry?

HOPKINS: Yes.

BEAVERBROOK: Did you get a telegram from Averell? Can you help us there?

HOPKINS: I can assure you we can.

BEAVERBROOK: That is very fine.

HOPKINS: And in very important ways. I will not mention details, but it is encouraging, and I am going to talk to Morris Wilson and Ed Taylor tonight.

BEAVERBROOK: That is very fine indeed. Thank you.

HOPKINS: Don't worry.

BEAVERBROOK: That is grand.

HOPKINS: In order to make it really tough for Hitler we will undoubtedly greatly increase our amounts.

BEAVERBROOK: I can't hear you.

HOPKINS: We are going to do far better.

(Communication cut at this point and resumed later.)

HOPKINS: Hello, Max.

BEAVERBROOK: Yes, Harry.

HOPKINS: I wanted to say that we are going to do far better than you or I ever thought. Much better.

BEAVERBROOK: That is very fine.

HOPKINS: If Hitler thought he could start a war and do that, he is going to be greatly mistaken.

BEAVERBROOK: Fine. I will put Averell on to you.

HOPKINS: Hello, Ave. Things are going all right here.

HARRIMAN: That is fine.

HOPKINS: Don't worry.

HARRIMAN: We're not at all.

HOPKINS: Things are going to turn out far better for you over there in the long run and in the not distant future. They made another mistake, by God. Don't worry.

HARRIMAN: I would like to hear from you once in a while.

HOPKINS: You can imagine what is going on here, but you can count on it we are not going to let them down.

HARRIMAN: All right, Good-bye.

HOPKINS: Good-bye, Ave.

The telephone talks between the White House and London were frequently as uninteresting as this sample. No matter how secure the scrambler system might presumably be, the speakers were always inclined to be so extremely careful of what they said that they gave no really important information, saving that for the cables. One may wonder, therefore, why they used the telephone so much; the answer to that is easy—being strictly human, they enjoyed the thrill of talking to each other across three thousand miles of embattled ocean.

On that same day, December 11, while Harriman's first cable was *en route*, the news came that Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States. Ciano in his Diary recorded that Ribbentrop was 'joyful over the Japanese attack on the United States. He is so happy, in fact, that I can't but congratulate him, even though I am not so sure about the advantage.' Ciano added that 'Mussolini was happy' and that the King of Italy also 'expressed his satisfaction'. And Hitler told his staff at Berchtesgaden that American soldiers are 'nothing but a bunch of rowdies. They can't stick in a crisis. They have absolutely no ideals.'

On the day of Pearl Harbour Roosevelt had been urged to make mention of Germany and Italy in his message to Congress asking for the declaration of war on Japan. He refused to do so. He wanted to wait for Hitler and Mussolini to declare war on the United States. He was aware that a cable from Berlin to Tokyo, on November 29, had been intercepted and decoded by 'Magic'; this cable gave assurance to the Japanese that if they 'became engaged in a war against the United States, Germany would, of course, join in the war immediately'.

It seemed at the time that the German-Italian declaration of war was another 'irrational act'; true, the Nazis and Fascists were in honour bound by their pledges to the Japanese, but they had not previously shown much inclination to let such bourgeois-democratic considerations interfere with their own conceptions of self-interest. Perhaps Hitler had completely taken leave of his senses and was now hysterically eager to fight all comers on all fronts; and perhaps he had been worn down by the psychological warfare that had been going on continuously for years between him and Roosevelt, and he was at last glad of an excuse to abandon his sensible determination to avoid war with the United States until he had disposed of Britain and Russia. In any case, he seconded the Japanese in solving Roosevelt's sorest problems.

Churchill and the British people could, of course, make no secret of their exultation at these developments, but their celebration was shortlived. The sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off the Malayan Coast and the quick capture of Hong Kong by the Japanese were the first of a series of irreparable blows to British imperial prestige in Asia.

Churchill arrived in Washington with his entourage on December 22 for the series of conferences which were known under the code name *Arcadia*. He was installed in the big bedroom across the hall from Hopkins's room, and as the two of them walked back and forth to visit one another they had to pick their way through great piles of Christmas parcels. That upstairs hall in the White House underwent an extraordinary change. Ordinarily quiet and usually deserted, it was now the headquarters of the British Empire, and various dignitaries and staff officers and secretaries were continually hurrying through, carrying the old red-leather dispatch-cases which make British officials look really official. The White House staff were amazed and fascinated by these goings-on, and the British were even more amazed by the atmosphere of placidity and seeming detachment from events that surrounded the President and the incomprehensible fact that the total military staff on duty at the White House at some given moment might consist of one nervous Navy Ensign. There was an even greater contrast, the other way around, between the size of Roosevelt's bodyguard and Churchill's; the British gave considerably less weight to the possibility of assassination.

The food in the White House was always better when Churchill was there and, of course, the wine flowed more freely. Since Churchill knew of Roosevelt's habits of going to bed early, he made a pretence of retiring himself at a fairly reasonable hour; but Roosevelt knew that his tireless guest and Hopkins would go on talking, and he did not want to miss any of it, so he stayed up much later than usual. The conversations that went on from early morning until late at night covered not only the entire world, but a very large part of its history. Churchill was one of the few people to whom Roosevelt cared to listen, and vice versa.

Hopkins told many times a story of Roosevelt being wheeled to his guest's room, and as he entered Churchill emerged from the bathroom, stark naked and gleaming pink from his bath. Roosevelt started to apologize and made as if to leave, but Churchill protested it was quite all right. 'The Prime Minister of Great Britain,' he said, 'has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States.'

I asked Churchill if his story was factual. He replied firmly that it was nonsense—that he never received the President without at least a bath towel wrapped around him. And, he said: 'I could not possibly have made such a statement as that. The President himself would have been well aware that it was not strictly true.'

Churchill was in the White House because he was the King's First Minister, but he could not forget that he was also a professional historian who was most sensitive to the radiations of the past. He looked questioningly at the portraits of the Presidents and undoubtedly had more than a nodding acquaintance with all of them that mattered. After his return to London he cabled Roosevelt: 'I was terribly sorry to have to leave you and, what is more than those can say whose pictures are on the walls, there is not a moment of it that I did not enjoy.'

Ordinarily the White House surged with children at Christmas-time, but this year Diana Hopkins was the only one; the President's sons were all in the services and their families scattered, and his daughter, Anna, was in Seattle. However, there could be no failure of Christmas spirit with the warm-hearted and (despite all appearances to the contrary) tradition-loving Roosevelts. On Christmas Eve Churchill joined Roosevelt in the ceremony of lighting the tree on the White House lawn. Both of them made short speeches, Roosevelt starting with the words 'Fellow workers for freedom', and introducing Churchill as 'my associate, my old and good friend'. The Prime Minister started off: 'Fellow workers in the cause of freedom: I have the honour to add a pendant to the necklace of that Christmas good will and kindness with which my illustrious friend, the President, has encircled the homes and families of the United States.' Even in brief Christmas messages, which have tended throughout the centuries to become pretty well standardized, the two statesmen managed to emphasize the differences of their literary styles as well as the community of their interests. Their broadcasts gave a thrill to the American people, who needed it, for by that time the deadly seriousness of the war in the Pacific had become apparent: the gallant defence of Wake Island had ended in surrender and Manila seemed doomed.

On Christmas Day Roosevelt and Churchill attended an interdenominational service at the Foundry Methodist Church. The Reverend F. B. Harris gave prayers for the President and Prime Minister. Of the latter he said: 'With Thy enabling help he continues to lead his valiant people even through blood and sweat and tears to a new world where men of good will may dwell together, none daring to molest or make afraid.' The congregation sang 'O Little Town of Bethlehem' with the lines:

'Yet in thy dark streets shineth
The everlasting light;
The hopes and fears of all the years
Are met in thee tonight.'

The day after Christmas Churchill journeyed to Capitol Hill and addressed a joint session of the Congress. It was one of his greatest speeches and superbly attuned to the temper of as difficult an audience as he had ever faced. Hopkins

had some worries as to the quality of the reception that Churchill might receive from the Senators and Representatives, but there was no further doubt about it when he heard the roars of laughter and the cheers from Republicans and Democrats alike which followed the Prime Minister's remark: 'I cannot help reflecting that if my father had been American and my mother British, instead of the other way around, I might have got here on my own.' A few days later Churchill went to Ottawa and gave another great speech before the Canadian Houses of Parliament, making his gloating reference to 'Some chicken; some neck', which harked back to Weygand's grim prophecy when France was about to surrender.

Roosevelt was then preparing his 1942 State of the Union Message to Congress, and some of his associates were becoming concerned at the quality of the oratorical competition being offered by Churchill. Steve Early was particularly exercised about this; fiercely loyal and jealous of his Chief's prestige, he kept charts showing the fluctuations of the size of the President's radio audiences, and he did not welcome the appearance of a new star attraction in a field which Roosevelt had so long monopolized. It was as though the President's championship were at stake. However, Roosevelt was not troubled; he was greatly amused by his friends' concern. He had no desire to attempt to compete with Churchill as a master phrase-maker. Indeed, he went more and more to the other extreme, striving to find the shortest and simplest and most obvious means of saying what he wanted to say. But he managed to make sure that his Message to Congress of January 6, 1942, was one of his best efforts. It presented the whole programme for the United States at war in terms that could not possibly be misunderstood by friend or foe. Before delivering it on Capitol Hill, he read it aloud in the Oval Study to Churchill and Beaverbrook, and he reported later that 'it went over big'.

Churchill had originally planned to stay only a week in the White House, then go on to Canada for two days and start home to England on January 1. This plan was revised after the intended week was more than half over and Churchill did not leave for England until the night of January 14. In the meantime he had made the trip to Canada, December 29 to January 1, and from January 5 to January 11 he was off on a trip to Florida, his first holiday in the sun since the war started in 1939. During the fourteen days that Churchill was in the White House he and Roosevelt and Hopkins had lunch and dinner together every day but one. It was at the lunches that most of the major problems were thrashed out, so that when the President and Prime Minister went into the full-dress meetings they were often already in agreement. There were at least eight major White House meetings of the President, Prime Minister, Secretaries of War and Navy, Beaverbrook, Hopkins, and the British and American Chiefs of Staff, and twelve meetings

of the two sets of Chiefs of Staff by themselves in the Federal Reserve Building. Christmas Day was perhaps the busiest of all. Unlike the Atlantic meeting, the Arcadia Conference had an agenda, and it was followed through with remarkable precision and success. The first point on this Agenda was a large one: 'Fundamental basis of joint strategy.' As the record shows, discussions of this had been started when Admiral Ghormley and Generals Emmons and Strong went to London during the Battle of Britain in August, 1940, and were continued in the secret Staff conferences in Washington the following winter. Although joint strategy had then been determined, it was on a purely tentative 'if-as-and-when' basis, and when the British gathered for the Arcadia Conference they suspected that extraordinary events in the Pacific might well have produced a reversal in strategic thinking in Washington and that they would be met with plans for all-out American effort against Japan, leaving the British and Russians to handle the German enemy in Europe. Certainly, the isolationist Press was clamouring at the time, and continued to do so, for just that policy. However, British apprehensions were quickly dispelled. When the Chiefs of Staff first sat down together General Marshall and Admiral Stark immediately presented these two paragraphs as forming the basis for all plans:

1. At the A-B (abbreviation for American-British) Staff Conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

Actually, on the day of Pearl Harbour, Marshall and Stark put into effect the war plans (Rainbow No. 5, etc.) which had resulted from many months of Anglo-American staff conferences and which gave priority to the operations against Germany. The paragraphs quoted above represented an American redraft of British proposals radioed to Washington from the battleship which carried Churchill and the British Chiefs to the Arcadia Conference; they were included in the report of the Joint Army and Navy Board to Roosevelt on the day before Churchill's arrival at the White House.

The accusation has been made, particularly by officers who were attached to General MacArthur, that at the Arcadia Conference Churchill wheedled and cajoled Roosevelt into adopting the Germany-first policy when the President should have dedicated himself to the conquest of America's real enemy, Japan; but this assumption gives far too much credit to Churchill and too little to Marshall, Stark, and the American staff planners, including

Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had only recently been promoted from temporary Colonel to temporary Brigadier-General. The principle of Germany first was based on strictly military reasoning: it was assumed—and, it would seem from the results, correctly—that Germany had far greater potential than Japan in productive power and scientific genius, and if given time to develop this during years of stalemate in Europe, would prove all the more difficult if not impossible to defeat.

In point of fact, Churchill soon learned that if he wanted to influence American strategic thinking, as he often did, he must do his arguing with the Generals and Admirals. For Roosevelt respected the judgment of his Chiefs of Staff, and there were not more than two occasions in the entire war when he overruled them (it could be argued that there was only one such occasion—in Cairo, in December, 1943), although there were various times when the Chiefs of Staff were not in complete agreement among themselves and the President as Commander-in-Chief had to decide between one point of view and another. It was the American opinion that Churchill dominated his own Chiefs to a much greater extent.

The President and Prime Minister selected as their first, main business the formation of the grand coalition of the Allies. This was what Germany, Italy, and Japan failed so signally to achieve, for all their boasts about the solidarity of the Fascist States; they formed their Axis, but they could not work together and they could not hold together as did the Allied coalition until total victory was won.

By Christmas Eve Roosevelt had prepared one draft of a Declaration of the 'Associated Powers' and Churchill had prepared another. These were blended and the result cabled to London.

On Christmas Day a cable was received from Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, conveying the comments of the War Cabinet on the proposed draft. The War Cabinet was evidently surprised at this—for so vast a project had not been previously planned—and was not entirely clear as to whether the Declaration was to be signed by all the Allies, or only by the President and Prime Minister with provision for subsequent signatures in the future. In this cable Attlee emphasized the War Cabinet's hope that all of the Allied Governments would be given a chance to participate in this Declaration, even though this might mean a delay of a day or two in its publication. He said that such participation would provide proof 'that this war is being waged for the freedom of the small nations as well as the great powers'.

The War Cabinet suggested that the Declaration should contain a paragraph pledging each Government not to conclude a separate peace, which had already been provided for in Roosevelt's draft, but eliminated in the blend. It is interesting to note that the War Cabinet also suggested that the words 'social security' should be included among the ideals for which the

Allies were waging war. This was an indication of the fact that at that time Great Britain had a National Government with members of the Labour as well as the Conservative party represented in the Cabinet. The Declaration as of December 25 was as follows:

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, China, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugo-Slavia,

Having subscribed to a common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, and known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that the complete and world-wide victory of all the Governments is essential to defend and preserve life, liberty and independence as well as the righteous possibilities of human freedom, justice, and social security not only in their own lands but throughout the world, and that the struggle in which they are now engaged is the common defence of human decencies everywhere against savage and brutal force seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

1. Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources against the Axis forces of conquest and to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated;

2. Each Government pledges itself to the other Governments associated in this Declaration to effect the full co-ordination of its military effort and the use of its resources against the common enemies;

3. Each Government pledges itself to continue war against, and not to make a separate peace with, the common enemies or any of them.

Other Governments desirous of associating themselves with this Declaration are hereby privileged to accede to it.

It will be seen that in the opening paragraph of this draft the United States was first, the United Kingdom second, then the Dominions, followed by other Allies in alphabetical order, which put the U.S.S.R. well down the list.

The War Cabinet definitely stated that India was not to be included among the signatory nations. Lord Halifax, who had been in his time Viceroy of India, wrote in a note to Churchill; 'I think with all respect to the War Cabinet that this is a mistake, and I would hope it might be reconsidered.'

Hopkins's comments on the above draft were communicated to Roosevelt

in the following memorandum, written early in the morning of December 27:

I think, if possible, you should make every effort to get religious freedom in this document. I believe it will be necessary for you to talk to Litvinov this noon about this.

I think the wording in (paragraph) '1' on page 2 is a very difficult one for the U.S.S.R. to subscribe to. Paragraph 1 might read:

'Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources against those Axis forces of conquest with which it is at war. Each Government pledges itself to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated.'

(NOTE.—Hopkins suggested this change, of course, because the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan.)

As long as this list (in the opening paragraph) must include a great many names, I think we should include them all, including the South American Republics. I think there are distinct advantages having a long list of little countries joining with us.

I would lift the countries like China and the U.S.S.R. out of their alphabetical listing and place them with our own and the U.K., the distinction being those actively engaged in war in their own countries and those that have been overrun by the Axis.

I think this listing is extremely important and should be gone over with great care by the State Department.

I think it is up to the British to decide whether or not India should be included, although for the life of me I don't understand why they don't include it.

My own feeling is that at the moment the Free French should not be included.

At the end of the second paragraph of the Joint Declaration, another sentence should be added including a restatement of our aims for human freedom, justice, security, not only for the people in our own lands, but for all people in the world. I think a good deal of care should be given to the exact words of this and I do not think the reference to the Atlantic Charter is adequate.

(NOTE: Hopkins's reference to the Free French in the foregoing was an indication of the storm that had broken over Washington following the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident, which is described in the next chapter.)

That day Litvinov lunched with the President, Churchill, and Hopkins at the White House. Roosevelt urged on him the importance of including a reference to religious freedom. It will be remembered that the omission of

this from the Atlantic Charter had brought down a great deal of criticism on that document, and Roosevelt wanted to be sure to have it in this one. Litvinoff felt that his Government, to which he had already cabled the text of the Declaration, would not look with favour on this suggested change. He said that the Kremlin might possibly agree to the phrase 'freedom of conscience', but Roosevelt assured him, and asked him to convey this assurance to the Kremlin, that it was precisely the same thing. He explained that he wanted to use the word 'religion', because that had been in his oft-proclaimed Four Freedoms. He said that the traditional Jeffersonian principle of religious freedom was so broadly democratic that it included the right to have no religion at all—it gave to the individual the right to worship any God he chose or no god. I do not know how Litvinov managed to convey this to Stalin and the Politburo, but the fact remains that the words 'religious freedom' appeared in the final Declaration.

Churchill asked that another change be made. After the word 'Governments', in the phrase 'the Governments signatory hereto', he wished to add the word 'authorities'. The purpose of this was to permit the inclusion either immediately or subsequently of the Free French. On this discussion Hopkins has written:

The President and Churchill both tried to get Litvinov to accept the amendment which had been urged by the British Cabinet so that the Free French might subscribe to the document.

Hull had been opposed to having the Free French in it, and while he had not vigorously opposed the word 'authorities', it was clear Hull wanted no part of the Free French. His antagonism to the Free French is very deep-seated and he still believes there is some way we can get on with Vichy. Nevertheless the President overruled Hull and agreed to the word 'authorities'.

Litvinov, however, told the President and Churchill that he had no power to agree to the inclusion of that word, that the approval of the Declaration was an approval by the Government in contradistinction to the Foreign Office and no ambassador of Russia has the power to agree to any textual change.

Churchill tried to argue that the change was inconsequential, but it was perfectly clear that Litvinov did not believe this, and he insisted that he could not agree to a change and, because both the President and Churchill were anxious to have the text released at once, there was no time to cable to Russia.

At this point Churchill became quite angry and told Litvinov in effect that he wasn't much of an ambassador if he didn't have the power to even add a word like this; that we were in a war and there was no time

for long-winded negotiations. He said that we had agreed to every change in the text that the Russians wanted and it seemed to him they could agree to this.

Litvinov stuck by his point, however, and the Declaration was issued without the word 'authorities'.

Later I learned that Litvinov had cabled for approval to include the word 'authorities' and his Government had given it to him.

However, this agreement must have come too late, as the word 'authorities' did not appear. The changes in the text requested by the Kremlin were actually negligible. They were all due to Russian reluctance to indicate any commitment to join the war against Japan. For instance, the Russians substituted the words 'the struggle for victory over Hitlerism' for the words 'the defeat of members or adherents of the Tripartite Pact'. The Soviet Ambassador made it clear that in his country the word 'Hitlerism' covers 'Nazism, Fascism and Japanism'. All of the Russian revisions were accepted and Roosevelt wrote them on the draft in his own hand.

By December 29 Anthony Eden had returned to London from Moscow. His mission had been largely fruitless. The Soviet Government had demanded that Great Britain, and presumably the United States as well, should recognize the frontiers held by the Russians on June 20, 1941, which included possession of the Baltic States and the portion of Poland seized in the first month of the Second World War. In refusing to agree to this recognition, Eden invoked the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the views of President Roosevelt, which had been definitely expressed by Winant to the British Government on the day before Pearl Harbour.

Eden now cabled Churchill his plea for the inclusion of the Free French in the United Nations Declaration, saying that 'they are in every sense an ally', and pointing out that their forces were now collaborating with the Americans and the British in many places of the highest strategic importance, particularly in New Caledonia. Eden said quite frankly that he did not think that the U.S. Government had the right to veto the participation of the Free French in the proposed Declaration.

Eden also felt strongly that the Dominions should be kept together in the listing and not separated alphabetically from the United Kingdom and from each other. He stated that the Viceroy of India was in favour of India's inclusion, and that the War Cabinet regretted that the words 'social security' had been dropped out of the Declaration. I do not know why these words were omitted, but it must have been at Roosevelt's insistence; probably he did not want to complicate matters by giving Congressional reactionaries the alarming idea that this was a Declaration of a permanent, global New Deal.

In the final listing of signatories, as written by Roosevelt in his own hand,

it was U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., China, and then all the others (including those Latin-American Republics which had already declared war) in alphabetical order.

When Churchill left for Canada on December 29 he and Roosevelt had agreed on the final language of the Declaration. There were twenty-four other nations involved, which meant that the representatives of all of them were cabling back and forth to their home Governments all over the world, detailing every syllable and every suggested change. The last change was made by the President: for the words 'Associated Powers' he substituted the name that he had conceived and of which he was very proud—'United Nations'. All the Governments, of course, had to send formal authorization to their representatives in Washington to sign the document. On December 30 Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt from Ottawa expressing the belief that if they could get the Declaration through on time it would represent 'a pretty considerable achievement'. It was all of that. Two days later, on New Year's Day, 1942, the representatives of twenty-six countries gathered in the White House and signed the document which gave birth to the United Nations and provided an uplifting message of hope for countless millions in all parts of the world who prayed for a restoration of freedom and the establishment of enduring peace.

THE VICHY POLICY

THERE was another episode of the Arcadia Conference which must be treated separately, because it could hardly be considered among the Conference's achievements. Cordell Hull described it as 'one of those footnotes of history that had dangerous possibilities of becoming whole chapters'; it did, in fact, become a chapter in Hull's memoirs, and it again becomes one herewith. The extraordinary resentment that it caused remained to effect other and far more important developments during the war years.

On December 24, while the President and Prime Minister were lighting the Christmas tree on the White House lawn, Admiral Emile Muselier led Free French naval forces (corvettes, escort craft, which had been aiding the Canadian Navy on the convoy routes) to the seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon, two small fishing islands off Newfoundland. These were French possessions and under the command of Admiral Georges Robert, the Vichy Governor at Martinique, some two thousand miles away. Unlike Martinique, these islands had little strategic importance, but they had been objects of great interest to the U.S., Canadian and British Governments because there was on St. Pierre a powerful radio transmitter which might broadcast weather reports and other intelligence to German submarine and surface raiders. Therefore, it was obviously desirable that the islands be put under Allied control. A few weeks before Pearl Harbour the Canadian Government suggested that it take the initiative in this matter, and London and Washington agreed. However, this suggestion angered the redoubtable and incorrigible Free French leader, General Charles de Gaulle, who felt that such an action would be an insult to French sovereignty unless it were taken by French forces under his command. He accordingly sent Muselier to Canada to study the situation.

On December 16 the British Foreign Office cabled Washington saying they were 'informing the Free French headquarters that we see no objection to undertaking this operation', but they had asked de Gaulle to postpone the issuance of orders for thirty-six hours to allow time to consult the view of the U.S. Government. Roosevelt was not favourable to the proposed action, for the United States Government had just concluded an agreement with Admiral Robert in Martinique involving maintenance of the *status quo* in French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

On December 17 the Foreign Office cabled that the President's view had been communicated to de Gaulle 'who agreed that the proposed action should *not* (repeat not) now be undertaken'.

On December 19 the Foreign Office cabled that it was the opinion of the

British Chiefs of Staff that nothing short of the occupation of the islands 'would be satisfactory from the military point of view. This course, however, now seems to be ruled out by the American attitude.'

There were continued discussions between the three Governments up to December 22, the day of Churchill's arrival in Washington, when the Canadians indicated they did not want to go ahead with a State Department suggestion that they send representatives to St. Pierre in an attempt to gain control of the radio transmitter by persuading the Vichy Administrator there to be reasonable. At the same time, the Canadian Government gave assurance that any action by Free French forces had been called off. Presumably, the islands were to be discussed at the Arcadia Conference, during which the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, was to meet with Roosevelt and Churchill. Nobody could foresee what a large and troublesome topic of conversation they were to provide.

For it turned out that on December 18, just one day after he had given the assurance previously noted, de Gaulle sent the following order to Muselier:

We know for certain that the Canadians intend to (destroy) radio station at St. Pierre. Therefore, I order you to carry out rallying of Miquelon Islands with means at your disposal and *without saying anything to the foreigners*. I assume complete responsibility for this operation, which has become indispensable in order to keep for France her possessions.

(The italics in the foregoing are mine.)

De Gaulle's action in this matter was plainly outrageous and inexcusable, even though it was in accord with Allied military policy, and sound policy at that. It was an act calculated—and, it would seem, deliberately calculated—to cause acute embarrassment to three of France's greatest and most powerful friends and allies—Britain, Canada, and the U.S. It was a demonstration of the arrogance and recalcitrance as well as the courage and fierce devotion to the cause of French sovereignty which made him the strange character that he was. In the words of Admiral Muselier, who was compelled to carry it out, 'General de Gaulle's order was that of a dictator'. It was not 'democratic enough to fit his (Muselier's) ideal of France'. (Muselier, whose conduct of the whole operation appears to have been blameless, was later disowned and even placed under arrest by de Gaulle.)

The story broke in the morning papers on Christmas Day, the *New York Times* carrying an eyewitness account by Ira Wolfert, a distinguished American war correspondent who was later to cover the landings at Guadalcanal and Normandy. He described the warm reception accorded to the Free French forces, saying: 'A little less than half an hour after the first sailor had jumped ashore the islands had been secured in the military sense. Not a shot was fired; the Admiral's Chief of Staff was able to report with immense

pride that not a drop of blood had been shed.' Muselier immediately announced that a plebiscite would be held the following day. Wolfert, who watched the casting of every ballot, wrote of this election:

In the first free expression of opinion permitted Frenchmen who have been governed since the summer of 1940 by 'we Henry Philippe Pétain', Chief of State of the Vichy regime, the male population of this island today voted better than 98 per cent for the policy of Free France, ally of the United States and Britain. So an extraordinary parable of the modern world at war comes on this obscure island on Christmas Day to the kind of climax for which the democratic world has been praying. A dictatorship that had been throttling the people was set aside temporarily by armed forces Wednesday until the people could speak and decide their fate. The people decided to do without the dictatorship.

The American people hailed this news joyfully. They had been absorbing terrible news for the past eighteen days and they were delighted to cheer any evidence that anyone on the Allied side had actually done something that was bold, adventurous, and successful. The great majority of Americans had no idea who or what General de Gaulle was, nor had they been acutely aware of the existence of islands named St. Pierre and Miquelon; all that mattered was that some French sailors and marines who had been fighting in the Allied navies had gone off on their own to seize territory which belonged to their own country and had thereby snatched from Hitler's grasp a radio station which might have been used to help the Germans to kill Americans. As the *New York Times* said in an editorial: 'As an episode in a conflict sadly lacking in the chivalrous gestures and romantic flourishes of old-fashioned wars, fought between soldiers according to set rules, it made a colourful story . . . as an exploit the incident was picturesque, but as an act of policy it seems to have been a blunder.'

The news produced embarrassment and shock in official circles in Ottawa and London, as well as in Washington. On Christmas Day, Anthony Eden cabled to Lord Halifax: 'This was a complete surprise to us, since General de Gaulle had authorized an assurance to be given to us on December 17 that no orders for the operation had been issued and that it would not be carried out by the Free French naval forces.' But no explanations or expressions of regret were sufficient to assuage the wrath of Secretary Hull, who issued the following terse statement:

Our preliminary reports show that the action taken by the so-called Free French ships at St. Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the United States Government.

This Government has inquired of the Canadian Government as to the steps that Government is prepared to take to restore the *status quo* of these islands.

The Vichy Government issued a communique stating:

French official circles have received with satisfaction the news that the Federal Government (in Washington) has publicly condemned the initiative taken against its knowledge and its sentiment by former Admiral Muselier.

The Vichy Ambassador, Henry-Haye, emerged from a long conference with Hull to express confidence that Vichy sovereignty would be re-established over St. Pierre and Miquelon.

Then the protests began. American public opinion was outraged by the suggestion that the U.S. Government would support any demand that Allied fighting men—it made small difference to the average American whether they were French or Canadian or whatever—should restore the islands to the authority of the shabby Government in Vichy. Hull was given plenty of cause to regret his singularly unfortunate choice of words in the reference to 'the so-called Free French'. There were numerous scornful remarks in the Press about 'the so-called State Department', and letters of protest were addressed to 'the so-called Secretary of State'. Hull did not accept this indignant outburst in a spirit of amused indifference. It should be remembered that in his eight years of distinguished service as Secretary of State he had been virtually exempt from the criticism which had been heaped on other members of the Cabinet—Morgenthau, Ickes, Hopkins, Frances Perkins and, certainly, on the President himself. As an elder statesman and a figure of great dignity, Hull had established for himself a position that was almost sacrosanct. It was bewildering as well as infuriating for him to find himself the target of the kind of insults and gibes to which many of his colleagues in the Administration had long since become accustomed.

On December 29 Hopkins passed on to the President memoranda from Eden and Halifax urging that the Free French be included in the United Nations Declaration. As we have seen, Hopkins opposed this, but he added in a note to the President:

The Prime Minister just phoned me at 6.45, reading me a cable from the Foreign Office to him, in which they indicate the most strenuous objection to the ousting of the Free French from Miquelon.

They claim de Gaulle will not issue the orders to throw his commander out.

The burden of the message was that the whole business would kick up an unbelievable row, for which we could give no good public explanation. In spite of the fact that de Gaulle acted in bad faith, the British don't

see how he can be forced out and think that the use of force would be very bad.

On December 30, in his speech at Ottawa, Churchill poured his full-flavoured scorn on Pétain, Darlan and company, and also paid glowing tribute to the followers of de Gaulle. Although the Prime Minister had never made any secret of his feelings for the 'men of Vichy', and although it seemed not out of order that he should refer to France in a Canadian speech, these words caused Hull's rage to mount to hurricane proportions. He and Churchill engaged in a 'blunt conversation' and 'indulged in some plain speaking'.

An editorial comment on the Churchill speech in the *New York Herald Tribune* did not help matters:

If there was any longer any question about it, the Prime Minister has certainly blown all question of St. Pierre-Miquelon and Washington's 'so-called Free French' through the dusty windows of the State Department. To Mr. Churchill there is nothing 'so-called' about the Free French, 'who would not bow to their knees' and 'whose names are being held in increasing respect by nine Frenchmen out of every ten'; there is no trucking to the Vichy politicians who 'misled' France and who 'fawned upon' the conqueror; there is no glossing over the 'cat-and-mouse game' which Hitler is now playing with the 'tormented men' who live only by his 'blows and favours'. Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Churchill understands that in the grim psychology of war there are moments when the forthright and aggressive spirit, the boldness to demand as well as dicker, the capacity to grasp the emotional values of a situation, are more important than all the gains of deviousness and subtlety.

That is what the State Department has failed to realize in respect to the problem of France. Uninformed as to what the department is trying to do, most Americans will still hesitate to criticize its recent actions; few after this can do otherwise than criticize the befuddlement and want of courage in the manner of its utterances.

This comment by the *Herald Tribune* was representative of the criticism being expressed by newspapers all over the country and perhaps even more violently by various radio commentators. Hopkins noted in a private memorandum:

Obviously Hull is so mad at Churchill because of his anti-Vichy speech in Canada, which he thinks made the settlement of this issue in the islands so much more difficult for Hull.

I think Hull also believes that the British have turned their Press agents

loose on him. He is obviously very sensitive of the criticism he is receiving and blames it on the British and particularly on Churchill.

Hull really wanted to take the whole thing up through the normal diplomatic channels, but the President insisted on handling it with Churchill.

The day after Churchill's Ottawa speech Hull sent a memorandum to the President. This document has been quoted in part in the interesting book *Our Vichy Gamble*, which was written by Professor William L. Langer at Secretary Hull's direction. But Langer failed to quote the most significant passages of this extraordinary Memorandum and it is therefore given herewith in full:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since our conversation this afternoon in regard to the St. Pierre-Miquelon seizure by the Free French and its possible consequence, I have carefully reviewed the record, including some dispatches that came in during the afternoon. It is a mess beyond question and one for which this Government was in no remote sense responsible.

Hereto attached is a somewhat detailed memorandum covering the entire matter as prepared and agreed to by all of the appropriate members of the European Division. I think it very important that you read this so as to get an up-to-date perspective clearly set forth.

The repercussions, in my opinion, are going to be much greater than one would ordinarily suppose. For example, the following is a quotation from a cable giving the conversation between Darlan and the Marshal with Admiral Leahy:

'Darlan then referred to the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident and said that Germany has already used the seizure of those islands by de Gaulle as an argument for the entry of Axis troops into Africa in order that it may be protected against a similar invasion.'

This is just the beginning of ominous and serious developments which, in my opinion, will occur. Our British friends seem to believe that the body of the entire people of France is strongly behind de Gaulle, whereas according to all of my information and that of my associates, some 95 per cent of the entire French people are anti-Hitler, whereas more than 95 per cent of this latter number are not de Gaullists and would not follow him. This fact leads straight to our plans about North Africa and our

omission of de Gaulle's co-operation in that connection. The developments revolving around the Vichy-North African situation and those revolving around the South American and Rio Conference situation are calculated to be very materially affected to our disadvantage if the fact goes out to the world that the British Government was really behind this movement and we abandon our own policies without serious protest, et cetera, et cetera. This may also seriously affect the question of the French naval units in Martinique by giving Robert a chance to pronounce our agreement null and void.

While, of course, I do not know yet just how agreeable the French (Vichy Government) will be in working this matter out in an amicable manner, provided Churchill would be disposed to talk with you, or rather to let you talk with him, about the necessity from our standpoint to work out the matter and announce to the general public that nobody is censurable and that the matter came up on account of confusions and misunderstanding as to the complications in this Hemisphere with respect to such action.

(signed) C.H.

The construction of that last paragraph, which Langer omitted, is a little difficult to follow, but the slur on both Churchill and Roosevelt is all too clear. The preceding statement that more than 95 per cent 'are not de Gaullists and would not follow him' hardly agreed with the results achieved in the St. Pierre plebiscite. The people of St. Pierre, and of all other French regions when given a chance to express themselves in a free election, voted not necessarily for de Gaulle: they voted for freedom and against Vichy. The records proved there had long been public demands in St. Pierre and Miquelon that a plebiscite be held, but it had been persistently barred by the Vichy Administrator, because, he admitted, he knew it would result in an overwhelming vote in favour of the Free French. It was patently foolish to attempt to estimate what percentage of the French people were for or against de Gaulle at that time or any other time before liberation. Certainly, in 1941, there were large numbers of people in Metropolitan France who knew little or nothing about de Gaulle as an individual, but they approved any force that bore the name 'Free France' and later 'Fighting France'. Such ruckuses as this one, however, served to give de Gaulle great advertisement and contributed materially to the increase of his prestige with the French people.

In Hull's Memorandum he mentions the 'fact' that 'the British Government was really behind this movement', despite the mass of evidence that de Gaulle had gone ahead completely on his own, ordering Muselier to proceed 'without saying anything to the foreigners'.

Roosevelt refused at first to take all of this seriously. He could not be

deeply disturbed by an incident which seemed trivial to the point of ridiculousness in comparison with all of his other problems. At a time when he and Churchill were engaged in the planning of global war and the formation of the greatest coalition in history, he could hardly consider entering into an open dispute with Great Britain in order to assuage the injured feelings of Marshal Pétain, Admiral Darlan, Admiral Robert, and Ambassador Henry-Haye. He refused to make any reference to the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident in his Message to Congress, for he believed that the whole thing would quickly blow over and be forgotten. He was wrong. Nothing could convince Hull that the British had not double-crossed him. He has underscored the intensity of his feelings about this in his Memoirs:

As for myself, the refusal of the President to bring more pressure on Mr. Churchill to clarify the relations between Great Britain and the United States with regard to de Gaulle and Vichy was one of several factors that almost caused me to resign as Secretary of State in January, 1942. I so seriously considered resigning that I pencilled out a note to the President tendering my resignation.

I do not know what were the other 'factors' referred to, but this particular factor was so sudden in development and so insignificant in origin that it could hardly have justified the resignation of a Secretary of State in time of war. Before the St. Pierre and Miquelon episode, the Vichy policy had not been subjected to any widespread criticism, nor had it been considered a Sacred Cow in the State Department.

Professor Langer has written:

(The Vichy) policy had been formulated long before and was adhered to unswervingly until the time of the invasion of North Africa. It never was and never became a policy that we thought we could rely on. Quite the contrary, it was a day-by-day, hand-to-mouth policy all the way through. No one in the State Department liked the Vichy regime or had any desire to appease it. We kept up the connection with Vichy simply because it provided us with valuable intelligence sources and because it was felt that American influence might prevail to the extent of deterring Darlan and his associates from selling out completely to the Germans.

Churchill himself had been no more eloquent and vehement as a critic of the men of Vichy than had the American Ambassador, Admiral William D. Leahy. Only three weeks before Pearl Harbour, when Weygand was dismissed from his command in North Africa, Leahy wrote to Roosevelt describing Pétain as a 'feeble, frightened old man, surrounded by self-seeking conspirators'. He added: 'This abject surrender to a Nazi threat at a

time when Germany is completely occupied in Russia is the kind of jellyfish reaction that justifies the stoppage of all assistance to France.'

At this same time Leahy cabled recommendations that the time had come 'to consider a complete revision of American policy in regard to the Vichy Government', since it seemed that the Vichy authorities were now beginning to collaborate with German moves to gain control of the French colonies—Leahy suggested that both he and Robert Murphy be recalled 'for consultation', that all economic assistance to the French colonies be stopped for the time being, and that the U.S. Government should proclaim through all radio broadcasting channels its attitude towards this latest surrender by the Vichy authorities to Axis demands.

Robert Murphy, who was then in Algiers, cabled urgent advice against any immediate change in policy. He said that his 'contacts' had begged that the U.S. should not 'slam the door in the French face now', that if economic assistance were now stopped 'France will surely and inevitably be thrown into the German camp'. (This last was the unvarying argument in favour of continuance of the Vichy relationship.) Weygand himself managed to send a note to Murphy saying much the same thing. Therefore, the course recommended by Admiral Leahy was not then followed.

The British Government agreed with the State Department on that. When Churchill came to Washington for the Arcadia Conference the recommendations of the Foreign Office to the U.S. Government were summed up as follows:

1. Keep Admiral Leahy in Vichy.
2. Bring all possible pressure to bear on Pétain to use the strong cards that he still holds—the French Fleet and the African bases—to refuse excessive German demands.
3. Open negotiations with the French authorities in North Africa for the institution of an economic charter agreement.

On New Year's Day, 1942—which marked the birth of the United Nations—Eden cabled Churchill his view that it was impossible to reach any satisfactory settlement with the Vichy Government and that, in attempting to seek one, the State Department was merely 'courting a rebuff'. However, he felt that the Vichy authorities must be very reluctant to break relations with the United States, this being 'their sole remaining link with respectability', and he expressed his hope that the U.S. Government would not act too hastily in severing relations with Vichy.

Thus, there was no serious divergence between American and British thinking in regard to basic policy, nor even in awareness of the less appealing qualities of General de Gaulle. There seemed to be no good reason why the St. Pierre-Miquelon episode should be regarded as more than an isolated flea-bite.

Langer has written:

As the public clamour died down in the United States, Hull reluctantly concluded that the best thing would be to let the matter rest until the end of the war.

Ostensibly de Gaulle had scored a resounding success, but he had forgotten the old diplomatic adage that it is dangerous to play little tricks on great powers.

One may comment that, in the first place, Hull never did 'let the matter rest' and, in the second place, de Gaulle continued to forget the old adage, and three years later was even more recalcitrant than ever.

A week after the end of the Arcadia Conference Hopkins got out of bed at the Navy Hospital and went over to the White House to attend a Cabinet dinner, which he described as a 'dull affair.' He wrote:

The only point to the whole business was a very moving toast by the President to the United States and victory and Hull's response, proposing a toast to the President.

Hull was in excellent form and expressed the admiration and confidence that all of us have in the President's leadership.

Which indicates that, for the time being at least, Roosevelt had successfully talked the Secretary of State out of his determination to resign. But Hull retained possession of the threat of resignation which was for him a secret weapon that the President could seldom ignore.

There was no doubt that Roosevelt was at first amused by the St. Pierre-Miquelon 'teapot tempest' as he called it. One might even be permitted the surmise that he derived a certain amount of mischievous pleasure from the spectacle of his esteemed old friend, the Secretary of State, learning at last how it felt to be the target of widespread criticism. However, this situation became less amusing for Roosevelt when it reached the point of a major rupture in his own Administration; this was a development that he always dreaded—and now, in such critical times, he was more than ever anxious to avoid it at almost any cost. Before the Arcadia Conference had ended Roosevelt had become so irritated by the consequences of the teapot tempest that he was telling Churchill he might send the battleship *Arkansas* to drive the Free French by force out of the tiny islands, or he might establish a blockade to starve them into submission. In the end the semblance of Vichy sovereignty over St. Pierre and Miquelon was restored, with provisions for strict Allied supervision of the activities of the radio station, so that no active aid and comfort could be given to the enemy. The United States Government protected this sovereignty throughout the Western Hemisphere for nearly two

years after the Pétain Government itself had been obliterated by the German occupation of the remainder of France. It was not relaxed until after France had been liberated by the Allied forces under General Eisenhower and a new French Government was formed under General de Gaulle.

The episode was, indeed, a flea-bite, but it developed into a persistent, festering sore. It was a source of infection before D-Day in Normandy and after it. As Henry Stimson has written, he 'could not believe that it was wise for the State Department to have so long a memory for such annoyances'.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMBINATION

IN preparation for the Arcadia Conference, the State Department had prepared a draft of an inter-Allied agreement for the establishment of a Supreme War Council to provide political as well as military direction for the entire Allied effort. Roosevelt rejected this. He considered it much too complicated and also impractical, for the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and therefore could not sit at the same council table with China, which was not in the war against Germany. It was Roosevelt's conviction that only Britain and the United States could really co-operate in formulating and implementing global strategy, and, most importantly, in determining the allocation of the combined resources.

Thus, even as the great coalition of the United Nations was being formed to establish the essential moral principles for which the war would be fought, the President and Prime Minister and their respective staffs were working out the unprecedented executive organization to do the day-to-day job in pursuance of victory. This organization was composed against the reverberations of shocking defeats. The Japanese were sweeping through Malaya and the Philippines; they had made their first parachute landings in the East Indies; they had taken Guam, Wake and Hong Kong; they were advancing on Manila, leaving General MacArthur and the last American-Filipino force isolated beyond help on the southern tip of Bataan Peninsula and the rock of Corregidor.

American prestige was sinking rapidly at this time, particularly in the Far East. The Japanese propagandists were screaming in triumph: 'Where is the U.S. Navy?' They were effectively and delightedly making capital of the inability of the arrogant, purse-proud Americans to bring aid to their allies or even to their own beleaguered forces throughout the Western Pacific.

On December 28 General MacArthur sent an urgent cable to the War Department asking that Washington do something to offset this 'crescendo of enemy propaganda' which was being used with 'deadly effectiveness' in the Philippines. MacArthur added, with awful truth: 'I am not in a position here to combat it.' The best that Washington could do at the moment was a proclamation, hastily prepared, by the President to the people of the Philippines, which said in part: 'I renew my solemn pledge to you that your freedom will be redeemed and your independence established and protected.' Although this pledge could then have little meaning, the Filipino people will not forget that word 'protected' if their independent Republic is ever imperilled again.

On December 30 Roosevelt sent the following memorandum to the Secretary of War:

I wish that War Plans would explore every possible means of relieving the Philippines. I realize great risks are involved, but the objective is important.

Unfortunately, that was a problem that could not be solved at the oddly named Arcadia Conference.

There was serious discussion in the White House of the possibility of Japanese attacks on the West Coast of North America by naval bombardment, minelaying in ports (Seattle or San Francisco,) 'attacks by human torpedoes' (such as those carried out by Italians in Alexandria)—or even carrier-borne air attacks or actual seaborne expeditions of troops. This last seemed improbable, to say the least, but the Japanese were demonstrating a will and a capacity for fantastic manoeuvres. Churchill said he could see little likelihood that even the Japanese would attempt an invasion of the North American Continent, but he did think that the West Coast might be 'insulted' (that was his word) from time to time. (It was 'insulted' once by a submarine a few weeks thereafter.) Roosevelt thought that the danger of carrier-borne bombing was great enough to warrant 'dispersal' of aircraft factories on the West Coast, and Beaverbrook made available the British experience in working out this process. Far more serious than any spectacular demonstrations against Seattle, San Francisco or Los Angeles—or even Hollywood—was the possibility of a concerted attack on the Panama Canal. But even this vital point was considered as purely local and incidental. The main problem in the Japanese war was still on the other side of the Pacific. In his State of the Union Message, Roosevelt said:

We cannot wage this war in a defensive spirit. As our power and our resources are fully mobilized, we shall carry the attack against the enemy—we shall hit him and hit him again wherever and whenever we can reach him.

We must keep him far from our shores, for we intend to bring this war to him on his own home grounds.

This was reaffirmation of the tremendous principle stated in the Joint Board Estimate, quoted in an earlier chapter, that our 'national policies can be effectuated in their entirety only through military victories outside this Hemisphere'.

It had been assumed, when the grand strategy was laid down, that the Japanese could be contained within the line bounded by the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, the East Indies, Singapore, Thailand, and the maritime provinces of Siberia. Now it was becoming

evident that they could not be thus contained, that they might sweep southward over the East Indies to Australia and westward through Burma into India and even on to the Middle East.

A new theatre of war was accordingly and hastily established, known as the A.B.D.A. Area, the initials standing for American, British, Dutch, Australian. This covered the huge, confused area from the Bay of Bengal to Australasia. It was during the first discussion of this problem, at a meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff on the afternoon of Christmas Day, that General Marshall made a proposal which was to assume utmost importance in the conduct of the Second World War. These are his words as directly quoted in the official Minutes:

I express these as my personal views and not those as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans Division. As a result of what I saw in France and from following our own experience, I feel very strongly that the most important consideration is the question of unity of command. The matters being settled here are mere details which will continuously reoccur unless settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and between services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank and direct basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theatre—air, ground, and ships. We can not manage by co-operation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.

There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not achieve this. We never think alike—there are the opinions of those on this side of the table and of the people on the other side; but as for myself, I am willing to go the limit to accomplish this. We must decide on a line of action here and not expect it to be done out there. I favour one man being in control, but operating under a controlled directive from here. We had to come to this in the first World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished during the World War.

There was plenty of disagreement with that proposal. At a major meeting in the White House on December 26 Roosevelt expressed his approval of the Marshall suggestion, but Churchill took issue with it. The Prime Minister said that unity of command was all very well when there was a continuous line of battle, such as the line from the Vosges to the Channel in the first

World War, but that in the Far East some of the Allied forces were separated from each other by a thousand miles or more. He believed that these various forces, Army, Navy, and Air, representing four different countries, should operate on their own with the individual commanders responsible only to the Supreme Command in Washington. At this point in the discussions Beaverbrook jotted down a note on a White House memo pad and passed it to Hopkins. It read: 'You should work on Churchill. He is being advised. He is open-minded and needs discussion.' As a result of this, Hopkins arranged for a private meeting between Churchill and Marshall, at which the latter was able to convince the Prime Minister of the soundness of his proposal and to gain his agreement to it. This was a demonstration of the peculiar role played by Hopkins at all the major conferences of the next three years. Because of the utter informality of his position as well as of his character he could act in an extra-official capacity, and thus bring about ready settlement of disputes which might have been greatly prolonged or completely stalled if left to the traditional, antiquated machinery of international negotiation. There were many more notes passed to Hopkins under conference tables and many more examples of his effective, off-the-record action. He was rarely confined by the customary 'channels'.

When the principle of unified command was accepted Roosevelt suggested that General Sir Archibald Wavell be named for the unenviable post of Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area. Discussing this suggestion among themselves later, the British Chiefs of Staff were firm in their opposition to the appointment of Wavell or any other Briton to a command which seemed doomed to defeat and even disaster. Suspecting that this was a Roosevelt trick to shift the ugly responsibility, they felt that the British delegation should be unanimous in insisting that an American commander be given the post (and the blame). Lord Halifax agreed with them, but when they expressed their views to Churchill he exploded that this suspicious attitude implied doubt of the motives of the President of the United States and he would not stand for it. So far as he was concerned, Roosevelt's gesture was a friendly and a generous one, imposing high confidence in Wavell. So that settled that discussion, although there was an attempt to effect a compromise by having the naval command kept separate under the American Admiral T. C. Hart. General Marshall, however, insisted that Hart be placed under Wavell's command, and Roosevelt instructed Marshall and Hopkins to draft the orders accordingly.

Wavell never was given a chance to exercise this command. The situation had gone to pieces before adequate forces could be assembled, let alone deployed.

By December 29, four days after General Marshall had urged the principle of unity of command, Wavell's appointment had been cleared with the

Dominion Prime Ministers and he himself had been notified. There remained the problem of what to do about China, for it was obvious that no part of the Chinese Republic could be put under any Anglo-American Command. Marshall drafted a memorandum, which was approved informally by the Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to Hopkins for the President's approval. It contained the following recommendation:

The advisability of a similar command of activities of the Associated Powers in the Chinese theatre appears evident. This theatre we suggest should include Northeast Burma and such portion of Thailand and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the Associated Powers.

Roosevelt inserted the word 'initially' before 'include' and he cut out the reference to North-East Burma. Also, each time that the word 'Associated' appeared he changed it to 'United'—for this was the day when the United Nations was given its name.

The announcement that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had accepted Supreme Command of Allied land and air forces in the Chinese theatre was made coincidentally with that of Wavell's appointment. However, Roosevelt and Churchill, who had to think of so much in those and other days, overlooked the sensibilities of the Netherlands Government-in-Exile in London, who were naturally deeply concerned about any arrangements affecting command in the East Indies. Extensive apologies were made for this oversight.

There was no question of doubt that the attention of the American people at this time was directed almost entirely toward the Pacific. When Churchill spoke to the Congress he was applauded many times, but by far the greatest ovation greeted his challenge to the Japanese: 'What kind of a people do they think we are? Is it possible they do not realize that we shall never cease to persevere against them until they have been taught a lesson which they and the world will never forget?' And when Roosevelt addressed the Congress he paid tribute to our British allies and our Russian allies, but the loudest and least punctilious applause was reserved for his tribute to the Chinese.

The country's heart was naturally with the few Americans who were then fighting the Japanese; the gallantry and efficiency of the little garrison at Wake had both stimulated and sobered the people, and now the tragic-heroic story of Bataan and Corregidor and of the hopeless sea fights off Java was beginning to be told. Nevertheless, the participants in the Arcadia Conference stuck to their purpose and devoted most of their planning to the war in Europe.

The agreed strategy involved the closing and the tightening of a ring around the territory under German control. This ring was defined roughly as running on a line from Archangel to the Black Sea, through Anatolia, along the northern seaboard of the Mediterranean and the western seaboard

of the European continent. The main object was 'to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian Front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing their strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African Coast, for the prevention of "German eruptions" toward the Persian Gulf, or the West Coast of Africa, or elsewhere.'

The basis for actual planning was provided in these three paragraphs:

15. In 1942 the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:

- a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.
- b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.
- c. The blockade.
- d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large-scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing-down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

(In the British estimates, the final land offensives would be launched by the Russians from the east, the Americans from the south, and the British from the west.)

The two obvious points of access to the European Continent were the United Kingdom, which was presently available, and North-West Africa, which was not. Roosevelt therefore began to plan movements of American forces to both points as soon as possible. The first troops were *en route* to Northern Ireland before the conferences in Washington had ended. This expedition, known as *Magnet*, was at the start largely a propaganda measure, designed to bolster the morale of the British people and to provide encouraging assurance to the Russians and the people of the German-occupied countries that the Americans were coming in force into the European theatre. It also served notice on a few intransigent isolationists at home that Roosevelt was not heeding their demands that the war be fought on a defensive basis and solely against Japan.

The North African operation—first called *Gymnast*, then *Super-Gymnast*, and finally *Torch*—was planned for launching as early as March, 1942, pro-

vided an invitation were extended by the French, or if Hitler were to move into Spain. It was to consist of six divisions, three British and three American (one of them Marines). Roosevelt was always particularly favourable to this operation, which appealed to naval-minded men because it could result in the reopening of the Mediterranean route for shipping to the Middle East and Far East, thereby saving considerable tonnage employed in the long haul around the Cape of Good Hope. American Army men were less interested in it, for it involved no direct attack on German land power or production centres.

The records of the Arcadia Conference are too voluminous to be reproduced here, but the Minutes of one meeting, held on January 12, give an idea of the scope and complexity of the problems under discussion. Present at this meeting were:

The President	Admiral Pound
The Prime Minister	Field-Marshal Dill
Lord Beaverbrook	Air Chief Marshal Portal
Mr. Harry Hopkins	Brigadier Hollis
Admiral Stark	Colonel Jacob
Admiral King	Colonel Sexton
General Marshall	
General Arnold	
General Watson	

Hollis was substituting for General Ismay at this Conference, and Jacob (British) and Sexton (American) were the Staff secretaries. I do not know why Secretaries Stimson and Knox, who were usually present at the major meetings, were absent from this one. The Minutes follow:

The President suggested that the status of Super-Gymnast be discussed.

Mr. Churchill stated that he understood that the Staff had produced a timetable which was approved in principle; that it looks as if Rommel might get away; that if defeated, his defeat would be preceded by a stern chase; that the British are getting a new armoured brigade into the Near East and there will be a battle soon; that information had been received of a convoy arriving at Tripoli with additional German materiel; that the possible date at which the Germans will be pushed back to Tripoli will be delayed, and that more time exists for the completion of Super-Gymnast.

The President stated that politically there is more time available; that there is a tendency on the part of Vichy to say No to German demands; that reports received indicate that a growing number of French Army officers have been making inquiries as to whether their overtures would be accepted if they did something. That Admiral Darlan had

asked if he would be accepted into a conference; that the answer had been, not under present circumstances. That if he brought the French Fleet over to the Allies, the situation would change. However, more time exists for Super-Gymnast; it was desired to get a fairly well settled timetable which could be fitted into the time of the negotiations. That as soon as the negotiations commence, the Germans are sure to know that a plan exists; that when the negotiations start, we should have the Army aboard ships ready to land in Casablanca in a week or ten days. (It had been figured that a period of three weeks grace could be obtained from the time the Germans commenced their movement into the Iberian Peninsula.)

The President then asked about transports.

General Marshall stated that both Staffs had engaged in negotiations last night and had reached a tentative agreement which involved a reduction of the schedule of troops to Ireland. Also, a reduction of the cargo ships available for the Magnet Expeditions, which brought up the question of quarters and supplies for troops involved in Magnet.

Mr. Churchill stated that there was no question about the quarters there; that one British Division was being moved out of Northern Ireland and the British will have quarters ready for the American troops.

General Marshall then explained briefly the substance of the plan agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in substance as follows: 21,800 American troops to sail from the East Coast on January 20, to arrive in the ABDA Area approximately February 14. This convoy to consist of 10,000 ground troops for New Caledonia, which with the artillery brigade now in Australia, would furnish approximately a division for New Caledonia. The remainder of the expedition would consist of engineers and other ground service troops for the bombers now arriving in the ABDA Area. Also moving out were 20 cargo ships, carrying 250 pursuit, 86 medium bombers, 57 light bombers, 220 ship tons of cargo, and four and one-half million gallons of gasoline. The airplanes involved were to replace those lost by attrition.

General Marshall further stated that in order to permit this expedition to depart, the following changes would have to be made in existing plans:

In the first convoy for Magnet, the 8,000 troops scheduled for Iceland on January 15 would be reduced to 2,500; the 16,000 scheduled for Ireland would be reduced to 4,000. The *Queen Mary* could carry 7,000 troops to Ireland February 1; then transport the British troops desired to the Middle East. 9,000 troops would be carried to Ireland on the *Andes*, *Oronzay*, and *Orion*, to sail February 15-20.

Three Navy transports—the *West Point*, the *Wakefield*, and the *Mount*

Vernon—now being used to transport troops from the Middle East to the Far East by Suez, would be available for another round trip to move British troops over the same route. In addition, 4,400 more troops could be moved to Ireland on the *George Washington*, February 24. Under the plan, approximately 24,000 troops would be in or *en route* to Ireland by the 25th of February.

The involvements in this plan are as follows:

(1) It would cancel the present movements to Ireland and Iceland, which have already been arranged for.

(2) It would cause some confusion in the Port of New York, due to the necessity of unloading ships.

(3) It would require the utilization of the *Kungsholm*, which at present is being held for the State Department.

(4) Some difficulty would be incurred in crating the medium bombers scheduled for the ABDA convoy.

(5) It would be necessary to use two vessels now on the South American route, and would involve the loan of three British ships.

The President asked, with reference to the ABDA convoy, about the matter of refuelling.

Admiral King stated that refuelling would not be necessary *en route*.

General Marshall then stated that another serious consideration was the fact that the proposed ABDA convoy would result in a 30 per cent reduction of lend-lease to Russia for a period of four months, and would also reduce the lend-lease materiel going to Basra.

The President stated that the plan sounded good.

Mr. Churchill asked what utilization was being made of the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Aquitania*.

General Marshall stated that the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Aquitania* were to be used for a third convoy to the Far East from the West Coast, which would involve the movement of three anti-aircraft regiments. It was now understood, however, that the *Aquitania* would not be available until the end of February. Also, there are being moved from the West Coast, 7,000 troops on January 12; 14,000 on January 30; 11,000 early in February. With regard to the ABDA convoy from the East Coast, it would take three to four weeks to assemble the freight boats, and the American troops leaving on January 20 would arrive before their equipment. To split up the convoy would involve complications for the Navy. To delay added to the dangers of the voyage. It was therefore best to send a single troop convoy, even if some units arrived ahead of their materiel.

The President asked about troop accommodations in New Caledonia.

General Marshall stated that owing to the climate, little difficulty was

anticipated in finding adequate shelter for the troops; that they could take tents.

Mr. Churchill observed that the plan as prepared would result in some confusion, that a fact to be given consideration was the delay of shipments to Russia; that the Russians would undoubtedly be disappointed.

He asked if the plan had been the subject of joint discussion between the Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall stated that it had; and that this particular matter had been brought up, but there was no use sending troops to the ABDA Area without their equipment. That if a cut becomes necessary, the New Caledonia increment should be eliminated. It is of urgent necessity that the air reinforcements be sent to the ABDA Area immediately.

Admiral Pound stated that the matter had been discussed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference and that the people in London were working on a slightly different shipping schedule, particularly with respect to the use of American transports from the Middle East to the Far East, and the possible use of the *Queen Mary* from England to the Middle East; that an answer on this could be received by tomorrow noon.

The President asked, if the occupation of New Caledonia was eliminated, could we carry out our Russian promises?

General Marshall stated that he could not be sure, but if anything was to be pared, the New Caledonia portion should be the first reduction.

Mr. Hopkins observed that 30 per cent of the shipping to Russia involves only seven ships, and that we should be able to find seven ships, even if it involved stopping the shipment of some reserve materials to England; that with the 1,200 merchant ships we have available, locating seven should not be too difficult.

Admiral King observed that if Archangel is closed now, there is a question as to whether Russia could absorb the shipments.

The President stated that the Russians deny that Archangel is closed, and state that they can absorb the shipments.

Admiral Stark stated that the primary question was which was of the greater importance—the 30 per cent reduction of lend-lease to Russia, or immediate reinforcements for the Far East.

Mr. Churchill observed that the fighting in the Far East and the fighting the Russians are doing should take priority over other things; that Magnet and the Iceland relief are secondary. That he was sorry about reducing Magnet, but he could understand the necessity therefor.

General Marshall observed that an early decision must be reached in order that the January 15 Magnet shipment may be altered.

General Arnold stated that there was no use sending planes to the Far East without their ground service crews.

Admiral Pound observed that the only immediate commitment was the matter of unloading the January 15 convoy for Magnet.

General Marshall stated that if we unload this convoy, we must immediately commence loading for the Australian convoy.

Mr. Churchill again asked whether this matter had been taken up with the British Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall replied that the matter had been discussed jointly.

The President stated that he liked General Marshall's programme, if only some means could be found to take care of the Russians.

Mr. Hopkins suggested that Admiral Land be directed to find six or seven more ships a month for Russia; that he did not think General Marshall should be held up by the necessity for Russian lend-lease.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that he would be very sorry to see ships diverted from the Atlantic because of the increased strain on shipping which would result; also that it was important that certain items be continued to England in order to keep up production schedules, and he hated very much to stop shipments to Russia.

The President agreed that there might be unfortunate repercussions in Russia if at the very time they are pinched as at present we let them down. He then asked how important is the occupation of New Caledonia.

Admiral King replied that this is on the line of naval communication and is a potential object for Japanese occupation.

The President asked if it would be easy to reconquer.

Admiral King replied that none will be easy to reconquer once they are occupied.

General Arnold stated that as far as flying routes are concerned, both New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands can be jumped if necessary.

Admiral King observed that the urgent question was assistance to the Far East.

Mr. Churchill agreed that it should come ahead of New Caledonia.

The President observed that the only thing holding up General Marshall's plan is the seven cargo ships.

Mr. Hopkins asked if Russia were not involved, would General Marshall's plan be approved?

It was agreed that it would be.

Mr. Hopkins then suggested that the President and the Prime Minister take the responsibility of getting lend-lease material to Russia, and not hold up General Marshall's plan on this account.

Mr. Churchill suggested that the present ships on the Russian run continue, and that we find other ships to make up the deficit. He then asked if the Chiefs of Staff agreed on the mechanics of the plan.

Admiral Pound stated that it must be approved in London, because they had been working on a slightly different arrangement.

The President asked Mr. Hopkins if he could get enough ships to take care of the Russians.

Mr. Hopkins stated that if the President would get Admiral Land and Sir Arthur Salter in and tell them the situation, he was sure it could be done.

General Marshall said that Admiral Land had told him earlier in the day that under our present protocol agreement with Russia we were behind in furnishing material.

Mr. Churchill suggested that the plan be accepted and a search made for the seven ships, and asked if the British were behind in their deliveries to the Russians.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that the British are behind in some items, but that he anticipated they would catch up.

General Marshall added that what we are doing in the Far East would help the Russians anyway.

Mr. Churchill observed that there was a possibility, if Japan continued to succeed in the Far East, of a Pan-Asiatic movement all over the Far East, including all the brown and yellow races, which might complicate seriously our situation there; that a symbolic landing in Ireland would be satisfactory except that he hoped material for England would not be piled up on the docks in New York awaiting ships.

Lord Beaverbrook observed that additional shipping had been scraped up for convoy movements to the ABDA Area; and that more could be found if another search were made.

Mr. Churchill stated that the ABDA plan makes no provision for Super-Gymnast.

General Marshall stated that no ships arranged for combat loading are being used for the ABDA convoy.

The President asked, assuming that we go through with the ABDA plan, and enough shipping for Russia could be found, when would Super-Gymnast be possible?

Mr. Churchill stated that the Joint Staffs had already established that some days would be required for planning; and if January 7 was established as the beginning of planning, D-Day (the day loading would commence) would be February 4; and the earliest arrival in Casablanca would be March 3.

General Marshall stated that the shortage was not in troop carriers, but in cargo carriers.

Mr. Churchill stated that the Staffs should get data as to the effect of this plan on Gymnast.

Admiral King stated that, for purposes of a round calculation, the date on which the ships could be available for Gymnast would be determined

by the turn around between the East Coast and Australia, which would amount to approximately three months, which would set back the possible date of loading for *Gymnast* to about April 15. Also Admiral King stated that 15,000 troops, combat loaded, can be embarked for *Gymnast* without delay at any time.

Mr. Churchill then observed that the whole problem is to get planes to the Far East.

General Arnold stated that this is the only way we can stop the Japanese advance to the south.

The President then stated: We approve General Marshall's plan. We will make Beaverbrook and Hopkins find ships and will work on *Super-Gymnast* at the earliest possible date.

Air Marshal Portal pointed out that one point of the agreement which the Chiefs of Staff had come to was that the ABDA movement would not interfere with the movement of pursuit ships to the Far East.

Mr. Churchill then stated that the Staff is to check up on the actual impact of the plan on *Gymnast* and establish the earliest date on which it would be possible; and also what would be available for the expedition if an invitation arrived suddenly.

Like all official Minutes, the foregoing gives little suggestion of the quality of the dialogue. There may have been no heated exchanges at this particular session and no picturesque invective or thunderous oaths, but if there had been the recording secretaries would carefully have toned them down to a polite 'exchange of views'. Even so, one can hardly read these cold, dry Minutes without sensing the Homeric awfulness of the responsibility imposed upon the few who were compelled to decide so much. These men represented the highest authority in nations which commanded gigantic resources; but, at this time, only fragments of the total of resources had been realized, and even when they were amply available, there remained the incessant problem of where, when, and how they should be applied. The seven ships that Hopkins argued should be kept on the supply routes to Russia seem like a negligible quantity in a war of such dimensions; yet when this meeting was held, for all anyone could tell, those seven ships and their cargoes might mean the difference to the Soviet Union between continuing the war or making a separate peace.

In the momentous determinations of strategy and priorities—where this ship or that division could best be employed—it was not a matter of dispute between allies. The British did not invariably line up on one side and the Americans on the other. There could be conflict between the interests of an American Commander in the Canal Zone or in Africa, and another American in Alaska or in China. There could be far more violent conflict between the

three Services in any one theatre of war. For example, when it came to allotting the limited supply of Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns, the British Navy and the U.S. Navy would stand together as staunch allies in favour of using these on ships—in joint opposition to demands that the guns be used for mobile batteries, or for the defence of London, Moscow, Rangoon, or various air bases, or even demands from Congressmen (this is not a joke) that they be used for the defence of Capitol Hill.

Such matters could be settled, quickly if not always correctly, when the President and Prime Minister and all the Chiefs of Staff were gathered conveniently together under the same roof. It was obvious, however, that the Arcadia Conference could not continue in session until VE and VJ-Days. A means must be found to continue the application of this top authority on a day-to-day basis.

On December 28, during the hard-pressed discussions of the High Command in the ABDA Area, Churchill prepared a cable to the Lord Privy Seal reporting the decisions arrived at. He gave the draft of this cable to Hopkins, who subsequently noted: 'I showed it to the President, who agreed there were certain things in it that shouldn't be there. General Marshall and Admiral King and I stepped in the next room and made the eliminations noted here. The Prime Minister's final draft represents these additions and deletions.' (These changes were mostly to make sure that the American Admiral Hart should, as previously noted, be subject to General Wavell's Command rather than independent.)

The cable, as finally approved and transmitted to London, said the intention was that Wavell should have a staff divided between British and Americans in about the same proportion as that of Foch's High Control in 1918. Wavell would receive his orders from 'an appropriate joint body', which would be responsible to the President as Commander-in-Chief and to the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence. The Lord Privy Seal replied that the War Cabinet approved of this proposal since the Prime Minister considered it 'a war-winner', but the Cabinet was anxious to know just what would be the composition of the 'appropriate joint body'.

On December 29 the Chiefs of Staff drew up an outline of the system of command. This was sent to the White House in the evening and Roosevelt and Hopkins worked over it. The Chiefs of Staff had recommended as follows:

It is suggested that no special body should be set up for this purpose, because it would tend to clog the machine for the following reasons:

- (a) It would be necessary to have Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand representatives on this body.
- (b) Each representative in (a) would probably wish for time to consult his Government before giving an opinion.

It is proposed, therefore, that existing machinery should be used in the following manner:

- (a) The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, both in London and in Washington, his proposal, whatever it might be.
- (b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London would immediately telegraph to the British Mission in Washington to say whether or not they would be telegraphing any opinions . . .

Roosevelt's revision of this was drastic. Here are the same passages as he rendered them:

It is suggested that a special body be set up for this purpose in Washington.

- (a) 3 Americans, 3 British.
- (b) And 1 Australian, 1 New Zealander, and 1 Dutch for consultation and advisory purposes.

It is proposed, therefore, that above machinery should be used in the following manner:

- (a) The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the above Committee, in Washington, his proposal, whatever it might be.
- (b) The Committee in Washington would immediately telegraph to London to ask for any recommendations or opinions . . .

The following day, December 30, Hopkins noted:

The suggestion of an 'appropriate joint body' has kicked up a hell of a row.

As a matter of fact, I suggested the words to the Prime Minister when I found he was getting all set to issue all the directions himself. It seemed to me so essential to get the unity of command through in the South-West Pacific that rather than try to define what the 'appropriate body' would be, I urged both the Prime Minister and the President to send it along and decide the make-up of the 'appropriate joint body' later.

It now develops that everybody and his grandmother wants to be on the joint body, and it now looks as if it would end by having the joint British and American staffs assist the President. At any rate, they will run it.

The 'appropriate joint body' was the organization which became known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the reference to 'everybody and his grandmother' reflected the desire of other Allied nations to be represented on it—and not merely 'for consultation and advisory purposes'. As has been seen, the nucleus of the Combined Chiefs had been provided at the Staff talks in Washington a year before, but until the Arcadia Conference there

was a general assumption that the permanent body when established would function as a sort of joint secretariat to pool records and intelligence and serve as liaison between the British Chiefs in London and their American opposite numbers. However, the traditional concept of liaison in Marshall's opinion—and in Roosevelt's—was simply not good enough to meet the new circumstances. The Navy's Kimmel and the Army's Short had maintained formal 'liaison' within signalling distance of each other on Oahu, and the Japanese attackers had come and gone before the antiquated machinery could function. If the principle of unity of command was valid for each theatre, it was all the more valid for the top command of the entire American-British effort. It was inconceivable that any one man could undertake such a job, and it was questionable whether any board, representing both nations and all the services, could ever come to agreement on major decisions. But there was little disagreement that the experiment should be tried—although, when it came to naming the location of supreme headquarters, it was obviously difficult for the British to accept the American contention that because the United States would contribute the bulk of the manpower and materiel, and because it was placed geographically between the two wars, Washington should be the seat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, they did accept, and Field-Marshal Sir John Dill was named ranking British officer on the new, supreme body. There was some difficulty about this appointment at first, as Dill was designated personal representative of the Prime Minister. Marshall protested that this would give Dill a special, detached, and therefore anomalous position, with political as well as military authority. Churchill agreed that this was a sound objection and the matter was quickly straightened out by cable after Churchill's return to London. Dill's American colleagues, Marshall, Arnold, and King, are the best witnesses to the extraordinary quality of his performance of high duty; long ill, he died on active service in 1944, and his grave in Arlington National Cemetery, at Washington, is a memorial to an incalculably successful collaboration.

When the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been agreed on, it was logical to proceed to the establishment of combined boards for all war activities: Munitions Assignment, Shipping Adjustment, Raw Materials, Food, Production, and Resources.

The first of these was by all odds the most important and controlled to a large extent the determinations of the others. Furthermore, it was obviously as vital to the carrying out of grand strategy as the deployment of men, ships, and aircraft. I believe it can be said that the formation of the Munitions Assignment Board provoked more heated argument than any other topic considered at the Arcadia Conference; the only individual upon whom all elements could agree as bearer of final responsible authority was Harry Hopkins.

It was first intended that the Board would handle all problems of production and supply as well as ultimate allocation. On December 27 Beaverbrook wrote to the President:

It is my hope that you will permit Mr. Hopkins to take charge of a committee of production with full powers and entire authority.

Such a committee would not only dispose of the production requirements, but would also be responsible for mobilising and distributing the necessary raw materials.

Beaverbrook sent a copy of this letter to Churchill, adding:

I support a Supreme Command in supplies as well as in strategy. Mr. Harry Hopkins is the proper authority, and he should be asked to co-ordinate the production of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, including raw materials.

However, Roosevelt was not likely to agree with this proposal; having refused for two years, and in the face of endless criticism, to name a supreme boss of American production, he would have provoked roars of protest from the Congress and the Press had he appointed Hopkins czar of the entire Allied effort. One can readily imagine the charges that would have been made about putting the war on a 'leaf-raking' basis. Furthermore, the War Department and Navy Department were actively hostile to civilian control of production of 'end weapons'; actually, no Combined Production Board was formed until five months later, and even when set into operation it was unable to function successfully.

The arguments over Munitions Assignment had political roots, for it was obvious that decisions affecting the distribution of supplies as between one ally and another, or one neutral and another, might assume considerable diplomatic significance. This was one of the few subjects on which a division appeared on nationalistic lines as between British and Americans, and it was never completely closed. For a time it seemed as if no agreement could be reached, and the final resolution reached by Roosevelt was accepted by the British only on a temporary, trial basis.

General G. N. Macready, Assistant Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, had proposed a system of sub-allocation whereby the world would be divided in effect into two spheres of influence, with the U.S. and Britain 'each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility'. The word 'protégés' was used to describe these Allies, the U.S. protégés to include Latin American countries and China, and the British protégés to include France and other countries of continental Europe, and Turkey and the Arab States, as well as all the British Dominions and colonies. I am not entirely clear as to the position of Russia in this proposed arrange-

ment, but I believe it was to be treated as a separate problem jointly by the U.S. and Britain.

This proposal of General Macready's for a division of protégés, which was strongly backed by the British Chiefs of Staff, was not well received by the Americans, including Hopkins. It would mean that all allocation of American-produced material for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East would be directed from London. When it was presented at the Combined Chiefs meeting on the next to last day of the Conference the Americans struck it out; they stated that this was a matter for decision on the highest level.

Shortly before the final formal session of the Arcadia Conference in the White House at 5.30 p.m. on January 14 the President read to General Marshall the statement which he and presumably Churchill and Beaverbrook had prepared concerning the make-up of the Munitions Assignment Board. The Board was to be divided into two co-equal parts, one in Washington, headed by Hopkins, and the other in London, headed by Beaverbrook. Hopkins and Beaverbrook were to report directly to the President and Prime Minister, and thus be on a level with and independent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Roosevelt invited Marshall's comments on this—and he got them. Marshall made his position abundantly clear. He insisted that the Munitions Assignment Board must be under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He 'saw no objection whatever to having parallel Allocation Committees in Washington and London dealing with the allocation of American and British war materiel respectively', but 'there could be no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and in London'. (Which meant that the London 'Allocation Committee' would be no more than a subordinate branch office, and this proved to be the case.)

Marshall felt so strongly on this subject that he informed the President that unless the conditions as he stated them were accepted he could not continue to assume the responsibilities of Chief of Staff. He advanced the unanswerable argument that neither he nor any other Chief of Staff could plan military operations and carry them through if some other authority, over which he had no control, could refuse to allocate the materiel required for such operations. When Marshall completed the brief but vigorous and clear statement of his views Roosevelt turned to Hopkins and asked for his opinion. Marshall assumed that Hopkins had participated in the arrangement as Roosevelt had stated it and would therefore oppose him, but, to his surprise, Hopkins supported him vociferously, even stating that if the organization were not established as Marshall said it should be, he could not assume any responsibility for or in it, either. At this point Churchill, Beaverbrook, Stimson, Knox, and the Staffs arrived for the meeting, in the course of which Marshall again stated his positive opinions and Hopkins again

supported them with vehemence. The formal records of this session give little indication of the tension and even embarrassment that prevailed; the historian must read a great deal between the lines to appreciate the fact that herein was the serving of notice on such proud men as Churchill and Beaverbrook that Roosevelt was the boss and Washington the headquarters of the joint war effort. Hopkins became the head of the Munitions Assignment Board, but he himself at this meeting described the M.A.B. as a 'subcommittee' of the Combined Chiefs of Staff who, if they 'do not like the subcommittee's recommendations, can alter them or throw them out'. Both Churchill and Beaverbrook argued the point, but Roosevelt made it clear that he supported Marshall and Hopkins. The British then made their suggestion that 'the system be set up and tried for one month'. Roosevelt said: 'We shall call it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way.' It was accordingly tried out that way and continued that way throughout the war. All those involved in the Munitions Assignment Board seem to agree that whenever Hopkins was well enough to give it his personal attention it worked harmoniously; when he was too ill, as he often was, or too pre-occupied with other matters to preside over its deliberations there was apt to be strife aplenty among the diverse, competitive factions involved. However, the fact remains, it worked: it handled the tremendous and bewildering job of allocating the supply of materiel to all of the services, all of the Allies, all of the various theatres of war. Needless to say, there was plenty of complaint from commanders in the field, particularly those operating in the Far East, who believed that they were being discriminated against and compelled to operate on a shoe-string, but this complaint was directed against the essential grand strategy which gave priority to the conquest of Germany rather than to the manner in which this strategy was carried out by the Munitions Assignment Board.

The Roosevelt-Churchill memorandum creating the M.A.B. provided for the pooling of all munitions and for the fullest exchange of information. The Board was to confer with the Soviet Union, China, and other United Nations whenever necessary. The Memorandum stated that differences which could not be settled by the Board itself were to be resolved by the President and Prime Minister, both of whom, however, expressed confidence that such differences would be rare. Because this Memorandum was insufficiently specific, the issue created by the Macready proposal of 'sub-allocations' to 'Allied protégés' persisted and created difficulties, especially when it came to furnishing Lend Lease supplies to Turkey and to the French forces in North and West Africa. Each time the British contended that since the benefiting nation was within their orbit, the allocations should be made by them, and each time the Americans went ahead on the assumption that no 'orbits' existed. The disputes which resulted produced minor irritations, but

no serious discord. Hopkins usually moved in on these, and his decision was accepted as final.

The production goals determined upon during the Arcadia Conference and announced in part by Roosevelt in his Message to Congress were so astronomic that they were greeted with derision and, in some cases, despair by military and civilian authorities alike. Some officers in the War Department were passing the remark: 'The President has gone in for the "numbers racket"!'. Others could see nothing humorous in these impossible figures; believing that the goals could not possibly be realized, they foresaw grave criticism and probable injury to public morale when the failures became evident. Hopkins was freely blamed for deluding Roosevelt into propagating this dangerous fantasy. It was assumed that Hopkins, a notoriously free spender, had been misled by alien influences, particularly Beaverbrook, and by the reckless New Dealers, such as Leon Henderson and Robert Nathan. However, as Hopkins had once told Quentin Reynolds, he was no Svengali, and Roosevelt was in no trance when he proclaimed the Victory Programme of production. It was in Roosevelt's nature to believe that the surest way to capture the imagination of the American people was to give them the greatest possible challenge. The total cost in money bothered him not at all; he always believed that it was far better to squander the taxpayers' dollars than to squander the taxpayers. As a matter of fact—and I can state it as such because I was one of those present when it happened—Roosevelt himself arbitrarily revised some of the figures upward on the eve of his speech to Congress. When Hopkins questioned him on this, Roosevelt said: 'Oh—the production people can do it if they really try.' He did the same thing years later *en route* to Chicago, where he proclaimed a national, post-war goal of sixty million jobs. He was never afraid of big, round numbers.

Two sets of figures tell the story of the raising of the sights. The first set represents the estimates for 1942 arrived at after months of conferences by Stacy May in London, and by Harriman and Beaverbrook in Washington, London, and Moscow, and by innumerable others:

Pre-Pearl Harbour Estimates:

	for 1942
Operational Aircraft	28,600
Tanks	20,400
Anti-aircraft guns	6,300
Merchant ships (deadweight tons)	6,000,000
Anti-tank guns	7,000
Ground and tank machine-guns	168,000
Airplane bombs (long tons)	84,000

Post-Pearl Harbour Directive (January 6, 1942):

	for 1942	for 1943
Operational aircraft	45,000	100,000
Tanks	45,000	75,000
Anti-aircraft guns	20,000	35,000
Merchant ships (deadweight tons)	8,000,000	10,000,000
Anti-tank guns	14,900	(expansion not fixed)
Ground and tank machine guns	500,000	(expansion not fixed)
Airplane bombs (long tons)	720,000	(expansion not fixed)

When Churchill saw those final figures he transmitted them to London in an exultant cable. He informed the War Cabinet that Beaverbrook had been 'magnificent' and Hopkins a 'godsend'.

When Roosevelt announced a part of the Victory Programme to Congress he said: 'These figures and similar figures for a multitude of other implements of war will give the Japanese and Nazis a little idea of just what they accomplished in the attack on Pearl Harbour.' The Congress cheered that vociferously and proceeded to appropriate the necessary funds with few of the quivers that assailed those who were responsible for carrying out the incredible programme. The two years set for its completion had not quite passed before Joseph Stalin raised his glass at Teheran and proposed a toast to American production, 'without which this war would have been lost'.

At the conclusion of the Arcadia Conference, Roosevelt announced the formation of the War Production Board and the appointment of Donald Nelson as its Chairman. This has been described at length in the official publication, *Industrial Mobilization for War*, and by Nelson himself and James F. Byrnes. Here is Hopkins's story of it, written January 14, 1942:

For the past three months the President has been considering the appointment of a single person to direct war production, but he never could find the right person. He discussed every conceivable possibility and played seriously with the idea of getting Bill Douglas off the Supreme Court and, in fact, talked to Douglas about it, but Douglas never had much enthusiasm for it.

As recently as last week-end, which we spent in Hyde Park, the President talked of getting a three-man committee made up of Willkie, Douglas, and Nelson to explore the matter for him and advise him about it. I urged very strongly that this not be done, primarily because neither Willkie nor Douglas knew anything about production and because Willkie was apt to use it as a political football.

He came back to the idea again later and I told him for the second time that I thought he was making a great mistake. I told him that if he were

going to move in this manner, my suggestion was to appoint Don Nelson, who was the best of the lot.

He was sympathetic with the President, had had a good record under severe conditions; that furthermore he belonged to the school that wanted to increase production and believed that it could be done; that he was easy to get on with and that the President liked him. I told the President that the most important asset, apart from the man's ability, was that he had the President's confidence.

Upon our return to Washington, the President told me that he thought Nelson was the man. I then urged him to make the appointment at once, because it would surely spread all over town, and all the people who wanted the job would be bombarding him with reasons why Nelson should not be appointed.

On Tuesday morning (January 13), when I saw the President in his bedroom, I urged him to appoint Nelson that day. He told me to get Harold Smith and Jimmie Byrnes together and plan an announcement. They came to my room at the White House and we worked out a statement which the President later released.

It was necessary to ask Wallace to resign as Chairman of S.P.A.B. because the President had made up his mind to change the name of S.P.A.B. to the War Production Board, and hence Wallace had to be seen prior to the announcement. The President decided to talk to none of the other interested parties.

At 5.30 that afternoon (January 13) he asked Wallace and Nelson to come to his office and wanted me present. He then reviewed the whole production business, including the shortcomings and assets of Knudsen, and the fact that after examining carefully all the potential candidates he had made up his mind on this.

He then told Wallace that in order to give Nelson the kind of authority he must have, Nelson would have to be Chairman of the Board and the Chairman would have to have all the power. I had a few hours earlier seen Nelson to prepare him for the meeting. To the best of my knowledge the only people who knew the President was going to appoint Nelson were Justice Byrnes, Harold Smith, and myself.

The amusing part of the whole business was that everybody was a candidate. Wallace, I am sure, hoped the President would ask him. Bernie Baruch was in a hotel room in Washington, spreading propaganda for himself. A great many of my friends were pushing Bill Douglas; Morgenthau wanted it worse than anything in the world. So did Jesse Jones and, of course, Knudsen.

The hullabaloo in the Press was in reality an attack on the President. The President's enemies wanted him to really give up being President

and let somebody else exercise the power to which the people had elected him.

The truth of the matter is that production has gone pretty well, except in the conversion of plants, and there the Government bumped head on into the selfish interests of big business, who refused to turn their hand unless they were forced to. The Army and Navy have been shortsighted and Congress has never seen the need of all-out production.

As far as I know the President is the only person in the whole crowd who, being sure we were going to get into the war sooner or later, was pushing the country, industry, the Army and the Navy harder and harder for all-out production.

As soon as Nelson and Wallace had left, the President told Steve Early to release the announcement, which appeared in the next morning's paper (this morning, January 14).

Two days later Hopkins added this:

In my conversation with Don Nelson immediately prior to his appointment (January 13) and, indeed, over a period of weeks when it became clear that Knudsen was not the man to run production during the war . . . it had occurred to me that the way to handle Knudsen, who had great standing with the American people and, indeed, great abilities, was to put him in the Army.

I suggested this once or twice to the President, but at that time he was not disposed to make the change. The evening of Nelson's appointment I had dinner with the President and told him that I thought it would be very difficult for Knudsen to work directly under Nelson, and that the simplest and best way out of the dilemma was to put Knudsen in charge of production in the Army and let him have nothing to do with procurement, but to be an expeditor in the great factories which had contracts with the War Department. Nelson had previously agreed to this.

I learned on the night of Nelson's appointment that Knudsen had taken it very badly; his feelings were hurt and he had told Jesse Jones he was going home. I urged Jones to do everything he could to induce Knudsen not to do this, for his own sake as well as for the President's. Nelson apparently saw Knudsen, too, that evening, and I learned the next day that Knudsen had pretty much changed his mind and had indicated he was ready to do anything the President wanted him to do.

At the same time it was clear the President had asked him to come down here and only the President could ask him to make a change. It seemed necessary that the Knudsen matter be settled at once.

I called Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of War, and asked him what he thought of putting Knudsen in the Army and he said he thought

extremely well of it. I asked him to clear it with Stimson and Marshall, which he promptly did.

On Thursday, January 15, I urged the President to handle the Knudsen matter promptly, because I learned that Knudsen was expecting a call from the President and everybody in town was wondering what was going to happen to him. The President agreed to see Knudsen on Friday and later arranged that Knudsen have lunch with him. The President asked me to join them at luncheon. I had been planning to go into the hospital that morning, but I postponed it until after luncheon.

I felt the President was not in his best form in dealing with Knudsen, although he was very kind and generous in his comments to Knudsen.

Knudsen was anxious to show the President what a good job he has done and gave him a lot of statistics showing the increase of production in a great many munitions of war between the time he came and the time he left.

It had been arranged that the President would offer him a job either as an officer or as a civilian. Knudsen had apparently been thinking about it, because I told Jesse Jones what was in the wind and he had explored it with Knudsen. Knudsen said he thought he could work more effectively as an officer. There was a good deal of banter about Knudsen in a uniform, but the luncheon ended with Knudsen saying he would do anything that the President wanted and accepting the appointment as Lieutenant General in the Army, in charge of production, to work under Patterson.

Churchill left for home on January 14, to face more criticism in the House of Commons than he had met at any previous time in the war. Serious defeats were multiplying not only in the Far East, but also in the Libyan Desert, where Rommel was now ready to push the British back for the second time over the line of advances made first by Wavell and then by General Sir Claude Auchinleck.

Hopkins wrote:

The last evening of Churchill's visit the President, Churchill, and I had dinner together.

During dinner we wound up the last details of the agreements relative to shipping, raw materials, and the allocation board. It was agreed that the text of these would not be given out, but at the appropriate time the President would release a general statement governing all of them. The President and Churchill initialled the several documents.

The President and Churchill reviewed together the work of the past three weeks and Churchill expressed not only his warm appreciation of the way he and his associates had been treated, but his confidence that

great steps had been taken towards unification of the prosecution of the war.

Churchill had not decided even then whether to fly from Bermuda or to go in a battleship. The President did not know until later that Churchill had actually flown to England.

They were supposed to leave at 8.45, but it was a quarter of ten before we got up from dinner and the President and I drove with Churchill to his train to Norfolk, Virginia. A special train had been put on the siding at Sixth Street.

The President said good-bye to Churchill in the car and I walked with him and put him on the train and said good-bye to him, Pound, and Portal.

On the way back, the President made it perfectly clear that he, too, was very pleased with the meetings. There was no question but that he grew genuinely to like Churchill, and I am sure Churchill equally liked the President.

Hopkins sent with the Prime Minister's party some presents for his friend 'Clemmie' (Mrs. Churchill) and a note in which he said:

You would have been quite proud of your husband on this trip. First because he was ever so good natured. I didn't see him take anybody's head off and he eats and drinks with his customary vigour, and still dislikes the same people. If he had half as good a time here as the President did having him about the White House he surely will carry pleasant memories of the past three weeks.

After which Hopkins went back to the Navy Hospital, understandably exhausted. He was a sick man, but he had four years more of life left in him, and they were four of the most tremendous years in history.